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ABSTRACT	
	
	
This	research	examines	issues	raised	by	social	media’s	depiction,	over	recent	years,	as	source	
of	 civic	 empowerment	 and	 radical	 socio-political	 change.	 The	 intensely	 publicized	 role	 of	
social	networking	sites	at	the	onset	of	the	2011	Arab	uprisings	has	served	to	support	at	times	
overly	 linear	 perspectives	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 new	media	 technologies	 and	 socio-
political	change.	Debates	in	the	field	have	been	limited	by	an	over-emphasis	on	strategic	and	
instrumental	 use	 of	 social	media	 by	 political	 and	 cyber-activists	 to	 achieve	 pre-determined	
political	 outcomes.	 Less	 is	 currently	 known	 about	 the	 perspectives,	 experiences	 and	
motivations	of	more	ordinary	users	as	they	learn	to	navigate	politicised	online	spaces	and	to	
participate	 in	the	production,	mediation	and	dissemination	of	content	on	social	media.	This	
research	 revisits	 Tunisia,	 the	 country	 where	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 first	 started,	 to	 provide	 an	
inter-disciplinary	exploration	and	contextualization	of	these	questions,	and	of	how	everyday	
social	media	practices	may	relate	to	users’	knowledge	of,	engagement	with,	and	participation	
in	 a	 shared	 public	 and	 political	 world.	 The	 study	 focuses	 on	 developments	 in	 the	 country	
between	January	2011	and	December	2013,	with	specific	focus	on	the	social	networking	site	
Facebook,	 as	 it	 dominates	 social	 media	 use	 in	 Tunisia	 during	 this	 transitional	 period.	 By	
juxtaposing	 qualitative	 analysis,	 quantitative	 elements,	 and	 a	 chronological	 dimension,	
research	 findings	 highlight	 the	 complexity	 of	 social	 media’s	 rapidly	 evolving	 role,	 from	
perceived	 source	 of	 civic	 empowerment,	 to	 contributor	 to	 social	 tensions	 and	 political	
polarization	in	the	country.	The	research	argues	that	the	communicative	conditions	provided	
by	social	media,	in	this	context,	facilitates	civic	encounters	and	political	communication,	but	
equally	that,	by	making	individual	and	collective	socio-political	identities	and	positions	more	
publicly	 visible	 and	 fixed,	 social	 media	 use	 also	 reinforces	 differences	 and	 undermines	
sociality,	 engendering	 complex	 negotiation	 processes	 and	 adaptive	 participative	 practices	
over	time.	
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INTRODUCTION	
	
	
In	January	2011,	Sihem,	Ahmed,	Sarra	and	numerous	other	Tunisians	posted	videos,	photos	
and	comments	on	their	Facebook	profiles,	connected	to	dozens	of	new	people	and	sources	in	
their	 online	 networks	 and	 spent	 most	 of	 their	 waking	 hours	 either	 participating	 in	 street	
protests	or	on	their	social	media	accounts	at	home.	Although	many	of	them	had	been	using	
social	 media1	 for	 years,	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 online	 activities	 radically	 changed	 during	 this	
period.	For	most	of	them,	this	was	the	first	time	in	their	life	that	they	were	openly	expressing	
their	views	and	positions	on	the	social	and	political	situation	in	their	country,	communicating	
their	dissent,	and	collectively	participating	in	the	production	and	dissemination	of	alternative	
representations	of	their	shared	wider	public	world.	
	
Sihem,	Ahmed	and	Sarra	do	not	know	each	other	and	their	lives	have	little	in	common.	At	the	
time	 of	 the	 revolution,	 Sihem	was	 a	 student	 in	 her	 early	 twenties	who	 loved	 Arab	 poetry,	
watched	 American	 television	 series	 on	 her	 flatmate’s	 laptop	 and	 was	 looking	 forward	 to	
spending	the	winter	holidays	at	her	parents’	in	the	North	Eastern	region	of	Kasserine.	Ahmed	
was	in	his	late	twenties,	a	father	of	two	who	worked	as	a	salesman	in	the	town	of	Sousse	and	
had	 found	 in	 religion	 a	 new	 balance	 in	 his	 life	 after	 years	 of	 a	 self-professed	 lifestyle	 of	
excessive	 drinking	 and	 partying.	 Sarra,	 who	 was	 also	 close	 to	 thirty,	 was	 an	 unemployed	
medical	graduate	who	had	recently	married,	and	lived	with	her	husband	in	the	capital	Tunis.	
	
None	of	them	were	political	activists,	and	their	knowledge	and	perception	of	their	common	
socio-political	world	was	 limited	by	 the	 strict	 censorship	 and	media	 control	 in	 the	 country.	
They	 were	 not	 used	 to	 discussing	 opinions	 outside	 of	 the	 occasional	 hushed	 exchange	
between	relatives	or	friends	in	private;	their	encounters	with	representations	of	the	Tunisian	
political	sphere	were	dominated	by	images	of	former	president	Ben	Ali,	whose	portraits	filled	
public	 spaces,	 and	 offered	 shopkeepers,	 taxi	 drivers	 and	 media	 outlets	 relative	 immunity	
from	trouble	with	the	police.	This	dissertation	follows	Sihem,	Ahmed,	Sarra	and	a	number	of	
other	 ordinary	 social	 media	 users	 in	 Tunisia	 as	 they	 discover,	 communicate	 about,	 and	
engage	with	the	new	socio-political	context	in	their	country	after	the	revolution.	
																																																						
1	The	term	‘social	media’	will	be	used	throughout	the	rest	of	this	work	as	a	shorthand	to	designate	commercial	social	networking	
sites	such	as	Facebook	and	Twitter	that	are	the	focus	of	this	study.	
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Since	 the	 start	 of	 the	 revolution	 in	 December	 2010,	 developments	 in	 Tunisia	 have	 been	
framed	by	a	number	of	competing	narratives.	The	country	was	first	hailed	as	the	birthplace	of	
Facebook	and	Twitter	revolutions,	and	of	democratisation	through	social	media	 in	the	Arab	
world	 (Howard	 and	Hussain,	 2011;	 Khamis	 and	Vaughn,	 2011;	 Shirky,	 2011;	 Radsch,	 2011).	
These	 techno-deterministic	 discourses	 were	 gradually	 -	 and	 rightly	 -	 countered	 with	more	
contextualised	and	historically-grounded	perspectives	that	highlighted	the	underlying	social,	
economic	and	political	factors	and	processes	leading	to	the	popular	movements	(e.g.	Aouragh	
and	 Alexander,	 2011;	 Lynch,	 2012;	 Fuchs,	 2012;	 Achcar	 2013;	 Zayani,	 2015).	 These	 further	
challenged	 the	 framing	 of	 populations	 in	 Arab	 countries	 as	 inherently	 passive	 and	mutely	
accepting	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	 for	 several	 generations,	 and	 pointed	 instead	 to	 an	 evolving	
civic	and	political	culture,	 to	alternative	 forms	of	 resistance	that	citizens	performed	 in	 their	
everyday	lives,	as	well	as	to	a	number	of	protest	attempts	that	preceded	the	2011	uprisings	
(the	specific	context	of	Tunisia	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	1).	
	
Despite	 these	more	nuanced	appraisals	of	 the	pre-revolutionary	 context,	 an	overly	positive	
narrative	of	 citizens’	emancipation	 from	oppression,	 and	of	 their	 relatively	 linear	 trajectory	
towards	 democracy,	 prevailed	 in	 post-revolution	 commentary.	 As	 the	 situation	 in	 other	
Arabic	speaking	countries	such	as	Libya,	Syria	and	Egypt	became	 increasingly	unstable	after	
the	political	upheavals	of	 the	 so-called	Arab	Spring,	Tunisia’s	 case	became	entrenched	as	a	
democratic	 exception	 among	 countries	 either	 sliding	 into	 civil	 conflict,	 or	 reverting	 to	
authoritarianism	 (Beau	and	 Lagarde,	 2014;	Ayari,	 2015;	Daoud,	 2015).	Although	 the	deadly	
attacks	against	tourists	in	Tunisia	in	March	and	June	2015	served	to	undermine	this	image	of	
the	 country,	 these	 events	 were	 swiftly	 repositioned	 within	 the	 narrative	 of	 a	 nascent	
democracy	at	war	with	 terror.	And	yet,	 the	post-revolution	period	 in	Tunisia	provides	a	 far	
more	mitigated	record	of	democratic	 transition,	one	marked	as	much	by	the	experience	of,	
and	experimentation	with,	new	civic,	social,	religious	and	political	freedoms,	as	by	a	context	
of	 continual	 social	 inequalities,	 economic	 uncertainties,	 political	 crises	 and	 rising	 violence.	
Similarly,	the	first	few	years	of	the	transitional	period	showed	mixed	results	 in	terms	of	the	
reform	 of	 institutional	 structures	 and	 political	 practices	 that	 served	 to	 sustain	 decades	 of	
centralised	and	opaque	decision-making	processes	and	abuses	of	power	(see	Chapters	1	and	
6).		
	
This	 context	 and	 the	 competing	 discourses	 and	 interests	 surrounding	 it,	 raise	 important	
questions	 about	 the	 role	 of	 symbolic	 and	 communicative	 resources	 available	 to	 citizens	 in	
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making	 sense	 and	 influencing	 their	 new	 socio-political	 reality.	 My	 own	 partially	 Tunisian	
background,	 and	my	 personal	 experience	 of	 frequently	 travelling	 between	 Tunisia	 and	 the	
United	 Kingdom	 and	 following	 a	 number	 of	Western	 and	Arabic	media	 outlets	 since	 2011,	
provided	me	with	a	particularly	acute	awareness	of	 the	competing	 forces	shaping	the	post-
revolution	 narrative,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 theory	 and	 practice	 of	
change.	 Having	 closely	 followed	 stages	 of	 the	 revolution	 period	 in	 Tunisia,	 I	 started	 the	
project	with	a	broad	question	in	mind.	Although	I	did	not	adhere	to	simplistic	perspectives	on	
Facebook	or	Twitter	 revolutions,	 I	was	 intrigued	by	 the	extraordinarily	politicised	nature	of	
communicative	content	on	social	media	during	this	period	in	Tunisia.	I	wondered	what	role	–	
if	 any	 –	 social	 media	 could	 continue	 to	 play	 after	 the	 revolution	 in	 relation	 to	 supporting	
political	involvement	and	a	political	culture	in	which	voice	–	the	“agency	to	represent	oneself	
and	 the	 right	 to	 express	 an	 opinion”	 (Tacchi,	 2012)	 –	 seemed	 to	 now	 be	 relevant.	 I	 was	
particularly	interested	in	assessing	those	social	media	dynamics	which	had	apparently	played	
a	crucial	role	in	informing,	coordinating	and	mobilising	a	number	of	Tunisian	protestors	at	the	
beginning	of	2011,	and	how	they	would	evolve	 in	a	 fractured,	pluralised	political	context	 in	
which	a	common	target	of	dissatisfaction	was	no	 longer	easily	definable.	Some	other	wide-
ranging	 questions	 also	 informed	 my	 initial	 approach	 to	 the	 project.	 Was	 a	 new	 form	 of	
politics	 emerging	 in	 Tunisia,	 and	 was	 this	 sustainable	 in	 the	 longer-term?	Would	 formerly	
politically	inactive	citizens	continue	to	use	social	media	in	their	everyday	lives	to	engage	with	
socio-political	issues	and	voice	their	opinions?	
	
Markham	 (2014)	 identifies	 –	 in	 his	 review	 of	 a	 literature	 on	 social	 media	 and	 the	 Arab	
uprisings	 -	 a	 teleological	 tendency	 to	 attribute	 political	 agency	 and	 progressive	 political	
spaces	to	social	media.	He	supports	a	reading	that	acknowledges	the	role	played	by	different	
social	media	platforms	during	the	Arab	uprisings,	but	warns	against	reading	too	much	or	too	
little	 into	 this.	 There	 is	 evidence	 of	 politically-oriented	 discourse	 as	 well	 as	 more	 trivial	
content	on	social	media.	Whilst	Markham	clarifies	that	non-political	content	is	not	necessarily	
apolitical	and	that	the	boundaries	that	separate	different	types	of	discourses	are	porous,	he	
argues	 that	 it	 would	 nevertheless	 be	 mistaken	 to	 differentiate	 social	 media	 content	 from	
other	 everyday	 discourses	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 and	 to	 presume	 that	 social	media	 platforms	
may	be	conducive	to	new	political	subjectivities.	He	critiques	academic	framings	that	tend	to	
associate	such	platforms	to	discourses	of	empowerment	and	liberation,	and	to	connect	such	
subjectivities	 to	 social	 media,	 rather	 than	 to	 changing	 contexts	 and	 gradual	 processes	
anchored	in	(always	already)	existing	structures	(Markham,	2014).	The	discourses	denounced	
by	Markham	can	also	be	seen	to	reflect	and	revive	a	“modernization	paradigm”	and	produce	
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“essentialising	 assumptions”	 about	 the	 Arab	 world,	 as	 Dina	 Matar	 points	 out	 (2012).	 The	
perception	 of	 political	 affairs	 in	 the	 region	 being	 fundamentally	 static	 was	 suddenly	
undermined,	 only	 to	 be	 reasserted	 under	 a	 “neo-developmentalist”	 (Thussu,	 2009,	 p.15)	
prism	 of	 new	 media’s	 purported	 positively	 destabilising	 effect	 on	 an	 otherwise	 passive,	
disempowered	or	under-achieving	‘other’.		
	
As	discussed,	the	prevalence	of	specific	framings	of	social	media’s	transformational	capacity	
in	the	Arab	world	need	to	be	overcome	in	favour	of	more	complex	reappraisals.	 In	order	to	
achieve	this,	a	grasp	of	how	such	discourses	are	constructed	and	sustained	 is	necessary.	To	
overcome	this,	Markham	contends	that	it	is	important	to	provide	more	historically-grounded	
analyses,	 in	which	 to	 inquire	 “how	politics	 is	 experienced	at	 the	 level	 of	 the	everyday	–	 as	
social	 as	 well	 as	 serious,	 laborious	 as	 well	 as	 creative,	 banal	 as	 well	 as	 imaginary”	 (2014,	
p.102).	
	
Social	media	cannot	be	singled	out	as	primary	contributor	to	the	development	of	alternative	
communicative	 dynamics	 during	 and	 after	 the	 revolution	 period.	 Assessing	 social	media	 in	
isolation	 risks	 reinforcing	 the	 “wall	 of	 idealism”	 (Horst	 and	 Miller,	 2012,	 p.8)	 that	
accompanies	much	 inquiry	 into	digital	media.	However,	 this	does	not	preclude	 focusing	on	
social	 media	 within	 a	 specific	 media	 ecology	 and	 wider	 context.	 Indeed,	 social	 media	 is	
worthy	of	 particular	 scrutiny	 because	 it	 provides	 geographically	 dispersed	 citizens	with	 the	
opportunity	to	mediate	their	own	representations	of	the	public	world	on	an	everyday	basis,	
to	 advance	 and	 negotiate	 their	 interpretations	 of	 the	 social	 and	 political	 order,	 and	 to	
digitally	 and	 collectively	 perform	 a	 new	 civic	 and	 political	 culture.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	marks	 a	
radical	shift	in	the	construction	of,	and	delineation	between,	private	and	public	space.	
	
This	dissertation	is	not	aimed	at	providing	a	comprehensive	assessment	of	the	revolution	or	
post-revolution	 period.	 Nor	 is	 it,	 per	 se,	 an	 analysis	 of	media’s	 contribution	 to	 democratic	
change.	It	does	not	adhere	to	any	singular	narrative	framing	of	these	developments	and	does	
not	 make	 any	 pre-determined	 claims	 about	 social	 media’s	 role.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 interested	 in	
understanding	 users’	 divergent	 experiences,	 practices,	 and	 reflections	 on	 social	 media’s	
provision	of	 a	 communicative	 space	within	 a	broader	 and	 changing	political	 context	 that	 is	
open	 to	 redefinition.	 Their	 reading	 of	 this	 space,	 of	 its	 influence,	 and	of	 its	 relation	 to	 the	
wider	world	 they	 imagine	as	 shared,	matters	not	because	 social	media	makes	a	difference,	
but	in	as	far	as	they	attribute	meaning	to	their	interactions	within	it.	The	thesis	thus	seeks	to	
assess,	through	the	perspectives	and	practices	of	the	sample	group,	the	political	dimensions	
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of	everyday	social	media	use	by	Tunisian	citizens	 in	this	setting,	between	January	2011	and	
December	 2013.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 it	 asks	what	 difference	 social	media	may	make	 to	 their	
relationship	with	 the	 shared	 public	 and	 political	 world	 they	 inhabit.	More	 specifically,	 it	 is	
concerned	with	 developing	 insights	 into	 social	media’s	 role	 in	 supporting	 the	 formation	 of	
public	knowledge	and	opinion	about	the	public	world	(and	their	place,	as	citizens,	within	it),	
and	 into	 the	engagement	with,	and	participation	 in,	 the	public	and	political	world	 linked	to	
this	knowledge.	
	
The	mediation	of	public	expression	on	social	media	infers	a	shift	in	paradigm	from	a	framing	
of	 symbolic	 power	 as	 primarily	 confined	 to	 the	 production	 and	 large-scale	 distribution	 of	
representations	 of	 the	 public	 world	 by	 the	 media,	 to	 alternative	 perspectives	 that	 can	
account	 for	seemingly	 less	hierarchical	and	more	diffuse	 forms	of	networked	power	online,	
whilst	 also	 taking	 into	 account	 how	 these	 relate	 to	 wider	 political,	 economic,	 social	 and	
media	contexts.	As	Fenton	(2012)	stresses:	
	
While	 social	 networking	 forces	 us	 to	 recognise	 the	 destabilisation	 of	 the	 producer	 and	 the	
consumer	and	the	blurring	of	the	social	and	political	public	spheres,	to	be	fully	understood	it	
must	be	considered	contextually	(p.142).	
	
A	 number	 of	 approaches	 have	 emerged	 in	 recent	 years	 to	 address	 these	 shifts,	 but	 it	
continues	 to	 be	 an	 area	 in	 need	 of	 further	 exploration.	 This	 thesis	 resultantly	 taps	 into	
debates	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 political	 theory,	 media	 sociology	 and	 anthropology	 on	 the	
transformative	 characteristics	 of	 networked	 communications.	 I	 query	 in	 particular	 the	
multiple	 theoretical	 personas	 that	 the	 social	 media	 user	 embodies	 as	 engaged	 citizen,	
participant	in	and	through	media,	member	of	a	wider	public,	media	producer	and	distributor,	
member	of	an	audience	as	well	as	online	witness	of	the	self-representations	of	other	citizens.	
Social	media	users	 shape	 a	 representation	of	 themselves	 and	 their	 relation	 to	 their	 shared	
public	world	through	their	social	media	practices	and,	vice	versa,	the	meanings	they	attach	to	
these	 practices	 are	 in	 turn	 constructed	 in	 and	 through	 such	 representations,	 and	 through	
individual	as	well	as	collective	identity	performances.	A	shift	is	consequently	necessary	away	
from	 the	 familiar	 framing	 of	 media	 audiences	 (news	 audiences	 in	 particular)	 and	 their	
engagement	 in	 interpretive	 activities,	 to	 embracing	 alternative	 approaches	 that	 capture	
social	media	users	engaged	in	“audiencing”	activities	(Fiske,	1992),	as	well	as	participants	 in	
the	 production	 and	 distribution	 of	 media	 content	 and	 in	 the	 symbolic	 construction	 of	
particular	representations	and	meanings	as	more	legitimate	than	others	within	a	given	socio-
political	order.		
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New	 media	 has	 challenged	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘audience’,	 previously	 widely	 applied	 in	
relation	to	mass	media.	Whereas	some	have	considered	the	term	obsolete	in	the	new	media	
age	(e.g.	Rosen,	2006),	others	have	contended	that	the	term	poorly	fits	the	“variety	of	modes	
of	engagement”	with	new	media	(Lievrouw	and	Livingstone,	2002,	p.10)	that	extend	beyond	
what	audiences	were	 traditionally	understood	 to	consist	of,	or	 to	 ‘do’	 in	 relation	 to	media.	
Instead	the	term	 ‘user’	has	been	privileged	to	better	capture	 the	diversity	of	activities,	and	
the	 turn	 to	 more	 active	 engagement,	 rendered	 possible	 by	 new	 media.	 Nevertheless,	 as	
Carpentier	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 contend,	 ‘user’	 is	 also	 problematic,	 because	 it	 tends	 to	 stress	 the	
distinctive	 (and	 seemingly	 mutually	 exclusive)	 character	 of	 audiences	 and	 users,	 and	 their	
respective	 association	 with	 (negatively-framed)	 passivity	 and	 (positively-framed)	 activity.	
Furthermore,	 as	 they	 highlight,	 this	 shift	 in	 terminology	 also	 intensifies	 the	 somewhat	
artificial	distinction	between	offline	space	(characterised	by	mass	media	reception	activities)	
and	 online	 space	 (that	 of	 user	 participation),	 which	 often	 results	 in	 commentators	 either	
dismissing	online	reception,	or	leaving	the	issue	under-explored.	
	
In	this	thesis,	 I	adopt	the	term	‘user’	 in	relation	to	social	media,	but	 I	 take	 into	account	the	
important	points	raised	above	and	I	employ	the	term	in	its	broader	sense	that	seeks	to	take	
into	account,	as	Lievrouw	and	Livingstone	note	(2002),	the	“variety	of	modes	of	engagement	
with	new	media”	(p.10).	I	also	seek	to	avoid	the	stark	contrast	between	activity	and	passivity,	
online	 and	 offline,	 and	 reception	 and	 participation.	 Instead,	 the	 thesis	 explores	 different	
facets	of	these	activities	and	the	meanings	that	‘users’	(for	want	of	a	better	word)	associate	
with,	 and	 attach	 to,	 them.	 Furthermore,	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	
difference	in	audiencehood	and/or	usage	that	the	online	environment	may	give	rise	to,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 explore	 these	 activities	 within	 a	 given	 and	 wider	 context,	 as	 well	 as	 to	
contextualise	different	activities	undertaken	online	in	relation	to	each	other.	
	
Paralleling	this	approach,	I	have	devised	an	empirical	methodology	that	aims	to	capture	the	
communicative	content	 that	 social	media	users	produce	and	are	exposed	 to,	as	well	as	 the	
evolving	meanings	they	attach	to	their	media	practices	and	to	their	position	as	citizens	in	the	
post-revolution	Tunisian	context.	To	achieve	this,	I	conducted	two	sets	of	interviews	with	the	
same	 sample	of	 Tunisian	 social	media	users	 at	 different	points	 in	 time	during	 the	 research	
period.	Additionally,	 I	have	assessed	the	social	media	content	they	produced	on	their	social	
media	profiles,	and	undertaken	a	content	analysis	of	a	sample	of	publicly	accessible	Facebook	
pages	 they	 interact	 with.	 A	 total	 of	 thirty	 participants	 were	 recruited	 for	 this	 study.	 My	
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strategy	has	been	to	prioritise	access	to	social	media	users	who,	like	Sihem,	Ahmed	and	Sarra	
(referenced	above)	had	limited	experience,	prior	to	the	revolution,	of	expressing	their	socio-
political	opinions	‘publicly’.	Within	this	criteria,	I	sought	a	variety	of	levels	of	civic	and	political	
involvement	 post-revolution,	 of	 ages,	 and	 of	 socio-political	 identifications	 within	 the	
increasingly	 polarised	 transitional	 period,	 between	 the	 beginning	 of	 2011	 and	 the	 end	 of	
2013.	These	 included	government	 supporters	and	opponents,	as	well	 as	 those	who	did	not	
find	 in	 either	 position	 a	 point	 of	 reference.	 My	 sampling	 approach	 prioritised	 the	
achievement	of	 this	 range	of	perspectives	and	everyday	social	media	practices,	placing	 less	
emphasis	 on	 political	 and	 cyber-activists	 whose	 use	 of	 social	 media	 was	 arguably	 more	
strategic,	 being	 aimed	 at	 the	 achievement	 of	 pre-defined	 political	 goals	 (a	 point	 further	
elaborated	in	Chapter	2).	
	
	
OUTLINE	OF	CHAPTERS	
	
	
The	discussion	above	highlighted	several	problematic	issues	and	shortcomings	with	a	number	
of	 recent	 academic	 perspectives	 and	 empirical	 explorations	 of	 questions	 relating	 to	 the	
correlation	 between	 social	 media	 and	 socio-political	 change.	 Whilst	 adopting	 a	 broadly	
chronological	structure,	the	remainder	of	this	thesis	will	seek	to	account	for	the	issues	raised.	
Expressly,	it	will	address	the	need	to	set	social	media’s	usage	within	local	political	and	media	
contexts;	to	differentiate	between	-	as	well	as	juxtapose	-	different	types	of	activity	enabled	
by	social	media	 (media	reception	and	production	 in	particular);	and	to	provide	 insights	 into	
social	 media	 practices	 within	 longer-term	 historical	 processes	 and	 an	 evolving	 political	
culture.	This	approach	is	outlined	in	more	detail	below.	
	
Chapter	 1	 provides	 a	 broad	 overview	 of	 the	 historical	 and	 political	 background	 of	 Tunisia	
since	 its	 independence	 from	 French	 colonial	 rule	 in	 1956.	 It	 highlights	 the	 complex	
imbrication	of	factors	that	formed	the	basis	of	a	rise	in	social	and	political	contention	in	the	
years	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 revolution	 movement	 of	 2010/11.	 The	 chapter	 also	 examines	 the	
backdrop	of	ideological	and	political	outcomes	that	were	to	mark	the	early	transitional	phase	
that	this	thesis	focuses	on.	Most	importantly,	in	terms	of	the	objective	of	the	thesis,	it	charts	
the	development	of	the	media	landscape	in	relation	to	the	unfolding	socio-political	scene	of	
the	country,	 in	order	to	contextualise,	 in	particular,	digital	media’s	evolving	role	before	and	
after	the	revolution.	
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Chapter	2	discusses	the	methodological	approach	to	the	empirical	study,	which	is	based	on	a	
constructionist	 epistemological	 perspective,	 and	 inspired	 by	 the	 turn	 to	 practice	 theory	 in	
media	studies.	It	further	explores	the	ambiguities	relating	to	researching	online	phenomena,	
and	 discusses	 the	 adequacy	 of	 ethnographically-inspired	 terminology	 and	 methodological	
elements	in	this	regard.	The	chapter	argues	for	the	importance,	in	the	context	of	this	study,	
of	accounting	 for	 the	perspectives	of	ordinary	social	media	users	and	 their	everyday	media	
practices,	rather	than	more	strategic	activist	use,	which	has	been	over-emphasised	 in	social	
media	 research	 relating	 to	 political	 questions.	 The	 chapter	 further	 discusses	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 research	 and	 the	 challenges	 encountered	 in	 adapting	 to	 a	 rapidly-
evolving	research	setting.	
	
Chapter	3	explores	the	shift	to	politicised	social	media	usage	during	the	revolution	by	starting	
with	an	assessment	of	study	participants’	recollections	and	reflections	on	their	media	habits	
before	 this	 turning	 point.	 By	 drawing	 parallels	 with	 explorations	 of	 media’s	 role	 in	 other	
countries	with	 an	 authoritarian	 system	of	 government,	 the	 chapter	 highlights	 the	 different	
sociological	 and	 political	 dimensions	 to	media	 consumption	 in	 a	 heavily	 censored	 national	
media	landscape	that	lacks	credibility	among	the	general	public,	and	it	further	delineates	the	
consequently	 ambiguous	 positions	 that	 audiences	 frequently	 develop	 in	 relation	 to	 media	
and	 news	 consumption	 habits.	 This	 exploration	 serves	 as	 an	 important	 background	 to	
understanding	new	media	practices	under	authoritarian	or	illiberal	forms	of	government.	The	
assessment	 further	 supports	 the	 analysis	 and	 its	 conclusions,	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	
chapter,	 of	 the	 radical	 changes	 to	 media	 practices	 which	 occurred	 during	 the	 revolution	
period,	from	which	a	highly	politicised	social	media	space	emerged	after	the	revolution.	
	
Chapter	 4	 joins	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 enquiry	 into	 media’s	 role	 in	 supporting	 public	
knowledge	and	opinion	formation,	and	the	questions	that	arise	in	relation	to	these	dynamics	
in	 the	age	of	 social	media.	The	chapter	 focuses	 this	exploration	around	 the	post-revolution	
period	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2012.	 It	 discusses	 in	 detail	what	 it	means,	 for	 the	 participants,	 to	 be	
informed	in	this	drastically	transformed	political	and	media	landscape,	and	what	their	media	
exposure	to	offline	and	online	media	sources	-	and	their	media	habits	–	are	informed	by,	in	a	
context	marked	by	the	multiplicity	of	representations	and	interpretations	of	the	public	world.	
Social	media’s	role	within	these	processes	emerges	as	particularly	central.	
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Chapter	5	considers	in	turn	questions	of	media	and	participation	in	theory	and	practice.	It	is	
interested	 in	 assessing	 how	 this	 knowledge	 relates	 to	 involvement	 in	 political	 participation	
offline,	as	well	as	in	mediated	participation	on	social	media.	Furthermore,	it	explores	the	new	
opportunities	 provided	 by	 social	 media	 for	 public	 and	 political	 communication	 and	
interaction,	and	queries	their	participative	dimension.	Similarly	to	the	previous	chapter,	 the	
empirical	dimension	of	this	chapter	focuses	on	these	questions	in	the	transitional	context	at	
the	 end	 of	 2012.	 It	 approaches	 these	 questions	 with	 a	 particularly	 broad	 framing	 of	 what	
participation	may	entail,	and	it	is	concerned	in	particular	with	examining	social	media	users’	
own	perspectives	on,	and	experiences	of,	different	participatory	activities	and	their	expected	
outcomes.	
	
Chapter	 6	 outlines	 developments	 in	 the	 political	 situation	 and	 in	 the	 media	 landscape	 in	
Tunisia	 in	2013.	 It	describes	 the	 increasing	socio-political	and	 ideological	polarisation	 in	 the	
country,	divisions	 starkly	 reflected	on	 social	media.	 The	 chapter	 then	 revisits	 the	questions	
assessed	in	the	previous	two	chapters.	 It	empirically	explores	changes	in	media	–	and	social	
media	–	practices	one	year	after	the	 initial	 research	was	undertaken.	The	chapter	contrasts	
content	 reception	 and	 production/distribution	 activities	 on	 social	 media,	 and	 the	 relation	
between	changes	in	these	activities	and	the	evolution	of	the	political	situation	in	Tunisia.		
	
The	 thesis	 conclusion	 revisits	 the	 research	 question	 in	 light	 of	 these	 different	 findings,	
stressing	 the	complexity	of	 the	dynamics	at	play	and	 the	continually	evolving	nature	of	 the	
meanings	constructed	in	relation	to	social	media	practices	in	this	context.	
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CHAPTER	1	
	
THE	TUNISIAN	REVOLUTION	IN	CONTEXT	
	
	
This	 chapter	 delves	 more	 deeply	 into	 the	 Tunisian	 context,	 outlining	 some	 key	 recent	
historical	and	political	 turning	points	and	examining	 the	media	 landscape	that	has	arisen	 in	
conjunction	 with	 these	 developments.	 It	 sketches	 out	 the	 political	 background	 to	 the	
revolution,	in	which	nearly	five	decades	of	largely	authoritarian	rule	shaped	Tunisian	citizens’	
relationship	with	 the	 public	 and	 political	 realm,	 and	 briefly	 looks	 at	 the	 country's	 complex	
relationship	 with	 the	 colonial	 period,	 under	 French	 rule,	 against	 which	 different	
conceptualisations	of	socio-political	 life	evolved	(Voll,	1997).	 In	the	aftermath	of	decades	of	
close	 control	 and	 censorship	 of	 the	 public	 realm,	 the	 ambiguities	 and	 contradictions	
accompanying	these	issues	became	central	to	the	social	and	political	contentions	during	the	
initial	post-revolution	phase	that	this	research	explores.	
	
	
1. The	Bourguiba	era	
	
1.1. The	complex	foundations	of	political	culture	and	modernisation	post-independence	
	
Tunisia	is	a	small	country	compared	to	its	immediate	North	African	neighbours	-	Algeria	and	
Libya	 -	 with	 a	 fairly	 cohesive	 territory,	 and	 relatively	 homogenous	 ethnic	 and	 religious2	
demographics.	 Although	 possessing	 limited	 natural	 resources,	 it	 occupies	 a	 strategically	
important	 position	 –	 it	 is	 close	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 Mediterranean	 basin,	 and	 is	 the	
northernmost	tip	of	the	African	landmass.		At	its	closest	point,	it	is	less	than	a	hundred	miles	
from	Sicily.	Throughout	its	eventful	history,	 its	territory	successively	fell	under	the	influence	
and	 control	 of	 various	 foreign	 powers3.	 The	 last	 of	 these	 colonial	 rulers	 was	 France,	 who	
governed	 the	 country	 as	 a	 French	 protectorate	 between	 1881	 and	 1956.	 Although	 French	
colonial	 rule	arguably	 left	a	 less	overtly	 traumatic	 legacy	 than	 that	of	neighbouring	Algeria,	
the	 experience	 nevertheless	 continues	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 shaping	 contemporary	 national	
																																																						
2	The	population	is	ninety-nine	per	cent	Sunni	Muslim	(US	State	Department,	2012).	
3	See	for	example	Cherif	(1975)	for	a	detailed	summary;	Laroui	(1977),	Naylor	(2009)	for	more	in-depth	explorations.	
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identities	and	the	 fragile	balance	between	traditional	and	modern	discourses	which	exist	 in	
the	country	(Perkins,	2004;	Willis,	2012).		
	
Habib	 Bourguiba	 was	 a	 key	 figure	 in	 securing	 Tunisia's	 independence	 and	 establishing	 the	
foundations	 of	 its	 first	 republic,	 proclaimed	 in	 1957.	 As	 the	 country’s	 first	 president,	 he	
initially	 enjoyed	 a	 relatively	 high	 degree	 of	 popular	 approval	 and	 was	 regarded	 by	 many	
Tunisians	 as	 national	 hero,	 an	 image	 increasingly	 honed	 and	 developed	 in	 later	 years	
(Krichen,	 1992).	 A	 charismatic	 leader	 who	 frequently	 addressed	 the	 nation	 through	 public	
broadcasts	 (in	 his	 first	 years	 in	 office	 this	 took	 the	 form	 of	 a	 weekly	 radio	 broadcast),	 he	
embarked	 on	 a	 political	 project	 that	 sought	 to	 integrate	 a	 Western-inspired	 ideology	 of	
progress	and	rationality	with	elements	of	a	more	 traditional	Tunisian	 identity.	His	objective	
was	to	lay	the	foundations	of	a	modern	and	secular	-	yet	religiously	anchored	–	state	that	was	
to	 define	what	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 Tunisian	 specificity	 (Ghorbal,	 2012)	 or	 Tunisian-style	
secularisation4	 (Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	 2015,	 p.18).	 Among	 his	 priorities	 were	 the	 country’s	
economic	development,	improving	access	to	education5,	and	supporting	women's	rights.	The	
latter	 aims	 were	 partly	 achieved	 through	 what	 has	 often	 been	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 his	 most	
significant	 legacies;	 the	promulgation,	within	 the	 first	 few	months	of	 independence,	 of	 the	
“code	 du	 statut	 personnel”,	 a	 set	 of	 emancipatory	 laws	 that	 ranged	 from	 the	 abolition	 of	
polygamy,	to	the	extensive	reform	of	the	country’s	divorce	 laws,	providing	Tunisian	women	
with	rights	unequalled	in	the	rest	of	the	Arab	world	(Murphy,	2007).	
	
The	 fragile	 boundaries	 between	 markers	 of	 traditional	 authenticity	 and	 the	 modernising	
reforms	that	Bourguiba	sought	 to	 rapidly	 implement	were	also	a	source	of	 tension,	as	 they	
called	for	a	radical	break	with	the	past	(Siino,	2004).	His	authoritarian	programme	of	reform	
and	 secularisation	 (see	 Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	 2015,	 p-16-20)	 was	 perceived	 by	 part	 of	 the	
population,	eager	to	demarcate	itself	from	former	colonial	authority,	as	a	Western-influenced	
imposition	by	a	French-educated	leader.	The	changes	were	seen	by	this	group	as	not	attuned	
to	 the	 country's	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 religious	 makeup	 (Willis,	 2012).	 Opinions	 about	
Bourguiba’s	legacy	were	–	and	are	-	consequently	ambiguous	and	divided,	as	the	discourses	
of	modernisation,	secularisation,	national	identity,	and	of	paternalistic	authoritarianism	were	
closely	 imbricated,	 reflecting	 the	 complex	 ideological	 and	 sociological	 anchoring	of	political	
culture	in	this	context	(Voll,	1997).	Emblematic	of	this	issue	is	an	often	cited	photograph	from	
the	fifties,	portraying	the	president	removing	the	traditional	Tunisian	‘sefseri’	veil	of	a	woman	
																																																						
4	Translated	from	French	“sécularisation	à	la	Tunisienne”	
5	Less	than	a	third	of	children	were	schooled	when	Bourguiba	came	to	power	(Timoumi,	2008).					
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on	 the	 street	 (see	 for	 example	 Borsali,	 2012,	 p.222-223),	 an	 image	 that	 continues	 to	 be	 a	
point	 of	 reference	 and	 disagreement,	 being	 regarded	 by	 some	 as	 symbolising	 an	
emancipation	 from	 constrictive	 and	 repressive	 cultural	 norms,	 and	 by	 others	 as	 a	 forcible	
attack	on	Tunisian	identity	and	values.	
	
Bourguiba’s	ability	 to	 institute	drastic	 reforms	rested	 in	 large	part	on	 the	highly	centralised	
nature	 of	 political	 power	 that	 he	 established	 within	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 his	 rule.	 This	 was	
achieved	 essentially	 by	 cumulating	 executive	 and	 legislative	 powers,	 making	 the	 very	
existence	 of	 political	 opposition	 contingent	 on	 the	 consent	 of	 his	 party,	 the	 PSD	 (Part	
socialiste	Destourien,	known	until	1964	as	the	‘Néo-Destour6’),	and	thereby	turning	it	from	a	
“party	 in	 power”	 to	 the	 “party	of	 power”	 (Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.17).	 This	 enabled	a	
number	 of	 important	 social	 and	 economic	 advances	 that	 may,	 arguably,	 have	 been	 more	
difficult	to	implement	at	such	speed	under	less	centralised	and	hierarchical	power	dynamics.	
For	 instance,	 this	 resulted	 by	 the	 eighties	 in	 the	 highest	 life	 expectancy	 of	 the	 Maghreb	
region,	the	lowest	fertility	rate,	and	the	highest	primary	schooling	rate	(Muenz,	2012,	p.242-
244).	 However,	 on	 a	 political	 level	 Bourguiba’s	 three	 decades	 in	 power	 (1956-1987)	 were	
marked	 by	 the	 limitations	 of	 what	 the	 profound	 contradiction	 of	 his	 authoritarian	
emancipatory	 project	 inevitably	 engendered,	 what	 Camau	 (1987,	 p.39)	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
inadequacy	of	seeking	to	reform	society	 through	“passive	citizenship”.	 Indeed,	whereas	 the	
opening	 of	 the	 socio-political	 space	 underwent	 fluctuating	 cycles	 during	 this	 period,	 party	
politics	was	severely	impeded.	Between	1963	and	1981,	no	opposition	party	was	allowed	to	
exist	at	all	(Chouikha,	2004,	p.343).	A	level	of	political	pluralism	was	later	conceded	in	1981	
by	 a	 president	 under	 pressure,	 but	 only	within	 restrictive	 parameters,	 and	 over	which	 the	
ruling	party	 continued	 to	exert	an	 important	 influence	 (ibid).	 The	 increasingly	authoritarian	
character	of	 the	 regime	was	perhaps	made	most	explicit	 in	1975	with	 the	passing	of	 a	 law	
enabling	Bourguiba	to	be	proclaimed	president	for	life.	
	
1.2. The	limits	of	economic	reform	and	rise	in	social	contention	
	
The	1970s	witnessed	the	progressive	shifting	and	centring	of	main	political	opposition	to	and	
around	 alternative,	 non-party,	 structures	 -	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 the	 circumscribing	 of	
conventional	 party-based	 political	 activity.	 The	 workers’	 union	 UGTT	 (Union	 Générale	 des	
Travailleurs	 Tunisiens)	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 the	 human	 rights	 league	 LTDH	 (League	
Tunisienne	des	Droits	de	l’Homme)	were	the	most	significant	of	these	groupings.	The	rise	of	
																																																						
6	‘Destour’	means	constitution	in	Arabic.		
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the	 UGTT	 was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 rapidly	 changing	 economic	 context:	 Whereas	 the	 first	
decade	of	Bourguiba’s	rule	was	marked	by	heavy	state	interventionism,	the	nationalisation	of	
key	sectors	of	the	economy7	as	well	as	a	set	of	ultimately	unsuccessful	socialist	policies	(see	
Perkins,	 2004,	p.130-156),	 the	 seventies	were	a	period	of	 exponential	 growth	 spurred	by	a	
(relatively)	more	economically	liberal	approach.	Although	the	public	sector	continued	to	play	
an	 important	 role	 as	 key	 investor	 and	 employer,	 the	 economy	became	 increasingly	 geared	
towards	private	as	well	as	foreign	investment8.		
	
Despite	improved	GDP	growth	rates,	a	result	of	rapid	and	intense	industrialisation	during	this	
period9,	 unemployment	was	 relatively	 high	 at	 approximately	 fifteen	 per	 cent	 (World	 Bank,	
2014)	due	to	demographic	pressures	as	well	as	to	the	nature	of	the	opportunities	on	offer,	as	
they	 mostly	 consisted	 of	 low-skilled	 work,	 providing	 low	 wages	 and	 limited	 long-term	
prospects.	 Relatedly,	 more	 tangible	 regional	 and	 social	 inequalities	 started	 to	 become	
apparent	with	these	changes	as	economic	development	predominantly	benefited	the	coastal	
areas	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 interior	 regions.	 Simultaneously,	 rapid	 urbanisation	 also	
contributed	to	very	high	urban	and	youth	unemployment	levels	that	were	as	much	as	three	
times	the	average	national	rate	(Perkins,	2004,	p.120).	By	the	end	of	the	1970s,	the	UGTT’s	
growing	 influence	 culminated	 in	 the	 first	 general	 strike	 of	 the	 republic	 in	 January	 1978,	
ending	in	violent	clashes	with	police	in	which	between	fifty	and	two	hundred10	protestors	lost	
their	lives	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.28).	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	violent	suppression	of	
the	protests	at	the	time	was	orchestrated	by	the	Director	General	of	National	Security	Zine	El	
Abidine	 Ben	 Ali,	 who	 was	 to	 subsequently	 rise	 through	 the	 ranks	 to	 become	 the	 next	
president	 of	 the	 Republic	 (Perkins,	 2004,	 p.170),	 and	 ultimately	 be	 ousted	 during	 the	
revolution.		
	
The	 regime	 became	 increasingly	 beset	 by	 crises	 in	 the	 eighties	 as	 the	 country’s	 economic	
situation	 deteriorated,	 social	 movements	 increasingly	 demanded	 more	 autonomy,	 and	 a	
vicious	political	power	struggle	over	the	succession	of	the	ageing	president	began.	Economic	
development	 slowed	 in	 the	 eighties	 and	 the	 economy’s	 level	 of	 dependence	 on	 the	 public	
sector	 continued	 to	be	 relatively	high.	Public	 expenditure	was	 spiralling	out	of	 control	 as	 a	
result	of	inefficient	public	investments	and	expenditure	on	substantial	food	subsidies,	leading	
to	an	unsustainable	budget	deficit	(Alexander,	2010,	p.79).	The	economic	difficulties	faced	by	
																																																						
7	This	included	the	nationalization	of	companies,	institutions	and	land	formerly	in	the	hands	of	the	French.	
8	Over	five	hundred	foreign-owned	factories	were	established	in	Tunisia	within	four	years	(1973-1977)	(Perkins,	2004,	p,160).	
9	Average	annual	real	GDP	growth	of	seven	and	a	half	per	cent	between	1970	and	1979	(IMF,	2016).	
10	Numbers	remain	disputed.	
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the	country	at	this	time	led	to	the	repeated	intervention	of	the	International	Monetary	Fund	
and	 the	 World	 Bank,	 whose	 financial	 support	 was	 contingent	 on	 the	 government’s	
implementation	 of	 drastic	 structural	 reforms	 and	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 state	 spending.	
These	 included	 the	 elimination	 of	 state	 subsidies	 on	 a	 number	 of	 basic	 ingredients,	 which	
resulted	 in	 1984	 in	 the	 ‘bread	 riots’,	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 social	 unrest	 of	 the	
Bourguiba	era,	as	bread	prices	doubled	overnight.		
	
1.3. Cycles	of	repression	and	relaxation	of	the	political	and	public	realm	
	
Whilst	not	formally	recognised,	influential	parties	and	ideological	movements	emerged	out	of	
this	context,	which	were	met	with	a	 level	of	 tolerance.	Notably,	during	 the	early	 seventies,	
political	 Islamism	 started	 to	 emerge	 as	 a	 coherent	movement	 out	 of	 a	 backdrop	 in	 which	
modernising	post-colonial	political	discourse	was	exhausted,	and	Pan-Arabism’	fall	from	grace	
had	been	accelerated	by	the	defeat	by	Israel	of	an	Arab	military	coalition	in	1967	(Hermassi	
1984,	p.40).	In	particular,	this	period	witnessed	the	early	steps	of	what	was	to	later	become	
the	 MTI	 party11	 (Movement	 de	 la	 Tendance	 Islamique),	 led	 by	 Rached	 Ghannouchi	 and	
Abdelfattah	 Mourou.	 The	 government	 initially	 turned	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 the	 development	 of	
Islamism	as	it	was	considered	as	a	useful	counterweight	to	the	appeal	of	the	political	left	and	
the	 influence	 of	 the	 UGTT	 union	 (Chouikha	 and	 Geisser,	 2015,	 p.31).	 However,	 the	
movement’s	development	became	more	problematic	 for	 the	regime	over	 the	course	of	 the	
1980s,	 as	 the	 MTI	 became	 increasingly	 popular,	 attracting	 both	 the	 economically	
disenfranchised	as	well	as	proponents	of	a	more	traditional,	religiously-and-morally	inspired	
national	identity	discourse,	a	growing	popularity	on	which	the	movement	sought	to	capitalise	
in	1981	by	seeking	to	become	a	formally	recognised	political	actor.		
	
Notwithstanding	 the	 centralised	 and	 authoritarian	 character	 of	 Bourguiba’s	 regime,	 the	
media	sphere	was	not	as	closed	as	was	to	later	be	the	case	under	Ben	Ali.	There	were	regular	
phases	of	political	 openness,	 followed	by	a	 return	 to	 the	 status	quo	of	 tighter	 government	
control	of	public	space	and	discourse.	While	state-owned	broadcasting	and	print	publications	
served	 as	 the	 voice	 of	 the	 regime12	 and	 propaganda	 for	 a	 president	 who	was	 increasingly	
losing	 touch	 with	 his	 people	 (Zalila,	 2004),	 a	 number	 of	 newspapers	 with	 connections	 to	
opposition	 parties	were	 permitted	 to	 publish	 some	 critical	material,	 particularly	 during	 the	
																																																						
11	Established	in	1981	as	the	MTI	(French	name)	or	Harakat	al-Ittijah	al-Islami	(Arabic	name),	and	renamed	in	1987	as	Ennahdha.	
The	movement	was	 originally	 inspired	 by	 the	 Egyptian	Muslim	 Brotherhood	 as	well	 as	 by	 the	 Iranian	 revolution	movement,	
although	it	did	not	fully	adhere	to	the	latter’s	ideology	(see	Perkins,	2004,	p.166).	
12	State-owned	media	outlets	included	the	Tunisian	radio	and	television,	established	in	the	first	decade	after	independence,	as	
well	as	newspapers	Assabah,	La	Presse	and	Le	Temps,	and	magazine	Réalités	(further	details	can	be	found	in	Hostrup	Haugbølle,	
2013).	
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eighties	when	a	level	of	political	pluralism	was	enforced	by	the	opposition13.	However,	most	
publications	were	operating	under	difficult	circumstances,	with	 limited	 resources	and	being	
regularly	 subjected	 to	 political	 pressures	 that	 adversely	 affected	 their	 printing	 schedules,	
financing	 or	 distribution	 (Chouikha,	 2004,	 p.348-351).	 Its	 popularity	 and	 legitimacy	 having	
been	eroded	over	time,	the	regime	fluctuated	between	allowing	a	degree	of	free	expression,	
and	heavy-handed	censorship	of	the	opposition’s	publications	in	order	to	quell	dissent	and	to	
maintain	 its	 grip	 on	 power.	 As	 Chouikha	 (ibid)	 notes,	 although	 it	 was	 difficult	 at	 times	 for	
political	 commentators	 to	 identify	with	clarity	what	 they	could	or	 could	not	write14,	overall	
the	expression	of	critical	stances	on	a	wide	range	of	social	and	political	issues	was	tolerated,	
and	this	enabled	the	development	of	a	relatively	vibrant	media	sphere	in	the	eighties.	
	
The	eighties	became	increasingly	marked	by	intense	power	struggles	in	which	the	two	main	
opposition	forces,	the	UGTT	union	and	the	Islamist	party	MTI,	experienced,	in	turn,	cycles	of	
repression	and	a	 relaxation	of	 restrictions,	a	divisive	strategy	aimed	at	 isolating	each	group	
and	 undermining	 their	 influence	 (Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	 2015).	 For	 instance,	 the	 growing	
influence	of	 the	MTI	 lead	 to	a	wave	of	 repression	 in	1981	 that	 included	 the	 rejection	of	 its	
request	to	be	officially	recognised	as	a	political	party,	the	imprisonment	of	its	leadership,	and	
banning	 women	 from	 wearing	 the	 Islamic	 headscarf	 (hijab)	 in	 government	 offices15.	
Paralleling	this,	government	relations	with	the	UGTT	improved	during	this	period	and	a	level	
of	 political	 opening	 was	 signalled	 through	 the	 organisation	 of	 early	 legislative	 elections.	
However,	 this	 precarious	 balance	worsened	 during	 the	 eighties	 and	 the	 union	 became	 the	
target	of	 renewed	 repression,	whilst	 the	 imprisoned	 Islamist	 leadership	benefited	 from	 the	
issuing	 of	 presidential	 pardons	 in	 1984.	 Although	 the	 Islamist	 party	 was	 still	 not	 officially	
recognised,	it	was	allowed	to	gain	influence,	in	particular	through	its	powerful	student	union	
at	 universities.	 However,	 the	 non-legalisation	 of	 the	 party	 slowly	 led	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 a	more	
violent	 Islamist	 faction,	 further	 bolstered	 by	 renewed	 suppression	 of	 Islamist	 protests	 at	
universities.	This	 cycle	of	violence	culminated	 in	 the	summer	of	1987	with	bomb	attacks	 in	
four	hotels	in	the	tourist	town	of	Sousse16.	These	were	claimed	by	an	extremist	jihadist	group,	
but	 blamed	 on	 the	MTI	 party	 by	 the	 government,	 leading	 to	 the	 severe	 persecution	 of	 its	
supporters	and	 its	 leadership	being	sentenced	to	death	-	who	consequently	sought	political	
asylum	abroad.	 In	 this	climate	of	economic	 instability,	 social	 tension,	and	recurring	political	
																																																						
13	Numerous	opposition	newspapers	were	published	during	this	time,	notably	Attariq	al	Jadid	of	the	PCT	(Parti	Communiste	
Tunisien)	and	El	Mawkef	of	the	Democratic	Progressive	Party	(Zayani,	2015,	p.56).	Others	include:	El	Mostaqbal,	El	Wahda,	
Outrouhat,	Le	Progrès,	Démocratie	(see	Chouikha,	2004	for	further	details).	
14	The	only	clear	red	line	was	that	they	could	not	directly	target	their	criticism	at	the	president	(Chouikha,	2004,	p.350).	
15	This	ban	was	later	extended	to	educational	establishments.	
16	The	same	town	where,	in	the	summer	of	2015,	a	terrorist	attack,	claimed	by	the	Islamic	State,	took	place	in	a	beach	hotel,	
killing	close	to	forty	tourists.	
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crises,	the	then	prime	minister	Zine	El	Abidine	Ben	Ali	seized	the	opportunity	to	assume	the	
presidency	 through	a	non-violent	 coup17	on	7th	November	1987,	bringing	Bourguiba’s	 three	
decades	in	power	to	an	end.	
	
	
2. The	Ben	Ali	years	
	
2.1. Rise	of	Islamism	and	the	authoritarian	turn	
	
Ben	 Ali’s	 period	 in	 power	 can,	 in	 retrospect,	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 fairly	 unbroken	 continuation	 of	
Bourguiba’s	 policies	 and	 intolerance	 of	 dissent,	 as	 detailed	 above.	 However,	 the	 level	 of	
opposition	 and	pluralism	erratically	 permitted	 by	 Bourguiba’s	 regime	 in	 the	 1980s	was	 not	
replicated	 by	 that	 of	 Ben	 Ali,	 whose	 rule	 soon	 came	 to	 be	 characterised	 by	 a	 far	 more	
stringent	and	systematic	 lockdown	of	public	space	and	discourse.	Ben	Ali’s	access	to	power	
initially	raised	the	promise	of	an	 improvement	of	the	socio-political	situation	 in	the	country	
and	 a	 possible	 gradual	 move	 to	 democracy.	 Indeed,	 a	 number	 of	 reforms	 and	 pieces	 of	
legislation	 enacted	 within	 the	 first	 year	 of	 the	 coup	 supported	 the	 perspective	 that	 the	
control	of	 the	political	 sphere	and	public	space	were	to	be	relaxed.	Political	prisoners	were	
freed	and	an	amnesty	of	 the	 Islamist	party	was	declared.	Furthermore,	 the	Press	Code	and	
laws	regulating	associative	life	were	eased,	and	limits	were	instated	on	the	number	of	terms	
a	president	could	stay	in	power18	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.45-46).		
	
However,	 a	 different	 narrative	 soon	 emerged	 which	 highlighted	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 regime’s	
engagement	with	 the	 concept	 of	 political	 pluralism.	 Although	 tolerated,	 the	 Islamist	 party,	
renamed	 Ennahdha19	 (meaning	 renaissance),	 continued	 to	 have	 its	 request	 for	 formal	
recognition	 as	 a	 party	 refused,	 whilst	 secular	 opposition	 parties	 were	 systematically	
weakened.	In	1988,	Ben	Ali	oversaw	the	signing	of	a	National	Pact	between	political	parties20	
in	 the	 country,	 which	 effectively	 neutralised	 opposition	 by	 outlining	 a	 consensus	 on	 how	
political	 life	was	 to	 be	 conducted	 (Santucci,	 1993,	 p.75).	Under	 the	 new	 configuration,	 the	
two	main	political	 forces	were	 the	president’s	party,	 renamed	as	 the	RCD	 (Rassemblement	
																																																						
17	Officially	the	coup	was	undertaken	on	medical	grounds	that	certified	Bourguiba’s	inability	to	continue	holding	the	office	of	
president.	It	occurred	at	a	time	when	the	Islamist	party	MTI	was	purported	to	be	preparing	a	coup,	with	the	help	of	part	of	the	
military	and	security	forces,	a	day	later,	on	8th	November	(Geisser	and	Gobe,	2008,	p.377).	
18	These	limits	were	lifted	again	in	2002.	
19	Formerly	the	MTI,	the	name	change	was	conceded	in	1988	along	with	a	number	of	other	measures	aimed	at	stressing	a	more	
secular	character	for	the	party	and	thereby	supporting	its	(unsuccessful)	attempt	to	be	formally	recognised.	
20	All	parties	except	the	communist	party	signed	the	pact,	including	the	MIT	despite	not	being	officially	recognised	as	a	party.	
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Constitutionnel	 Democratique)21,	 and	 Ennahdha,	 which	 continued	 to	 enjoy	 high	 levels	 of	
popularity.	As	Santucci	(ibid)	observes,	Ben	Ali	initially	sought	to	contain	Ennahdha	through	a	
less	repressive	strategy	than	in	previous	years	by	tolerating	the	Islamist	party’s	activities	on	
the	one	hand,	whilst	simultaneously	engaging	in	a	“re-islamisation	of	the	state	discourse”	on	
the	 other	 hand;	 a	 marked	 departure	 from	 the	 strictly	 secularist	 rhetoric	 of	 the	 previous	
regime.	 Whereas	 Bourguiba	 stressed	 a	 break	 from	 traditional	 social	 norms	 and	 religious	
references	through	actions	such	as	publicly	drinking	a	glass	of	water	during	the	fasting	period	
of	 Ramadan,	 Ben	 Ali	 appeared	 on	 television	 dressed	 in	 traditional	 clothes,	 taking	 part	 in	
religious	 ceremonies.	 Equally,	 a	 number	 of	 state-supervised	 religious	 institutions	 were	
allowed	to	develop,	and	calls	to	prayer	began	to	be	broadcast	on	television	on	a	daily	basis,	
measures	aimed	at	undermining	Ennahdha’s	monopoly	over	religious	discourse	and	providing	
the	regime	with	a	level	of	controlled	“religious	legitimacy”	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.48).		
	
The	onset	of	civil	war	in	neighbouring	Algeria	following	electoral	wins	by	Islamist	party	FIS	in	
1990,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 relative	 success	 of	 Ennahdha	 party	members22	 in	 the	 1989	 legislative	
elections	 in	Tunisia,	 led	to	a	drastic	change	 in	Ben	Ali’s	 regime’s	strategy	towards	 Islamism,	
revealing	the	increasingly	authoritarian	nature	of	its	political	rule.	Ennahdha	was	accused	of	
plotting	 to	overthrow	 the	government	and	designated	a	 criminal	organisation,	a	move	 that	
triggered	 a	 fresh	 cycle	 of	 harsh	 repression	 directed	 at	 both	 the	 party’s	 leaders	 and	 its	
supporters.	 Protests	 and	 hunger	 strikes	 at	 universities	 were	 violently	 quashed	 and	 many	
party	supporters	were	imprisoned	and	tortured,	whilst	others	fled	into	exile	abroad.	As	noted	
by	 Murphy	 (2001),	 Amnesty	 International	 estimated	 that	 there	 were	 approximately	 eight	
thousand	political	prisoners	by	1993,	in	total,	"while	Islamists	put	the	figure	closer	to	30,000"	
(p.204).	Furthermore,	the	state	tightly	controlled	the	expression	of	religious	observance	and	
piety	in	the	media	and	in	public	spaces	through,	amongst	other	measures,	enforcing	a	ban	on	
the	wearing	of	Islamic	headscarves	in	public	and	even	harassing	men	into	shaving	beards	that	
were	considered	as	sign	of	support	for	the	Islamists.	Paradoxically,	the	attempt	to	eradicate	
the	Islamist	movement	and	the	enforced	de-Islamisation	of	public	life	only	served	to	fuel	the	
rise	of	radical	Salafism	in	the	country	(Willis,	2012,	p.60).		
	
	
	
	
																																																						
21	Formerly	the	PSD	under	Bourguiba.	
22	The	party	was	not	allowed	to	take	part	in	the	elections	as	it	was	not	formally	recognised	but	a	number	of	its	members	stood	
for	election	as	independents.	
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2.2. Consolidation	of	the	‘façade	democracy’	
	
These	 developments	 were	 accompanied	 by	 a	 more	 generalised	 authoritarianism,	 and	 an	
increasing	 intolerance	 of	 any	 form	 of	 perceived	 opposition	 and	 dissent,	 a	 shift	 that	 the	
regime	justified	by	the	need	for	the	secular	opposition	to	rally	against	the	purported	threat	of	
Islamism,	and	that	was	in	part	facilitated	by	Ben	Ali’s	tightening	grip	on	the	country’s	security	
apparatus23.	 The	 government’s	 increasing	 intimidation	 and	 persecution	 of	 the	 opposition,	
religious	and	secular,	resulted	in	many	members	being	forced	into	submission	or	exile,	with	
others	coerced	or	persuaded	 into	actively	voicing	support	 for	the	regime.	By	1994	electoral	
law	had	been	amended	to	fix	the	number	of	seats	allocated	to	the	opposition	in	parliament	
prior	to	any	election	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.59),	with	the	majority	being	reserved	for	
the	 president’s	 RCD	 party.	 This	 process	 consolidated	what	 Sadiki	 (2002)	 termed	 a	 “façade	
democracy”	in	which	electoral	 laws	were	progressively	adjusted	to	modify	the	conditions	of	
recognition	for	presidential	and	legislative	candidates	to	the	regime’s	liking.	
	
The	political	clampdown	initiated	in	the	early	nineties	was	soon	extended	to	the	activities	of	
unions,	to	associational	 life,	and	more	generally	to	any	form	of	public	action	and	gatherings	
deemed	subversive	by	the	state.	The	regime	adopted	a	similar	double-discourse	to	that	used	
to	weaken	political	party-based	opposition,	permitting	the	existence	of	a	number	of	formerly	
influential	unions	and	associations	on	the	one	hand	(such	as	the	worker’s	union	UGTT	and	the	
human	 rights	 league	 LTDH),	 while	 utterly	 undermining	 their	 effectiveness	 on	 the	 other,	
through	a	series	of	financial,	legal	and	coercive	means.	The	regime	was	consequently	able	to	
externally	project	an	 image	of	political	pluralism	–	albeit	an	extremely	superficial	one	-	and	
pay	lip	service	to	human	rights	concerns,	whilst	stifling	or	eliminating	any	potential	source	of	
genuine	opposition.		
	
The	 regime	 operated	 through	 a	 centralised	 single-party	 system,	 around	 which	 a	 network	
characterised	by	nepotism,	cronyism	and	corruption	developed.	Eight	thousand	regional	cells	
of	the	RCD	existed	across	the	country	and	a	fifth	of	Tunisia’s	population	of	ten	million	were	
estimated	to	be	members	of	the	party	by	2008	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.57),	either	out	of	
choice	 or	 necessity.	 Indeed,	 the	 RCD’s	 centralised	 structure	 significantly	 extended	 the	
regime’s	control,	enabling	it	to	infiltrate	all	aspects	of	political,	social,	economic	and	personal	
																																																						
23	The	number	of	police	agents	and	security	forces	remains	contested	to	date.	Chouihka	and	Gobe	(2015	p.56)	estimate	it	to	
have	stood	at	between	fifty	thousand	and	one	hundred	and	fifty	thousand	agents,	additionally	to	thousands	of	supporting	
personnel,	and	extensive	networks	of	informants.	IMS	(2002)	instead	report	an	“estimated	145,000	strong	police	force	with	
reportedly	an	additional	200,000	plainclothes	security	personnel”	(p.3).	
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life,	 serving	 to	 mediate	 employment	 opportunities	 and	 promotions,	 overseeing	 business	
allocations,	 distributing	 resources	 to	 the	 under-privileged	 and	 resolving	 citizens’	 everyday	
administrative	issues	or	problems	with	the	police24.		
	
Crucially,	the	regime’s	ability	to	maintain	power	was	also	enabled	by	an	important	economic	
dimension	of	Ben	Ali’s	rule.	Although	initial	hopes	for	democratic	reforms	that	accompanied	
his	accession	to	power	soon	dissipated,	his	liberal	economic	reforms	and	relative	stabilisation	
of	 the	 economic	 situation	 meant	 that	 his	 regime's	 increasingly	 overt	 disregard	 for	 the	
democratic	process	were	met	with	relatively	muted	international	criticism	(Murphy,	2001)	as	
well	 as	 a	 level	 of	 acceptance	by	 a	 significant	 section	of	 Tunisia’s	 population	 that	 benefited	
from	the	rise	of	a	new	middle	class,	predominantly	located	in	the	capital	and	coastal	areas	of	
the	country.	
	
Assessments	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 economic	 measures	 have	 been	 mixed.	 The	
government	partially	 implemented	 the	 structural	 readjustment	plans	advanced	by	 the	 IMF,	
which	advocated	a	reduction	of	the	budget	deficit,	an	expansion	of	the	private	sector’s	share	
of	economic	activity	and	the	introduction	of	new	taxation.	The	IMF	proposal	also	encouraged	
the	 prizing	 open	 of	 the	 Tunisian	 economy	 to	 international	 –	 and	 in	 particular	 European	 -	
markets	and	companies	 through	 free	 trade	agreements,	 reductions	 in	 tariffs,	and	 fiscal	and	
currency	 devaluation	measures.	 	 The	 country	 witnessed	 a	marked	 economic	 improvement	
during	this	period,	with	annual	growth	rates	of	over	five	per	cent	for	the	first	decade	of	Ben	
Ali’s	rule,	and	a	GDP	per	capita	growth	of	eight	per	cent	in	the	latter	half	of	the	nineties	(King,	
2003).	However,	this	was	also	accompanied	by	a	sharp	rise	in	inequality.	Crucially,	high	levels	
of	 unemployment	 -	 already	 a	 challenge	 under	 Bourguiba’s	 regime	 -	 remained	 largely	
unresolved.	The	country’s	population	stood	at	approximately	10.5m	at	the	end	of	2010,	when	
the	revolution	started	(INS,	2015),	of	which	one	third	were	between	fifteen	and	twenty-nine	
years	of	age	at	the	time	(UNFPA,	2015).	Structurally,	this	demographic	distribution	or	“youth	
bulge”,	 characteristic	 of	 many	 countries	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	 North	 African	 regions,	
translated	in	Tunisia	into	a	youth	unemployment	rate	twice	the	national	average,	from	which	
high	 education	 levels	 –	 previously	 a	 radical	 determinant	 of	 social	 mobility	 for	 the	 post-
independence	generations	(Allman,	1979)	–	no	longer	provided	security	(Roudi,	2011;	UNFPA,	
2015;	Cammett	et	al.,	2015;	Zayani,	2015).	 In	 fact,	 youth	and	graduate	unemployment	was	
exacerbated	 by	 an	 education	 policy	 that	 strongly	 encouraged	 the	 attainment	 of	 higher	
																																																						
24	See	for	instance	the	treatment	of	this	issue	in	Leila	Bouzid’s	film	Ala	Hallet	Aini	(2015).	
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education	 qualifications,	 and	 by	 the	 continued	 discrepancy	 between	 employment	 demand	
and	the	low-skilled	work	on	offer	(Stampini	and	Verdier	Chouchane,	2011).		
	
In	addition	to	these	dynamics,	the	Tunisian	economy	during	the	Ben	Ali	years	was	also	subject	
to	 a	 pervasive	 degree	 of	 control	 and	 interference	 by	 the	 state.	 Not	 only	 did	 it	 directly	
oversee,	 through	 the	 centralised	 RCD	 party	 structure	 (see	 above),	 the	 running	 of	 business	
affairs	and	the	allocation	of	projects,	work	opportunities	and	promotions,	but	the	president	
and	his	wife’s	family	were	also	able	to	gradually	assume	control	of	key	assets	and	companies	
in	 the	 country.	 These	 were	 estimated	 to	 equal,	 in	 total,	 one	 quarter	 of	 GDP	 by	 2010	
(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.57).	As	noted	by	Camau	and	Geisser	(2003),	the	growth	of	the	
private	sector	under	Ben	Ali	was	 in	fact	 in	total	“symbiosis”	with	the	regime	(p.212).	Whilst	
there	 are	 contrasting	 interpretations	 of	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 centralised	 control	 over	
economic	matters	 inhibited	 -	 or	 perhaps	 to	 some	 level	 also	 supported	 -	 growth25,	 what	 is	
clear	is	that	under	these	circumstances	the	links	between	the	economic	and	political	sphere	
were	deeply	 intertwined,	contributing	to	as	much	(active	or	passive)	consent	to	the	regime,	
as	nurturing	inequalities,	injustice	and	fomenting	public	resentment	in	the	longer	term.	
	
2.3. Centralised	control	of	the	media	sphere	
	
“It	is	with	pride	and	elation	that	Tunisians,	wherever	they	are,	in	the	far	
	end	of	the	country	or	outside	it,	celebrate	today	the	23rd	anniversary	
	of	the	Change.	Our	people,	through	the	different	stages	of	their	history,		
have	never	been,	in	fact,	this	dignified,	free,	prosperous,	solidary,	
	sovereign	and	ambitious.”		
(La	Presse,	7th	November	2010)26	
	
Under	Ben	Ali,	state	surveillance	and	control	of	national	print	and	broadcast	media,	and	later	
of	 online	 access,	 became	 particularly	 pervasive	 and	 sophisticated,	 with	 any	 indications	 of	
political	 and/or	 social	 dissent	 being	 closely	monitored.	 The	media	 space	 in	 fact	 occupied	 a	
pivotal	 role	 in	 the	 government’s	 projection	 and	 maintenance	 of	 power.	 Although	 media	
infrastructure	 and	 access	 to	 satellite	 television	 and	 internet	 connections	were	 significantly	
developed	 and	 expanded	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Ben	 Ali	 period,	 the	media	 landscape	was	
submitted	 to	 "one	 of	 the	most	 repressive"	 systems	 among	 Arab	 nations	 "in	 terms	 of	 both	
freedom	of	expression	and	political	independence"	(El-Issawi,	2012a,	p.19).	Whilst	the	media	
																																																						
25	See	Camau	(2008)	for	an	overview	of	debates	on	the	links	between	political	and	economic	liberalization.	
26	This	excerpt,	translated	from	French,	was	originally	published	on	the	title	page	of	La	Presse	newspaper	on	the	occasion	of	the	
celebration	of	Ben	Ali’s	access	to	power	(7th	November	1987),	often	referred	to	as	the	date	of	‘the	Change’	(‘le	Changement’).	
The	date	of	this	newspaper	publication	marked	the	last	anniversary	of	‘the	Change’	before	the	start	of	the	revolution	in	mid-
December	2010	and	Ben	Ali’s	removal	from	power.	
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sphere	 had	 benefited,	 under	 Bourguiba’s	 rule,	 from	 intermittent	 phases	 of	 liberalisation,	
particularly	 during	 the	 1980s	 with	 the	 state’s	 political	 concessions	 (detailed	 above),	 the	
situation	rapidly	changed	under	Ben	Ali.	Although	hopes	of	a	transition	to	more	democratic,	
pluralistic	form	of	government	that	the	1987	coup	had	raised	were	initially	accompanied	by	
an	 opening	 of	 the	 media	 sphere,	 which	 saw	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 some	 formerly	 banned	
publications	 (Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	 2015,	 p.47),	 this	 period	 was	 soon	 superseded	 by	 an	
increasingly	systemic	control	of	public	discourse,	unequalled	in	post-independence	Tunisia.	
	
Several	 aspects	 of	 the	 subsequent	 media	 strategy	 of	 the	 Ben	 Ali	 government	 can	 be	
identified:	 First	 of	 all,	 it	was	 characterised	 by	 an	 overt	 and	 extensive	 censorship	 system.	 A	
complex,	 interlocking	 network	 of	 state	 agencies	 and	 institutions	 existed	 to	 control	 media	
activity,	governing	everything	from	licensing,	to	content	production	and	distribution.	One	of	
the	 most	 significant	 of	 these	 was	 the	 department	 of	 political	 affairs,	 part	 of	 the	 Interior	
Ministry,	 which	 checked	 pre-publication	media	 content27	 and	 reported	 on	 the	 activities	 of	
journalists,	associations	and	political	parties	(INRIC,	2012,	p.58-59).	Another	important	state	
organ	 with	 extensive	 powers	 of	 (effectively)	 censorship	 was	 the	 Agence	 Tunisienne	 de	
Communication	 Exterieure	 (ATCE),	 which	 became	 central	 to	 the	 allocation	 of	 public	
advertising	 budgets28.	 The	 Tunisian	 Internet	Agency	 (ATI),	 established	 at	 a	 later	 date,	 dealt	
with	online	access	and	content,	again	playing	a	key	role	 in	restricting	expressions	of	dissent	
and	 criticism	 of	 the	 regime	 (the	 online	media	 environment	 is	 discussed	 in	 detail	 at	 a	 later	
point	 in	 this	 chapter).	 Censorship	 became	 stricter	 in	 the	 early	 1990’s	 (a	 period	 outlined	
above)	 in	which	repressive	measures	were	 implemented	by	the	state	 in	an	attempt	to	curb	
the	 growing	 political	 influence	 of	 the	 Islamist	 movement.	 During	 this	 time,	 many	 well-
established	newspapers	 such	 as	El	 Fejr	 and	 Le	Maghreb	were	 subjected	 to	 regular	 bans	 or	
were	even	 forced	 to	 close	 (INRIC,	2012,	p.58).	 Several	 legislative	amendments	 to	 the	press	
code29	 during	 Ben	 Ali’s	 years	 in	 power	merely	 served	 to	 reinforce	 its	 repressive	 character.	
More	 generally,	media	 content	was	 scrutinised,	 critical	 publications	 banned	 and	 journalists	
and	editors	regularly	intimidated,	imprisoned	or	coerced	into	writing	favourable	coverage.	As	
noted	in	a	UNESCO	report	on	media	development	in	Tunisia	(2012,	p.32),	opposition	media	in	
Tunisia	almost	ceased	to	exist	under	 the	state’s	centralised	system	of	censorship	and	other	
politically	 repressive	 measures.	 The	 few	 surviving	 opposition	 newspapers	 that	 were	
successful	 in	 carving	 out	 an	 alternative	 space	 of	 expression	 (see	 Zayani,	 2015,	 p.56-57	 for	
																																																						
27	This	was	a	new	phenomenon	in	journalism’s	difficult	history	with	political	censorship	in	Tunisia	since	independence	(INRIC,	
2012,	p.57).	
28	Extensive	details	on	these	different	institutions	and	censorship	mechanisms	can	be	found	in	the	final	report	of	the	commission	
for	media	reform	(INRIC,	2012).	
29	The	‘code	de	la	presse’	was	originally	established	in	1975.	
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more	details)	were	significantly	undermined	through	the	imposition	of	further	barriers	at	the	
distribution	 level.	 Rival	 opinions	 were	 also	 discouraged	 by	 exerting	 financial	 pressure	 on	
media	companies,	 in	part	by	threatening	to	withdraw	vital	government	advertising	budgets,	
subsidies	 or	 licences	 (Chouikha,	 2007).	 These	 measures	 were	 also	 effective	 in	 instilling	 an	
atmosphere	of	fear	which	engendered	self-censorship.	Although	the	number	of	media	outlets	
significantly	increased	during	the	Ben	Ali	years,	the	media	sphere	was	marked	by	a	uniformity	
in	 perspective	 that	 failed	 to	 engage	 the	majority	 of	 citizens,	 as	 indicated,	 for	 instance,	 by	
existing	 print	 distribution	 figures30	 (Aisen	 Kallander,	 2013).	 Not	 only	 were	 journalists	
prohibited	 from	 voicing	 criticism	 and	 from	 covering	 important	 political	 events	 (such	 as	 the	
Islamists’	 trials	 in	 1991	 and	 1992),	 but	 journalists	 were	 occasionally	 not	 even	 allowed	 to	
provide	coverage	on	‘adverse’	events	that	had	no	political	character,	such	as	the	aftermath	of	
floods	 and	 other	 natural	 disasters	 (INRIC,	 2012,	 p.51).	 This	 censorship	 also	 extended	 to	
foreign	media,	 such	 as	 the	 French	 television	 channel	 France	 2.	 The	 broadcaster	 had	 been	
transmitting	 content	 to	 a	 Tunisian	 audience	 for	 ten	 years	 when	 it	 was	 banned	 in	 1999,	
apparently	as	a	result	of	making	a	number	of	on-air	references	to	the	authoritarian	nature	of	
the	Tunisian	state	(Chouikha,	2007).	
	
Secondly,	 the	 regime’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 media	 sphere	 included	 its	 subordination	 to	 the	
pervasive	 government	 propaganda,	 which	 was	 particularly	 pronounced	 on	 public	 media.	
State	 institutions	such	as	the	ATCE	(referred	to	earlier)	as	well	as	the	national	news	agency	
TAP	(the	only	official	information	source	in	the	country)	largely	contributed	to	supporting	this	
strategy.	One	dominant	 theme	of	 state	 propaganda	was	 the	 relentlessly	 positive	 and	 (self)	
congratulatory	coverage	in	print	and	broadcast	news	programmes	of	Tunisian	achievements	
under	Ben	Ali	(as	illustrated	by	the	quote	above).	Such	content	became	increasingly	dissonant	
with	 citizens’	daily	 lives	and	experiences	 (see	Chapter	3).	Another	defining	characteristic	of	
the	 state’s	 control	 over	 the	 media	 was	 the	 gradual	 emergence	 of	 defamatory	 content	
attacking	 and	 undermining	 the	 reputations	 of	 some	 political	 opponents	 and	 regime	 critics.	
Equally	prevalent	were	posters,	banners	and	other	representations	of	the	president,	located	
in	public	spaces.	The	propagation	of	a	‘cult	of	personality’	focusing	on	Ben	Ali	was	expressed	
in	a	variety	of	ways,	such	as	in	the	posters	covering	the	walls	of	shops	whose	owners	sought	
to	 avoid	 trouble	 with	 the	 police,	 and	 in	 the	 sculptures	 and	 effigies	 symbolising	 Ben	 Ali’s	
																																																						
30	Distribution	rates	below	50,000	for	some	of	the	most	established	newspapers	such	as	Al-Shuruq	and	La	Presse	(Aisen	
Kallander,	2013).	
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rhetoric	 of	 progress31	 which	 were	 sited	 in	 prominent	 locations,	 such	 as	 town	 centres	 and	
important	traffic	roundabouts.		
	
Thirdly,	one	of	the	key	features	of	the	Tunisian	media	 landscape	during	this	period	was	the	
government’s	progressively	tighter	hold	over	the	ownership	of	different	media	outlets	in	the	
country.	While	 public	 media	 served	 predominantly	 as	 a	 mouthpiece	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 the	
activities	 of	 the	 private	 print	 sector	 were	 severely	 restricted,	 private	 broadcasting	 was	
authorised	for	the	first	time	in	2003,	in	large	part	due	to	international	economic	and	political	
pressures	 (Chouikha,	 2007;	 Unesco,	 2012,	 p.53).	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 number	 of	 new	 radio	 and	
television	 channels	 emerged	 over	 the	 following	 years.	 However,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 in	 the	
privatisation	 of	 other	 sectors	 of	 the	 Tunisian	 economy	 (see	 above),	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
legislation	regulating	the	audio-visual	sector	(INRIC,	2012,	p.20),	these	new	media	companies	
were	 far	 from	being	 independently	 run.	Rather,	 for	 the	most	part,	 they	 formed	part	of	 the	
same	network	 of	 partonage,	 cronyism	and	personal/political	 connections	which	 dominated	
most	areas	of	economic	activity	in	the	country.	These	broadcasters	were	also	prohibited	from	
reporting	on	politics	(El-Issawi,	2012b),	and	nearly	every	single	one	of	the	new	media	outlets	
was	 partly	 or	 fully	 owned	 by	 members	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 extended	 family	 or	 his	 close	 allies.	
Hannibal	TV,	for	example,	was	launched	in	2005	and	was	the	country’s	first	private	television	
channel.	It	was	owned	by	a	businessman	whose	son	was	married	to	one	of	Ben	Ali’s	in-laws.	
Similarly,	Shems	FM	 radio	was	 launched	in	2010	by	Ben	Ali’s	daughter,	and	Express	FM	was	
financed	 by	 his	 brother-in–law.	 Simultaneously,	 the	 state	 rejected	 numerous	 other	
(independent)	requests	for	private	media	licences	(Hostrup	Haugbølle,	2013;	Chouikha,	2007)	
and	forced	those	private	broadcasting	outlets	who	were	permitted	to	operate	to	adhere	to	
strict	 agreements	 over	 programming	 and	 the	 management	 of	 news	 content,	 which	
additionally	 required	 them	 to	 avoid	 any	 form	 of	 political	 commentary.	 Government	
interference	 also	 extended	 to	 directly	 involving	 itself	 in	 the	 choice	 of	 staff	 members	
overseeing	 news	 bulletins	 (Chouikha,	 2007).	 Control	 over	 the	 channels	 through	 which	
Tunisians	 received	 news	 and	 other	 information	 was	 not	 confined	 to	 domestic	 media	
ownership:	Canal	Horizons	Tunisie	-	part	of	French	Canal	Plus	group	(but	sixty	per	cent	owned	
by	 Tunisian	 shareholders)	 -	 started	 broadcasting	 on	 the	 Tunisian	 herzian	 frequency	 in	 the	
early	1990’s,	but	was	only	able	to	do	so	on	the	condition	that	it	sign	a	convention	stipulting	
the	boudaries	of	permissible	content	(Chouikha,	2007).		
																																																						
31	For	instance,	these	included	sculptures	representing	a	globe	and	the	number	7,	which	stood	for	the	date	of	Ben	Ali’s	accession	
to	power	(7th	of	November	1987);	other	sculptures	and	campaign	posters	related	to	regime	achievements	in	the	environmental,	
transport,	or	technology	sectors.	Equally,	the	statue	of	former	president	Bourguiba	at	the	center	of	Tunis	was	replaced	with	an	
imposing	clock-tower	designed	to	symbolize	modernity	and	progress	(further	details	in	Chomiak,	2013).	
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Additionally,	the	media	strategy	of	the	regime	was	characterised	by	what	could	be	termed	a	
‘containment’	 strategy,	 constraining	 those	 whose	 voices	 were	 more	 difficult	 to	 control	 or	
undermine.	The	launch	of	local	public	radio	stations	in	the	early	1990’s	in	the	interior	regions	
of	 the	 country	where	 feelings	 of	marginalisation	 had	 fuelled	 protests	 in	 the	 past	 (Hostrup	
Haugbølle,	2013,	p.162)	exemplified	this	approach.	In	a	similar	vein,	a	religious	radio	station	
and	 Islamic	bank	were	 launched32	 in	 the	 latter	phase	of	Ben	Ali’s	 rule	 to	 contain	 the	 rising	
Islamisation	 of	 parts	 of	 Tunisian	 society	 (Merone	 and	 Cavatorta,	 2013,	 p.257).	 Ben	 Ali’s	
regime	 invested	 significant	 resources	 in	 camouflaging	 social	 and	 political	 tensions	 and	
propagating	a	unilaterally	positive	image	of	the	country	to	its	citizens,	but	also	to	its	Western	
interlocutors.	 It	 sought	 to	 contain	 critical	 coverage	 of	 the	 regime	 by	 foreign	 media.	 The	
activities	of	 foreign	 journalists	 in	Tunisia	and	the	distribution	of	western	publications	 in	 the	
country	were	 closely	monitored	 and	 controlled.	 Equally,	 broadcaster	Al	 Jazeera’s	 offices	 in	
Tunisia	were	 repeatedly	 shut	 down	 following	 unfavourable	 coverage	 of	 the	 regime	 (Lynch,	
2012,	 p.76).	 Key	 to	managing	media	 coverage	of	 the	 country	 abroad	was	 the	ATCE	 agency	
(referred	to	above).	By	progressively	becoming	the	central	organ	for	the	distribution	of	public	
advertising	budgets,	it	played	an	important	part	in	the	coercion	and	manipulation	of	foreign	
journalists	into	delivering	uncritical	coverage	of	the	real	situation	in	the	country.	As	detailed	
in	 the	 report	 of	 the	 national	 commission	 for	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 media	 sector	 after	 the	
revolution	 (INRIC,	2012),	 the	ATCE’s	activities	 included	 ‘guiding’	 	 foreign	 journalists’	 reports	
on	the	country	in	various	ways,	the	issuing	of	licences	for	foreign	correspondents	in	Tunisia,	
the	acquisition	of	print	space	in	foreign	publications	to	include	articles	written	by	ATCE	staff	
praising	 the	 virtues	 of	 the	 Tunisian	 government	 and	 Ben	 Ali,	 as	 well	 as	 making	 direct	
payments	 to	 foreign	 journalists	 to	 produce	 ‘helpful’	 articles	 and	 other	material	 casting	 the	
State	in	a	positive	light	(ibid,	p.154-156).	
	
2.4. Rhetoric	of	progress	and	censorship	practices	in	the	new	media	age	
	
The	 profound	 contrast	 between	 Ben	 Ali’s	 rhetoric	 of	 political,	 social	 and	 technological	
progress,	 and	 the	 government’s	 regressive	 policy	 of	 centralising	 control	 over	 public	 life,	
became	most	 apparent	 with	 the	 introduction	 and	 development	 of	 the	 Internet	 in	 Tunisia.	
Outwardly,	 the	 state	 strongly	 endorsed	 and	 promoted	 the	 development	 of	 Internet	
infrastructure,	 which	 served	 a	 number	 of	 national	 and	 international	 economic	 purposes,	
																																																						
32	Radio	station	Zitouna	FM	and	Islamic	bank	Banque	Zitouna	were	launched	in	2007	and	2010	respectively	by	the	president’s	
son-in-law.	
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whilst	forming	an	integral	part	of	the	regime’s	cultivation	of	the	image	of	a	progressive	and	
youth-oriented	democracy	(IMS,	2002,	p.6;	Zayani,	2015,	p.80).	Tunisia	was	the	first,	among	
Arab	countries,	to	connect	to	the	Internet,	in	199133	(Rinnawi,	2011,	p.126).	The	government	
invested	significant	resources	into	promoting	Internet	access	and	boosting	what	was	initially	
a	relatively	limited	adoption	rate	of	the	new	technology	(Aisen	Kallander,	2013).	For	instance,	
in	the	late	1990’s	and	early	2000’s,	it	supported	the	establishment	of	the	first	generation	of	
Internet	cafés	(known	as	‘publinets’	in	Tunisia),	subsidised	the	purchase	of	home	computers,	
lowered	 Internet	 subscription	 rates,	 and	 promoted	 the	 development	 of	 Internet	 access	 in	
educational	 establishments	 (see	 Zayani,	 2015,	 p.81-82).	 By	 the	 time	 of	 the	 revolution,	 just	
over	one	third34	of	the	population	in	the	country	used	the	Internet	(ITU,	2011;	Internet	World	
Stats,	 2011;	 ATI,	 2011).	 This	 rate	 placed	 Tunisia	 slightly	 above	 the	 average	 figure	 for	 Arab	
countries35,	 and	 second	 (after	Morocco)	 compared	 to	 other	 countries	 in	 the	North	 African	
region36	(ITU,	2011).	The	number	of	households	with	personal	computers	was	relatively	low37,	
but	many	users	 accessed	 the	 Internet	 at	work,	 university,	 secondary	 schools	 or	 at	 internet	
cafés.	There	were	just	under	five	hundred	thousand	broadband	subscribers	in	Tunisia	at	the	
time	 (World	 Bank,	 2012),	 and	 just	 under	 one	 hundred	 thousand	 subscriptions	 to	 3G	 USB	
keys38.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	however,	the	state	subjected	content	and	users	in	the	country	to	one	of	
the	 most	 intrusive	 and	 repressive	 Internet	 surveillance	 regimes	 in	 the	 world	 (OpenNet	
Initiative,	2005),	leading	Reporters	Without	Borders	(Reporters	Sans	Frontières)	to	designate	
Tunisia	 in	2006	as	one	of	a	select	few	global	“Internet	enemies”	of	free	speech	(RSF,	2006).	
Navigating	 the	 online	 space	 prior	 to	 the	 revolution	 involved	 regular	 encounters	 with	 the	
government’s	 censorship	 apparatus,	widely	 referred	 to	 under	 the	 term	 “Ammar	404”	 after	
the	 “404	 error”	 message	 that	 appeared	 on	 blocked	 web	 pages	 to	 pass	 censorship	 for	 a	
technical	 error.	 The	 Internet’s	 centralised	 infrastructure	 in	 Tunisia	 enabled	 the	 state	 to	
systematically	control	and	 filter	content	 (OpenNet	 Initiative,	2005,	p.7;	Goupy,	2013;	Silver,	
2011).	 Indeed,	 all	 computer	 traffic	 transited	 through	 the	 government	 ATI	 agency	 (Agence	
Tunsienne	d’Internet),	established	in	1996	when	the	Internet	was	first	made	available	to	the	
public.	Filtering	software	such	as	SmartFilter	was	deployed	to	detect	potentially	contentious	
																																																						
33	The	Internet	was	introduced	for	public	use	in	1996.	
34	Rates	range	from	thirty-four	to	thirty-seven	per	cent	depending	on	source	and	definitional	parameters.	
35	Defined	here	as	those	countries	in	the	MENA	region	with	a	predominantly	Arabic-speaking	population.	
36	For	instance,	Algeria	was	at	thirteen	per	cent,	Lybia	at	fourteen	per	cent	and	Egypt,	where	the	Tunisian	revolution	movements	
rapidly	spread	in	February	2011,	was	estimated	to	have	an	Internet	user	rate	of	approximately	twenty-two	per	cent	(ITU,	2011).	
37	In	total,	the	number	of	computers	per	100	inhabitants	stood	at	13	in	2010	(Freedom	House,	2012).	
38	The	first	3G	network	was	launched	in	2010	and	covered	about	half	of	the	Tunisian	territory	by	year	end	(Hostrup	Haugbølle,	
2013,	p.168).	It	was	mostly	used	to	access	the	Internet	through	a	USB	key	connected	to	a	computer,	as	Internet	access	through	
mobile	telephony	was	very	limited	and	prohibitively	expensive	at	this	point.	
36	
	
website	content,	and	roughly	one	hundred	and	twenty	agents	at	the	ATI	and	at	the	Interior	
Ministry	were	tasked	with	the	surveillance	and	censoring	of	websites	(Goupy,	2013).	By	2005,	
the	OpenNet	Initiative	(2005)	estimated	that	approximately	one	in	ten	websites	were	unable	
to	be	accessed	 from	within	 the	 country	as	a	 result	of	 this	 control	mechanism.	 State	use	of	
such	technological	tools	to	further	tighten	constraints	on	free	speech	became	an	increasingly	
sophisticated	 strategy	 for	public	 control.	As	Goupy	 (2013)	notes,	 in	 conjunction	with	mass-
scale	 phone	 tapping	 (fixed	 line	 as	well	 as	mobile	 telephony),	 they	 provided	 very	 effective,	
cheap	 and	 relatively	 invisible	 means	 of	 detecting	 and	 silencing	 dissenting	 voices.	 Public	
Internet	cafés	were	not	 immune	either	 from	this	control,	as	 their	owners	were	required	by	
law	to	monitor	content	accessed	by	users	(OpenNet	Initiative,	2005,	p.4).		
	
Internet	surveillance	and	censorship	became	steadily	more	prevalent	and	oppressive	as	 the	
number	 of	 users	 increased,	 and	 new	 ways	 of	 circumventing	 Ammar404	 were	 sought	 by	
Tunisian	 users.	 Recognising	 this,	 the	 government	 endorsed	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 Internet	
surveillance	tools	in	Tunisia,	or	purchased	them	from	European	suppliers,	in	the	latter	half	of	
the	2000’s	in	order	to	control	email,	and	increasingly	also	social	media	content.	For	instance,	
email	 content	 was	 filtered	 through	 a	 deep-packet	 inspection	 technique	 with	 suspicious	
content	being	sent	to	the	Interior	ministry,	and	emails	were	even	altered	at	times,	to	include	
threatening	 messages	 to	 intimidate	 opponents,	 or	 pornographic	 content	 to	 inflict	
reputational	 damage	 (Silver,	 2011).	 More	 savvy	 Internet	 users	 and	 activists	 also	 gradually	
learned	 to	 bypass	 this	 surveillance,	 by	 migrating	 away	 from	 email	 messaging,	 using	
encryption	in	their	online	communications,	connecting	to	the	Internet	through	proxy	servers,	
and	adopting	anonymous	user	profiles	online	(Lecomte,	2013).	Information	on	how	to	do	so	
was	 carefully	 circulated	 around	 opposition	 networks,	 but	 the	majority	 of	 Tunisian	 Internet	
users	lacked	the	knowledge,	skills,	or	motivation	necessary	to	circumvent	online	censorship,	
or	to	assume	the	risks	inherent	in	transmitting,	receiving	or	observing	potentially	subversive	
content.	 An	 additional	 weapon	 in	 the	 state’s	 Internet	 control	 strategy	 consisted	 of	
increasingly	 resorting	 to	 the	 judicial	 system	to	 imprison	citizens	on	the	basis	of	 their	online	
activities.	This	was	rather	effective	in	encouraging	self-censorship	and	dissuading	many	web-
users	from	accessing	critical	content.	At	least	a	dozen	bloggers	were	arrested	between	2001	
and	2008,	as	well	as	several	students	accused	of	simply	downloading	materials	critical	of	Ben	
Ali	(Aisen	Kallander,	2013).	Paralleling	these	developments,	a	number	of	laws	and	legislative	
amendments	 were	 drawn	 up	 to	 extensively	 detail	 and	 legitimate	 existing	 restrictions	 on	
online	 activities,	 and	 to	 criminalise	 cyber-dissidents	 on	 grounds	 such	 as	 defaming	 public	
officials	or	posing	a	threat	to	national	security	(IMS,	2002;	INRIC,	2012).		
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2.5. The	escalation	of	resistance	and	repression	before	the	revolution		
	
The	last	three	years	of	the	Ben	Ali	era	became	increasingly	marked	by	the	rise	of	social	and	
political	 contention.	 Unsurprisingly	 perhaps,	 the	 state’s	 intrusive	 and	 authoritarian	 nature	
served	to	ultimately	undermine	its	authority,	fuelling	a	sense	of	injustice,	and	strengthening	
the	resolve	of	its	opponents.	Although	Tunisian	society	continued	to	be	closely	subjected	to	
government	control,	new	pockets	of	resistance	also	emerged,	leading	to	a	level	of	dissipation,	
within	 some	 circles,	 of	 the	 culture	 of	 fear	 (see	 Zayani,	 2015,	 p.47-49)	 surrounding	 any	
expression	of	political	activism	that	decades	of	authoritarian	rule	had	instilled.	Such	pockets	
of	resistance	became	apparent,	for	example,	within	the	legal	profession.	In	2000,	the	human	
rights	 league	 (LTDH)	managed	 to	 force-through	 the	 election	 of	 a	 committee	 that	was	 fully	
independent	 of	 RCD	 party	 involvement,	 although	 its	 activities	 continued	 to	 be	 severely	
constrained	 by	 the	 state	 (Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	 2015,	 p.71).	 Equally,	 the	 National	 Bar	
Association	elected	an	independent	leadership	in	2001	(Zayani,	2015,	p.56)	and	lawyers	-	who	
frequently	 faced	 restrictions	on	 the	exercise	of	 their	professional	duties	 -	 staged	numerous	
protest	 actions	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 2000’s.	 	 Their	 experience	 of	
protesting	 was	 to	 prove	 valuable	 in	 the	 revolutionary	 period	 (Gobe,	 2013).	 The	 rise	 of	
extremist	and	jihadi	strands	of	Islamism	also	represented	a	growing	challenge	to	the	regime’s	
control	 over	 public,	 political	 and	 religious	 discourse.	 In	 2002,	 the	 bombing	 of	 the	 Ghriba	
synagogue	on	the	island	of	Djerba	was	claimed	by	a	branch	of	Al	Qaeda	in	the	Maghreb	and,	
at	the	end	of	2006,	confrontations	with	Salafist	extremists	who	were	plotting	attacks	on	New	
Year’s	Eve,	 led	to	fighting	between	heavily	armed	militants	and	police	forces	in	the	areas	of	
Soliman	and	Hammam-Lif,	both	in	close	proximity	to	the	capital.		
	
The	crises	confronted	by	Ben	Ali’s	regime	in	its	last	years	were	exacerbated	by	the	impact	of	
the	global	economic	crisis	on	a	Tunisian	economy	that	was	highly	dependent	on	its	European	
partners.	A	mix	of	rising	levels	of	youth	unemployment,	corruption	and	the	continued	growth	
of	the	informal	economy	contributed	to	a	deepening	of	the	country’s	economic	problems.	In	
2008,	 the	 deterioration	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 context	 translated,	 in	 the	 Southern	 mining	
region	of	Gafsa,	 into	 the	most	 important	 collective	protest	movements	 in	Tunisia	 since	 the	
bread	 riots	 of	 1984.	 Against	 a	 backdrop	 of	 high	 local	 unemployment	 and	 a	 series	 of	mass	
redundancies	 at	 the	 Companie	 des	 Phosphates	 de	 Gafsa	 (CPG),	 the	 main	 local	 employer,	
these	 were	 sparked	 off	 by	 the	 results	 of	 a	 recruitment	 contest	 deemed	 to	 be	 based	 on	
nepotism	 rather	 than	merit.	 The	 initial	protests	 soon	escalated	and	 spread,	 involving	wider	
sections	 of	 the	 local	 population.	 Although	 these	 demonstrations	 ultimately	 remained	
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confined	to	the	 local	area,	 their	protracted	nature	(six	months)	despite	the	 implementation	
of	 violently	 repressive	 measures	 by	 the	 government,	 and	 the	 involvement	 -	 against	 its	
leadership’s	directives	-	of	the	local	militant	base	of	the	UGTT	union,	signalled	a	turning	point	
in	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 regime	 to	 enforce	 its	 authority.	More	 protest	 actions	 ensued	 in	 the	
following	years,	 further	widening	the	underlying	fissures	between	the	state	and	many	of	 its	
citizens,	notably	in	the	town	of	Ben	Guerdane	near	the	Lybian	border	in	the	summer	of	2010,	
and	 in	 the	 region	 of	 Sidi	 Bouzid	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 2010,	 where	 local	 farmers,	 including	
members	of	Bouazizi’s39	extended	family,	protested	against	the	seizure	of	their	lands	by	the	
government	(for	a	detailed	account,	see	Zayani,	2015,	p.66-68).	
	
In	 response	 to	 the	 escalation	 of	 these	 tensions,	 the	 regime	 adopted	 an	 increasingly	
authoritarian	 stance	 and	 attempted	 to	 restrict	 any	 articulation	 of	 political	 dissent	 in	 the	
media.	However,	this	response	in	turn	engendered	further	expressions	of	dissatisfaction	and	
calls	 for	the	 liberalisation	of	public	and	political	expression,	creating	a	cycle	which	the	state	
was	unable	to	break.		The	discrepancy	between	the	positive	image	projected	by	the	regime,	
and	 the	 rising	 instability	 and	 recurrent	 crises	 on	 the	 ground,	 had	 reached	 a	 new	 level	 of	
incongruity.	 The	 national	 media’s	 complete	 lack	 of	 coverage	 of	 the	 attacks	 in	 Djerba	 and	
Soliman,	and	of	the	protests	in	Gafsa	(Zayani,	2015,	p.65),	arguably	had	the	effect	of	further	
undermining	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 throwing	 its	 vulnerabilities	 into	 ever	 sharper	
relief	(Geisser	and	Gobe,	2008).		
	
2.6. The	digital	media	sphere:	an	increasingly	difficult	space	to	control	
	
The	 proliferation	 of	 transnational	 television	 and	 online	 media	 technologies	 made	 the	
systematic	control	of	communicative	flows	increasingly	difficult	to	maintain	(Murphy,	2011).	
For	 instance,	 the	 Tunisian	 government	 was	 forced,	 in	 2006,	 to	 abrogate	 a	 law	 aimed	 at	
restricting	the	sale	of	satellite	dishes,	having	given	up	on	attempts	to	restrict	their	purchase	
and	 use	 (Chouikha,	 2007).	 Political	 activists	 took	 advantage	 of	 the	 communicative	
opportunities	afforded	by	digital	 technologies	to	express	their	opinions,	 in	particular,	 in	the	
few	media	spaces	that	had	eluded	government	control.	For	some,	foreign	satellite	television	
channels	and	online	petitions	were	a	means	of	appealing	to	international	public	opinion	and	
non-governmental	organisations	into	exerting	political	pressure	on	the	Tunisian	government	
by	its	Western	partners	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.58).	By	2007,	at	least	sixty	per	cent	of	
																																																						
39	Mohamed	Bouazizi	is	the	street	vendor	whose	self-immolation	in	Sidi	Bouzid	triggered	the	revolutionary	protest	movements	in	
December	2010	(as	detailed	later	in	this	chapter).	
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Tunisian	households	had	a	satellite	television	dish40	in	urban	as	well	as	rural	areas	(Chouikha,	
2007),	 providing	 them	with	 access	 to	 channels	 from	different	 parts	 of	 the	world,	 including	
hundreds	of	Arabic-speaking	channels	 that	proliferated	 in	 the	2000’s.	Qatari	broadcaster	Al	
Jazeera,	which	played	an	important	role	in	the	transformation	of	the	Arab	public	sphere	from	
the	mid-1990’s	(Lynch,	2006;	El	Oifi,	2011),	was	seen	by	the	state	to	pose	a	particular	threat,	
due	 to	 its	 critical	 stance	 towards	 the	 Tunisian	 government.	 It	made	 frequent	 references	 to	
the	political	situation	in	the	country,	and	provided	a	platform	from	which	Tunisian	opposition	
figures41	 could	 air	 their	 opinions.	 A	 number	 of	 unlicensed	 Tunisian	 satellite	 channels	 also	
emerged	 at	 this	 time,	 launched	 by	 exiled	 political	 opponents,	which	 primarily	 broadcasted	
political	 content	 from	outside	 the	country	 for	a	 few	hours	per	week	 (e.g.	El	Mustakillah,	El	
Hiwar).	
	
On	the	whole	however,	online	media	became	the	favoured	space	of	expression	for	opposition	
activists	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 For	 instance,	 Sihem	 Ben	 Sedrine,	 a	 human	 rights	
activist	whose	journalistic	work	had	been	repeatedly	subjected	to	restrictions	and	sustained	
governmental	interference	since	the	1980’s,	was	swift	to	recognise	and	exploit	the	possibility	
offered	by	the	Internet	to	reach	a	wider	audience.	Having	been	denied	permission	to	issue	a	
print	publication,	she	consequently	launched	an	online	newspaper,	Kalima42	(Pintak,	2007),	in	
2000.	But	equally,	the	Internet	became	increasingly	important	in	enabling	the	rise	of	a	“digital	
culture	of	contention”	(Zayani,	2015),	from	which	new	actors	and	forms	of	activism	emerged	
that	 were	 not	 tied	 to	 any	 officially	 recognised	 or	 clandestine	 political	 grouping.	 Zayani	
provides	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 the	 development	 of	 cyber-activism	 in	 the	 Tunisian	 context	
over	 the	 decade	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 revolution,	 carefully	 charting	 and	 contextualising	 its	
evolution	 from	 early	 experiments	 with	 news	 sites,	 newsletters	 and	 online	 forums	 (e.g.	
TUNeZINE,	Réveil	Tunisien)	run	by	a	few	isolated	individuals	and	groups,	many	of	whom	were	
part	of	the	Tunisian	diaspora,	to	the	rise	of	a	community	of	bloggers	who	ultimately	provided	
an	important	connection	between	offline	and	online	contention	during	the	revolution.	Zayani	
highlights	 the	 close	 link	 between	 succeeding	 waves	 of	 Tunisian	 cyber-activists,	 their	
experimentation	with	 various	 forms	 of	 online	 expression	 as	well	 as	 its	 boundaries,	 and	 he	
provides	 important	 insights	 into	 how	 the	 state’s	 intensive,	 and	 increasingly	 arbitrary,	
censoring	of	the	Internet	inevitably	affected	all	aspects	of	everyday	and	social	life.	The	state’s	
																																																						
40	A	figure	difficult	to	estimate	due	to	the	proliferation	of	black	market	dishes.	Chouikha	(2007)	refers	to	at	least	sixty	per	cent	
and	Mabrouk	(2007)	mentions	a	satellite	penetration	rate	of	sixty-nine	per	cent.	
41	Notably	for	Moncef	Marzouki,	who	was	to	be	elected	as	president	after	the	revolution.	
42	The	Arabic	word	Kalima	means	‘word’.	In	2008	ben	Sedrine	also	co-founded	an	unauthorised	radio	station	of	the	same	name.	
After	her	enforced	exile	in	2009,	the	station	continued	to	broadcast	its	programmes	online	from	France.	
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approach	 was	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 gradual	 politicisation	 of	 a	 section	 of	 the	 Tunisian	 blogging	
community.	
	
A	 number	 of	 protest	 actions	 were	 organised,	 over	 the	 years,	 to	 contest	 rising	 levels	 of	
censorship	as	the	state	assumed	an	increasingly	authoritarian	character.	These	were	initially	
mostly	staged	by	political	activists,	or	members	of	the	media	and	journalistic	community	with	
direct	experience	of	the	negative	consequences	of	censorship	on	their	livelihoods.	However,	
anti-censorship	campaigns	intensified	over	the	last	years	of	the	Ben	Ali	regime,	in	large	part	a	
consequence	 of	 the	 extension	 of	 media	 expression,	 production,	 and	 distribution	
opportunities	offered	to	a	wider	section	of	the	population	through	access	to	the	Internet.	A	
pivotal	moment	in	the	evolution	of	this	movement	was	arguably	the	hosting	by	Tunisia	of	the	
World	 Internet	 Summit	 (WIS)	 in	 2005,	 which	 was	 used	 to	 draw	 the	 attention	 of	 the	
international	community	to	the	suppression	of	democratic	rights	and	freedom	of	expression	
in	Tunisia.	Significantly,	members	of	different	opposition	parties	organised	a	joint	protest	and	
staged	a	month-long	hunger	strike	ahead	of	the	summit.	Cyber-activists	also	coordinated	an	
international	 web-campaign	 during	 the	 summit	 to	 denounce	 the	 lack	 of	 freedom	 of	
expression	 in	 the	 country43.	 The	 government’s	 response	 was	 to	 censor	 undesired	 online	
coverage,	attack	journalists	covering	the	protests,	and	even	interrupting	the	live	transmission	
of	the	summit’s	opening	ceremony	on	national	television	when	the	subject	of	censorship	was	
referred	to.	
	
The	following	years	were	marked	by	the	exponential	growth	of	the	Tunisian	blogosphere.	For	
the	most	part,	political	subject	matter	remained	taboo	in	these	blogs,	but	at	the	same	time	
increasingly	 creative	 and	 playful	 strategies	 were	 developed	 in	 this	 space	 to	 bypass	 the	
regime’s	imposed	boundaries	of	expression	(see	Zayani,	2015,	p.123-126	for	further	details).	
Although	the	community	of	bloggers	who	were	bold	enough	to	challenge	these	restrictions	
remained	 relatively	 small	 (Aisen	 Kallander,	 2013),	 their	 anti-censorship	 campaigning	
intensified	and	became	more	coordinated,	partly	 reflecting	widespread	anger	at	 the	state’s	
increasingly	 severe	persecution	 and	 imprisonment	of	 online	dissidents.	 The	 anti-censorship	
movement	 culminated	 in	 2010	 with	 attempts	 by	 cyber-activists	 to	 translate	 online	
campaigning	 into	 physical	 action	 in	 the	 form	 of	 street	 demonstrations,	 a	 day	 they	 termed	
“Nhar	ala	Ammar”	(a	day	against	Ammar44),	which	led	to	the	arrest	of	its	main	instigators	and	
																																																						
43	The	campaign	was	run	under	the	motto	“Yezzi	Fock	Ben	Ali”,	which	similarly	to	the	slogan	of	the	‘Kefaya’	movement	in	Egypt,	
or	the	‘Ya	Basta’	motto	of	the	Zapatistas	in	Mexico	and	the	anti-capitalist	association	in	Italy,	meant	“enough	already”	and	called	
for	the	end	of	oppression.	Yezzi	Fock	asked	supporters	to	upload	photos	of	themselves	holding	a	sign	reading	the	slogan.	The	
campaign	was	picked	up	by	several	prominent	international	news	media	(Zayani,	2015,	p.100-103).	
44	With	reference	to	online	censors	nicknamed	‘Ammar	404’,	as	mentioned	earlier	in	the	chapter.	
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the	 forced	 cancellation	 of	 the	 protest.	 More	 campaigns	 were	 organised	 over	 subsequent	
months,	and	were	 responded	 to	with	 further	 repression.	Despite	 these	 restrictions	and	 the	
limited	 success	 of	 these	 campaigns	 in	mobilising	 the	wider	 blogging	 community	 or	 a	wider	
public,	 the	 intensification	 of	 the	 anti-censorship	movement	 arguably	 had	 a	more	 effective	
longer-term	 contribution	 in	 strengthening	 the	 bonds	 of	 trust	 and	 solidarity	 in	 the	 small	
community	 of	 cyber-activists,	 which	 was	 later	 to	 be	 of	 far	 greater	 significance	 during	 the	
protests	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 revolution.	 	 It	 also	 articulated	 a	 powerful,	 symbolic	message	 to	
other	citizens,	within	the	wider	context	of	rising	social	contention;	that	it	was	possible	to	defy	
Ben	Ali’s	regime.	
	
The	social	media	space	was	not	 immune	to	the	prevalent	nature	of	political	surveillance.	 In	
particular,	 the	 increasing	 popularity	 of	 social	 media	 posed	 a	 particular	 challenge	 for	 the	
government,	as	they	permitted	the	rapid,	widespread	dissemination	of	public	opinion.	Access	
to	platforms	such	as	video	sharing	site	Youtube	and	Daily	Motion,	and	photo-sharing	platform	
Flickr,	 were	 all	 censored	 in	 turn.	 However,	 social	 networking	 platform	 Facebook	 was	
particularly	 problematic	 due	 to	 its	 popularity	 and	 the	 threat	 it	 potentially	 posed	 to	 the	
regime.	Although	its	use	remained	predominantly	de-politicised	prior	to	the	revolution,	it	was	
an	 attractive	 space	 for	 cyber-activists	 to	 migrate	 to,	 as	 censorship	 of	 the	 blogging	 sphere	
intensified	 and	 it	 became	 an	 ideologically	 compromised	 space	 as	 a	 result	 of	 intensive	
government	propaganda	campaigns	(Zayani,	2015,	p.121).	It	was	not	possible	for	the	regime	
to	 filter	 through	 communications	 on	 Facebook	 to	 detect	 suspicious	 activity,	 other	 than	 by	
deploying	 agents	 to	 infiltrate	 this	 communicative	 space	 and	 spy	 on	 individual	 users.	
According	to	Silver	(2011),	a	new	software	to	enable	more	systematic	surveillance	had	been	
ordered	by	 the	regime,	but	 the	revolution	occurred	before	 this	 tool	could	be	delivered	and	
implemented.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 2008,	 the	 government	 blocked	 all	 access	 to	 the	 platform	
from	within	the	country.	A	few	campaigns	emerged	to	protest	against	this	ban,	including	one	
in	which	users	 threatened	 to	 terminate	 their	 Internet	 subscriptions	 if	 Facebook	access	was	
not	reinstated	(Zayani,	2015,	p.146).	Perhaps	most	harmful,	from	the	state’s	perspective,	was	
the	reputational	damage	inflicted	by	the	strategy	as	it	drew	unwanted	international	attention	
to	its	broader	socially	repressive	policies,	and	bred	resentment	among	thousands	of	Tunisian	
Internet	users	accustomed	to	socialising,	flirting	and	sharing	their	private	lives	on	Facebook.	It	
remains	unclear	precisely	what	triggered	a	change	in	the	regime’s	social	media	strategy,	but	
two	weeks	later,	access	to	Facebook	was	reinstated	in	Tunisia.	By	the	time	of	the	revolution,	
the	 platform’s	 use	 had	 increased	 exponentially,	 with	 an	 estimated	 eighty	 per	 cent	 of	 just	
under	four	million	web-connected	Tunisians	subscribing	to	it	(Internet	World	Stats,	2011).		
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3. From	revolution	to	democratic	transition		
	
3.1. An	unsustainable	social	and	political	context	
	
At	the	time	of	the	December	2010	protests,	Ben	Ali	had	been	in	power	for	23	years,	securing	
five	 consecutive	 terms	 in	 national	 elections,	 which	 returned	 him	 with	 a	 consistently	
implausible	share	of	over	ninety	per	cent	of	 the	vote.	The	growing	sense	of	 frustration	and	
injustice	felt	by	a		significant	section	of	the	population	came	to	be	symbolised	by	the	public	
self-immolation	of	 street	vendor	Mohamed	Bouazizi	 in	mid-December	2010.	The	act,	which	
took	 place	 in	 front	 of	 the	 municipal	 building	 of	 the	 town	 of	 Sidi	 Bouzid,	 followed	 the	
confiscation	of	his	cart	–	his	livelihood	-	by	local	police,	and	the	refusal	of	the	local	governor	
to	 hear	 his	 pleas	 for	 its	 return.	 The	 government’s	 attempted	 suppression	 of	 the	 ensuing	
region-wide	 protests	 triggered	 larger-scale	 demonstrations	 as	 widespread	 economic	 and	
political	disatisfaction	coalesced,	which	quickly	spread	to	key	cities	and	the	capital.	By	mid-
January,	Ben-Ali’s	promises	to	introduce	more	egalitarian	policies	and	implement	democratic	
reform	 had	 been	 broadly	 rejected	 by	 the	 protesters,	 and	 on	 14th	 January	 2011,	 mass	
mobilisation	in	the	capital	prompted	the	departure	of	the	president	to	what	was	to	become	
permanent	exile	 in	 Saudi	Arabia.	Bouazizi’s	 act	 initially	 caused	 spontaneous	protests	 in	 Sidi	
Bouzid,	a	town	located	in	Tunisia’s	geographic	centre	whose	forty	thousand	inhabitants	had	
experienced	decades	of	socio-economic	marginalisation.	Only	a	few	months	earlier	the	state	
had	 taken	 repressive	measures	 to	 quell	 the	 protests	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	 region	 (see	 above),	
which	had	an	effect	on	local	anti-government	sentiment.			
	
No	single	factor	is	attributable	for	the	successful	outcome	of	these	uprisings.	The	escalation	
was	partly	due	to	the	eruption	of	spontaneous	solidarity	protests	across	the	country,	as	well	
as	 riots	 and	 acts	 of	 vandalism	 against	 state	 instituions	 and	 party	 buildings	 through	 which	
citizens’	 long-repressed	 anger	 against	 Ben	 Ali’s	 regime	 apparatus	 was	 vividly	 and	 violently	
expressed.	Members	 of	 every	 social	 group	 eventually	 joined	 these	 uprisings,	 and	 no	 clear	
leadership	 structure	 of	 the	movement	was	 identifiable	 (Zayani,	 2015;	 Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	
2015).	 The	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 background	 to	 the	 revolution	 outlined	 in	 this	
chapter	highlight	 that	a	 renewed	political	 crisis	 and	accompanying	public	discord	 in	Tunisia	
were	probably	inevitable.	However,	the	scale	of	the	escalation,	propagation	and	politicisation	
of	 this	 crisis,	 from	 its	 early	 stages	 in	 December	 2010	 to	 the	 departure	 of	 Ben	 Ali	 in	 mid-
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January	2011,	was	 tied	 to	a	number	of	contributory	 factors	and	 the	 involvement	of	 several	
groups	of	individuals	and	activists.	
	
The	 specific	 succession	 of	 incidents	 and	 the	 timing	 of	 events	 had	 a	 part	 to	 play	 in	 this	
escalation.	The	relatively	delayed	reaction	by	the	president	to	these	events	was,	for	instance,	
due	to	the	fact	that	Ben	Ali	was	abroad	in	Dubai	when	these	events	started	(Camau,	2014).	
Equally,	 whereas	 the	 early	 phase	 of	 the	 protests	 had	 started	 to	 lose	 momentum	 in	 Sidi	
Bouzid,	 it	was	 a	 number	of	 rapidly	 succeeding	 events	 that	 fuelled	 the	movement	 including	
the	 second	public	 suicide	of	 a	 young	man	 five	days	after	Bouazizi’s,	 and	 the	 first	deaths	of	
protestors	from	police	gunshots	in	neighbouring	areas	two	days	afterwards.	Furthermore,	the	
wider	spread	of	the	social	movements	to	other	regions	can	be	partly	tied	to	the	start	of	a	new	
term	at	 secondary	 and	higher	educational	 establishments,	 as	many	 young	people	 gathered	
again	 in	 great	 numbers	 after	 spending	 time	 home	 or	 with	 families	 during	 the	 winter	
holidays45.	Although	 these	are	quite	 incidental	parameters,	 they	are	worth	mentioning	as	a	
different	timing	may	have	delayed	or	altered	the	movements’	escalation.	
	
More	significantly,	the	handling	of	these	events	by	the	regime	was	an	important	factor	in	the	
rapid	 expansion,	 in	numbers	 and	 geographical	 range,	 of	 the	protests.	 The	disproportionate	
level	 of	 violence	used	by	 security	 forces	 to	 subdue	 the	protests	 inflamed	an	already	highly	
volatile	 situation.	 The	 rising	 death	 toll	 as	 police	 started	 to	 use	 live	 ammunition	 against	
protestors	 was	 an	 important	 catalyst	 in	 intensifying	 the	 level	 of	 violence	 present	 in	
confrontations	 between	 local	 youth	 and	 security	 forces,	 and	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 triggering	
solidarity	protests	in	other	regions.	The	cumulative	effect	of	this	was	a	gradual	shift	in	most	
protestors’	demands	from	socio-economic	to	political	ones.	By	the	time	Bouazizi	died	of	his	
burns,	 two	weeks	 after	 his	 act	 of	 protest,	 the	movement	 had	 reached	 the	 governorate	 of	
Kasserine,	 where	 unprecedented	 levels	 of	 police	 brutality	 and	 cruelty46	 triggered	 further	
public	 demonstrations	 in	 key	 urban	 centres	 and	 the	 capital.	 In	 total	 over	 three	 hundred	
people	 died	 in	 the	 events	which	 took	 place	 during	 the	 revolution,	 and	 in	 the	 chaos	which	
ensued	in	the	power-vacuum	following	Ben	Ali’s	departure	(Bouderbala	Commission,	2012).	
Close	to	two	thousand	people	were	also	injured.	The	violent	response	of	state	security	forces	
was	accompanied	by	an	antagonistic	and	dismissive	position	adopted	by	the	president	in	his	
initial	 speeches	 that	 attempted	 to	 delegitimise	 the	 protestors	 by	 characterising	 them	 as	
terrorists	and	delinquents.	It	was	only	once	the	movement	had	built	up	a	strong	momentum	
																																																						
45NB:	A	week	later,	by	10th	January,	classes	were	suspended	again.	
46	For	example,	in	the	governorate	Kasserine,	a	women’s	hammam	(public	bath)	was	attacked	and	a	number	of	injured	
protestors	were	prohibited	from	accessing	hospitals	(Bouderbala	Commission,	2012,	p.21).	
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that	 this	 uncompromising	 stance	 shifted,	 with	 the	 president	 assuming	 a	more	 conciliatory	
tone,	in	his	last	speech	on	13th	January	(delivered	for	the	first	time	in	Tunisian	dialect47),	and	
promised	socio-economic	reforms	and	important	political	concessions.		
		
Equally,	one	of	the	most	significant	contributory	elements	to	the	outcome	of	the	revolution	
was	that	different	social	and	political	players	joined	the	protest	movement	during	this	period,	
crucially	 among	 them	was	 the	national	union	 confederation	UGTT.	Members	of	 local	UGTT	
syndicates	 were	 soon	 involved	 in	 the	 Sidi	 Bouzid	 demonstrations,	 helping	 to	 stage	 and	
coordinate	 further	 protests,	 and	 to	 frame	 the	 tragic	 narrative	 of	 Bouazizi’s	 act48	 to	 the	
populations	 of	 other	 areas.	 Although	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 national	 union	 was	 slow	 to	
officially	 express	 its	 support	 of	 the	 movement,	 local	 branches	 across	 the	 country	 quickly	
sought	to	politically	capitalise	of	events	and	mobilise	workers	in	different	regions	(Chouikha	
and	 Gobe,	 2015,	 p.76).	 Eventually,	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 union’s	 leadership,	 despite	 its	
relatively	conciliatory	position	and	apparent	hesitancy	to	take	an	unambiguous	stand	against	
the	 state,	 marked	 a	 decisive	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 movement,	 leading	 to	 the	 successful	
organisation	of	 a	 general	 strike	 in	 key	 cities	on	12th	 January,	 including	 in	 Sfax,	 the	 country’	
second	 biggest	 city	 (Langohr,	 2014,	 p.182).	 Additionally,	 the	 involvement	 of	 other	
professional	 groups,	 notably	 that	 of	 Tunisian	 lawyers	 who	 staged	 protests	 in	 front	 of	
tribunals,	 also	 lent	 the	 demonstrations	 important	 symbolic	weight.	 The	 role	 played	 by	 the	
Tunisian	 army	was	 also	 fundamental	 in	 supporting	 the	movement	 in	 its	 final	 stages	 before	
Ben	 Ali’s	 departure,	 as	 the	 relatively	 small	 Tunisian	military	 body,	 sent	 in	 to	 protect	 state	
institutions,	 chose	 to	maintain	 a	 strictly	 neutral	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 ongoing	 events.	 Its	
refusal	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 repressive	measures	 being	 undertaken	 by	 other	 state	 security	
organs	at	a	time	when	these	started	to	lose	control	over	the	situation,	effectively	translated	
into	tacit	support	for	the	socio-political	movements.	
		
3.2. Media’s	role	during	the	revolution	
	
The	media	sphere	further	contributed	to	these	factors	in	several	ways.	Importantly,	the	role	
of	new	media	needs	 to	be	understood	 in	 relation	 to	 the	wider	existing	media	 landscape	 in	
Tunisia	during	this	period.	National	media,	for	instance,	continued	to	act,	as	it	had	in	the	past,	
as	barriers	to	the	circulation	of	information	about	the	rising	movement.	Whereas	a	complete	
																																																						
47	Previously,	all	presidential	speeches	were	delivered	in	the	more	formal	classical	Arabic	language	(fos’ha).	
48	For	instance,	in	order	to	add	to	the	dramatic	impact	of	the	event	and	mobilize	more	people,	these	narratives	were	shaped	to	
highlight	Bouazizi’s	status	as	a	victim	(Langohr,	2014,	p.181).	Equally,	the	false	rumor	was	generated	that	he	was	an	unemployed	
graduate,	which	gave	his	desperate	act	more	resonance	(Chouikha	and	Gobe,	2015,	p.76).	Zayani	(2015,	p.176)	also	points	out	
that	imagery	found	online	was	used	to	depict	Bouazizi’s	self-immolation	as	none	was	available	when,	in	fact,	the	photo	
originated	from	a	South	Korean	cult.	
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information	blackout	was	no	 longer	sustainable	with	the	spread	of	the	uprisings	 in	January,	
programming	 on	 public	 television	 remained	 unaltered	 and	 only	minimal	 references	 to	 the	
turmoil	were	made	in	daily	news	bulletins.	Similarly,	national	media	continued	to	serve	as	a	
propaganda	 tool	 for	 the	 regime.	 Zayani	 (2015)	 notes,	 in	 this	 respect,	 that	 public	 television	
channel	Tounes	7	was	broadcasting	images	of	jubilant	Ben	Ali	supporters	celebrating	on	the	
streets	after	the	announcement	of	reforms	by	the	president	in	his	last	speech	on	13th	January	
(p.78).		
	
Al	 Jazeera’s	 coverage	 of	 the	 uprisings	 also	 attracted	much	 attention	 and	was	 regarded	 by	
some	 observers	 as	 crucial	 to	 regime	 change	 in	 Tunisia.	 As	 previously	 noted,	 satellite	
penetration	rate	in	the	country	was	much	higher	than	Internet	penetration	and,	as	the	main	
reference	point	for	televised	political	coverage	in	the	Arab	world	at	the	time,	Al	Jazeera	was	
soon	accessed	by	a	significant	share	of	a	population	frustrated	by	the	absence	of	content	on	
national	 media	 sources.	 The	 broadcaster	 was	 among	 the	 first	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 events	 in	
Tunisia,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 it	 played	 an	 active	 role	 in	 amplifying	 the	 size	 and	
influence	of	the	protest	movement,	by	providing	uninterrupted	coverage	of	them	at	an	early	
stage	 (Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	 2015,	 p.175).	 In	 addition,	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 coverage	 was	
significant	as	much	of	it	consisted	of	amateur	video	footage,	rather	than	professionally	shot	
material.	 Indeed,	 as	 Hammami	 (2011)	 points	 out,	 the	 broadcaster	 had	 no	 official	 active	
presence	in	Tunisia	at	the	time,	its	local	office	having	been	forced	to	close	a	number	of	years	
earlier	due	to	restrictions	imposed	by	the	Ben	Ali	regime.	These	limitations	on	filming	meant	
that	 the	 broadcaster	 relied	 substantially	 on	 transmitting	 amateur	 footage	 instead,	 which	
contributed	 to	one	of	 the	 first	 instances	of	what	Hammami	 refers	 to	 as	 a	 "bi-media"	 logic,	
where	 traditional	 and	 new	media	 reinforced	 each	 other	 (ibid).	 Furthermore,	 Campbell	 and	
Hawk	 highlight	 in	 their	 analysis	 of	 the	 broadcaster’s	 news	 programming	 during	 the	
revolutionary	 period	 (2012)	 that	 it	 also	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 shaping	 a	 positive	
narrative	 about	 civic	 empowerment	 through	 social	media	 during	 these	 uprisings.	 Campbell	
and	Hawk	argue	that	this	helped	to	establish	social	media	not	only	as	a	useful	resource,	but	in	
fact	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 social	 and	 political	 change	 (p.5),	 a	 narrative	 that	 supported	 the	
broadcaster’s	 own	 ideological	 positioning	 as	 a	proponent	of	 democratisation	 and	a	 revived	
pan-Arab	identity.		
	
New	media	provided	an	important	space	for	the	circulation	of	imagery	and	information	that	
starkly	 contrasted	 with	 the	 regime’s	 official	 discourse.	 As	 the	 protest	 movements	 in	 the	
country	 gathered	 pace	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 January	 2011,	 Facebook	 turned	 into	 a	 central	
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online	 network	 for	 the	 dissemination	 of	 highly	 politicised	 media	 content	 whilst	 national	
media	 outlets	 were	 still	 reconsidering	 their	 political	 position.	 Citizens	 with	 Internet	 access	
turned	en	masse	to	this	social	media	platform	with	the	aim	of	forming	a	level	of	connection	
with	a	national	political	environment	in	flux.	Much	of	this	online	media	content	was	produced	
by	individual	protestors	capturing	video	footage	on	their	phones,	as	well	as	by	cyber-activists	
reporting	 from	 the	 locations	 of	 demonstrations	 and	 increasingly	 overtly	 expressing	 their	
support	for	the	movement.	The	role	of	these	activists	was	most	tangible	in	terms	of	helping	
the	 dissemination	 of	 this	 content	 by	 circumventing	 and	 undermining	 censorship.	 Indeed,	 a	
real	 battle	 unfolded	 online	 between	 the	 regime	 and	 cyber-activists	 during	 the	 revolution,	
which	 is	 indicative	of	 the	 level	 of	 political	 threat	 associated	by	 the	 regime	with	networked	
online	 communication.	 Government	 censors	 intensified	 their	 control	 of	 website	 and	 blog	
content,	blocking	access	to	controversial	material	and	arresting	some	of	the	most	prominent	
cyber-activists.	 Additionally,	 they	 hacked	 into	 emails	 and	 social	 media	 accounts,	 stealing	
passwords	 and	 deleting	 undesirable	 content	 (Silver,	 2011;	 Madrigal,	 2011)	 -	 cyber-attacks	
that	were	 conducted,	 according	 to	Silver,	directly	 from	 the	presidential	palace	 (rather	 than	
the	 ATI)	 with	 the	 help	 of	 hired	 foreign	 hackers.	 In	 response,	 direct	 collaboration	 between	
cyber-activists	and	IT	staff	at	Facebook	helped	to	raise	awareness	of	these	issues	and	of	the	
disappearance	 of	 some	 content	 posted	 on	 the	 platform.	 As	 a	 result,	 additional	 security	
measures	were	 instated	by	 them	to	prevent	 further	attacks,	and	 to	provide	 safer	access	 to	
the	platform	for	social	media	users	in	the	country	(Denieul,	2013).	Counter-attacks	were	also	
coordinated,	 under	 the	 name	 ‘Operation	 Tunisia’,	 by	 hacking	 group	 Anonymous	 in	
collaboration	 with	 Tunisian	 cyberactivists,	 with	 the	 avowed	 aim	 of	 disabling	 the	 state	
censorship	 apparatus	 and	 bringing	 down	 several	 Tunisian	 government	 websites	 (Aisen	
Kallander,	2013).	These	activities	 further	served	to	transmit	a	sense	of	 the	political	 turmoil,	
and	 repression,	 in	 Tunisia	 to	 an	 international	 audience.	 In	 a	 last	 attempt	 to	 quell	 popular	
anger	 during	 his	 speech	 on	 13th	 January,	 Ben	 Ali	 announced	 the	 end	 of	 censorship	 and	
enabled	access	to	previously	censored	online	sites	and	social	media	platforms	(e.g.	Youtube),	
but	the	impact	of	this	announcement	was	severely	diminished	by	the	fact	that	footage	of	the	
protests	was	already	being	broadcast,	and	that	extensive	politicised	use	of	social	media	was	
already	underway,	irrespective	of	the	regime’s	surveillance	machinery.	Many	citizens	had,	by	
that	 point,	 lost	 the	 fear	 of	 publicly	 expressing	 their	 dissatisfaction	 and	 anger	 with	 the	
government.	
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3.3. The	discovery	of	new	democratic	freedoms	and	the	resurgence	of	religion	on	the				
political	map	
	
Although	this	research	focuses	in	more	detail	on	specific	moments	during	the	post-revolution	
phase,	 its	 overall	 scope	 covers	 a	 three-year	 period	 from	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 revolution	 in	
December	2010	to	the	resignation	of	the	first	elected	post-revolution	government	at	the	end	
of	2013.	This	last	part	of	the	chapter	provides	a	brief	chronological	overview	of	key	events	of	
relevance	to	understanding	this	post-revolution	period	(a	more	detailed	exploration	of	these	
issues	is	provided	in	subsequent	chapters	of	this	dissertation).	This	three-year	period	can	be	
roughly	divided	 into	 three	phases:	a	 first	phase	of	 just	under	a	year	 from	the	 revolution	 to	
elections	 at	 the	 end	 of	 October	 2011;	 a	 second	 phase	 to	 February	 2013	 when	 a	 political	
assassination	marked	a	turning	point	in	Tunisia's	transitional	period;	a	third	phase	to	the	end	
of	 2013	 where	 a	 continued	 rise	 in	 violence	 and	 a	 second	 political	 assassination	 led	 to	 a	
lengthy	political	crisis,	which	ended	with	the	formation	of	a	provisional	unity	government	and	
the	 accelerated	 completion	 of	 the	 new	 Tunisian	 constitution.	 A	 chronological	 overview	 of	
these	events	is	also	included	in	Appendix	(A)	at	the	end	of	this	dissertation.	
	
The	 immediate	 aftermath	 of	 Ben	 Ali's	 departure	 was	 marked	 by	 a	 mix	 of	 euphoria	 and	
anarchy	 as	 scores	 were	 settled,	 hierarchies	 overturned	 and	 large	 numbers	 of	 detainees	
released	 from	 prisons	 (France	 24,	 2011).	 The	 former	 regime's	 prime	minister	Mohammed	
Ghannouchi	 temporarily	 headed	 the	 government	 but,	 under	 renewed	 pressure	 from	 the	
streets	 during	 the	 ‘El	 Kasbah	 sit-ins’,	 he	 was	 forced	 to	 resign	 in	 March	 2011.	 A	 new	
transitional	 government,	 deemed	 to	 be	 further	 removed	 from	 the	 former	 political	 power	
network,	was	formed	and	the	RCD	party	was	formally	dissolved.	This	government	was	headed	
by	 Beji	 Caid	 Essebsi,	 an	 octogenarian	 who	 previously	 served	 as	 minister	 under	 one	 of	
Bourguiba's	 governments,	 and	 who	 was	 to	 subsequently	 establish	 one	 of	 Tunisia’s	 main	
political	parties,	Nidaa	Tounes.	A	number	of	commissions	were	formed	during	this	period	to	
support	the	process	of	political	reform	and	investigate	alleged	abuses	by	the	former	regime.		
	
In	this	new	context,	freedom	of	expression	and	rights	for	political	participation	were	radically	
transformed.	Hundreds	of	new	media	outlets	emerged	and,	as	El-Issawi	 (2012a)	notes,	 this	
period	witnessed	the	"legalisation	of	more	than	106	political	parties,	most	of	them	unknown	
to	 the	 Tunisian	 voters"	 (p.19).	More	 generally,	 a	 new	public	 realm	 emerged.	 Citizens	were	
suddenly	 able	 to	 discuss	 political	 opinions	 in	 public	 without	 fear	 of	 reprisals.	 Public	 and	
private	media	 broadcasted	 a	wide	 range	 of	 political	 analysis	 and	 debate	 programmes,	 civil	
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society	progressively	organised	 into	new	structures,	and	numerous	non-profit	organisations	
and	 charities	were	 created	 (600	 new	 associations	 between	October	 2011	 and	March	 2012	
alone	 (IFEX-TMG,	 2012).	 The	 media	 landscape	 was	 also	 extensively	 expanded.	 Initially	 an	
explosion	of	print-based	titles	occurred,	evinced	by	the	emergence	of	228	new	publications	
(INRIC,	 2012)	 immediately	 after	 the	 revolution,	 although	most	 of	 these	 have	 since	 ceased	
activity.	Within	eighteen	months,	five	new	television	channels	and	twelve	national,	as	well	as	
regional,	 radio	 stations	 were	 also	 created,	 and	 the	 Tunisian	 Internet	 Agency	 (Agence	
Tunsienne	de	l’Internet	-	ATI)	announced	the	end	of	Internet	censorship	(Unesco,	2012,	p.50).	
In	 this	 context,	 online	 social	 networking	 platform	 Facebook	 became	 a	 particularly	 popular	
and	vibrant	platform	for	expression	and	interaction.	In	2011,	this	social	networking	site	was	
the	most	visited	website	in	Tunisia	(Kharbachi,	2011).		
	
The	first	democratic	elections	in	the	country	were	held	at	the	end	of	October	2011,	aimed	at	
electing	members	of	a	constituent	assembly	for	a	period	of	one	year.	This	assembly's	role	was	
to	appoint	 the	new	government	and	 to	draft	a	new	constitution	 for	 the	country.	Mounting	
disagreement	over	the	role	of	Islam	in	public	life	and	the	country's	secularist	legacy	became	
key	issues	when	the	elections	brought	Islamist	party	Ennahdha	to	power,	with	over	forty	per	
cent	of	the	vote	(ISIE,	2012).	The	party's	perceived	identification	with	working	class	interests,	
and	its	ability	to	organise	an	effective	electoral	campaign	(El-Issawi,	2012a,	p.19)	were	critical	
components	 in	 securing	 its	 political	 victory.	 Significantly,	 the	 party’s	 background	 as	
persecuted	 political	 opponent	 under	 Bourguiba	 and	 Ben	 Ali,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 religious	
foundation,	 lent	 it	credibility	 in	the	eyes	of	many	Tunisians	eager	to	witness	a	radical	break	
with	 former	 governments	 that	 were	 perceived	 as	 both	 morally	 and	 financially	 corrupt.	 A	
'troika'	 coalition	 government,	 led	 by	 Ennahdha	 together	with	 two	 secular	 parties	 (CPR	 and	
Ettakatol),	was	formed	by	the	end	of	December	2011.	The	electoral	results	marked	a	shift	in	
the	socio-political	landscape.	
	
The	 subsequent	 political	 phase	 and	 its	 contentious	 process	 of	 drafting	 a	 new	 constitution	
foregrounded	 issues	 that	 had	 little	 or	 no	 connection	with	 the	 revolution's	 initial	 demands,	
and	 redirected	 national	 debate	 towards	 questions	 of	 religion	 and	 national	 identity	
(Antonakis-Nashif,	 2013).	 This	was	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 religiously-anchored	 political	
movement	 to	 power,	 but	 equally	 a	 predictable	 outcome	 of	 the	 extensive	 and	 unremitting	
restrictions	imposed	for	decades	on	public	discourse	in	relation	to	these	issues.	Polarisation	
between	 "the	 traditional	 Tunisia	 of	 conservative	 Islam"	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 "the	
Francophile	Tunisia	inspired	by	the	secular	colonial	regime"	(El-Issawi,	2012a,	p.20),	became	
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increasingly	evident	during	this	period.	This	situation	was	exacerbated	by	the	relatively	slow	
progress	 made	 by	 the	 governing	 triple-coalition,	 which	 faced	 a	 multitude	 of	 obstacles	 to	
implementing	 effective	 reforms	 -	 including	 an	 alarming	 economic	 situation	 (Yaros,	 2013).	
Furthermore,	 Ennahda	 was	 increasingly	 criticised	 by	 opposition	 groups	 during	 this	 period,	
due	to	its	perceived	tolerance	towards	the	rise	of	extremist	Salafist	and	jihadi	groups	(Shadid,	
2012)	whose	actions,	such	as	an	attack	on	the	US	embassy	in	Tunis	in	September	2012,	went	
largely	 unpunished.	 These	 developments	 gradually	 served	 to	 strengthen	 opposition	 to	 the	
government,	but	the	increasing	polarisation	equally	stimulated	a	rise	in	violence.	
	
3.4. Polarisation	of	opinions	and	rise	in	violence	
	
The	one-year	mandate	of	 the	 constituent	 assembly	passed,	but	 the	process	of	drafting	 the	
new	 constitution	 continued,	 and	 no	 concrete	 plans	 for	 the	 organisation	 of	 new	 elections	
were	 presented.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 political	 polarisation	 in	 the	 country	 became	 increasingly	
violent	 (Hinds,	 2014).	 In	 October	 2012,	 Lotfi	 Nagdh,	 a	 regional	 coordinator	 of	 opposition	
party	 Nidaa	 Tounes,	 was	 dragged	 out	 of	 his	 office	 and	 beaten	 to	 death	 by	 a	 crowd	 of	
protestors.	 In	 February	 2013,	 Chokri	 Belaid,	 an	 outspoken	 left-wing	 opposition	 figure	 and	
fierce	 critic	 of	 the	 Islamist	 party	 was	 shot	 outside	 his	 house	 in	 broad	 daylight.	 The	 latter	
assassination	sparked	widespread	protests,	attacks	on	some	of	Ennahdha's	party	offices,	and	
violent	clashes	causing	the	death	of	a	police	officer.	On	the	day	of	Belaid's	funeral,	the	first	
general	 strike	 in	 the	 country	 in	 over	 thirty	 years	 was	 observed	 and	 the	 funeral	 itself	 was	
attended	 by	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 people.	 The	 Prime	 Minister,	 Hamadi	 Jebali,	 proposed	
dissolving	the	incumbent	government	and	forming	a	non-partisan	transitional	government	to	
lead	the	country	in	the	run-up	to	hastily	arranged	elections,	a	proposal	that	failed	to	find	the	
backing	of	his	own	party	Ennahdha,	 leading	 to	his	 resignation.	Ali	 Larayedh,	 from	the	same	
party,	and	formerly	acting	as	Interior	Minister	replaced	him.	Members	of	an	extremist	Salafi	
group	were	 later	 identified	 by	 the	 Interior	Ministry	 as	 Belaid's	 killers	 -	 a	 version	 of	 events	
contested	 by	 the	 politician's	 relatives	 and	 close	 allies,	 who	 pointed	 to	 the	 government’s	
(direct	 and/or	 indirect)	 responsibility	 in	 the	 assassination,	 and	 of	 interference	 with	 the	
subsequent	police	investigation	(Dreisbach,	2014).		
	
The	 climate	 became	 one	 of	 deepening	 suspicion	 and	 distrust.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 July	 2013,	 a	
second	 political	 opposition	 figure	 of	 the	 left,	 Mohammed	 Brahmi,	 was	 assassinated	 in	 a	
similar	way.	A	few	days	 later,	eight	soldiers	were	killed	by	a	group	of	religious	extremists	 in	
the	mountainous	region	bordering	Algeria	 to	 the	West	of	 the	country.	These	developments	
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triggered	some	of	the	 largest	scale	protests	 in	the	country	since	the	revolution.	The	 'Bardo’	
square	 in	 front	 of	 the	National	 Constituent	 Assembly	 building	was	 occupied	 by	 a	 group	 of	
protestors	 and	 opposition	 politicians	 from	 the	 assembly	 who	 boycotted	 its	 activities	 and	
demanded	 the	 government's	 resignation.	 A	 long	 political	 crisis	 ensued.	 The	 bloody	
developments	in	Egypt	during	this	period	informed	a	significant	effort	to	reach	a	consensual	
outcome	 (McCarthy,	 2013)	 in	which	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 in	 particular	workers'	 union	
UGTT	and	employers’	union	UTICA	played	a	vital	 role49.	The	political	 impasse	 lasted	several	
months,	 but	negotiations	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	nomination	of	 a	 new	prime	minister	with	 a	
mandate	 to	 head	 a	 reduced	 ‘caretaker’	 government.	 The	 finalisation	 of	 the	 constitution's	
drafting	 and	 the	 setting	 of	 a	 date	 for	 new	 legislative	 and	 presidential	 elections	 was	
prioritised.	The	new	constitution	was	adopted	in	January	2014,	and	elections	were	scheduled	
for	October	2014.	The	tumultuous	events	of	 the	three	years	since	the	revolution	 took	their	
toll	on	citizens'	political	engagement	and	participation.	Campaigns	to	increase	the	number	of	
registered	 voters	were	met	with	 limited	 success	 (The	 Economist,	 2014),	 and	 voter	 turnout	
was	 low	 in	 comparison	 to	 2011,	 particularly	 among	 the	 youth	 demographic	 considered	 to	
have	fuelled	the	revolution	movement	in	2010/11	(Bonhoure,	2014).	
	
3.5. Difficult	reform	of	the	national	media	sector	
	
Despite	 these	sudden	and	very	drastic	changes,	a	more	 in-depth	and	 lengthy	 reform	of	 the	
media	 sector	 encountered	 much	 internal	 and	 external	 resistance.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 new	
journalistic	 sphere	 lacked	 the	 skills	 and	 resources	 necessary	 to	 support	 civic	 engagement	
during	 this	 democratic	 transition.	 This	 often	 translated	 into	 a	marked	 lack	 of	 objectivity	 in	
media	 coverage	 and	 analysis,	 further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 journalists	 and	
media	 professionals	 felt	 compelled,	 in	 the	 new	 context,	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 past	
practices	 under	 Ben	 Ali,	 where	 enforced	 de-politicisation	 and	 an	 uncritical	 news	 reporting	
equated	 to	 serving	 as	 voice	 for	 the	 regime.	 Furthermore,	 the	 sector	 continued,	 after	 the	
revolution	 to	 suffer	 from	 relatively	 poor	working	 conditions	 and	 remunerations,	 as	well	 as	
insufficient	 professional	 training	 (El-Issawi,	 2012b).	 In	 this	 context,	 misinformation	 and	
defamation	 campaigns	were	occasional	 reminders	 of	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 sector’s	 reform	
process.	 The	 situation,	 also	 translated	 at	 times	 into	 misinformation	 circulating	 on	 social	
media	to	be	picked	with	no	further	verification	by	traditional	mass	media	professionals,	thus	
expanding	 the	 online	 social	 network’s	 scope,	 beyond	 its	 three	 million	 users,	 to	 a	 mass	
																																																						
49	The	role	of	four	civil	society	organisations	in	heading	the	national	dialogue	process	during	this	period	was	rewarded	in	2015	
with	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize.	
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audience.	In	addition,	journalists	were	faced	with	new	types	of	challenges	in	the	volatile	and	
highly	contested	political	context	after	the	revolution.	As	the	Unesco	report	(2012)	highlights,	
many	 ‘red	 lines’	 completely	 disappeared,	 yet	 new	 boundaries	 started	 to	 emerge	 after	 the	
revolution,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	 religion	 and	 issues	 of	 public	 morality	 (ibid,	 p.18),	
marking	 a	 slow	 return	 of	 self-censorship	 in	 these	 areas.	 Another	 report	 (IFEX,	 2012)	 also	
triggered	 alarm,	 detailing	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 attacks	 on	 journalists	 and	 cases	 of	
persecution	of	members	from	the	media	community	under	the	new	provisional	government	
(ibid,	p.8).	In	addition,	the	study	highlights	the	weak	coordination	between	state	institutions	
and	civil	society	structures,	making	political	dialogue	more	challenging	(ibid,	p.16).		
	
Regulation	of	the	transformed	media	 landscape	remained	problematic.	Paradoxically,	whilst	
the	 practice	 of	 free	 speech	 was	 becoming	 established,	 the	 minimal	 legal	 guarantees	 to	
protect	it	were	initially	suspended	(Unesco	2012,	p.26).	Whilst	a	new	constitution	was	still	in	
the	midst	of	being	drafted,	provisional	 legislation	on	human	rights	and	freedom	guarantees	
remained	 vague,	 and	 emergency	 law	 endowed	 the	 provisional	 government	 with	 extensive	
powers.	 New	 legislation	 to	 guarantee	 media	 pluralism	 and	 to	 create	 the	 country’s	 first	
independent	audio-visual	regulatory	institution	was	officially	approved	by	the	government	in	
November	 2011,	 but	 no	 concrete	 measures	 were	 subsequently	 taken	 to	 implement	 them	
(ibid,	 p.22).	 In	 the	 meantime,	 criminal	 law	 was	 employed	 by	 the	 judicial	 system	 to	 frame	
some	 cases	 where	 freedom	 of	 expression	 was	 perceived	 to	 clash	 with	 public	 order	 and	
morality,	thus	undermining	civil	 liberties	(Amnesty	International,	2012).	For	instance,	one	of	
the	cases	that	attracted	particular	attention	 in	the	early	transitional	period	was	that	of	two	
young	 Tunisians	 who	 circulated	 cartoons	 of	 the	 Prophet	 Mohammed	 on	 their	 private	
Facebook	page.	The	content,	deemed	as	offensive	by	a	group	of	private	citizens	who	initiated	
legal	proceedings	against	them,	resulted	in	the	delivery	of	harsh	court	verdicts	that	included	
a	seven-year	prison	sentence	for	one	of	the	two	young	men.	
	
The	 High	 Independent	 Authority	 for	 Audiovisual	 Communication	 (HAICA)	 was	 eventually	
created	 in	 May	 2013,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 operational	 until	 several	 months	 later.	 Its	 ability	 to	
enforce	 the	 proposed	 separation	 of	 broadcast	media	 ownership	 from	 political	 activity	was	
(and	continued	to	be)	one	of	its	biggest	challenges,	as	most	media	outlets	remained	linked	to	
political	groupings	and	individuals,	to	different	degrees	of	transparency.	It	is	not	only	the	case	
that	some	of	the	old	connections	to	political	elites	were	still	in	place,	and	that	new	ones	have	
emerged,	but	 also	 that	new	 figures	 from	 the	media	 stage	have	 in	 turn	engaged	with	overt	
political	activities	(Abrougui,	2014).	This	ownership	issue	needs	to	also	be	understood	in	the	
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context	of	 the	media's	political	economy	 in	 the	country	and	a	 fledgling	advertising	 industry	
that	was	previously	controlled	by	Ben	Ali's	 regime.	Sources	 for	 reliable	viewer	numbers	are	
still	developing,	 leaving	most	private	media	outlets'	 financial	viability	dependent	on	funding	
by	 those	 pursuing	 political	 agendas.	 As	 a	 result,	 as	 El-Issawi	 emphasises,	 by	 end	 of	 2012,	
media	 platforms	 were	 turning	 into	 "the	 main	 stage	 for	 the	 fierce	 political	 and	 ideological	
battle"	being	waged	 in	 the	 county	 (2012b,	p.14).	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	note	 in	 this	 regard	
that	under	 the	 troika	government,	 these	politicised	ownership	 links	 led	 to	 the	view,	within	
Islamist	circles	in	particular,	that	they	were	under	attack	by	most	mainstream	national	(public	
and	 private)	 broadcasting	 outlets	 due	 to	 their	 overly-critical	 stances	 on	 government	
achievements	 and	 defence	 of	 secularist	 values	 (Farmanfarmaian,	 2014).	 Campaigns	 to	
boycott	many	such	outlets	were	particularly	noticeable	on	social	media	platforms	during	this	
period	 (this	 is	 further	 discussed	 in	 the	 empirical	 findings).	 These	 key	 issues	 of	 financial	
transparency	and	political	neutrality	were	particularly	central	to	media	coverage	 in	the	run-
up	to	the	elections	in	October	2014.	It	remains	unclear	at	this	stage	to	what	extent	the	HAICA	
will	be	able	 to	execute	 its	 far-reaching	regulatory	powers,	but	early	 indications	suggest	 it	 is	
faced	with	 significant	 obstacles.	 Additionally,	 the	 proliferation	 of	 unlicensed	media	 outlets	
such	 as	 satellite	 television	 channels	 and	 community	 radio	 stations,	 but	 also	 platforms	 that	
promote	 jihad	and	violence,	has	created	an	extremely	challenging	operational	environment	
for	the	regulatory	body	(Al	Jazeera,	2014).	In	this	respect	any	attempt	at	regulation	is	likely	to	
be	 fraught	with	difficulty	 in	order	 to	 address	 the	pressing	need	 for	oversight	on	 terrorism-
related	 communications	 (Article	 19,	 2014)	 without	 reinstating	 the	 threat	 of	 media	
surveillance	 and	 control	 in	 public	 perception.	 These	 issues	 are	 even	more	 tangible	when	 it	
comes	to	the	online,	and	social	media	environment.	
	
	
With	only	two	rulers	in	over	fifty	years,	followed	by	five	government	leaders	in	three	years,	it	
would	be	 fair	 to	 characterise	 the	 initial	 transitional	period	 in	Tunisia	as	a	period	of	 intense	
social	 and	 political	 instability,	 albeit	 one	 with	 a	 relatively	 successful	 outcome	 to-date	 in	
comparison	to	other	post-revolutionary	contexts	in	the	Arab	world.	Whilst	there	was	a	clear	
common	 denominator	 to	 rally	 against	 during	 the	 revolution,	 the	 subsequent	 period	 was	
characterised	 by	 a	 more	 complex	 negotiation	 over	 socio-political	 projects,	 identities	 and	
prevailing	ideologies	amid	a	transformed	media	environment	and	a	newly	found	pluralism	of	
voices.	
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CHAPTER	2	
	
RESEARCHING	A	SHIFTING	SUBJECT	
	
	
Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 methodological	 approach	 adopted	 in	 the	 thesis,	 its	 underlying	
assumptions	 and	 its	 application	 in	 practice.	 Like	 most	 investigations	 of	 this	 nature,	 this	
empirical	 study	 required	 a	 degree	 of	 flexibility	 in	 its	 approach	 to	 the	 project.	 As	 an	
exploration	of	new	media	and	political	change,	 it	 faced	a	number	of	challenges:	One	of	 the	
principal	difficulties	-	but	equally	a	strength	–	was	the	politically	unstable,	rapidly	changing,	
and	unpredictable	nature	of	the	environment	in	which	the	study	was	conducted.	
	
The	 socio-political	 context	 in	 Tunisia,	 as	well	 as	 its	media	 landscape,	 underwent	 significant	
transformations	during	the	research	period	(see	Chapters	1	and	6),	many	of	which	could	not	
have	 been	 anticipated.	 Repeated	 changes	 to	 the	 electoral	 calendar,	 for	 example,	 and	 the	
occurrence	of	important	political	turning	points,	including	two	political	assassinations	during	
the	research	period	(see	Chapter	1	for	details),	rendered	the	planning	and	optimal	timing	for	
fieldwork	 problematic.	 Equally	 difficult	 to	 predict,	 capture	 and	 decipher,	 was	 the	 lack	 of	
change,	on	other	levels,	over	time	in	this	context.	Indeed,	whilst	numerous	social,	economic	
and	political	reforms	were	announced	with	regularity	by	successive	governments	during	the	
research	 period,	 their	 implementation	was	 slow	 and	 relatively	 ineffective,	 leaving	many	 of	
the	 issues	 that	 triggered	 the	 revolution	 unresolved50	 and	 seemingly	 feeding	 new	 cycles	 of	
social	 and	 political	 disaffection.	 This	 context	 impacted	 on	 citizens’	 relation	 to	 -	 and	
involvement	with	 –	 their	 socio-political	 reality	 and,	 concurrently,	 their	 orientation	 towards	
different	media	and	communicative	opportunities	online	and	offline.	
	
Whilst	requiring	a	level	of	adaptability	in	research	methodology,	the	relative	complexity	and	
instability	of	the	socio-political	backdrop	to	the	study	also	provided	a	particularly	rich	setting	
in	which	to	address	different	hypotheses	on	social	media’s	civic	and	political	role.	 It	offered	
additional	 support	 for	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 study,	 which	 emphasised	 the	 local	 and	
																																																						
50	This	was	particularly	the	case	in	terms	of	deeper	structural	reforms	of	the	economic	sector,	as	well	as	in	terms	of	the	
transitional	justice	process.	
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historical	 contexts	 of	 actions,	 motivations	 and	 their	 consequences,	 and	 stressed	 the	
application	 of	 caution	 in	 assuming	 any	 overarching	 causal	 links	 detected	 between	
communication	technologies	and	socio-political	change.		
	
Equally,	 the	 study	 was	 set	 in	 a	 rapidly	 evolving	 academic	 context,	 in	 which	 a	 number	 of	
theoretical	 and	methodological	 framings	 arose	 to	 conceptualise	different	 social	 networking	
sites,	 which	 were	 in	 turn	 relatively	 unstable	 objects	 of	 investigation.	 Not	 only	 do	 new	
platforms,	 that	 users	 might	 migrate	 to,	 emerge,	 but	 their	 architecture,	 adoption	 and	 the	
media	habits	 that	users	might	develop	around	 them	may	also	be	 subject	 to	 rapid	 changes.	
Furthermore,	 as	 Karpf	 (2012)	 stresses,	 conducting	 research	 related	 to	 the	 rapidly	 evolving	
field	 of	 online	 communications	 poses	 particular	 challenges	 for	 researchers,	 as	 previously	
established	methods	may	no	longer	be	suitable	to	capture	the	complexity	of	the	phenomena	
at	hand,	and	new	methods	can	be	untested	and	consequently	relatively	flawed.	
	
The	following	chapter	delves	into	these	issues	in	more	depth,	starting	with	a	discussion	of	the	
methodological	 perspective	 adopted	 and	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 study’s	 methodological	
approach,	followed	by	an	outline	of	the	implementation	of	the	interviewing	process	and	the	
issues	 that	 arose	 with	 conducting	 research	 in	 the	 transitional	 Tunisian	 context.	 This	
assessment	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 detailed	 reflection	 of	my	 own	 position	 as	 researcher	 and	
“halfie”	 (Abu-Lughod,	 1991)	 in	 this	 context.	 The	 third	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 delves	 into	 the	
online	component	of	the	research	and	the	research	dilemmas	associated	with	studying	social	
media.	Inevitably,	this	type	of	study	also	raises	new	ethical	challenges,	a	discussion	of	which	
closes	the	chapter.	
	
	
A	brief	overview	of	methods	
	
Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 research	 period,	 from	 the	 end	of	 2011	 to	 the	 end	of	 2013,	 I	 spent	
extensive	periods	of	time	in	Tunisia.	In	total,	I	visited	the	country	on	five	occasions,	with	two	
of	 these	 visits	 lasting	 approximately	 seven	 weeks	 (each),	 during	 which	 interviews	 were	
conducted.	Data	gathering	centred	around	three	main	dimensions	of	research.	First	of	all,	the	
study	 started	 from	 in-depth	 face-to-face	 interviews	with	a	 sample	of	 thirty	 'ordinary'	 social	
media	users	in	Tunisia	(as	defined	later	 in	this	chapter).	Participants	were	asked	to	describe	
and	 reflect	 on	 their	 experiences	 of	 the	 revolution	 period,	 their	 political	 interest(s)	 and	
involvement,	as	well	as	their	media	practices	before	and	after	the	revolution,	and	to	discuss	
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in	 further	 detail	 key	 issues	 arising	 from	 their	 social	 media	 practices.	 Interviews	 were	
conducted	 in	October	and	November	2012,	one	year	after	 the	 first	democratic	elections	 in	
Tunisia	were	held,	and	at	a	time	when	the	first	elected	transitional	government	was	due	to	be	
dissolved	and	new	elections	were	timetabled.		
This	 offline	 data	 was	 complemented	 by	 an	 online	 component	 derived	 from	 the	 interview	
participants'	personal	social	media	profiles.	This	online	data	was	composed	of	two	elements:	
the	 first	 one	 assessed	 key	 patterns	 from	 their	 profiles;	 the	 second	 element	 contextualized	
their	 online	 practices	 in	 relation	 to	 broader	 online	 patterns	 based	 on	 a	 small	 sample	 of	
publicly	accessible	social	media	pages	that	the	participants	interacted	with.		
Finally,	 the	 design	 also	 accounted	 for	 a	 temporal	 dimension	 to	 these	 online	 and	 offline	
practices.	It	assessed	changes	in	participants'	online	and	offline	media	practices	over	time.	To	
this	end,	 their	online	profile	data	was	 compared	at	different	points	of	 the	 research	period.	
Furthermore,	this	was	achieved	via	a	second	round	of	 interviews	with	participants	from	the	
initial	sample,	one	year	after	the	first	interviews.		
The	 chapter	 discusses	 these	 methodological	 elements,	 and	 the	 issues	 they	 highlight,	 in	
greater	depth.	
	
	
1. Methodological	perspective	and	rationale	
	
1.1. Foregrounding	social	media	users’	construction	of	meaning	
	
In	 this	 study,	 my	 primary	 concern	 was	 to	 further	 an	 understanding	 of	 what	 it	 meant	 for	
Tunisian	 citizens	 to	 have	 access	 to	 networked	 media	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives	 after	 the	
revolution.	The	basic	premise	of	 the	study	was	 that	 social	media	played	a	contributing	 role	
during	 the	 2011	 revolution	 (see	 Chapters	 1	 and	 3),	 and	 consequently	 that	 the	 political	
dimension	 of	 such	 online	 activity	 in	 the	 subsequent	 period	 was	 worthy	 of	 detailed	
examination.	As	a	project	that	was	empirically-led,	is	was	important	to	adopt	and	develop	a	
research	methodology	that	was	appropriate	to,	and	driven	by,	the	research	questions.	It	was	
also	 important	 to	 stress,	 through	my	 approach	 to	 the	 issue,	 that	 I	 had	 learned	 the	 lessons	
that	emerged	from	early	techno-utopian	appraisals	of	the	Arab	uprisings	and	what	Markham	
(2014)	 highlighted	 as	 a	 teleological	 tendency	 to	 attribute	 political	 agency	 and	 progressive	
political	spaces	to	social	media.	Through	my	methodological	choices,	I	sought	to	articulate	a	
neutral	position	 in	respect	of	social	media’s	role	after	the	revolution,	and	to	clearly	express	
that	 although	 the	 research	 focused	 on	 social	media’s	 civic	 and	 political	 dimensions	 in	 this	
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context,	this	was	simply	because	I	believe	that	these	dimensions	mattered,	even	if	they	have	
frequently	been	misinterpreted	or	over-emphasised.	Indeed,	my	initial	observations	pointed	
to	a	far	more	complex	and	‘messy’	answer.	As	a	result,	my	approach	sought,	from	the	outset,	
to	highlight	 the	 importance	of	 context	 in	 relation	 to	 the	adoption	of	different	 social	media	
practices,	to	emphasise	the	perspectives	of	citizens	of	varying	levels	of	political	involvement	
rather	than	taking,	as	a	starting	point	evidence	of	mediated	action	and	forms	of	activism	on	
social	 media,	 and	 to	 provide	 different	 facets	 of	 what	 politically-related	 activity	 on	 social	
media	 could	 mean,	 rather	 than	 to	 establish	 a	 pre-defined	 framework	 for	 how	 action	 and	
participation	were	to	be	defined	in	this	context	(see	Chapter	5	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	this	
question).		
	
As	a	result,	the	study	is	mainly	anchored	in	a	constructionist	epistemological	perspective	that	
stresses	 the	contingency	of	knowledge	and	of	“meaningful	 reality”	on	human	practices	and	
interactions	(Crotty,	1998,	p.42),	and	principally	in	symbolic	interactionist	theory,	as	well	to	a	
limited	 extent	 in	 ethnomethodological,	 theoretical	 perspectives.	 Both	 perspectives	 have	
much	 in	 common,	 in	 particular	 the	 foregrounding	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 "unit	 of	 analysis"	
(Denzin,	2005,	p.124).	Through	a	focus	on	the	meaning-making	activities	of	social	actors,	both	
approaches	establish	a	"link	between	the	person	and	social	structure	that	rests	on	the	role	of	
symbols	and	common	meaning"	(ibid).	However,	they	also	differ	in	their	underlying	research	
traditions,	although	the	debate	about	these	differences	has	arguably	been	marred	by	a	 lack	
of	comprehension	and	unfortunate	mis-readings	(Dennis,	2011,	p.349).	A	closer	examination	
of	 these	 debates	would	 divert	 this	 discussion	 from	 its	 intended	 trajectory.	 However,	 I	 will	
briefly	 flag	 up	 the	 main	 issues	 of	 relevance	 for	 my	 purposes	 and	 contend	 that	 their	
juxtaposition	is	not	only	relevant,	but	indeed	beneficial	to	this	study.		
	
Symbolic	 interactionism	 emphasises	 the	 fact	 “that	 people	 create,	 negotiate,	 and	 change	
social	 meanings	 through	 the	 processes	 of	 interaction"	 (Sandstrom	 et.	 al,	 2006,	 p.1).	 This	
perspective	 particularly	 stresses	 the	 agency	 of	 individuals	 in	 constructing	 social	 reality	 and	
meaning	(Dennis,	2011,	p.350).	It	is	especially	useful	as	an	approach	to	capturing	individuals’	
engagement	 and	 participation	 in	 the	 Tunisian	 socio-political	 context	 in	 online	 interactions	
with	each	other,	as	well	as	 in	the	way	they	regard	these	processes	 in	 interview	accounts.	 It	
allows	for	an	assessment	of	the	meanings	that	individuals	uphold,	collectively	construct	and	
negotiate.	Whilst	this	perspective	provides	a	very	useful	angle	of	analysis,	it	can	be	limiting	in	
terms	 of	 clarifying	 how	 this	 meaning	 is	 constructed	 beyond	 the	 way	 it	 is	 conceived	 of	 by	
individuals.	 Whilst	 individual	 discourses,	 both	 on-	 and	 off-line,	 will	 be	 given	 particular	
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attention,	 a	 certain	 critical	 distance	needs	 to	be	 simultaneously	maintained.	 This	 is	 to	help	
clarify	 the	 differences	 and	 similarities	 between	 online	 and	 offline	 contexts,	 and	 to	 help	
decipher	 the	 relation	 between	 mutual	 meaning-making	 processes.	 Ethnomethodology	 is	
useful	 in	 this	 respect.	 It	 emphasises	 the	 ongoing	 creation	 of	 social	 order	 "through	 the	
practices	by	which	people	make	 sense	of	what	others	 are	doing"	 and	 it	 further	 focuses	on	
their	actions	as	a	way	to	"display	that	understanding"	(Hammersley,	2006,	p.103).	As	Dennis	
summarises:	
	
Instead	of	focusing	on	what	interpretations	are	made,	then,	ethnomethodologists	emphasize	
the	ways	 in	which	meaning	 is	produced,	 recognized,	 and	 transformed	during	an	 interaction	
(2011,	p.	351,	italics	in	original).	
	
Consequently,	 ethnomethodology	 tends	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	 conversational	 analysis	 and	
emphasise	 the	 role	 of	 "interactional	 processes",	 rather	 than	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 social	 actor	
being	the	"driving	force"	of	the	interaction	(ibid,	p.352).	This	view	will	be	particularly	useful	
for	my	purposes	in	helping	to	assess	online	interactions	beyond	the	meaning	they	'appear'	to	
carry,	 and	 further	open	 the	analysis	 to	how	 these	 interactions	are	 in	 turn	delimited	by	 the	
online	 environment	 they	 are	 embedded	 in,	 including	 the	 communicative	 architecture	 they	
are	framed	by	on	specific	social	media	platforms.	
	
1.2. Ethnographic	elements	
	
My	approach	includes	a	number	of	ethnographic	elements	to	address	some	of	these	issues,	
but	 as	 I	 argue,	 adopting	 a	more	 rounded	ethnographic	 approach	was	not	 appropriate.	 The	
notion	that	culture	 is	contained	 in	a	bounded	space,	within	which	ethnographers	can	freely	
explore	 it,	 has	 long	 been	 challenged.	 	 Alternative	 perspectives	 have	 been	 advanced	 that	
emphasise	 movement,	 processes	 and	 links	 between	 different	 entities	 (Burrell,	 2009).	 But	
such	reappraisals	are	nevertheless	not	fully	aligned	with	some	of	the	purposes	of	a	study	that	
aims	to	foreground	citizens’	own	reflections	on	their	political	engagement,	and	the	meanings	
they	associate	with	social	media	practices	in	this	context.		
Research	into	media	use	in	the	past	focused	on	audience	reception,	on	mass	media	viewers’	
interpretive	 activities	 or	 contexts	 of	 reception	 in	 particular.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 highlighted	 the	
multifaceted	 discursive	 dimensions	 of	 media.	 A	 number	 of	 methods	 were	 developed	 and	
combined	 in	 order	 to	 more	 effectively	 capture	 the	 relationship	 between	 media	 user	 and	
media	 text,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 space	 this	 relationship	 evolved	 in.	 Lesser	 attention	 was	 paid,	
however,	to	the	performative	dimension	of	media	use,	to	what	Jensen	(2002,	p.165)	refers	to	
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as	the	wider	“social	context	of	action”.	This	was	 in	part	because	defining	the	boundaries	of	
such	 an	 exploration	 posed	 significant	 challenges,	 but	 equally,	 as	 Jensen	 further	 contends,	
because	 of	 a	 more	 pronounced	 emphasis	 on	 conceptualising	 media	 as	 “means	 of	
representation,	rather	than	as	resources	for	action”	(ibid,	p.163).		
	
The	rise	in	the	usage	of	ethnographic	terminology	in	the	field	of	media	studies	since	the	mid-
1980’s,	and	of	calls	for	a	more	radical	emphasis	on	context	(e.g.	Radway,	1988),	can	then	be	
understood	 as	 partly	 seeking	 to	 redress	 the	 previous	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 actions,	
practices,	and	identity	performances	that	media	use	relates	to	within	a	wider	social	context	
(Jensen,	 2002).	 However,	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 this	 new	 methodological	 emphasis,	 the	
difficulties	 in	 defining	 the	 scope	 of	 “media	 ethnography”	 also	 became	 more	 pronounced.	
What	space	should	the	researcher	immerse	themselves	in	to	best	capture	this	broader	social	
dimension,	 and	 if	 no	 single	 space	 is	 adequate	 for	 this	 purpose,	 then	 how	 can	 media	
ethnography	 be	 differentiated	 from	 other	 mixed	 methods	 and	 multi-sited	 research	
strategies?	As	Hine	(2005,	p.8)	argues,	one	of	the	problems	of	talking	about	ethnography	 is	
that	 there	 is	 no	 consensual	 basis	 from	 which	 to	 judge	 what	 constitutes	 an	 ethnographic	
approach	 or	 otherwise.	 Whilst	 some	 (e.g.	 Lull,	 1988)	 criticised	 the	 stretching	 of	 the	 term	
“media	ethnography”	to	refer	to	a	wide	variety	of	qualitative	approaches,	others	emphasised	
the	need	to	reimagine	contemporary	ethnography	around	the	different	parts	that	compose	it	
(Marcus,	1998).		
	 	
I	 consider	 that	 it	 is	 important	 for	 a	 researcher	 to	 be	 immersed	 in	 the	 environments	 they	
explore	in	order	to	understand	them	in	depth.	As	Madianou	(2015)	stresses,	ethnography	is	
unique	 in	 providing	 a	 combination	 of	 ‘macro	 and	 micro’	 lenses	 through	 which	 to	 explore	
complex	 processes,	 such	 as	 those	 relating	 to	 social	 media	 use.	 However,	 the	 new	 media	
environment	also	poses	substantial	new	research	challenges.	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	I	
adopted	a	number	of	elements	inspired	by	an	ethnography,	but	I	do	not	consider	that	my	line	
of	enquiry	is	ethnographic.	The	level	of	immersion	in	a	fieldsite	that	a	more	ethnographically	
informed	approach	requires,	would	not	have	been	compatible	with	the	breadth	and	variety	
of	 views	 and	 practices	 that	 I	 sought	 to	 account	 for	 in	 this	 study.	 Rather	 I	 consider	 my	
methodology	to	be	a	primarily	qualitatively-driven	mixed-methods	approach	that	 includes	a	
number	of	ethnographically	inspired	elements.	I	sought	to	provide	insights	into	some	of	the	
wider	contexts	of	 social	action,	 to	 link	media	use	 to	broader	and	 longer-term	processes,	 to	
contextualise	findings	in	depth,	and	I	also	drew	-	to	a	limited	extent	-	on	personal	observation	
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and	 experience	 of	 the	 wider	 socio-political	 context	 in	 Tunisia	 to	 decipher	 social	 media	
practices.		
	
This	 methodological	 approach	 was	 also	 inspired	 by	 the	 new	 practice	 paradigm	 in	 media	
research	(Couldry,	2004,	2012;	Postill,	2010),	for	its	emphasis	on	what	people	do	“in	relation	
to	media”	in	different	contexts,	and	its	exploration	of	how	these	media-oriented	practices	are	
related	 to	 their	 agency	more	generally	 (Couldry,	2012,	p.37).	 The	 turn	 to	practice	 in	media	
studies	evolved	out	of	a	research	context	whose	primary	focus	was	formerly	anchored	in	the	
study	of	media	 texts,	or	of	media	 institutions,	and	 their	purported	effects	on	society	 (ibid).	
This	 paradigm	was	 progressively	 challenged	 by	 some	 strands	 of	 audience	 research,	 and	 by	
media	 anthropology	 in	 the	 eighties	 and	 nineties51,	 in	 favour	 of	 more	 contextualised,	 and	
ethnographically-informed,	 research	 perspectives.	 The	 media	 practice	 paradigm	 decentres	
“media	 research	 from	 the	 study	 of	 media	 texts	 or	 production	 structures”	 (Couldry,	 2004,	
p.117),	 and	 it	 stresses	 that	 opting	 to	 (methodologically)	 take	media-related	 practices	 as	 a	
research	 starting	 point	 assists	 in	 avoiding	 the	 tendency	 towards	 functionalism	 in	 media	
research.	It	is	also	an	approach	which	arguably	engages	more	effectively	with	the	variety	and	
complexity	of	media	practices,	and	that	recognises	how	media	and	other	practices	in	daily	life	
can	be	mutually	constitutive	(ibid).	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	it	helps	to	shift	focus	onto	
the	 complex	 and	 non-linear	 meaning-making	 processes	 that	 underpin	 people’s	 divergent	
relations	to	media	within	a	broader	context	of	action,	and	to	provide	insights	into	how	their	
everyday	media	practices	relate	to	their	orientations	towards	particular	understandings	and	
representations	of	social	order	and	political	reality.	
	
	
2. Offline	research	components	
	
2.1. Starting	offline	
	
To	some	extent,	the	change	introduced	by	networked	online	communication	to	media	users’	
position(s)	-	a	transformation	from	(passive)	audience	to	potential	producers	of	content	-	was	
accompanied	 by	 a	 reversal	 in	 the	 conceptualization	 of	media	 that	 Jensen	 (2002)	 contends,	
leads	 to	 an	 emphasis	 on	media’s	 appraisal	 primarily	 as	 “resources	 for	 actions”	 rather	 than	
“means	 of	 representation”	 (p.163).	 The	 “wall	 of	 idealism”	 (Horst	 and	 Miller,	 2012)	 that	
																																																						
51	This	paralleled	the	practice	turn	in	social	theory	which	sought	to	overcome	the	divide	between	structure	and	agency	debates	
(Couldry,	2004,	p.120).	
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accompanied	 early	 online	 research	 over-emphasized	 the	 transformative	 potential	 of	 new	
media,	and	this	often	translated	into	a	focus	on	online	environments	in	isolation	from	offline	
contexts.	 Parallels	 can	 equally	 be	 drawn	 with	 past	 debates	 in	 audience	 theory,	 where	 a	
widely-held	perception	of	audiences	as	passive	receivers	of	media	messages	was,	over	time,	
replaced	with	a	view	which	sought	to	incorporate	the	many	aspects	of	their	engagement	and	
meaning-making	 activities	 that	 had	 previously	 gone	 mostly	 undetected	 or	 neglected	 by	
researchers.	The	adoption	of	networked	online	communications	and	their	highly	visible	role	
in	 recent	 social	 movements	 led	 to	 an	 over-emphasis	 on	 their	 framing	 as	 instruments	 for	
socio-political	 action.	 Their	 conceptualisation	 as	 a	 means	 of	 representation	 was,	 however,	
equally	 challenging,	 as	media	 users	were	 able	 to	 represent	 themselves	 and	 others,	 and	 to	
collectively	contribute,	 interpret	and	react	to	each	other’s	framings	of	socio-political	reality.	
However,	with	the	rise	of	new	media,	a	new	binary	emerged	and	it	seemed	that	mass	media	
audiences	were	 relegated,	again,	 to	 the	 realms	of	passivity,	 in	 sharp	contrast	 to	a	new	and	
distinct	category	of	active	online	media	users.	How,	then,	can	media	research	account	for	the	
large	 number	 of	 people	 who	 seem	 to	 straddle	 these	 two	 seemingly	 discrete	
characterizations?		
	
The	 intense	focus	on	the	parallel	between	new	media	and	agency	predictably	 led	to	similar	
shortcomings.	This	is	apparent,	for	example,	when	we	consider	the	change	in	perspective	on	
media	users’	relation	to	news	and	current	affairs.	Morley	(2011)	reminds	us	that,	as	far	back	
as	1948,	Merton	and	Lazarfeld	were	already	discussing	the	relation	of	audiences	to	news,	and	
expressing	 concern	 about	 the	 “narcotising”	 impact	 they	 perceived	 that	 the	 “exposure	 to	 a	
flood	of	information”	would	have	on	audiences’	motivation	to	take	action	in	response	to	the	
problems	they	were	informed	about	(ibid,	p.240).	The	role	that	online	social	networks	seems	
to	have	played	 in	disseminating	 information	 through	actions	by	 individual	citizens	 in	 recent	
social	movements,	 such	 as	 the	Arab	 uprisings,	may	 suggest	 that	 social	media	 provided	 the	
ideal	answer	 to	 this	 issue.	There	was	much	 that	people	could	do	 -	and	 indeed	have	done	 -	
with	information	and	media	content	they	encountered	on	social	media.	However,	if	we	take	
into	account	the	valuable	insights	that	debates	in	audience	theory	have	provided	us	with	over	
the	last	few	decades,	a	different	perspective	arises.	The	move	from	offline	to	online	contexts	
for	the	"people	formally	known	as	the	audience"	(Rosen,	2006)	is,	then,	not	so	much	a	move	
from	passivity	to	activity,	but	one	to	an	activity	that	is	shaped	and	made	publicly	visible	-	to	
the	researcher,	among	others	-	in	new	and	different	ways.	The	availability	and	ease	of	access	
for	Western	researchers	to	large	sets	of	digital	data	from	the	online	space	in	the	Arab	world	
during	 the	 recent	 uprisings	 may	 have	 led	 to	 an	 over-emphasis	 on	 their	 democratic	
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significance,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 both	 individual	 local	 contextualisation	 and	 less	 visible	 long-
term	processes	underpinning	new	media	adoption	and	everyday	use	(such	as	those	detailed	
in	Chapter	1).	
	
In	 assessing	 questions	 relating	 to	 new	media’s	 role	within	 the	 public	 and	 political	 spheres,	
numerous	studies	to	date	have	tended	to	choose,	as	a	starting	point	of	their	exploration	an	
online	environment,	online	phenomena,	actions	and	activities,	or	communities	and	networks,	
at	 times	 incorporating	 into	 this	 exploration	 offline	 data,	 but	 typically	 as	 a	 subsequent,	
supplementary	 and	 contextualising	 research	 element	 that	 tends	 to	 be	 given	 less	 weight.	
Whereas	such	an	approach	can	elucidate	online	dynamics	and	actions,	it	provides	less	scope	
for	understanding	the	broader	context	from	which	action,	as	well	as	inaction,	may	emanate,	
or	to	assess	underlying	motives	and	consequences	of	the	adoption	of	new	media	in	relation	
to	other	media	uses	and	forms	of	connection	to	a	wider	public	world.	As	some	research	has	
highlighted	 in	 recent	 years	 (e.g.	 Madianou	 and	 Miller,	 2011;	 Tachi,	 2011),	 communicative	
opportunities	 provided	 by	 new	 media	 technologies	 do	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	 their	
adoption.	Instead,	individual	contexts,	circumstances	and	necessity	often	motivate	acting	on	
these	 possibilities	 (ibid).	 As	 a	 result,	 these	 technological	 affordances	 (Hutchby,	 2001;	 Nagy	
and	Neff,	2015)	may	frame	possibilities	for	action	and	shape	sociality	in	particular	ways,	but	
equally	be	shaped	by	their	wider	social	context	of	use	in	turn.		
	
No	methods	could	possibly	fully	capture	these	processes,	but	my	research	goals	necessitated	
an	approach	which	minimised	some	of	these	exclusions,	and	consequently	one	which	started	
from	 an	 offline	 context.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 online	 phenomena	 are	 not	 worthy	 of	
exploration	in	their	own	right,	or	that	the	offline	world	ought	to	be	seen	as	more	authentic	-	a	
valid	 criticism	 that	 Orgad	 (2009)	 addressed	 at	 those	 undermining	 the	 validity	 or	
meaningfulness	of	 the	online	sphere.	 It	 is,	however,	 to	 remind	us	of	some	of	 the	questions	
that	tend	to	be	overlooked	when	the	focus	of	such	an	enquiry	is	almost	exclusively	on	actions	
and	actors.	These	are	issues	that	I	argue	are	equally	determinant	of	an	understanding	of	new	
forms	of	action	and	power	in	the	networked	online	era.	As	Mackay	(2005,	p.131)	contends:	
	
Somehow,	decontextualizing	use	of	the	Internet	exaggerates	its	significance	for	identities	and	
everyday	lives,	and	emphasizes	the	radical	potentials	and	practices	of	Internet	use	[…]	Much	
research	on	electronic	communities	has	examined	those	who	are	heavier,	 rather	 than	more	
ordinary	or	less	committed,	users.	
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This	 unbalanced,	 even	 skewed,	 distribution	 of	 academic	 attention	 has	 occurred	 at	 the	
expense	of	assessments	of	the	political	dimensions	of	citizens’	Internet	usage	as	part	of	their	
everyday	lives.	Even	some	assessments,	such	as	Zayani’s	detailed	exploration	of	the	Tunisian	
context	before	the	revolution	(2015)	which	calls	for	a	reading	of	politicised	new	media	use	as	
part	of	everyday	 life,	ultimately	concentrate	on	forms	of	online	contention,	highlighting	the	
actions	of	the	minority	of	bloggers	whose	online	content	became	increasingly	politicised	prior	
to	the	Tunisian	revolution.	
	
My	research	approach	thus	sought	to	provide	an	alternative	framing	of	new	media’s	political	
dimension	 by	 focusing	 on	media	 practices	 by	more	 ordinary	 and	 less	 politically	 committed	
citizens	 using	 the	 Internet.	 If	 we	 are	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	 potential	 of	 networked	 online	
communication	to	empower	citizens	or	give	rise	to	new	forms	of	collective	action	capable	of	
challenging	established	political	elites	and	hierarchies,	then	we	need	to	account	for	a	broader	
and	less	politically-conscious	group	of	online	users	as	they	engage	with	–	or	disengage	from	–	
their	 shared	 socio-political	 context	 and	 its	 mediated	 representation.	 	 These	 are	 the	 same	
citizens	who,	for	the	most	part,	did	not	participate	in	online	contention	before	the	revolution	
in	Tunisia	and	yet	took	advantage,	after	the	revolution,	of	the	newfound	freedoms	to	express	
their	opinion	and	contribute	with	others	 in	exploring	social	media’s	opportunities	for	public	
and	political	participation.	The	 simple	binary	of	activism	and	passivity,	or,	 as	Corner	 (2009)	
contends	 in	 the	context	of	attitudes	towards	authoritarian	regimes,	of	consent	and	dissent,	
risk	overlooking	the	majority	of	people	whose	commitment	and	involvement	with	a	cause	is	
far	more	ambivalent	and	contingent	on	circumstances.	 	As	Hann	 (1996)	contends,	“political	
society”	needs	to	be	understood	in	a	broad	sense	of	what	civil	society	may	entail,	as	not	just	
an	antagonism	to	the	state,	but	also	within	the	“context	of	the	 ideas	and	practices	through	
which	 cooperation	 and	 trust	 are	 established	 in	 social	 life”	 (p.22),	 and	 from	 which	 the	
inherently	political	potential	of	all	communities,	may,	or	may	not,	emerge.		
	
2.2. Participant	selection	and	interview	implementation		
	
As	the	research	sought	to	gauge	the	attitudes	and	behaviour	of	these	‘ordinary'	new-media	
users	 in	 relation	 to	 new	 communicative	 opportunities	 to	 engage	 and	 participate	 in	 the	
transitional	 socio-political	 context,	 three	 main	 criteria	 were	 established	 to	 determine	 the	
constitution	of	this	sample.	Participants	firstly	needed	to	have	access	to	the	Internet	or	to	a	
social	media	platform,	and	to	make	use	of	this	access,	at	least	to	a	minimal	extent.	Secondly,	I	
sought	 to	 select	 individuals	 who	 did	 not	 identify	 themselves	 as	 cyber-activists.	 Of	 course,	
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what	 constitutes	 an	 activist	 in	 the	 Internet	 age	 is	 debatable.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
networked	joining	of	forces	through	small	online	actions	by	'ordinary'	users	makes	each	and	
every	 one	 of	 them	 an	 activist.	 This	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 networked	 communication	 today	 is	
certainly	not	one	I	seek	to	discount	 in	my	reference	to	 'ordinary'	users	as	non-activists.	The	
key	 point,	 however,	 is	 that	 this	 study	 aims	 to	 turn	 the	 spotlight	 away	 from	 the	 forms	 of	
activism	 that	 are	 planned,	 and	 which	 add	 up	 to	 a	 more	 coherent	 and	 sustained	 strategy	
aimed	 at	 fulfilling	 specific	 political	 goals	 through	 the	 use	 of	 online	 resources	 to	 engage	 or	
mobilize	others.	The	research	focuses	instead	on	what	can	be	regarded	as	everyday	practices,	
taking	 as	 a	 starting	 point	 individuals	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 activity	 in	 relation	 to	 social	
media	and	politics,	rather	than	activism	per	se.	Finally,	the	third	selection	criteria	related	to	
the	 socio-political	 profile	 of	 study	 participants.	 The	 statistical	 representativeness	 of	 the	
sample	 was	 not	my	 primary	 objective,	 and	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 to	 provide	 any	 demographically	
statistically	significant	findings	in	this	study;	instead	the	study	adopted	a	strategy	inspired	by	
grounded	 theory	 (Glaser	 and	 Strauss,	 1967)	 and	 aimed	 to	 offer	 as	 wide	 a	 spectrum	 as	
possible	of	existing	positions	 in	 relation	to	 the	questions	explored.	My	main	priority	was	to	
have	access	 to	a	diverse	 range	of	 social	 and	political	opinions	and	backgrounds	 in	order	 to	
compare	media	practices	across	these	differences,	and	to	understand	them	in	greater	depth.	
The	sample	thus	includes	participants	from	different	socio-demographic	backgrounds	whose	
political	views	ranged	from	supporters	to	opponents	of	the	transitional	 'troika'	government,	
as	 well	 as	 those	 expressing	 a	 distrust	 of	 all	 political	 factions,	 and	 whose	 religious	 views	
variously	 include	 atheism,	 secularism,	 Islamism	 and	 Salafism.	 I	 continued	 to	 expand	 this	
sample	and	optimised	it	by	looking	for	under-represented	views	until	a	sense	of	“theoretical	
saturation”	was	achieved	(Seale,	2012,	p.396),	meaning	that	no	specifically	new	trends	could	
be	detected.	An	overview	of	 the	sample	composition	 is	 listed	 in	Appendix	 (B)	at	 the	end	of	
this	dissertation.	
	
There	 are	 thirty	 participants	 in	 the	 study	 in	 total.	 They	 were	 selected	 across	 three	 main	
regions:	 in	the	capital	Tunis,	 in	the	coastal	Sahel	region	to	the	Central-Eastern	region	of	the	
country,	 and	 in	 the	 North-Western	 region	 of	 the	 country	 in	 the	 Kasserine	 governorate.	 I	
sought,	 through	 this	 choice	 of	 regions,	 to	 provide	 a	 level	 of	 variety	 in	 perspectives,	 from	
participants	 living	 in	 urban	 centres	 to	 those	 from	 more	 socially	 and	 economically	
marginalised	regions,	a	variety	that	was	nevertheless	shaped	by	the	limited	resources	of	the	
project	 and	 the	 use	 of	 snowball	 sampling	 (Bienarcki	 and	 Waldorf,	 1981)	 from	 personal	
networks	 of	 acquaintances.	 The	 choice	 of	 sampling	 method	 was	 underpinned	 by	 two	
considerations:	Seeking	access	 through	an	organizational	 setting	or	civil	 society	association,	
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for	 example,	 would	 have	 been	more	 constricting	 in	 terms	 of	 profile	 variety;	 Secondly,	 the	
adoption	of	 this	 sampling	method	was	 rooted	 in	 a	need	 to	establish	a	 relationship	of	 trust	
with	participants	whose	aim	was	twofold.	It	helped	to	put	interviewees	at	ease	and	facilitated	
the	achievement	of	a	level	of	detail	in	conversations	with	participants	who,	for	the	majority,	
had	 limited	 experience	 or	 knowledge	 of	 qualitative	 research	methodologies.	 Furthermore,	
because	 of	 the	 progressive	 political	 polarization	 of	 opinion	 in	 Tunisia	 during	 the	 research	
period,	accessing	individuals	through	a	chain	of	existing	contacts	facilitated	the	development	
of	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 trust	 and	 enabled	 interviews	 to	 be	 conducted	 in	 greater	 depth	 than	
would	have	otherwise	been	possible.	 In	 particular,	 it	made	 it	 easier	 to	 overcome	potential	
barriers,	including	dispelling	the	potential	suspicions	of	supporters	of	the	transitional	Islamist-
led	 government	 towards	 my	 research,	 as	 there	 was	 the	 unavoidable	 potential	 of	 being	
identified	 as	 a	 Westernized	 Tunisian	 holding	 a	 correspondingly	 liberal	 (and	 consequently	
‘secularist’)	 agenda.	Although	 it	was	 largely	unproblematic	 to	 converse	with	people	 from	a	
broad	 range	 of	 backgrounds,	 the	 quality	 of	 interactions	 and	 openness	 in	 discussing	media	
practices	and	political	attitudes	 in	detail	was	 improved	by	 this	snowballing	approach.	As	an	
additional	 precaution,	 interviewees’	 identities	 were	 kept	 anonymous.	 No	 real	 names	 of	
participants	were	consequently	used	within	the	text	of	the	study	and	any	other	details	that	
were	likely	to	make	them	identifiable,	either	through	their	quotes	or	their	online	data,	were	
accordingly	excluded	from	the	research.		
	
Interviews	were	semi-structured	and	 it	was	possible	to	cover	most	points	 fairly	consistently	
across	 the	entire	sample.	Typical	questions	discussed	during	 the	 first	 interviews	 focused	on	
five	 main	 areas:	 1/	 an	 account	 of	 the	 participant's	 experience	 of	 the	 revolution	 period,	
including	their	media	use;	2/	current	(i.e.	during	autumn	2012)	'offline'	media	practices;	3/	a	
general	 account	 of	 online	 and	 social	media	 practices	 before	 and	 since	 the	 revolution	 (e.g.	
time	spent,	 typical	 activity,	 changes);	4/	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	 current	 social	media	
practices	 (e.g.	 motivations	 for	 different	 interactions,	 examples,	 trends	 and	 issues);	 5/	
engagement	 and	 participation	 in	 different	 forms	 of	 political	 talk	 and	 actions.	 A	 detailed	
example	of	interview	questions	is	listed	in	Appendix	(C)	of	this	thesis.	
	
As	previously	referred	to,	one	of	the	key	elements	of	this	methodology	was	the	inclusion	of	a	
temporal	 dimension	 in	 the	 research.	 My	 strategy	 aimed	 to	 capture	 the	 evolving	 culture	
around	social	media	use	by	Tunisian	citizens	during	the	research	period,	and	to	respond	to	a	
call	by	Karpf	(2012)	to	take	“Internet	time”	more	seriously	into	methodological	consideration,	
as	 online	 communicative	 technologies	 are	 “undergoing	 a	 social	 diffusion	 process	 and	 an	
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ongoing	 series	 of	 code-based	modifications”	 at	 the	 same	 time	 (p.640).	Whilst	 I	 adhere	 to	
Karpf’s	 view	 that	 that	 the	 rapidity	 of	 such	 changes	 can	 provide	 research	 findings	 on	 the	
Internet’s	 political	 impact	 with	 more	 limited	 “shelf	 life”	 (ibid,	 p.647),	 I	 believe	 that	 such	
changes	 only	 reinforce	 the	 need	 for	 a	 more	 detailed	 and	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	
underlying	 dynamics	 of	 use,	 and	 that	much	 can	 be	 learned	 from	 incorporating	 a	 temporal	
dimension	into	such	research,	particularly	in	a	transitional	context	such	as	the	one	I	focus	on,	
in	 order	 to	 better	 capture	 a	 framing	 of	 change	 –	 however	 transient.	 I	 therefore	 opted	 to	
include	in	my	research	a	second	set	of	 interviews	with	the	same	participants	one	year	after	
my	 initial	 encounter	with	 them	 and	 to	 assess	 the	 evolution	 of	 their	 social	media	 activities	
over	the	research	period.	
	
The	 second	 round	 of	 interviews	 was	 to	 some	 extent	 adapted	 to	 the	 responses	 of	 the	
individual	participants'	 in	the	first	 interviews,	but	covered	quite	similar	territory	 in	terms	of	
media	practices	and	political	involvement.	Additionally,	it	included	a	more	detailed	discussion	
of	any	changes	that	had	taken	place	in	the	socio-political	sphere	since	the	first	interview	and	
their	underlying	factors,	where	relevant.	These	interviews	also	incorporated	a	few	additional	
points	 to	 further	 probe	 perspectives	 on	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 limitations	 to	
autonomous	 expression,	 as	 well	 as	 perceptions	 of	 collective	 versus	 individual	 identities.	 It	
was	not	possible	to	have	access	to	all	the	participants	in	the	sample	for	the	second	round	of	
interviews	as	circumstances	had	changed	for	some	and	others	expressed	no	interest	in	being	
interviewed	 for	 a	 second	 time.	 I	 was,	 however,	 able	 to	 re-establish	 contact	 and	 interview	
two-thirds	of	the	original	respondents	at	the	end	of	2013.		
	
As	previously	mentioned,	interviews	took	place	in	October	and	November	2012,	followed	by	
a	 second	 round	 -	 as	 well	 as	 some	 additional	 contextual	 interviews	 -	 one	 year	 later.	 The	
interviews	had	no	specific	 time	 limit	and	 in	some	cases	 lasted	up	to	two	hours.	 I	 requested	
permission	 to	 record	 them	 on	 my	 mobile	 phone,	 to	 which	 most	 participants	 agreed.	
Additional	 interviews	 to	 help	 contextualise	 some	 of	 the	 questions	 were	 conducted	 with	
several	 online	 activists,	 politicians,	 civil	 society	 actors,	 journalists,	 and	 administrators	 of	
Facebook	 pages.	 Equally,	 early	 test	 interviews	 with	 close	 acquaintances	 provided	 useful	
informal	 feedback	 on	 the	 interview	 protocol.	 For	 instance,	 some	 respondents	 had	
preconceptions	 of	 what	 constitutes	 research,	 typically	 associated	 with	 large	 scale	
quantitative	surveys	and	opinion	polls	 that	had	become	quite	common	after	 the	 revolution	
and	 which	 were	 frequently	 cited	 by	 media	 outlets.	 However,	 interviewees	 were	 often	
intrigued	 by	 the	 more	 discursive	 form	 of	 the	 interviews,	 and	 pleasantly	 surprised	 by	 the	
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outcome	of	the	lengthy	discussions.	I	had	also	memorised	the	issues	I	wanted	to	cover	in	the	
interviews	 to	avoid	 reading	questions	 from	a	paper	and	 to	establish	a	more	conversational	
tone.	The	reflective	depth	achieved	through	these	discussions	 resulted	 in	generally	positive	
feedback	from	the	interviewees.	Many	seemed	to	have	enjoyed	the	interview	experience	and	
the	 topics	 discussed.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 same	 interview	 technique	was	 subsequently	 used	 for	
this	 first	 round	 of	 interviews,	 but	 I	 spent	 more	 time	 clarifying	 in	 advance	 how	 interviews	
would	proceed	and	the	purpose	of	the	methodology.	
	
Interviews	were	mostly	conducted	and	answered	in	Tunisian	dialect,	occasionally	mixed	with	
some	French.	The	language	choices	of	respondents	had	an	interesting	sociological	dimension	
that,	 although	 not	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 project,	 warrants	 a	 brief	 explanation	 as	 much	 of	 this	
subtlety	 was	 lost	 in	 the	 translation	 process52.	 These	 choices	 were	 linked	 to	 a	 number	 of	
factors	including	regional,	socio-economic,	political,	and	postcolonial,	as	well	as	gender,	that	
all	played	a	part	in	the	study	participants’	identity	performances	and	their	interactions.	These	
are	 inevitable	 and	 integral	 processes	 in	 any	 research	 and	 are	 important	 to	 flag	 up.	 For	
instance,	depending	on	the	context	in	which	it	was	used,	French	could	indicate	identification	
with	a	bourgeois	Francophile	urban	elite,	be	a	sign	of	demarcation	from	calls	by	Islamists	for	
re-acquaintance	with	 a	more	authentic	 Tunisian	 identity	 (and	 thus	 a	political	 positioning	 in	
turn),	 contribute	 to	 the	performance	of	 a	particular	 feminist	 or	 emancipatory	 stance,	 or	 in	
turn	 point	 to	 the	 positioning	 of	 a	 respondent	 towards	 my	 ambiguous	 Western-Tunisian	
identity.	Similarly,	differences	in	the	adoption	of	different	accents53,	or	use	of	a	rich	classical	
Arabic	 vocabulary,	 were	 at	 times	 indicative	 of	 regional	 identifications,	 education	 levels,	 or	
political	stance	for	example.	As	a	result,	I	sought	to	pay	attention	to	these	linguistic	dynamics	
in	 my	 interactions	 with	 interviewees,	 and	 attempted,	 where	 possible,	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	
between,	on	the	one	hand,	adjusting	to,	and	reflecting,	the	respondents’	use	of	language	in	
order	to	put	them	at	ease	or	avoid	antagonising	them,	and	on	the	other	hand,	performing	a	
relatively	neutral	 identity,	 for	 instance,	by	avoiding	 to	over-emphasise	 the	use	of	French	or	
classical	Arabic.	
	
Similarly,	 the	choice	of	 location	 for	 the	 interviews	was	 the	 result	of	a	 flexible	and	adaptive	
approach.	At	times,	this	involved	a	level	of	negotiation	between	participants’	needs	and	the	
requirements	of	the	project,	in	particular	as	I	tried	to	conduct	interviews	in	a	relatively	quiet	
																																																						
52	However,	in	the	quotes	included	in	the	empirical	chapters,	I	inserted	some	of	the	words	and	expressions	in	their	original	
language	to	highlight	some	of	these	language	uses.	
53	For	example,	the	pronunciation	of	the	[gu]	which	is	not	a	letter	in	the	classical	Arabic	alphabet,	has	a	political	dimension	in	
Tunisia.	Tunisians	with	regional	accents	using	the	“gu”	used	to	be	marginalised	and	derided	by	sections	of	the	urban	upper	and	
middle	classes	before	the	revolution.	Conversely,	this	became	a	source	of	pride	for	some	after	the	revolution.	The	use	by	leftist	
politician	Hamma	Hammami	of	the	“gu”	in	the	media	was	quite	revolutionary	in	the	early	days	of	the	transitional	period.	
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location	 to	 allow	more	 in-depth	 and	 uninterrupted	 engagement	 in	 conversation	 to	 unfold.	
However,	 this	was	not	 always	 feasible	 and	 I	 also	 attempted	 to	 accommodate	 respondents’	
preferences	so	far	as	possible.	As	Herzog	(2005)	argues,	interviewees’	choices	of	locations	are	
significant	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 social	 dimensions	 and	 identity	 performances	 they	 highlight,	 and	
they	 can	 be	 constitutive	 of	 the	 knowledge	 such	 spatial	 parameters	 enrich	 a	 study	 with.	
Interviews	mostly	took	place	in	research	participants’	homes,	works	places	or	in	cafés.	These	
settings	were	partly	dictated	by	societal	gender	norms	that	respondents,	to	varying	degrees,	
wished	or	implied	a	need	to	adhere	to.		
	
Being	a	female	researcher	in	the	Arab	world	has	both	advantages	and	disadvantages.	In	the	
field	of	political	research	for	example,	it	has	not	been	deemed	to	pose	any	significant	issues	
(Clarke,	2006).	Often	such	research	takes	the	form	of	short	quantitative	surveys	aimed	at	the	
general	public	or,	on	the	other	hand,	 lengthier	 interviews	with	‘expert’	figures.	However,	as	
my	 interest	 was	 primarily	 in	 non-experts	 and	 my	 research	 entailed	 a	 need	 to	 conduct	 in-
depth	 interviews,	my	 approach	 necessitated	 some	 adjustments.	 Furthermore,	 as	 someone	
conducting	 research	“at	home”54	 (Strathern,	1987),	 there	were	greater	expectations	 for	me	
to	adhere	to	local	gender	norms,	in	particular	in	those	less	urbanised	areas	where	the	public	
and	 private	 spheres	 were	 more	 distinctly	 gendered.	 For	 instance,	 whilst	 most	 female	
participants	 invited	me	to	 their	homes	 for	 the	 interviews,	 the	majority	of	male	participants	
were	 interviewed	 in	 less	 private	 locations.	 As	 a	 young	 female	 researcher,	 it	 was	 more	
problematic	 to	 interview	men	 in	 private,	 as	 in	 some	 contexts	 it	 was	 perceived	 as	 socially	
unacceptable	for	a	man	and	woman	to	be	together	and	unaccompanied	in	a	room.	Many	of	
the	interviews	with	male	respondents	took	place	(at	their	suggestion)	in	their	work	place	or	in	
cafés.	One	participant	was	also	eager	to	conduct	the	interview	in	a	bar,	a	choice	I	interpreted	
as	 seeking	 to	 ascertain	 a	 non-conservative	 identity,	 whereas	 at	 the	 other	 extreme	 of	 this	
dynamic	some	male	respondents	were	anxious	to	avoid	shaking	my	hand	or	have	any	form	of	
eye	contact	with	me	as	a	way	to	establish	their	interpretation	of	religiously-informed	gender	
norms,	and	to	maintain	a	distance	aimed	at	expressing	respect	towards	women.	In	four	cases,	
I	also	conducted	interviews	in	houses	of	mutual	acquaintances,	with	the	acquaintance	being	
present	in	a	separate	room,	with	doors	left	ajar	as	a	way	of	putting	everybody	at	ease.	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
54	This	is	discussed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter.	
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2.3. Interpretive	parameters	and	assumptions	
	
The	 theoretical	 discussion	 of	 the	 project’s	methodological	 perspectives	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
this	 chapter	 has	 laid	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 framework	 for	 data	 assessment.	 The	 interview	
accounts	were	assessed	on	the	level	of	the	meanings	explicitly	advanced	by	the	respondents,	
the	 meanings	 they	 constructed,	 and	 the	 assumptions	 they	 implied.	 The	 assessment	 can	
further	be	seen	as	anchored	 in	 the	method	of	discourse	analysis.	Although	no	 fundamental	
agreement	 exists	 between	 scholars	 as	 to	 its	 definition	 (Barker,	 2008),	 it	 can	 be	 broadly	
delineated	through	a	common	concern	with	the	social	role	of	linguistic	and	symbolic	systems	
and	 their	 power	 to	 “shape	 identities,	 social	 practices,	 relations	between	 individuals	 and	 all	
kinds	 of	 authority”	 (ibid,	 p.152).	 The	 approach	 selected	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 will	
inevitably	 suffer	 from	 the	 typical	 shortcomings	 commonly	 associated	 with	 qualitative	
research	in	the	broader	validity	of	the	claims	it	may	purport	to	make	(Jaworski	and	Coupland,	
2005,	p.30)	–	which	I	 fully	acknowledge.	There	were	some	limits	to	the	precision	that	could	
be	 achieved	 in	 the	 interview	 analysis	 due	 to	 linguistic	 issues.	 As	 Tunisian	 dialect	 is	 not	 a	
formally	 written	 language,	 transcribing	 the	 recordings	 phonetically	 carried	 with	 it	 its	 own	
challenges	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 subsequent	 analysis.	 To	 facilitate	 the	 process,	 interviews	 were	
instead	fully	translated	and	transcribed	 in	English.	Computer	software	NVivo	was	then	used	
to	help	manage	the	data	coding	process.	
	
Consequently,	 such	 an	 assessment	 also	 necessitates	 a	 critical	 assessment	 of	 my	 personal	
interpretative	 assumptions.	 As	 Kendall	 argues	 (2009,	 p.109),	 because	 the	 researcher's	
identity	 inevitably	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 an	 awareness	 of	 differences	 and	
similarities	is	crucial	in	order	to	decipher	how	these	may	be	affecting	responses.	Although	no	
claim	 to	 objectivity	 is	made,	 as	 this	would	 not	 adhere	 to	my	 ontological	 stance,	 particular	
care	was	taken	to	be	consistently	aware	of	the	ways	in	which	my	judgment	shaped	responses	
and	interactions	with	the	study	participants,	and	my	subsequent	assessment	of	material.	The	
comparative	elements	of	 the	 study,	at	 the	 level	of	a	 temporal	 comparison	between	sets	of	
interviews,	and	at	 the	 level	of	a	 comparison	between	offline	and	online	discourses,	 further	
support	this	effort.		
	
Doing	 research	 in	 the	 country	 I	 grew	 up	 in	 was	 an	 enriching,	 but	 equally	 a	 challenging	
endeavour	 in	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 this	 study,	 and	 one	 that	 calls	 for	 a	 more	 detailed	
reflection.	There	are	three	aspects,	 in	particular,	that	warrant	attention:	my	own	identity	as	
insider/outsider	 and	 ‘halfie’	 (Lughod,	 1991)	 conducting	 research	 in	 Tunisia;	 my	 own	
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positioning	 vis-à-vis	 the	 revolution	 events	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 the	 political	 landscape	 that	
subsequently	 emerged;	 and	my	personal	 experience	 and	use	 of	 traditional	 and	new	media	
relating	to	the	Tunisian	context.	Conducting	this	type	of	research	has	been	tied	to	a	number	
of	 methodological	 approaches	 and	 terminologies	 such	 as	 “insider	 ethnography”	 (Hayano,	
1979),	 “auto-anthropology”	 (Strathern,	 1987),	 and	 “auto-ethnography”	 (Reed-Danahay,	
1997;	Denzin,	2014;	Ellis	et	al.,	2011),	with	varying	definitional	scopes.	Whilst	some	of	these	
approaches	call	 for	a	 systematic	and	 in-depth	 reflexive	contextualisation	of	 research	within	
the	 researcher’s	 personal	 experience	 and	 biography,	 at	 a	 more	 basic	 level	 most	 of	 these	
methods	share	a	concern	with	the	position	of	a	researcher	exploring	his/her	own	culture.	As	
my	methodology	only	partially	intersects	with	these	debates,	it	is	at	this	broader	level	that	I	
tap	into	them	to	address	some	of	the	issues	that	arose	with	my	research.		
	
In	anthropology,	the	notion	of	researching	one’s	own	culture	has	been	at	the	centre	of	much	
debate	as	it	raises	particularly	probing	questions	about	research	context	and	conditions,	and	
in	 particular	 the	 power	 dynamics	 inherent	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 researcher	 and	
research	 objects	 (Rapport,	 2014,	 p.25).	 Indeed,	 proximity	 between	 the	 two	 challenges	 and	
undermines	the	notion	-	on	which	much	positivist-oriented	research	is	based	-	that	distance	is	
a	 necessary	 factor	 in	 conducting	 research	 and,	 by	 association,	 it	 threatens	 to	 collapse	 the	
separation	between	subjectivity	and	objectivity,	and	the	scientific	epistemology	on	which	the	
notion	is	based,	which	implies	that	a	value-free	knowledge	of	culture	and	human	experience	
can	 be	 produced	 (Marcus	 and	 Fisher,	 1986;	 Ellington	 and	 Ellis,	 2008).	 Challenges	 to	 these	
perspectives	have	grown,	however,	 in	particular	 in	connexion	with	anthropological	 theory’s	
tradition	of	being	 rooted	 in	 the	opinions	and	 judgments	of	Western	anthropologists	on	 the	
cultures	of	 ‘native’	 -	and	often	colonised	–	others.	Equally,	the	gradual	contestation	of	such	
perspectives	 has	been	 accelerated	by	 the	 increasing	 focus,	 over	 the	 last	 three	decades,	 on	
the	study	by	researchers	of	their	own	societies	and	cultures	in	the	West	(Jackson,	1987).		
	
Beyond	the	question	of	whose	culture	the	researcher	is	best	placed	to	explore,	these	debates	
challenge	 essentialist	 or	 fixed	 notions	 of	 identity	 (national	 or	 other),	 and	 highlight	 the	
complexity	and	fluidity	of	identity	performances	and	enactments	by	those	inside	and	outside	
a	given	culture.	As	Lughod	(1991)	denotes,	these	issues	become	particularly	apparent	in	the	
case	 of	 “halfies”,	 ‘native’	 or	 ‘semi-native’	 researchers	 whose	 position	 cannot	 be	 simply	
categorised,	from	the	outset,	as	being	 insiders	or	outsiders.	These,	she	contends,	appear	to	
destabilise	 the	 notion	 of	 distance	 and	 objectivity	 in	 anthropological	 research,	 but	 in	 fact	
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highlight,	 perhaps	more	markedly	 than	 in	 the	 case	of	other	 researchers,	 that	 “the	outsider	
self	never	simply	stands	outside”	(p.468).		
	
At	 the	same	time,	proximity	between	researcher	and	researched	raises	a	number	of	 issues.	
Whilst	 it	can	facilitate	access	and	provide	deeper	insights	 into	cultural	subtleties,	 it	can	also	
make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 researchers	 to	 sufficiently	 detach	 themselves	 from	 the	 contexts	
they	 are	 exploring	 (Strathern,	 1987;	 Hastrup,	 1995)	 and	 from	 the	 implicit	 hierarchies	 of	
power	 that	 govern	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 given	 social	 order.	 This	 can	 make	 it	 particularly	
difficult	for	researchers	to	maintain	a	level	of	independence	in	navigating	between	personal,	
public	 and	 academic	 identities,	 and	 it	 can	 blind	 them	 to	 the	 interpretive	 assumptions	 they	
ground	 their	 assessments	 in.	 These	 limitations	 have,	 however,	 gradually	 led	 to	 a	 re-
evaluation	of	anthropological	research	approaches	towards	a	broader	turn	to	self-reflexivity	
(Rapport,	2014,	p.35).		
	
In	media	studies,	deeper	engagement	with	the	issues	that	insider	research	can	raise	has	been	
less	prevalent	(Madianou,	2010,	p.429),	although	the	situation	is	changing.	Furthermore,	the	
reassessment	 of	what	 counts	 as	 ‘insider’,	 from	 fixed	 notions	 to	more	 conceptual	 and	 fluid	
conceptions	(Hastrup,	1995)	of	the	terms,	also	raises	questions	on	the	need	for	reflexivity	in	
anthropologically-inspired	media	research.	These	issues	are	of	growing	importance	in	an	era	
of	 increasing	media	 pervasiveness	 in	 the	 everyday	 life	 of	 both	 researcher	 and	 researched,	
particularly	 so	 in	 a	 digital	 age	 in	which	media	 affordances	 increasingly	 transcend	 local	 and	
national	 borders.	 This,	 perhaps	more	markedly,	 brings	 to	 the	 fore	 the	 need	 for	 the	media	
researcher	to	account	for	his/her	own	position	not	only	with	reference	to	a	specific	regional	
cultural	setting,	but	also	in	relation	to	mediated	transnational	and	networked	online	cultures.	
	
These	 ambiguities	 were	 certainly	 reflected	 in	 my	 own	 position	 as	 a	 researcher	 who	 was	
educated	 in,	 and	 a	 long-term	 resident	 of,	 the	 UK;	 of	 dual	 Tunisian-German	 heritage,	 who	
grew	 up	 in	 Tunisia,	 and	 whose	 research	 ‘at	 home’	 was	 funded	 by	 a	 British	 research	
institution.	This	meant	that,	quite	often,	participants	were	unsure	how	to	categorise	me	and	I	
paid	 particular	 attention	 to	 instances	 where	 this	 appeared	 to	 matter.	 Some	 interviewees	
seemed	to	interact	with	me	as	they	would	with	other	Tunisians,	speaking	in	Tunisian	dialect,	
taking	for	granted	that	I	understood	some	of	the	references	they	were	making,	and	including	
me	 in	 the	expressions	of	 the	groups	 they	 felt	 they	belonged	 to	 (e.g.	 “our	generation”,	 “we	
Tunisians”).	Others,	 in	 turn,	 seemed	 to	 place	me	 as	 a	 foreigner	 and	Westerner,	 expressing	
surprise	 that	 I	 spoke	 Tunisian	or,	 as	 one	 female	 participant	 did,	 complementing	me	on	my	
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height	 and	my	 ‘soft’	 hair.	 Some	 respondents,	 without	 being	 prompted,	 explained	 in	 detail	
political	 events	 they	 made	 reference	 to,	 which	 they	 evidently	 considered	 I	 might	 not	 be	
aware	of	 (e.g.	 that	elections	were	held	 in	2011,	 that	 a	politician	had	been	assassinated).	A	
few	 research	 participants	 also	 felt	 compelled	 to	 compare	 the	 Arab	 and	 Western	 world,	
making	 rather	 derogatory	 generalisations	 about	 Arabs	 whose	 views	 they	 set	 against	
‘Western’	development,	rationality	and	democratic	values.	These	comments	were	phrased	in	
a	way	which	 suggested	 that	 the	 speaker(s)	 expected	 to	 provoke	me	 into	 taking	 a	 position.	
Mostly,	 however,	 participants	 appeared	 to	 switch	 between	 different	modes	 of	 interaction,	
inclusion	 and	 exclusion.	 As	 Sabry	 (2010)	 notes	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 comparable	 context	 of	
Morocco,	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 Western	 world	 of	 many	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 region	 is	
frequently	 complex,	 and	 he	 makes	 the	 general	 observation	 that	 their	 discourses	 of	
“Arabness”,	of	Western	modernity,	and	of	Islam,	as	a	“symbolic	repertoire”,	are	not	fixed,	nor	
ever	“total”	(p.	153).	Instead	their	positions	towards	tradition	and	modernity	unfold,	and	are	
resisted,	on	different	levels	in	the	everyday.	An	attempt	was	made	on	my	part	from	the	start	
of	 the	 project	 to	 remain	 continuously	 aware	 of	 these	 dynamics	 and	 to	 establish	 a	 level	 of	
neutrality	towards	these	reflections,	whilst	maintaining	a	non-judgemental	attitude.	Similarly,	
I	sought	to	be	particularly	sensitive	to	what	interviewees	appeared	to	take	for	granted	about	
my	 familiarity	 with	 their	 perspectives,	 by	 dwelling	 on	 some	 of	 the	 links	 they	 inferred	 as	
obvious	and	asking	them	to	explain	their	views	in	more	detail.			
	
It	 is	also	important,	in	this	regard,	to	briefly	reflect	on	my	own	political	position,	and	how	it	
may	 have	 impacted	 on	 interactions	 with	 interviewees,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 my	 interpretative	
assumptions.	 The	 underlying	 impetus	 for	 focusing	 on	 digital	 media	 in	 the	 Arab	 world	 is	
related	 to	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 possibilities	 for	 alternative	media	 content	 and	 communicative	
configurations	 to	 support	 change	 towards	 a	more	 egalitarian	 society	 in	 the	 region.	 Having	
grown	up	in	Tunisia,	I	was	acutely	aware	of	the	social,	economic	and	political	 inequalities	in	
the	 country,	 although	 these	 were	 perhaps	 less	 pronounced	 than	 in	 other	 countries	 in	 the	
region.	 This	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 Tunisia	 prior	 to	 the	 revolution	 did	 not	
translate	 into	 any	 specific	 adherence	 or	 positioning	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 emerging	 political	
sphere	following	the	collapse	of	the	Ben-Ali	government.	Nevertheless,	as	someone	who	was	
brought	up	in	an	Islamic	culture,	but	held	agnostic	religious	views,	I	was	less	sympathetic	to	
the	 political	 project	 of	 the	 Islamist	 party,	 than	 to	 the	 liberal	 and	 secular	 agenda	 of	 other	
political	groups,	although	ultimately	none	of	 the	emerging	political	 figures	and	parties	held	
particular	 appeal	 for	 me.	 This	 meant	 that,	 in	 recruiting	 participants	 through	 snowballing,	
starting	 from	 personal	 acquaintances	 and	 contacts,	 it	 was	 initially	 easier	 to	 access	
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participants	whose	views	were	closer	to	my	own,	and	more	difficult	to	access	supporters	of	
ideological	movements	such	as	Islamism	and	Salafism.	I	was	fully	aware	of	this	imbalance	at	
the	outset,	and	consciously	set	out	 to	 redress	 it	 through	achieving	an	overall	 sample	which	
attempted	to	broadly	reflect	the	plurality	of	opinions	in	Tunisian	society	at	the	time.	
	
Finally,	 as	 Strathern	 (1987,	 p.17)	 notes,	 whilst	 the	 conducting	 of	 research	 in	 a	 familiar	
environment	 can	 result	 in	 a	 richer	 understanding,	 it	 can	 also	 result	 in	 a	 lack	 of	 critical	
objectivity.	 It	 may	 additionally,	 at	 times,	 lead	 to	more	 pressure	 on	 ‘native’	 researchers	 to	
provide	positive	accounts	of	 their	 ‘home’	setting	to	a	western	academic	audience,	and	to	a	
more	 heightened	 sense	 of	 awareness	 of	 the	 “risk	 of	 betrayal”	 that	 all	 research	 necessarily	
carries	(Darling-Wolf,	2003,	p.110).	This	was	certainly	an	issue	I	could	relate	to:	I	was	acutely	
aware	of	my	disappointment	at	some	of	the	research	findings,	which	served	to	paint	a	quite	
different	picture	of	the	Tunisian	democratisation	process	than	that	I	had	hoped	for.		
	
This	self-reflexive	account	would	not	be	complete	without	reference	to	my	perspective	and	
practice	in	relation	to	the	Tunisian	media	sphere.	These	were	also	characterised	by	a	level	of	
ambivalence	during	the	research	period,	tinged	with	cautious	optimism	about	social	media’s	
disruptive	potential	in	the	early	days	of	the	revolution,	and	an	awareness	of	the	specificity	of	
the	Tunisian	context	in	terms	of	the	highly	politicised	nature	of	online	interactions.	I	sought,	
throughout	 the	 research	 period,	 to	 maintain	 an	 engagement	 with	 different	 Tunisian	
broadcast,	print	and	online	content,	which	was	at	times	emotionally	taxing	due	to	the	level	of	
verbal	 aggression	 and	 symbolic	 violence	 encountered	 in	 some	 discourse	 -	 particularly	 on	
social	media.	My	personal	use	of	social	media	was	also,	to	some	extent,	shaped	by	the	online	
research	 component	as	participants	 connected	 to	my	personal	 Facebook	account,	 a	point	 I	
discuss	in	further	detail	below.	
	
	
3. Online	research	component	
	
3.1. Approach	and	delineation	of	online	fieldsite(s):	Following	users’	interactions	
	
Orgad	(2009)	highlights	that	one	of	the	prevalent	 interpretative	assumptions	 in	research	on	
"people's	experiences	of	 the	 Internet"	 relates	 to	 the	distinction	between	online	and	offline	
and	rests	on	a	view	of	online	relations	as	meaningful	in	their	own	separate	terms	(p.35).	This	
distinction	 has	 been	 progressively	 challenged	 (e.g.	 Sade-Beck,	 2004;	Wilson	 2006;	 Beneito-
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Montagut,	 2011)	 and	 this	 area	 of	 media	 research	 is	 increasingly	 evolving	 towards	 a	 less	
disjointed	analysis	 of	 online	 and	offline	materials,	 but	 such	an	approach	needs	 to	be	more	
systematically	embedded	in	online	media	research	in	a	manner	that	shows	these	materials	as	
contextualizing	each	other	(Orgad,	2009).		
	
Nevertheless,	Internet	research	is	still	quite	an	unstructured	research	area	with	much	scope	
for	creative	methodologies,	as	Baym	and	Markham	(2009)	highlight.	A	number	of	voices	have	
called	 in	 this	 regard	 for	 the	 adoption	 and	 development	 of	 new	 ethnographic	 methods	 to	
explore	online	media	and	communications,	described	 for	example	as	 “virtual	 ethnography”	
(Ruhleder,	2000;	Hine,	2000	and	2005),	and	“netnography”	(Kozinets,	2010).	To	a	point,	these	
discussions	 have	 extended	 previous	 debates	 on	 the	 critical	 adoption	 of	 ethnographic	
terminology	 (e.g.	 Postill	 and	 Pink,	 2012)	 and	 partially	 highlighted	 the	 necessity	 of	 creating	
new	and	more	flexible	approaches	(Pink,	2009,	Markham,	2013)	to	assess	online	contexts	as	
fieldsites	(Hine,	2005),	to	consider	online	fieldsites	as	networks	(Burrell,	2009),	or	to	focus	on	
a	 multiplicity	 of	 sites	 in	 Internet	 research	 beyond	 notions	 of	 networks	 and	 communities	
(Postill,	2008).	With	the	development	of	social	networking	sites,	such	approaches	were	also	
developed	 to	 explore	 social	 media	 uses	 and	 environments,	 such	 as	 what	 Postill	 and	 Pink	
(2012)	 refer	 to	 as	 social	 media	 ethnography	 –	 a	 term	 they	 are	 careful	 to	 frame	 as	 being	
‘internet-related’	rather	than	exclusive	to	the	exploration	of	online	sites.		
	
Both	the	discursive	and	performative	dimensions	of	media	use	are	 important,	and	 I	believe	
there	 is	 much	 to	 be	 gained	 from	 combining	 explorations	 of	 the	 two.	 As	 media	 users	
progressively	 adopted	 new	 media	 technologies	 and	 turned	 to	 online	 environments,	 more	
uncertainty	 developed	 for	media	 researchers	 regarding	 the	 focus	 and	 sites	 of	 exploration.	
The	 issue	 was	 further	 complicated	 by	 social	 media	 platforms,	 on	 which	 the	 boundaries	
between	 media	 users	 and	 producers,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 media	 text,	 users’	 interpretive	
activities	and	socially	performative	actions,	become	extremely	 indistinct.	This	 lack	of	 clarity	
translated	into	a	number	of	questions	and	methodological	issues.	
		
This	 study	 sought	 to	 explore	 the	 socio-political	 dimensions	of	 social	media	use	by	ordinary	
citizens	as	part	of	 their	everyday	 lives	 in	post-revolution	Tunisia.	As	previously	discussed,	a	
key	part	of	this	objective	was	to	avoid	a	focus	on	forms	of	activism	and	groups	of	activists	as	a	
starting	point	for	the	research.	However,	determining	who	and	what	to	assess	 instead	for	a	
study	of	‘ordinary’	citizens	and	the	everyday	was	equally	problematic,	as	this	opened	up	the	
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prospect	 of	 boundless	 online	 and	 offline	 fields	 of	 research.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 new	 problem	 in	
media	research,	but	one	that	is	significantly	complicated	by	online	media.	
	
A	 further	 important	 departure	 from	 ethnographic	 research	 on	 social	media,	 relates	 to	 the	
nature	of	the	immersion	such	an	approach	involves.	There	are	divergent	opinions	about	the	
adequate	 level	of	 interaction	with	online	users	 that	 informs	 such	 research	 (Postil	 and	Pink,	
2012).	 This	 issue	 relates	 to	 broader	 debates	 concerning	 the	 level	 of	 interaction	 that	
participant-observation	entails,	which	are	further	complicated	by	the	communicative	set-up	
of	online	research	as	it	facilitates	a	greater	level	of	observation	at	a	(physical)	distance.	With	
the	social	media	environment,	the	 issue	raises	a	different	set	of	questions	as	 lines	between	
the	researcher’s	private,	public	and	academic	lives	can	also	become	blurred.	For	instance,	the	
online	environment	may	expose,	to	the	researcher	and	to	research	participants,	information	
about	the	other	that	they	may	not	have	wished	to	disclose.	This	issue	requires	more	careful	
management	 of	 traces	 of	 online	 interactions,	 particularly	 in	 a	 context	 such	 as	 the	 one	 I	
studied,	which	became	increasingly	polarized.	The	dynamic	was	reinforced	by	communication	
and	 opinion	 expression	 on	 social	media	 as	 I	 later	 highlight	 in	 the	 empirical	 findings	 of	 this	
study.		
	
I	thus	elected	to	adopt	a	different,	less	obtrusive	approach	than	that	of	some	existing	social	
media	 research,	 one	 that	 started	 from	 a	 sample	 of	 ordinary	 users	 selected	 offline	 whose	
social	 media	 profiles	 were	 accessed	 and	 analysed	 retrospectively.	 Rather	 than	 observing	
participants	during	their	communicative	activities	on	social	media,	I	requested	access	to	their	
profiles	after	the	end	of	the	interviewing	process,	once	a	level	of	trust	had	been	established,	
as	a	way	to	avoid	impacting	on	research	findings	through	my	online	presence.	I	believe	that	
this	 approach	 was	 particularly	 helpful,	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 initial	 interviews	 suggested	 that	
some	 participants	 were	 quite	 unsettled	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 wanted	 to	 discuss	 their	 media	
practices.	From	the	perspective	of	a	number	of	 interviewees	 the	question	of	why	someone	
writing	a	thesis	at	a	Western	institution	would	be	interested	in	their	Facebook	usage	rather	
than	talk	to	cyber-activists,	was	perplexing.	Some	subjects	were	almost	apologetic,	pointing	
out	that	they	were	relatively	inactive	on	social	media	and	that	perhaps	they	were	unsuitable	
as	interview	subjects	as	a	result.	Whilst	I	attempted	to	clarify	the	aims	of	the	study	in	more	
detail,	 this	 highlighted	 to	 me	 that	 potential	 access	 to	 private	 social	 media	 accounts–	 if	
permitted	–	might	have	a	degree	of	impact	on	subsequent	use,	as	some	of	the	respondents	
may	have	sought	to	represent	activity	that	perhaps	better	fitted	(what	they	assumed	to	be)	
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my	expectations.	My	choice	 to	opt	 for	a	more	self-effacing	approach	and	 to	seek	access	 to	
social	media	data	retrospectively	was	well	suited	to	addressing	some	of	these	issues.	
	
The	 online	methodology	 of	 this	 study	 was	 designed	 along	 predominantly	 qualitative	 lines.	
However,	 it	 also	 incorporated	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 quantitative	 elements.	 Whilst	 my	
approach	 adheres	 to	 a	more	 interpretative	 agenda,	 it	 also	 supports	 a	 pragmatist	 paradigm	
that	 takes	 into	 consideration	 the	 weaknesses	 and	 strengths	 of	 quantitative	 as	 well	 as	
qualitative	 research	 elements,	 and	 aims	 to	 bring	 forth	 their	 mutually	 enriching	 aspects	
(Hewson,	2006,	p.180).	As	Deacon	(2008)	contends,	the	"incompatibility	thesis"	between	the	
two	 categories	 tends	 to	 overstate	 the	 "antinomy	of	 positivist-orientated	 and	 interpretivist-
orientated	research	concerns"	(p.95).	The	opposition	between	the	underlying	assumptions	of	
the	 two	perspectives	needs	 to	be	acknowledged	but	 it	 should	not,	 I	 argue,	 inhibit	 research	
from	 resorting	 to	 a	 well-delimited	 emphasis	 on	 "the	 factual	 characteristics	 of	 the	 object	
under	study"	(Silverman,	2012,	p.34)	-	whether	these	characteristics	are	of	a	quantitative	or	
qualitative	 nature	 -	 as	 long	 as	 an	open	mind	 is	maintained	 towards	 alternative	 readings	 of	
these	 characteristics,	 and	a	 critical	 eye	 is	 simultaneously	 applied	 to	 their	 reading	 as	 'facts'.	
Furthermore,	as	Hine	 (2005)	observes,	 the	sheer	volume	of	data	available	 to	researchers	 in	
an	 online	 environment	 calls	 for	 more	 proximity	 between	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	
approaches	in	research	designs	(p.109).	In	this	sense,	the	incorporation	in	a	qualitatively-led	
study,	of	elements	 to	quantify	 such	environments	 can	help	 in	 supporting	 their	 reading	and	
depiction.		
	
The	decision	to	focus	the	online	component	of	the	research	design	primarily	on	social	media	
platform	Facebook	was	deliberated	over	at	length.	Although	the	study	did	not	initially	intend	
to	 specifically	 focus	 on	 the	 platform,	 the	 centrality	 of	 Facebook	 to	 the	 online	 research	
component	 became	 increasingly	 evident.	 The	 suspicion	 that	 Facebook	 had	 not	 only	 been	
widely	adopted	in	Tunisia,	but	was	in	fact	the	dominant	social	media	platform	in	the	country	
and	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 online	 practices	 more	 generally,	 was	 confirmed	 from	 the	 very	
beginning	of	the	interviewing	process.	During	the	initial	test	interviews,	the	time	many	of	the	
interviewees	reported	to	spend	on	the	platform	compared	to	other	media	suggested	that	its	
role	was	central	to	media	practices	of	a	substantial	number	of	people	who	had	online	access.	
Furthermore,	 these	 findings	 revealed	 that	 social	 media	 platform	 Twitter	 had	 not	 met	 the	
same	success	 in	Tunisia	as	 in	other	 countries.	 It	was	perceived	as	being	 in	 some	way	more	
‘exclusive’	as	a	social	media	platform,	principally	used	by	the	media,	academic,	and	political	
elites,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 activists.	 By	 contrast	 the	 perception	 of	 Facebook	 as	 being	 more	 of	 a	
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mainstream	platform	appeared	 to	be	widespread.	Although	 the	 selection	of	 participants	 in	
the	 study	 was	 open	 to	 different	 types	 of	 Internet	 use,	 the	 entire	 sample	 had	 a	 Facebook	
account	and	only	a	few	study	participants	used	Twitter	in	addition	to	Facebook.	The	design	of	
my	online	research	component	resultantly	centred	on	analysing	data	from	this	platform.	This	
focus	meant	 that	 particular	 attention	 and	 critical	 distance	 needed	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 Facebook’	
communicative	architecture	and	political	economy	in	order	to	avoid	a	superficial	analysis	of	
its	 socio-political	 scope.	 An	 uncritical	 approach	 risked	 simply	 giving	 resonance	 to	 the	
platform’s	 “rhetoric	 of	 transparency	 and	 openness”	 (Van	 Dijck,	 2013,	 p.14)	 and	 to	 the	
conflation	 between	 “(human)	 connectedness	 and	 (automated)	 connectivity”	 (ibid,	 p.12)	 on	
which	the	branding	strategies	of	many	contemporary	‘social’	media	companies	are	based.		
	
3.2. Online	data	gathering	and	assessment	
	
The	 gathering	 and	 assessment	 of	 social	 media	 data	 consisted	 of	 two	 aspects.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	 personal	 account	 data	 was	 amassed	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 key	 trends,	 similarities	 and	
differences	 in	 practices	 between	 research	participants,	 and	 evolutions	 over	 time,	mainly	 in	
quantitative	 and	 anonymised	 terms.	 An	 initial	 assessment	 revealed	 that	 the	 majority	 of	
content	 shared	by	 individuals	on	 their	 Facebook	walls	was	not	user-generated,	 but	 instead	
stemmed	from	other	sources,	and	that	the	same	source	tended	to	be	regularly	drawn	on	by	
each	participant.	Consequently,	the	second	component	of	the	online	data	gathering	process	
consisted	 of	 a	 sample	 of	 ten	 publicly	 accessible	 Facebook	 pages	 that	 participants	 used	 as	
their	 primary	 source	 for	 material	 they	 shared.	 This	 data	 served	 to	 complement	 and	
contextualize	personal	account	data	as	it	provided	a	basis	of	comparison	between	individual	
and	large-scale	collective	patterns	of	interactions	(e.g.	‘likes’,	‘shares’,	written	comments),	as	
well	 as	 insights	 into	 a	 different	 and	 more	 public	 communicative	 environment	 that	
participants	operate	in.	
	
The	assessment	of	this	online	data	drew	on	a	mix	of	content	analysis,	conversation	analysis	
and	discourse	analysis.	The	online	data	was	treated	successively	as	texts,	as	discursive	acts,	
and	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 conversation	 between	 disparate	 parts	 of	 the	 social	 networking	
platform	 and	 framed	 by	 the	 communicative	 paths	 of	 its	 design.	 Social	 media	 data	 from	
participants'	 private	 accounts	 over	 the	 entire	 research	 period	 was	 first	 analysed	 for	 key	
statistical	 trends	 such	 as	 developments	 in	 the	 number	 of	 content	 pieces	 shared	 by	
participants	 on	 their	 walls	 and	 subsequent	 interactions.	 The	 type	 of	 content	 present	 on	
individual	 accounts	was	 also	 analysed	 from	 the	 following	 two	 angles.	 First,	 I	 assessed	 how	
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much	of	the	material	was	user-generated,	rather	than	shared	from	other	sources.	Secondly,	I	
looked	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 materials	 to	 thematically	 code	 them	 and	 capture,	 in	
particular,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 were	 politically-related.	 Every	 effort	 was	 taken	 when	
analysing	 this	 data	 to	 primarily	 extract	 common	 and	 comparative	 trends	 between	
participants	and	interview	accounts,	such	as	the	framing	of	some	of	the	events	during	these	
periods	by	government	supporters	and	opponents	 in	the	sample.	Personal	and	private	third	
party	 data	 was	 not	 used.	 Similarly,	 I	 assessed	 the	 use	 of	 profile	 pictures	 that	 were	 not	
personal	photos.	It	was	common	practice	for	Facebook	users	to	use	symbolic	images	for	their	
personal	profile	pictures	during	some	of	the	research	period,	such	as	Tunisian	flags	or	photos	
of	politicians.	These	uses	were	analysed	more	closely,	whilst	personal	profile	imagery	was	not	
used.		
	
The	 second	 element	 of	 the	 participants'	 social	media	 accounts	 that	was	 analysed	 in	 detail	
consisted	 of	 the	 sources	 from	which	 content	was	 distributed	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 political	
crisis,	and	mass	protests,	in	July	2013.	As	socio-political	polarisation	was	most	palpable	at	this	
point,	and	quite	different	representations	of	events	were	produced	on	social	media	accounts,	
this	period	was	chosen	as	the	basis	for	the	selection	of	a	sample	of	publicly	accessible	social	
media	 pages	 that	 were	 most	 frequently	 used	 by	 the	 participants	 as	 sources	 of	 politically-
related	content.		
	
The	overall	analysis	of	this	online	data	presented	particular	challenges	due	to	its	complexity	
and	 the	 sheer	 volume	 of	 available	material.	 As	 Baym	 (2009,	 p.175)	 notes,	 researchers	 are	
faced,	more	than	ever	before,	with	the	tensions	between	breadth	and	depth	when	they	come	
to	explore	a	 topic	across	 the	potentially	unlimited	number	of	possibilities	 that	a	 converged	
global	 networked	 communications	 environment	 presents	 to	 them.	 These	 issues	 were	
particularly	 evident	 in	 regards	 to	 assessing	 the	 broader	 online	 context	 within	 which	
participants	 operated	 as	 social	media	 users.	 Data	 from	 this	 sample	was	 limited	 to	 a	 single	
date,	the	31st	of	July	2013,	which	fell	in	the	midst	of	the	political	crisis	after	a	second	political	
assassination	 and	 a	 deadly	 attack	 on	 soldiers	 triggered	 the	 beginning	 of	 one	 of	 the	 largest	
wave	 of	 protests	 in	 the	 country	 since	 the	 revolution.	 Despite	 this	 narrow	 analytical	 time-
frame,	the	amount	of	data	gathered	from	this	sample	is	very	significant,	with	over	a	hundred	
separate	 pieces	 of	 content	 per	 day	 on	 some	 of	 these	 pages	 and	 up	 to	 several	 hundred	
comments	 per	 single	 item.	 To	 tackle	 this	 issue,	 analysis	 of	 these	 pages	 focused	 on	 the	
following	 key	 aspects.	 First	 of	 all,	 these	 source	 pages	 were	 coded	 by	 overall	 profile	
information,	 political	 orientation,	 content	 type	 and	 frequency.	 Secondly,	 a	 more	 detailed	
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coding	was	conducting	of	content	posted	on	each	page	in	the	sample	on	31st	July	by	source,	
number	 and	 type	 of	 interaction	 ('shares',	 'likes',	 'comments').	 Finally,	 content	 analysis	 was	
undertaken	of	the	three	most	interacted-with	posts	on	each	page,	as	well	as	of	key	discursive	
and	conversational	patterns	in	their	comments	discussion.	
		
Collecting	the	online	data	was	slightly	complicated	by	the	mix	of	languages,	and	alphabetical	
and	 numerical	 characters	 used	 across	 Tunisian	 social	 media	 content	 and	 commentaries.	
There	were	 limitations	 to	data	extraction	possibilities,	as	some	of	 these	 resulted	 in	 illegible	
materials	 (e.g.	 the	 order	 of	 Arabic	 letters	was	 inverted	 from	 its	 original	 right-to-left	 form).	
Data	 requiring	 more	 detailed	 scrutiny	 was	 therefore	 archived	 mostly	 manually	 through	
screenshots	in	order	to	facilitate	repeated	access,	categorization	and	coding.		
	
	
4. Ethical	considerations	
	
Despite	my	relative	familiarity	with	Tunisian	culture,	one	of	the	challenges	I	encountered	was	
in	 reconciling	 a	 Western-informed	 approach	 to	 research	 ethics	 with	 quite	 different	 local	
attitudes	towards	privacy.	For	example,	when	it	came	to	interviews,	the	fact	that	I	asked	to	
conduct	 them	 in	 private	 on	 a	 one-to-one	 basis	 was,	 at	 times,	 met	 with	 suspicion	 or	
incomprehension,	 and	 at	 times,	 it	 was	 simply	 not	 possible.	 It	 occasionally	 transpired	 that	
requests	to	 interview	subjects	separately	were	 interpreted	as	a	sort	of	accusation,	with	the	
implication	 that	 the	 subject	 in	 question	 was	 concealing	 something	 from	 those	 around	
her/him	–	be	 it	 friends,	or	 family.	This	 culture	of	openness	extended	 to	discussions	around	
potential	access	 to	personal	 social	media	accounts	with	Tunisian	 friends	who	were	advising	
me.	Their	 readiness,	and	 the	anticipated	 readiness	of	others,	 to	allow	access	 to	data	which	
would	-	from	a	Western	perspective	be	considered	personal,	was	surprising.	To	my	Tunisian	
interlocutors,	 however,	 this	 openness	 appeared	 self-evident	 and	 a	 strange	 issue	 for	me	 to	
even	be	 considering.	 For	 example,	 it	was	 pointed	out	 to	me	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 accepting	
complete	 strangers	 as	 'friends'	 on	 Facebook	 was	 relatively	 widespread	 in	 Tunisia	 at	 the	
time55,	 and	 that	 individuals	 were	 very	much	 aware	 that	 nothing	 too	 personal	 ought	 to	 be	
shared	 on	 the	 platform.	 Additional	 support	 for	 these	 perspectives	was	 provided	 at	 a	 later	
point,	 when	 respondents	 reflected	 on	 the	 public	 nature	 of	 the	 subject	 matter	 shared	 by	
individuals	on	their	private	social	media	accounts.	"If	you	put	it	on	Facebook	it's	like	you	hung	
it	on	your	washing	line	outside	for	everyone	to	see",	one	interviewee	memorably	said.	There	
																																																						
55	This	changed	later	during	the	research	period.	
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seemed	 to	 be	 quite	 a	 prevalent	 perspective	 that	 social	 media	 provided	 a	 public	 space	 of	
expression,	rather	than	a	more	ambiguous	public-private	one.	Consequently,	it	was	not	used	
to	share	particularly	personal	information.	The	discovery	of	new	freedoms	of	expression	after	
the	 revolution	 reinforced	 the	 use	 of	 the	 platform	 for	 exchanges	 on	 public	 and	 political	
matters	rather	than	personal	ones	(see	Chapter	4).	The	insistence	by	some	participants	that	
there	was	‘nothing	to	hide’	made	me	quite	wary	overall.	 I	was	conscious	of	the	increasingly	
contentious	 nature	 of	 interactions	 on	 social	 media,	 of	 progressive	 distrust	 and	 divisions	
between	 different	 social	 and	 political	 stances	 in	 the	 country,	 and	 that	 seemingly	 well-
established	 attitudes	 towards	 Internet	 usage	 could	 undergo	 significant	 changes	 over	 time,	
which	 led	me	to	be	cautious	about	 this	unproblematic	attitude	towards	data	access,	as	 the	
political	became	 increasingly	personal	and	 social	media	users	became	more	accountable	 to	
others	for	their	publicly-performed	political	identity	expression	(see	Chapter	5).			
	
A	 number	 of	 measures	 were	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 research	 was	 conducted	 ethically.	
Participants	in	the	study	were	under	no	pressure	to	take	part	in	the	first,	nor	second,	round	
of	 interviews.	Particular	 care	was	 taken	 to	 clarify	 the	 framework	and	aims	of	 the	 research.	
Although	 most	 of	 the	 interview	 material	 does	 not	 cover	 any	 particularly	 sensitive	 issues,	
interview	data	was	treated	anonymously	as	an	additional	precaution,	and	care	was	taken	to	
ensure	that	any	quotes	used	in	the	final	written	analysis	of	the	findings	were	used	in	a	way	
that	does	not	make	participants	 identifiable.	 Permission	was	 sought	 at	 the	beginning	of	 all	
interviews	 to	 proceed	 with	 recording	 the	 soundtrack	 of	 the	 conversation	 for	 analysis	
purposes,	and	where	this	permission	was	not	granted,	written	notes	were	taken	instead.	All	
interview	data	was	 treated	 confidentially,	 labelled	 anonymously,	 securely	 retained	 and	will	
be	destroyed	after	the	end	of	the	research	project.	Archiving	and	use	of	online	materials	was	
approached	along	similar	lines	and	these	were	kept	on	a	separate	external	storage	device.		
	
Permission	 to	access	and	assess	participants’	 social	media	accounts	as	part	of	 the	 research	
project	was	sought	at	the	end	of	the	interviews,	and	it	was	further	clarified	that	personal	data	
would	not	be	used,	that	data	would	be	treated	anonymously	and	that	the	majority	of	it	would	
be	utilised	to	draw	out	common	trends	as	well	as	some	statistical	evidence.	Respondents	who	
agreed	to	the	online	component	of	the	research,	were	asked	to	send	a	‘befriend’	request	to	
my	 Facebook	 account	 and,	 as	 previously	 clarified,	 data	was	 examined	 retrospectively.	 As	 a	
result,	 this	 connection	with	my	private	account	did	not	 impact	on	 their	activity.	 It	was	also	
indicated	to	participants	that	they	were	free	to	‘un-friend’	my	account	at	any	point.	
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Access	to	online	data	used	in	this	study	also	presented	new	ethical	challenges.	Consent	from	
Goldsmiths’	 ethical	 committee	was	 sought,	 and	guidelines	 from	 the	Association	of	 Internet	
Researchers	 (AoIR)	 and	 the	 International	 Communication	 Association	 (ICA)	 were	 consulted	
for	 additional	 advice.	 Many	 of	 these	 issues	 are	 relatively	 new	 to	 the	 field	 of	 media	 and	
communications	 research	 and	 some	 remain	 open	 to	 debate.	Of	 particular	 relevance	 to	my	
research	design	is	the	issue	of	dealing	with	data	from	the	sample	of	‘public’	Facebook	pages.	
There	 is	 a	 level	 of	 ambiguity	 on	 how	 to	 treat	 content	 from	 such	 pages	 as	 there	 were	 no	
privacy	restrictions	to	accessing	them	and	no	social	media	account	was	needed	to	do	so	(they	
were	 openly	 accessed	 like	 other	 websites).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 pages	 document	
interactions	 and	 comments	 by	 third	 party	 individuals	 who	 may	 not	 be	 aware	 of	 these	
unrestricted	 privacy	 settings,	 or	 despite	 this	 awareness,	 may	 hold	 certain	 expectations	 of	
privacy,	or	in	regards	to	the	use	of	this	data	(AoIR,	2012,	p.6).	But	equally,	as	the	pages	do	not	
constitute	 a	 closed	 community	 and	 any	 social	 media	 user	 can	 interact	 on	 them,	 it	 was	
impossible	to	seek	informed	consent	from	all	users.	Sveningsson	Elm	calls	for	a	conception	of	
private	and	public	as	a	continuum	rather	than	a	dichotomy	(2009,	p.74)	and	that	the	research	
site	-	but	also	the	nature	of	its	content	and	context	-	need	to	be	closely	examined	in	order	to	
make	 ethical	 decisions	 about	 the	 suitability	 of	 conducting	 research	 where	 no	 informed	
consent	is	available	(ibid,	p.85).	Internet	research	guidelines	stress	the	inherent	lack	of	clarity	
regarding	 how	 these	 research	 dilemmas	 ought	 to	 be	 resolved	 and	 suggest	 an	 in-depth	
assessment	on	a	case-by-case	basis	 in	order	to	balance	ethical	considerations	with	research	
needs	(ibid,	p.9).		
	
I	believe	that	my	approach	in	the	context	of	this	research	is	primarily	aimed	at	detecting	and	
making	 sense	 of	 social	 media	 user-interaction	 patterns	 in	 relation	 to	 content.	 My	
understanding	 of	 the	 use	 of	 public	 pages	 in	 the	 Tunisian	 context	 would	 indicate	 that	
references	 to	 the	 content	 pieces	 from	 these	 pages	 for	 research	 purposes	 posed	 no	 harm.	
These	are	materials	that	can	be	considered	similar	to	newspaper	clippings	or	comparable	to	
news	 content	 from	 other	 media.	 However,	 particular	 care	 was	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 any	
unethical	 content	 (such	 as	 particularly	 violent	 imagery	 or	 defamatory	 material)	 was	
approached	with	 due	 consideration	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 referring	 to	 it.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	
interaction	patterns	of	third-party	users	with	this	content,	the	research	also	sought	to	protect	
user	identities	in	referring	to	such	cases,	and	identify	and	elucidate	collective	patterns	rather	
than	 concentrate	 on	 individual	 users.	 Finally,	 there	 was	 also	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 findings	
referring	 to	 such	 content	 will	 be	 published,	 as	 this	 raises	 issues	 relating	 to	 intellectual	
property.	As	the	code	of	practice	developed	by	the	ICA	highlights	“scholars	find	their	research	
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goals	 stymied	because	of	 confusion	over	 their	 rights	 to	quote”	digital	 content	 in	particular,	
today,	and	the	area	suffers	from	a	“disconcertingly	wide	variety”	of	practices	(ICA,	2010,	p.5).	
The	 association	 clarifies	 that	 the	 law	 allows	 using	 copyrighted	 materials	 without	 securing	
permission	under	some	provisions,	including	that	of	“fair	use”	which	academic	research	work	
falls	 under	 when	 quoting	 such	 materials	 for	 purposes	 such	 as	 analysis,	 commentary	 or	
illustration	 in	academic	publications.	This	does	not,	however,	mean	that	 their	publication	 is	
ethical.	 I	 have	made	 decisions	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis,	 anonymised	 all	 data	 and	 opted	 as	
much	 as	 possible	 to	 provide	 descriptive	 accounts	 instead	 of	 such	 content	 when	 it	 was	
relevant.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 methodological	 approach	 had	 to	 account	 for	 a	 relatively	
complex	 context	 and	 to	 creatively	 navigate	 between	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 study	 and	 the	
delimitations	drawn	by	a	number	of	ethical	and	practical	issues	that	needed	to	be	taken	into	
consideration.	 By	 combining	 assessments	 of	 interviewee	 accounts	 of	 their	 everyday	media	
practices,	 retrospectively	 accessing	 their	 online	 activity	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 socio-political	
context,	 further	 drawing	 on	 that	 activity	 to	 contextualise	 large	 scale	 patterns	 of	 online	
interactions	at	the	height	of	a	political	crisis,	and	incorporating	a	comparative	assessment	of	
media	 use	 over	 time	 through	 a	 second	 set	 of	 interviews	 and	 an	 analysis	 of	 research	
participants’	 online	 activities	 over	 time,	 the	 research	 design	 directly	 addressed	 key	
methodological	issues	identified	in	this	chapter.	The	next	four	chapters	present	the	outcome	
of	 these	empirical	 investigations,	 in	conjunction	with	a	 theoretical	 framing	of	 the	questions	
they	relate	to.	
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CHAPTER	3	
	
EVERYDAY	SOCIAL	MEDIA	USE	IN		
AN	EVOLVING	INFORMATIONAL	LANDSCAPE	
	
	
Introduction	
	
Chapter	 1	 assessed	 key	 literature	 on	 the	 complex	 factors	 that	 underpinned	 the	 protest	
movements	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 highlighted	 that,	 although	 media-centric	 accounts	 failed	 to	
adequately	 explore	 the	 complexities	 of	 these	 progressive	 transformations,	 new	 media	
nevertheless	played	a	contributing	role	at	the	start	of	the	revolution	 in	Tunisia	 in	spreading	
information,	 partially	 resulting	 in	 a	 wider	 mobilisation	 of	 sections	 of	 the	 population.	
However,	less	is	known	and	understood	in	regards	to	how	citizens	related	and	reacted	to	the	
different	 sources	 of	 news	 and	 information	 they	 encountered	 -	 online	 and	 offline	 -	 in	 their	
daily	lives	before	the	revolution,	and	in	the	period	leading	up	to	it.	Similarly,	the	question	of	
how	 they	experienced	 the	 changes	 in	 the	media	 landscape,	which	was	 transformed	 from	a	
highly	monitored	 and	 controlled	 pre-revolutionary	 paradigm,	 to	 a	 revolution	 period	 during	
which	media	practices	radically	changed,	remains	underexplored.	
	
There	 is	 a	 crucial	 political	 dimension	 to	 this	 question.	 Citizens’	 orientation	 to	 mediated	
information	 about	 their	 shared	 socio-political	 environment,	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 how	
they	 conceive	of	 their	 relation	 to	each	other	 as	 citizens,	 of	 the	political	 sphere,	 and	of	 the	
hierarchies	 that	 order	 these	 relations.	 It	 can	 consequently	 also	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	
supporting	 or	 undermining	 the	 maintenance	 of	 these	 hierarchies	 and	 order,	 over	 time.	
However,	as	Coleman	et	al.	(2012)	observe,	the	political	dimension	of	media	and	information	
tends	to	be	theoretically	explored	–	and	often	idealised	-	at	the	expense	of	more	sociological	
and	 phenomenological	 perspectives.	 Providing	 this	 alternative	 perspective	 matters	 for	 a	
number	 of	 reasons:	 First	 of	 all,	 equating	 information	 access	 and	 the	 process	 of	
democratisation	 is	 overly	 simplistic	 and	 excludes	 important	 sociological	 elements	 as	 the	
analysis	 in	this	chapter	highlights.	 In	particular,	trust	plays	a	crucial	part	 in	how	(and	on	the	
basis	of	what	criteria)	public	knowledge	is	formed,	and	made	sense	of.	Furthermore,	offering	
these	alternative	viewpoints	 is	 important	within	the	contextual	parameters	of	this	study,	as	
the	citizens	whose	accounts	and	reflections	inform	this	study	experienced	a	radical	change	in	
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their	conceptions	of	the	media,	and	its	place	in	their	shared	social	and	political	lives,	prior	to	
and	after	the	revolution.	
	
To	 address	 these	 questions,	 the	 chapter	 employs	 a	 chronological	 structure.	 It	 opens	 by	
revisiting	the	developments	leading	up	to	this	period,	tracking	respondents’	media	practices	
before	 the	 revolution	 to	 determine	 which	 media	 acted	 as	 points	 of	 reference	 for	 the	
participants	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives,	 and	 how	 they	 formed	 an	 opinion	 about	 their	 socio-
political	 reality	 in	 a	 highly	 censored	 and	 closely	 controlled	 public	 space.	 The	 chapter	 then	
focuses	on	 research	participants’	 accounts	 of	 the	 revolutionary	period	between	 the	 end	of	
2010	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 2011.	 It	 draws	 on	 their	 experiences	 of	 this	 time	 to	 develop	 an	
understanding	of	how	knowledge	of	social	movements	was	acquired	and,	more	specifically,	
how	an	awareness	of	their	 importance	was	formed.	It	provides	an	overview	of	the	different	
communicative	means	employed	in	these	processes	and	of	the	shifts	in	the	way	respondents	
used	media	during	this	period.	This	analysis	aims	to	function	as	lens	through	which	to	better	
view	and	understand	the	post-revolution	context,	which	is	explored	in	subsequent	chapters.		
	
	
1. Disconnecting	media	and	enforced	disengagement	before	the	revolution	
	
This	 first	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 study	 participants’	 accounts	 and	 recollections	 of	
their	 media	 consumption	 before	 the	 revolution.	 It	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 comprehensive	
assessment,	as	 the	pre-revolution	period	 is	not	 the	principal	 focus	of	 this	 research.	Rather,	
the	discussion	aims	to	provide	an	outline	of	key	trends	and	the	orientations	of	these	Tunisian	
citizens	 towards	 different	 national	 and	 international,	 analogue	 and	 digital,	 and	 offline	 and	
online,	media	 sources	within	 a	 censored	 informational	 environment.	 Elucidating	how	 these	
were	used	by	 respondents	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives	 to	 form	knowledge	and	opinions	of	 their	
socio-political	 reality,	 is	 intended	to	provide	a	grounding	 for	a	deeper	understanding	of	 the	
media	context	from	which	a	highly	politicised	social	media	use	emerges	during	and	after	the	
revolution.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 highlight	 how	 censorship	 in	 Tunisia	 before	 the	 revolution	
reinforced	a	disconnection	of	citizens	 from	the	public	realm,	a	disconnection	that	was	even	
echoed	by	some	in	their	private	interactions,	and	further	enacted	online.	What	this	analysis	
further	 aims	 to	 emphasise	 is	 that,	 despite	 its	 profound	 disconnect	 from	 most	 citizens’	
everyday	lives,	and	its	lack	of	credibility	during	the	last	years	of	the	Ben	Ali	regime,	Tunisian	
media	 –	 and	 national	 news	 broadcasting	 in	 particular	 –	 nevertheless	 appeared	 to	 play	 an	
important	 role	 in	 participants’	 media	 habits.	 It	 acted	 as	 a	 marker	 for	 daily	 routines,	 and	
84	
	
equally	 signalled	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 Ben	 Ali	 regime	 and	 the	 political	 status	 quo,	
constructing	a	reality	that	respondents	oriented	themselves	against,	and	yet	were	obliged	to	
accept.	
	
1.1. A	dual	reality		
	
The	 civic	 and	 political	 dimensions	 of	 media	 are	 often	 discussed	 from	 a	 normative	 and	
idealised	 perspective	 emphasising	 their	 potential	 for	 instigating	 change,	 questioning	 public	
matters	 and	 holding	 the	 political	 sphere	 to	 account.	 This	 viewpoint	 is	 set	 against	
predominantly	Western	contexts	where	democracy	is	relatively	well-entrenched.	By	contrast,	
perspectives	on	media	 in	undemocratic	 settings	have	attracted	 less	attention	–	or,	 in	many	
such	cases,	the	terms	of	the	debate	have	tended	to	provide	a	rather	simplified	perspective	of	
the	 media	 as	 an	 effective	 propaganda	 tool	 enforced	 on	 a	 passive	 citizenry	 to	 manipulate	
public	opinion.	Such	a	view	fails	to	differentiate	-	as	Schudson	(2011)	notes	-	between	media	
power	and	indoctrination	(p.23),	or	to	take	into	account	the	complex	combination	of	factors	
that	support	the	resilience	of	authoritarianism	beyond	its	imposition	through	coercive	means,	
as	Camau	(2008)	notes	with	reference	to	the	Tunisian	context56.	Furthermore,	as	Gunther	and	
Mughan	 (2000a,	 p.20)	 stress,	 such	 viewpoints	 provide	 limited	 insights	 into	 the	 individual	
contexts	 in	which	propaganda	media	are	 received,	as	circumstances	vary	 from	case	 to	case	
and	 are	 contingent	 on	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 factors.	 Instead,	what	 authoritarian	 or	 totalitarian	
contexts	often	reveal	is	the	extent	to	which	propaganda	media	content	under	such	regimes	is	
in	fact	profoundly	at	odds	with	citizens’	experiences	of	their	shared	social	reality	(ibid,	p.19),	
and	how	limited	the	success	of	such	media	content	is	in	shaping	“the	basic	political	attitudes	
and	orientations	of	their	subject	populations”	(Gunther	and	Mughan,	2000b,	p.404).	Corner	
(2009)	 refers	 to	 a	 similar	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 “dual	 reality”	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes,	
and	of	citizens’	everyday	experiences,	a	gap	that	citizens	have	no	choice	but	to	inhabit	(p.9).	
Corner	 contends	 that	 the	 position	 this	 duality	 enforces	 is	 far	 more	 ambivalent	 for	 most	
citizens	than	that	which	categorises	them	as	either	consenting	or	dissenting	to	undemocratic	
rule.	 In	 such	 a	 context,	 those	 actively	 accepting	 or	 opposing	 such	 regimes	 usually	 form	 a	
minority,	whereas	the	majority	of	the	population	tends	to	inhabit	a	more	ambivalent	position	
(p.6).	Understanding	the	implications	of	this	duality	in	terms	of	citizens’	use	of	media	in	their	
everyday	orientation	to	public	matters	is,	therefore,	important.	
	
																																																						
56	Camau	highlights,	in	particular,	the	importance	of	transnational	and	economic	factors	in	this	respect.	
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In	the	context	of	Tunisia	before	the	start	of	the	2011	revolution,	control	over	media	content	
was	exerted	through	direct	and	indirect	means	(as	detailed	in	Chapter	1)	and	this	served	to	
uphold	 and	 bolster	 a	 positive	 image	 of	 the	 regime	 and	 of	 the	 population’s	 purported	
satisfaction	with	the	government.	However,	the	assumption	that	the	closely	controlled	media	
landscape	of	the	Ben	Ali	years	was	successful	 in	shaping	a	positive	public	opinion	about	the	
regime	 that	 was	 only	 undermined	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 ‘new	 media’,	 is	 erroneous.	 All	
participants	 in	 the	 sample	were	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	 undemocratic	 nature	 of	 the	 public	 and	
political	sphere	before	the	revolution,	although	more	specific	knowledge	of	issues	and	abuses	
of	 power	 in	 the	 country	 varied	 from	 participant	 to	 participant.	 The	 seemingly	 apolitical	
citizenry	before	 the	 revolution	–	or	what	Camau	 (1984)	 refers	 to	as	 ‘negative	citizenship’	–	
resulted	 from	 decades	 of	 surveillance	 of	 not	 only	 the	media	 space,	 but	 also	 of	 public	 and	
private	space	generally,	ensuring	consensual	silence	on	those	issues	in	discourse.	Whilst	this	
trend	was	 initiated	 under	 the	 long	 rule	 of	 president	 Bourguiba	 (1956-1987),	 it	was	 further	
intensified	under	Ben	Ali’s	regime,	resulting	 in	what	Geisser	and	Gobe	(2008)	refer	to	as	an	
utterly	“locked	political	space”57.		
	
The	government’s	Interior	Ministry	deployed	an	array	of	measures	to	maintain	this	degree	of	
control,	including	an	extensive	network	of	informants	and	spies	to	detect	dissident	views	and	
activities.	 As	 in	 many	 other	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 such	 surveillance	 mechanisms	
simultaneously	 acted	 as	 a	 means	 of	 repression,	 but	 equally	 as	 a	 way	 to	 gauge	 citizens’	
opinions	and	the	public	mood	(Corner,	2009,	p.11),	 revealing	the	regime’s	acute	awareness	
and	deep-seated	anxiety	about	 its	 lack	of	 legitimacy.	This	monitoring	extended	to	networks	
of	 informants	 in	 cafés,	 taxi	 drivers	 eavesdropping	 on	 and	 reporting	 passengers’	
conversations,	 and	 of	 agents	 infiltrating	 online	 forums	 or	 tapping	 the	 phone	 lines	 of	
opposition	figures	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2007;	Arfi	et	al.,	2011;	Thorne,	2012).	
	
Participants	 in	 this	 study	 were	 fully	 aware	 of	 this	 control	 and	 surveillance	 before	 the	
revolution.	The	majority	of	them	further	articulated	a	similar	knowledge	of	the	tacit	rules	that	
accompanied	this	censored	public	space.	Engaging	in	political	discussions	and	expressing	any	
form	of	 critique	of	 the	 regime	was	 regarded	by	most	 interviewees	 as	 a	dangerous	 activity.	
Political	 subject	 matter	 was,	 largely,	 taboo.	 The	 resulting	 climate	 of	 anxiety	 and	 fear	 in	
relation	to	public	 issues	before	the	revolution,	was	vividly	evidenced	by	 interview	accounts.	
Significantly,	 and	 as	 already	 alluded	 to,	 this	 fear	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 public	 interactions.	 A	
number	of	respondents	described	feeling	that	their	private	life	under	the	Ben	Ali	regime	was	
																																																						
57	Translated	from	French:	“un	champ	politique	verrouillé”		
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equally	 exposed	 to	 state	 surveillance.	 A	 vivid	 example	 of	 this	 was	 provided	 by	 one	 of	 the	
interviewees,	Sonia,	who	 lived	 in	Tunis	with	her	husband	and	small	 child;	 she	 recalled	how	
her	 brother,	 who	 had	 migrated	 to	 Europe	 several	 years	 earlier,	 shared	 information	 about	
corruption	issues	in	Tunisia	during	one	of	his	phone	calls	with	her.	She	was	so	scared	that	the	
phone	might	be	 tapped,	and	of	 the	possible	consequences	 for	her	and	her	 family,	 that	 she	
decided	to	hang	up	the	phone	on	him.	The	contrast	between	the	safety	and	spontaneity	of	
general	interactions	in	the	home	environment,	or	with	friends	and	family	members,	and	the	
self-control	 individuals	 had	 to	 exercise	 in	 such	 situations	 are	 illustrative	 of	 a	 shared,	
frequently	unspoken,	knowledge	among	citizens	in	the	country	of	the	communicative	norms	
they	needed	to	adhere	to.	Ahmed	and	Mehdi,	both	still	children	when	Ben	Ali	 first	came	to	
power,	made	-	independently	of	each	other	-	very	similar	observations	on	this	issue.	
	
Ahmed:		
Before,	 it	 was	 impossible	 to	 talk	 about	 politics.	 	 You	 couldn’t	 even	 utter	 the	 word.	 If	 you	
wanted	to	share	a	tiny	little	word	about	politics	with	friends,	you	had	to	be	in	a	closed	space,	
and	even	then	you	worried	that	the	walls	would	report	you.	
	
Mehdi:		
Before,	 something	 called	 politics,	 even	 in	 private,	 one	 wouldn’t	 talk	 about	 it.	 Even	 in	 the	
house,	in	one’s	home,	one	wouldn’t.	To	the	extent	that	they	used	to	say	even	the	walls	have	
ears	[hatta	el	hyout	and’ha	wedhnine].	
	
Their	wording	 indicates	not	only	a	 sense	of	pervasive	 surveillance	and	associated	paranoia,	
but	 also	 the	 level	 of	 self-awareness	 that	 accompanied	 citizens’	 self-censorship	 of	 political	
conversations	 in	 this	 impoverished	sphere	of	 civic	 communication.	The	 resultant	 space	was	
marked	by	an	avoidance	of	political	talk	in	public	for	the	majority	of	respondents,	and	a	very	
limited	 and	 cautiously	managed	 circulation,	 in	 private,	 of	 news	 and	 information	 relating	 to	
social	 and	political	developments	 in	 the	country,	 that	 increasingly	also	 included,	during	 the	
last	 years	 of	 the	 Ben	 Ali	 regime,	 jokes	 about	 the	 president	 and	 his	 wife’s	 entourage,	 as	 a	
means	of	expressing	dissent.	Everyday	life	for	these	participants,	their	constant	awareness	of	
the	 regime’s	 pervasive	 presence,	 and	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 their	 social	 reality	 and	 the	
regime’s	 representation	of	 it,	 served	 to	 impose	 a	 collective	 silence	on	–	 and	disconnection	
from	-	the	sphere	of	shared	public	concern.	
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1.2. Disconnecting	media	
	
Prior	to	the	revolution,	disinterestedness	in	politics	and	current	affairs	was	a	position	that	a	
large	majority	of	the	research	participants	were	obliged	to	accept,	as	a	result	of	the	restricted	
information	 that	 they	 were	 given	 access	 to	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives,	 their	 limited	 trust	 in	
national	media,	and	their	perception	of	the	regime’s	omnipresence	in	the	public,	and	to	some	
degree	 also	 private,	 sphere.	 This	 translated	 in	 most	 cases	 into	 a	 distancing	 from	 Tunisian	
media’s	representation	of	socio-political	reality,	and	news	in	particular.		
	
The	 sense	 of	 detachment	 was	 prevalent	 in	 many	 accounts,	 particularly	 among	 younger	
participants	who	 had	 grown	 up	 under	 the	 Ben	Ali	 regime.	Narjes,	 for	 example,	 considered	
that	her	distancing	from	news	was	because:	“the	news	we	had	didn’t	touch	us	so	closely”.	It	
was	striking	that	many	interview	accounts	of	participants’	media	usage	before	the	revolution	
were	articulated	in	similar	terms	to	Narjes’.	Tunisian	media’s	representation	of	socio-political	
reality	being	separate	from	their	own	common	experience	as	citizens.	Often	a	distinction	was	
drawn	 between,	 on	 one	 hand,	 a	 political	 sphere	 which	 Tunisian	 media	 was	 identified	 as	
forming	 a	 part	 of,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 togetherness,	 communal	 experience	 and	 culture	 on	 the	
other	hand:	“before	we58	didn’t	hear	about	anything”	(Ahmed),	“politics	was	not	part	of	our	
culture”	 (Youssef).	 By	 contrast,	 their	 perspectives	 about	 national	 news	 and	 the	 regime’s	
representations	of	events	in	the	country	framed	them	as	an	external	and	distant	reality,	or	a	
‘façade’	as	 Sadiki	 (2002)	notes	with	 reference	 to	Tunisia’s	pseudo-democracy.	These	points	
equally	confirm	the	notion	of	a	separation	or	duality	between	the	reality	constructed	by	the	
regime’s	 propaganda	 and	 citizens’	 everyday	 experiences	 -	 that	 Corner	 (2009)	 and	 Gunther	
and	 Mughan	 (2000b)	 pointed	 to	 as	 emblematic	 of	 civic	 experience	 under	 authoritarian	
regimes,	as	discussed	earlier.		
	
Ahmed,	 for	 example,	 referred	 to	 this	 representation	 of	 the	 country	 by	 the	 regime	 as	 “an	
image	for	the	tourists	and	investors	abroad”.	Sonia	justified	her	disinterest	in	Tunisian	news	
before	the	revolution	by	stating	that	it	was	“[all	about]	his	excellence	and	his	wife”	-	subject	
matter	 to	which	 she	 felt	 unable	 to	 relate,	 in	 contrast	 to	 international	 news	material	which	
was	of	 greater	 interest.	 In	 a	 similar	manner,	Meriem	 regarded	Tunisian	news	bulletins	 and	
shows	as	unimportant,	as	they	were	“always	the	same”,	denoting	her	awareness	that	by	not	
offering	 any	 variation	 in	 narrative,	 such	 news	 provided	 an	 unauthentic	 and	 untrustworthy	
reflection	 of	 reality.	 Similar	 points	 have	 been	made	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 contexts,	 such	 as	
																																																						
58	Emphasis	added.	
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those	 of	 former	 communist	 states	 (e.g.	 Mihelj	 and	 Huxtable,	 2016,	 p.9).	 The	 notion	 of	
‘liveness’,	and	its	associated	connotations	of	unfiltered	reality	and	authenticity,	seen	as	a	key	
feature	of	television’s	distinctiveness	(Scannell,	2014),	was	undermined,	particularly	in	news	
broadcasts;	 instead	 a	 controlled,	 predictable	 and	 repetitive	 reality	 was	 expressed,	 thereby	
denying	 television	 news	 the	 ability	 to	 deliver	 anything	 truly	 newsworthy,	 in	 turn	 severing	
many	viewers’	sense	of	connection	to	such	content.	
	
The	media	 in	Tunisia	played	a	crucial	 role	 in	restricting	citizens’	knowledge	of	events	 in	 the	
country	 and	 in	 shaping	 a	 representation	 of	 their	 socio-political	 world	 that	 transmitted	 a	
relentlessly	 positive	 image	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 regime.	 As	 previously	 indicated,	 the	 banality,	 and	
obvious	artifice	of	this	representation	was	of	very	limited	interest	to	the	respondents,	lacking	
both	 credibility	 and	 relevance.	 	 Qualitative	 assessments,	 by	 the	 interviewees,	 of	 pre-
revolutionary	national	media	as	news	and	information	providers,	were	consequently	almost	
uniformly	negative	in	this	sample	(P1,	P2,	P4,	P6,	P7,	P9,	P11,	P12,	P15,	P16,	P21,	P22,	P25,	
P28,	 P29,	 P30)59.	 When	 referring	 back	 to	 their	 media	 use	 before	 the	 revolution,	 the	 vast	
majority	 of	 participants	 indicated	 that	 they	 were	 relatively	 disconnected	 from	 news	 and	
information	about	their	country.	But	how	did	this	view	of	Tunisian	media	and	this	enforced	
disconnection	 from	 the	 media	 sphere	 relate	 to	 their	 everyday	 media	 habits	 before	 the	
revolution?	As	 these	media	were	considered	as	generally	 failing	 to	 fulfil	 their	 informational	
purposes,	 respondents	 developed	 different	 strategies	 and	 attitudes	 to	 distance	 themselves	
from	 the	 regime’s	 propaganda	 in	 their	 daily	 use	 of	 media.	 Alternative	 media	 sources,	
international	media	in	particular,	played	a	role	in	these	strategies,	but	as	transpires	from	the	
following	assessment,	this	role	should	not	be	over-emphasised.	
	
1.3. Orientations	to	national	vs.	international	media	
	
Most	 of	 those	who	 had	 access	 to	 satellite	 channels	watched	 them	 to	 some	 extent,	 and	 at	
times	also	followed	the	news	on	these	channels;	this	was	not	a	regular	occurrence,	however.	
Some	 participants	 preferred	 to	watch	 French	 channels	 such	 as	 France2,	 TF1	 and	 France24	
(P2,	 P12,	 P20,	 P28),	 but	 overall,	 pan-Arab	 satellite	 broadcaster	Al	 Jazeera	was	 cited	 as	 the	
main	 source	 they	 referred	 to	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 pre-revolution	 news	habits	 outside	 of	 the	
national	media	context.	However,	only	a	minority	of	respondents	(twenty	per	cent)	acted	on	
the	 possibility	 of	 accessing	 alternative	 media	 content	 by	 intentionally	 avoiding	 Tunisian	
																																																						
59	Participant	numbers	are	used	here	to	enable	an	easier	overview.	Their	names	are	used	for	more	detailed	discussions.	A	list	of	
names	and	corresponding	numbers	is	included	in	Appendix	(B)	at	the	end	of	this	chapter.	
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media	 (particularly	 television)	 as	 much	 as	 they	 could.	 This	 group	 consisted	 mostly	 of	
respondents	who	 turned	 to	 satellite	 television	 and/or	 the	 Internet	 to	 access	 pan-Arab	 and	
Western	media	content	exclusively,	and	in	place	of	any	Tunisian	media	sources.	This	was	the	
case	 for	 Ghada	 for	 example,	 a	 retired	 bank	 employee	 in	 her	 sixties,	 who	 expressed	 her	
profound	dislike	of	national	media	-	public	broadcaster	Tounes	760	especially.	She	explained	
that	 she	 refused	 to	watch	 it	 before	 the	 revolution,	 preferring	 French	 satellite	 channels	 for	
their	 international	 news	 content,	 and	 pan-Arab	 channels	 to	 follow	 soap	 operas.	 Similarly,	
Hanen,	 who	 was	 in	 her	 early	 twenties,	 expressed	 contempt	 for	 the	 public	 broadcaster	 –	
including	 its	 news	 coverage-	 and	 stated	 that	 she	 never	 watched	 it	 before	 the	 revolution,	
regarding	this	as	a	“pointless”	and	“unthinkable”	activity.	Her	perspective	was	in	line	with	a	
more	general	disinterest	in	news	and	political	issues	she	had	before	the	revolution.	She	spent	
most	of	her	media	time	online	chatting	to	friends,	downloading	American	television	series	or	
watching	pirated	films	on	DVDs.	
	
Most	other	participants	in	the	study	made	reference	to	using,	rather	than	avoiding,	Tunisian	
media	in	their	everyday	lives	before	the	revolution.	However,	all	seemed	to	have	developed	
relatively	 ambiguous	 and	 complex	 positions	 as	 audiences	 and	 consumers	 of	 these	 national	
media.	Approximately	one	third	of	them	turned	to	Tunisian	media,	but	were	very	selective	in	
their	choice	of	programming.	Overall	they	sought	to	 ignore	or	avoid	the	distorted	mediated	
representation	of	political	reality	in	the	country,	particularly	through	the	news	media.	In	their	
interview	 accounts,	 these	 respondents	 were	 keen	 to	 emphasise	 their	 distance	 from	 such	
representations.	 For	 example,	 five	male	 participants	 in	 this	 group	 explained	 that,	 although	
they	regularly	read	Tunisian	newspapers	before	the	revolution,	it	was	only	for	the	purpose	of	
finding	 out	 about	 football	 results.	 Similarly,	 listening	 to	 radio	 programmes	was	 exclusively	
associated	with	 access	 to	music	 and	 entertainment	 programmes,	 rather	 than	 any	 news	 or	
information	 on	 current	 affairs.	 Televised	 news	 programmes,	 in	 particular	 the	 daily	 evening	
news	 broadcast	 on	 Tounes7	 at	 eight	 o’clock	 in	 the	 evening61,	 was	 referred	 to	 by	 several	
interviewees	in	this	group.	Some,	such	as	Ahmed,	were	keen	to	emphasise	that	they	watched	
the	 channel	 but	 skipped	 the	 news,	 as	 they	 found	 its	 daily	 enumeration	 of	 the	 regime’s	
activities	and	grandiloquent	achievements	difficult	to	bear.	Others	were	keen	to	explain	that	
they	only	watched	 the	evening	news	 for	 its	 international	 section,	 avoiding	 the	 first	 half	 on	
national	 coverage	 because	 they	 found	 it	 tedious.	 This	 was	 the	 case	 for	 Sonia	 (referred	 to	
																																																						
60	Tounes7	(aka.	Tunis	7	and	Tunisie	7)	means	“Tunisia	7”.	The	7	in	the	name	of	the	national	channel	refers	to	the	7th	November,	
date	of	Ben	Ali’s	access	to	power	in	1987.	The	number	was	used	as	a	symbol	of	the	regime	in	various	propaganda	campaigns	and	
logos.	
61	This	was	the	first	news	broadcast	of	the	day	on	this	channel.	
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earlier),	who	explained	that	she	skipped	the	national	content	or	sometimes	had	it	on	in	the	
background	on	 low	volume	whilst	 engaging	 in	other	activities,	waiting	 for	 the	 international	
section	of	the	bulletin.	
	
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 research	 participants	 followed	 Tunisian	 media	 regularly,	 including	
evening	 news	 bulletins,	 but	 they	 were	 keen	 to	 stress	 their	 distance	 from	 the	 content	
presented	 to	 them.	 The	way	 in	 which	 interviewees	 reflected	 on	 their	 news-viewing	 habits	
before	 the	 revolution	 was	 particularly	 revealing	 in	 this	 respect.	 Watching	 the	 national	
evening	 news	 was	 an	 act	 that,	 for	 many	 respondents,	 was	 one	 which	 appeared	 to	 be	
performed	 reluctantly	 -	 at	 least	 when	 discussed	 retrospectively.	 Some	 interviewees	 felt	
compelled	 to	 justify	 their	 stated	 pre-revolutionary	 viewing	 choices.	 For	 example,	 Zied,	 a	
respondent	 in	 his	 early	 thirties,	 said	 he	 used	 to	 watch	 the	 national	 news	 broadcast	 every	
evening	 before	 the	 revolution,	 but	 he	was	 swift	 to	 add	 that	 this	was	 “out	 of	 habit”	 rather	
than	a	matter	of	 interest	or	 enjoyment.	 Furthermore,	 and	echoing	 a	number	of	 studies	on	
media	orientation	patterns	and	news	consumption	routines	(e.g.	Madianou,	2005;	Gauntlett	
and	Hill,	 1999;	 Jensen,	 1990),	 the	 activity	 of	watching	 the	 evening	 news	was	 an	 important	
marker	of	time,	often	associated	with	the	time	preceding,	during	or	following	family	dinners	
and	watching	evening	programmes	together,	for	a	number	of	participants.	Interviewees	over	
thirty	 years	 old	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 media	 routine	 whilst	 younger	
respondents	only	watched	the	news	if	they	were	still	 living	at	home	with	their	parents.	This	
was	 the	case	 for	Lobna,	Salma	and	Neila	 for	example,	all	under	 twenty	years	old	when	 the	
revolution	started.		
	
Satellite	access	supplied	the	participants	with	the	opportunity	to	gain	a	broader	perspective	
of	 international	 developments,	 but	 references	 on	 such	 channels	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 Tunisia	
were	 relatively	 rare.	 As	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 Ben	 Ali’s	 regime	 endeavoured	 to	 limit	 the	
impact	 of	 international	 media	 on	 Tunisian	 citizens’	 opinions.	 For	 example,	 it	 halted	 the	
distribution	 in	 Tunisia	 of	 French	 newspapers	 containing	 articles	 critical	 of	 Tunisian	 politics,	
and	 it	 intimidated	 and	 obstructed	 the	work	 of	 foreign	 journalists	 in	 the	 country.	However,	
limiting	 the	 transmission	 of	 similarly	 critical	 content	 on	 satellite	 television	 proved	 more	
challenging	for	state	censors,	as	programming	by	broadcasters	such	as	Al	Jazeera	occasionally	
focused	 on	 Tunisian	 politics	 and	 directly	 challenged	 the	 regime’s	 meticulously	 managed	
representation	of	the	socio-political	reality	in	the	country.	Access	to	alternative	international	
media	 sources,	 and	 satellite	 television	 in	 particular,	 by	 Tunisian	 citizens	 presented	 new	
problems	for	the	regime	in	maintaining	its	previously	firm	hold	over	the	terms	of	mediation	
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of	 content	 dealing	 with	 political	 or	 social	 issues.	 	 However,	 the	 importance	 of	 satellite	
broadcasting	 in	 viewers’	 everyday	 media	 routines	 should	 not	 be	 overstated	 either.	Whilst	
increasingly	political	and	politicised	programming	-	such	as	content	delivered	by	Al	Jazeera	-	
since	 the	mid-1990's	 certainly	encouraged	 the	opening	of	a	pan-Arab	public	 sphere	 (Lynch,	
2006),	it	did	not	follow	that	access	to	such	alternative	media	and	informational	sources	was	a	
prominent	 feature	 of	 respondents’	 everyday	media	 habits.	 Instead,	 as	Meyen	 and	 Schwer	
(2007)	contend	in	their	assessment	of	the	role	of	West	German	media	in	the	media	routines	
of	East	Germans	under	the	German	Democratic	Republic,	domestic	media	content	continues	
to	 be	 relevant	 in	 such	 contexts	 despite	 its	 widely	 acknowledged	 shortcomings,	 principally	
because	viewers	could	more	easily	relate	to	 it	and	-	 in	the	absence	of	reliable	 information	-	
citizens	 continued	 instead	 to	 base	 most	 of	 their	 opinions	 on	 their	 everyday	 contexts,	
encounters	and	experiences.	In	this	sense,	national	as	well	as	international	media	sources	can	
be	 seen	 to	 have	 played	 roles,	 but	 arguably	 limited	 ones,	 in	 shaping	 and	 orienting	 Tunisian	
citizens’	 perspectives	 towards	 the	 public	 and	 the	 political	 sphere	 in	 this	 undemocratic	
context.		
	
For	 participants	 with	 access	 to	 satellite	 television,	 such	 channels	 helped	 to	 occasionally	
satisfy	 some	 of	 their	 informational	 needs,	 but	 made	 a	 limited	 contribution	 in	 terms	 of	
forming	 a	 better	 knowledge	 of	 their	 local	 context.	 For	 Habib,	 who	 had	 a	 keen	 interest	 in	
Middle	 East	 politics,	 satellite	 television	 provided	 a	 means	 of	 expanding	 his	 awareness	 of	
international	 affairs	 when	 such	 information	 was	 severely	 limited	 in	 the	 national	 media.		
National	 news	 bulletins	 and	 television	 were	 nevertheless	 an	 important	 component	 of	 his	
daily	media	routines.	He	explains:		
	
Before,	media	were	totally	locked	down	so	we	used	to	get	information	through	other	means,	
mainly	when	satellite	TV	came.	I	remember	the	first	Gulf	war	in	1992,	we	just	had	our	satellite	
dish	installed,	it	was	the	first	few	satellite	dishes	on	tower	blocks.	I	remember	when	that	war	
started	I	followed	all	of	it	on	satellite	TV.	But	there	wasn’t	much	about	Tunisia.	
	
Similar	sentiments	were	expressed	by	Farah,	a	primary	school	teacher	in	her	fifties,	who	said	
that	 she	 used	 to	 be	 uninterested	 in	 politics	 before	 the	 revolution,	 but	 nonetheless	 felt	 it	
important,	even	at	the	time,	to	find	out	about	what	the	national	news	“have	to	say”.	This	was	
despite	the	fact	that	she	was	deeply	sceptical	about	their	representation	of	political	matters	
in	Tunisia.	Farah	also	had	access	to	satellite	television	and	stated	that	she	enjoyed	pan-Arab	
broadcaster	 Al	 Jazeera’s	 news	 and	 debates,	 but	 also	 stated	 only	 to	 have	 watched	 it	
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occasionally,	 unlike	 the	 national	 news	 broadcast	 on	Tounes	 7	which	 she	 viewed	 on	 a	 daily	
basis.	
	
The	 orientations	 towards	 national	 and	 international	 news	 and	 information	 sources	 are	
arguably	 indicative	 of	 the	 ambivalent	 position	 that	 many	 Tunisian	 citizens	 considered	
themselves	to	be	in,	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	revolution,	when	the	discrepancy	between	
the	 state	media’s	 representations	was	 particularly	 detached	 from	 citizens’	 own	 immediate	
experience	of	 the	 social,	 economic	 and	political	 realities	with	which	 they	were	 confronted.	
Tunisian	 media	 was	 also	 the	 official	 mouthpiece	 of	 a	 regime	 many	 wished	 to	 distance	
themselves	from,	but	it	equally	served	to	reiterate	and	reinforce	the	reality	that	citizens	were	
compelled	to	accept,	a	reality	that	was	both	marked	by	the	complete	absence	of	political	or	
politicised	media	content	outside	of	news	bulletins,	as	well	as	by	the	perceived	inauthenticity	
of	 the	 socio-political	 reality	 rendered	 by	 national	 news	 content.	 By	 consistently	 failing	 to	
provide	citizens	with	accurate	or	relevant	information,	the	implicit	message	in	Tunisian	media	
was	one	of	unbroken	and	unchallenged	political	continuity	and	the	maintenance	of	the	status	
quo.	As	Gunther	and	Mughan	stress	(2000b,	p.406-411),	media	messages	need	to	achieve	a	
level	 of	 homogeneity	 to	 play	 a	 role	 and	 be	 considered	 as	 legitimate,	 but	 often,	 in	
undemocratic	regimes,	they	are	inconsistent	in	the	long	run	with	a	number	of	other	factors,	
including	 people’s	 experiences,	 in	 which	 case	 their	 lack	 of	 credibility	 only	 serves	 to	
undermine	the	regime.		
	
Furthermore,	 as	 suggested	 by	 interview	 accounts	 I	 gathered,	 exposure	 to	 this	 mediated	
reality	 in	 Tunisia	 also	 fulfilled	 other	 purposes,	 marking	 domestic	 routines,	 social	 time,	 or	
forming	part	of	a	national	culture	(Morley	and	Silverstone,	1990;	Scannell,	1988),	albeit	one	
which	 respondents	 constructed	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 regime’s	 media	 representations,	 and	
with	 which	 older	 participants	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 involved	 than	 younger	 ones.	 In	 a	
different	authoritarian	context,	Mihelj	and	Huxtable	(2016)	reach	similar	conclusions.	In	their	
assessment	 of	 the	media’s	 role	 (television	 in	 particular)	 in	 the	 communist	 contexts	 of	 the	
Soviet	Union	and	Yugoslavia	between	the	sixties	and	late	eighties,	the	authors	stress	that	an	
important	distinction	needs	to	be	drawn	between	television’s	role	in	connecting	citizens	with	
the	 communist	 project,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 -	 drawing	 on	 Scannell	 (2014)	 –	 its	 role	 in	
synchronising	citizens’	quotidian,	and	in	providing	them	with	a	sense	of	instant	connection	to	
an	unfolding	reality	they	have	in	common.	The	study	highlights	how	television’s	embedding	in	
the	fabric	of	socialist	daily	life	played	a	role	in	sustaining	a	sense	of	comfort,	and	continuity,	
which	was	 in	many	ways	more	 important	 than	 the	communist	narratives	 it	articulated.	The	
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authors	stress	how	television,	in	these	contexts,	simultaneously	undermined	the	first	type	of	
socio-political	 connection	 whilst	 supporting	 a	 socio-temporal	 connection.	 The	 previous	
overview	of	 these	dynamics	 at	play	 in	 Tunisia	 similarly	 reveal	 that,	 despite	 the	barrier	 that	
Tunisian	media	 formed	 between	 the	 regime	 and	 its	 citizens,	 it	 still	 fulfilled	 some	 of	 these	
social	functions	by	bringing	many	citizens	together	around	shared	media	habits,	and	uniting	
them	 in	 their	 sense	 of	 detachment	 from	political	 and	 public	matters,	 a	 disconnection	 they	
were	aware	of,	but	nevertheless	had	no	choice	but	to	inhabit.		
	
1.4. Dual	worlds	online	
	
As	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 under	 a	 much-publicised	 modernisation	 programme	 in	 the	 mid-
nineties,	the	Ben	Ali	regime	supported	the	development	of	new	communicative	technologies	
in	Tunisia,	but	equally	swiftly	it	attempted	to	harness	them	as	a	further	means	of	extending	
its	control	(Goupy,	2013)62.	Fissures	nevertheless	appeared	in	the	regime’s	controlled	image	
in	conjunction	with	the	proliferation	of	online	communicative	opportunities,	but	once	again	
the	availability	of	alternative	informational	opportunities	did	not	automatically	translate	into	
participants	seizing	them.	Although	new	media	further	undermined	the	regime’s	constructed	
reality,	a	number	of	obstacles	also	meant	that,	for	many	participants,	online	connections	to	
alternative	 informational	 networks	 was	 difficult,	 fraught	 with	 risk	 and	 frequently	 required	
time,	dedication	and	technical	expertise	that	most	of	them	lacked.	
		
In	Tunisia,	political	activists	opposing	the	regime	were	quick	to	seize	on	the	potential	of	these	
new	 possibilities	 and	 participate	 in	 online	 discussion	 forums,	 blogs	 and	 social	 media.	
However,	 the	 Internet	 was	 also	 closely	 policed	 in	 the	 country	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	
filtering	 tools	 (OpenNet	 Initiative,	 2005),	 and	 a	 network	 of	 online	 agents	 and	 informers	 to	
block	 webpages,	 screen	 email	 content,	 infiltrate	 dissenting	 groups	 or	 intimidate	 political	
opponents	 (see	 Chapter	 1	 for	 further	 details).	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 blocking	 of	 a	 significant	
number	 of	 websites	 and	 blogs	 that	 were	 critical	 of	 the	 regime,	 as	 well	 as	 video	 sharing	
platforms	such	as	Youtube.	A	number	of	regime	opponents	and	political	activists	managed	to	
carve	 out	 an	 alternative	 online	 space	 that	 circumvented	 some	 of	 this	 control.	 Primarily,	
dissident	forums	and	blogs	were	managed	from	outside	the	country	and	were	only	accessible	
in	Tunisia	through	proxy	servers.	Many	figures	behind	such	spaces	were	part	of	a	political	or	
intellectual	elite	that	either	chose,	or	was	forced,	to	live	abroad.	
																																																						
62	Goupy	notes,	in	this	regard,	that	new	communicative	technologies’	inherent	potential	to	extend	surveillance	by	authoritarian	
regimes	such	as	Ben	Ali’s,	tends	to	be	ignored	under	a	principle	of	technological	neutrality	that	in	fact	serves	as	form	of	political	
legitimation	for	such	regimes.	
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However,	 the	 majority	 of	 Tunisian	 citizens	 who	 had	 Internet	 access	 remained	 relatively	
sheltered	 from	 this	 virtual,	 alternative	 informational	 sphere.	 Indeed,	 two	 quite	 different	
Internets	emerged	out	of	the	context	described	above.	Similar	to	trends	observed	in	relation	
to	the	national	media	landscape,	Internet	within	the	country	sustained	a	common	knowledge	
about	the	regime’s	undemocratic	nature	and	its	censorship,	but	it	was	relatively	effective	in	
restricting	the	formation	of	a	more	specific	knowledge	about	public	matters	 in	the	country.	
One	of	the	interviewees,	Ahmed,	who	had	the	opportunity	to	travel	to	Germany	before	the	
revolution,	described	how	overwhelmed	he	felt	by	the	difference	in	the	information	he	was	
able	to	access	online	about	his	country	in	Germany	and	in	Tunisia.	Although	he	was	aware	of	
censorship	 in	 Tunisia,	 he	 was	 not	 prepared	 for	 the	 level	 of	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 two	
realities	he	encountered	online	from,	within	and	outside	his	country:		
	
Before,	when	 you	 used	 to	 look	 up	 videos	 about	 Ben	Ali	 or	 news	 about	 the	 country,	 like	 in	
2008	 when	 there	 was	 a	 big	 revolution	 in	 Metlaoui	 and	 the	 miners	 there,	 there	 were	 big	
protests	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 got	 killed	 and	 arrested,	 but	we	were	 living	 in	 the	 country	 and	
didn’t	 hear	 about	 any	of	 it...	 But	 afterwards,	 I	was	 at	 some	point	 abroad	 in	Germany	and	 I	
asked	a	cousin	to	look	up	Ben	Ali	and	so	many	things	came	up	that	I	couldn’t	see	in	Tunisia,	he	
showed	me	all	the	problems	in	Tunisia	and	what	people	were	writing,	I	couldn’t	believe	it	at	
first.	 	 I	 was	 living	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 this	 person	was	 living	 abroad	 and	was	 showing	me	many	
things	about	Tunisia	that	I	didn’t	know	about.	
	
Despite	online	surveillance,	it	was	possible	for	some	citizens	to	access	this	alternative	space	
from	within	the	country.	Out	of	the	sample	of	interviewees,	four	(Youssef,	Habib,	Neila,	Anis)	
were	 aware	 of	 methods	 to	 circumvent	 online	 censorship,	 having	 learned	 how	 to	 do	 so	
through	 close	 friends.	 However,	 the	 level	 of	 effort	 this	 entailed,	 or	 the	 risks	 involved,	
dissuaded	 some	 of	 them	 from	 further	 venturing	 into	 such	 activities.	 The	 availability	 of	
Internet	 access	 did	 not	 automatically	 translate	 into	 a	 drive	 to	 explore	 alternative	
communicative	 opportunities,	 in	 some	 cases	 even	 when	 sufficient	 knowledge	 to	 bypass	
online	censorship	was	available.	In	this	regard,	Youssef	explained	that:	
	
Before	the	revolution,	the	Internet,	they	made	us	hate	it.	Because	almost	everything	was	shut	
[…]	You	had	to	use	peer-to-peer	programmes	to	be	able	to	access	sites	[run]	from	abroad.	 I	
did	use	them	a	bit	but	 it	was	such	a	hassle	until	you	reached	what	you	were	after	that	I	got	
fed	up.	It’s	only	after	they	opened	the	Internet	that	I	started	to	use	it	more.	
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The	 majority	 of	 participants	 did	 not	 possess	 either	 the	 opportunity	 and/or	 knowledge	 to	
access	 these	 alternative	 information	 sources	 online.	 Although	 digital	 media	 was	 gradually	
eroding	the	regime’s	control	of	 its	 image,	few	individuals	were	willing	to	assume	the	risk	of	
breaking	 the	 established	 norms	 of	 silence	 which	 were	 attached	 to	 civic	 and	 political	
engagement.	 For	 Tunisian	 citizens	 living	 beyond	 the	 confines	 of	 the	 country’s	 borders,	
contributing	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 dissenting	 Tunisian	 public	 space	 online	 was	 also	
associated	with	a	degree	of	risk,	albeit	a	less	significant	one.	This	was	the	case	for	Slim,	in	his	
mid-forties,	who	lived	in	France	and	the	UK	before	returning	to	Tunisia	after	the	revolution.	
During	this	time,	he	recalled	being	active	on	a	number	of	Tunisian	online	discussion	forums	
where	 many	 regime	 opponents	 found	 like-minded	 people	 and	 used	 pseudonyms	 to	
anonymously	 engage	 in	 political	 debate.	 Although	 this	 activity	 was	 conducted	 outside	 the	
country,	 it	 remained	 under	 close	 scrutiny	 and	 surveillance	 by	 the	 Tunisian	 authorities.	 He	
recounted	receiving	intimidating	phone	calls	at	the	time:	
	
They	had	my	phone	number	because	 I	would	have	given	 it	 to	 them,	because	you	would	be	
talking	 to	 people	 [in	 online	 forums]	 and	 befriend	 them,	 they’d	 be	 talking	 to	 you	 a	 lot,	 and	
maybe	they’d	say	at	some	point	if	I’m	in	your	area	I’ll	get	in	touch	or	there’s	someone	I	want	
to	put	you	in	touch	with,	what’s	your	number…	it’s	only	in	retrospect	that	you	would	find	out	
they	were	Ben	Ali’s	people,	or	if	you	put	something	bad	about	Ben	Ali	then	they	defended	it	
or	 said	give	me	your	number	 I	need	 to	 talk	 to	you,	 that’s	not	 right…	and	 so	 I	 got	 calls…	on	
three	occasions.	
	
As	 with	 offline	 public	 interactions,	 a	 large	 majority	 of	 respondents	 (who	 lived	 in	 Tunisia	
before	 the	 revolution)	were	 acutely	 aware	 of	 online	 surveillance	 and	 the	 discursive	 norms	
this	 entailed.	 In	 interviewees’	 descriptions	 of	 online	 media	 use	 before	 the	 revolution,	
politically-sensitive	 content	 regularly	 “disappeared”,	 was	 “blocked”,	 “closed”	 or	 “shut”,	
sharing	 it	 was	 “unthinkable”	 and	 “impossible”,	 and	 commenting	 on	 it	 like	 entering	 a	
“forbidden	 kingdom”63.	 Whilst	 some	 had	 direct	 experience	 of	 this	 online	 monitoring	 by	
noticing	that	some	content	disappeared,	that	other	content	was	signalled	as	inaccessible	with	
the	“404”	error	message	(mentioned	in	Chapter	1),	others	based	their	awareness	of	Internet	
monitoring	on	third	party	accounts	and	their	own	perception	of	the	ubiquitous	nature	of	the	
regime’s	surveillance	apparatus.	Although	they	were	aware	that	the	regime	could	not	control	
all	 online	 content,	 it	 was	 striking	 to	 which	 extent	 respondents’	 sense	 of	 the	 regime’s	
pervasive	presence	online	transpired	from	interview	accounts	and	shaped	online	interactions,	
reflecting	 views	 on	 the	 norms	 of	 public	 expression	 offline.	 This	 is	 vividly	 expressed	 in	
																																																						
63	An	ironic	reference	by	one	of	the	respondents	to	Jackie	Chan’s	movie,	the	title	was	mentioned	in	English.	
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comments	made	by	Zied,	an	 interviewee	 in	his	early	 thirties,	mirroring	Ahmed	and	Mehdi’s	
observations	 (see	 above),	 of	 a	 sense	 of	 being	 ‘watched	 by	 the	walls’	 in	 their	 own	 homes.	
Reflecting	 on	 his	 Internet	 use	 before	 the	 revolution	 Zied,	 in	 similar	 terms,	 explained	 that:	
“Even	if	you	were	not	being	watched,	you	felt	you	were	being	watched”.	As	a	result,	research	
participants	primarily	 accessed	 the	 Internet	 for	 relatively	 innocuous,	non-political	 activities,	
such	 as	 calling	 friends	 or	 relatives	 abroad,	 listening	 to	 music,	 chatting	 online	 and	 finding	
potential	girlfriends	or	boyfriends.		
	
Although	 online	 space	 afforded	 novel	 opportunities	 for	 informational	 access	 and	 the	
expression	of	dissent,	these	remained	underutilised	outside	of	a	limited	circle	of	‘cyber’	and	
political	 activists,	 and	 those	with	 not	 only	 the	 requisite	 skills	 and	 time	 to	 dedicate	 to	 such	
activities,	but	also	sufficient	motivation	to	take	the	risks	associated	with	challenging	the	rules	
of	silence	and	the	maintenance	of	the	status	quo.	Furthermore,	the	regime’s	surveillance	also	
fostered	 a	 climate	 of	 distrust	 online	 to	 which	 the	 apparent	 safety	 of	 anonymity	 was	 not	
immune.	As	evidenced	by	the	case	of	Slim,	communicating	one’s	dissent	in	online	forums	also	
had	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 a	 further	 source	 of	 threat,	 as	 equally	 anonymous	 regime	
informants	infiltrated	this	space	in	an	attempt	to	establish	a	rapport	of	trust	with	users	and	
track	down	their	identities.		
	
Considering	 that	 social	 networking	 sites	 offered	 the	opportunity	 to	 expand	 communication	
online	 across	 networks	 of	 pre-existing,	 and	 thus	more	 trusted	 acquaintances,	 the	 question	
consequently	 arises	 whether	 they	were	 used	 to	 access,	 disseminate	 or	 express	 alternative	
information	and	representations	of	socio-political	reality,	or	if	instead	the	trends	observed	in	
relation	 to	 the	 broader	 communicative	 context	 were	 replicated	 in	 the	 use	 of	 social	media	
before	the	revolution.	
	
1.5. Social	media:	The	status	quo	maintained	
	
Available	interview	accounts	and	social	media	data	support	the	latter	perspective.	The	social	
media	 space	 was	 not	 immune	 from	 the	 trends	 observed	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 media	 and	
communicative	 exchanges	 between	 citizens	 both	 offline	 and	 online.	 Although	 it	 offered	
relatively	easy	opportunities	 to	access,	produce	and	 transmit	alternative	news,	 information	
and	 opinions	 about	 social	 and	 political	 issues	 in	 Tunisia,	 participants	 who	 acted	 on	 these	
opportunities	were	in	the	minority.	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	social	network	content	was	
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far	 more	 problematic	 for	 the	 regime	 to	 control	 and	 that	 it	 had	 not	 (yet64)	 deployed	
surveillance	tools	in	this	space.	
	
Before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 protest	 movements,	 eighty	 per	 cent	 of	 research	 participants	 used	
social	media,	all	of	them	members	of	the	social	networking	site	Facebook.	None	of	them	used	
Twitter	 before	 the	 revolution.	 Although	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 for	 authorities	 to	 use	 Internet	
filtering	tools	to	restrict	information	transmission	on	social	media,	as	was	the	case	with	other	
websites,	the	platform	was	subjected	to	the	scrutiny	of	government	agents.	As	 in	the	wider	
online	 space,	 participants	 were	 keenly	 aware	 of	 this	 monitoring	 presence.	 Consequently,	
their	use	of	the	platform	was	considered	primarily	a	means	of	socialising,	and	participants	did	
not	use	it	to	share	information	or	news	relating	to	any	public	issues	or	socio-political	matters.	
A	 significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 interviewees	 concurred	 in	 describing	 their	 use	 of	 Facebook	
before	 the	 revolution	 as	 exclusively	 dedicated	 to	 “trivial”,	 leisure,	 “entertainment”	 and	
“social	 purposes”	 (P6),	 “cultural	 things”	 (P4),	 “just	 for	 a	 laugh”	 (P15),	 to	 see	 football	 news	
(P10,	 P16,	 P22),	 watch	music	 videos	 (P19,	 P16,	 P5),	 keep	 in	 touch	 with	 friends	 or	 expand	
networks	of	acquaintances	(P1,	P3,	P15,	P19),	and	for	sharing	personal	photos	and	jokes	(P4,	
P15,	 P18).	 Equally,	 this	 tendency	 was	 justified	 –	 in	 interviewees’	 reflections	 on	 their	 pre-
revolution	 social	media	 practices	 –	 by	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	monitoring	 and	 control	 of	 this	
networked	online	space.	 In	 this	 regard,	 several	 respondents	mentioned,	 for	example,	being	
aware	of	government	employees	 infiltrating	social	media	under	 fake	profiles	as	a	means	 to	
access	networks	and	monitor	posts	on	Facebook.		
	
Only	three	of	the	study’s	participants	who	had	a	Facebook	profile	before	the	revolution	said	
they	 used	 Facebook	 in	 a	 more	 politicised	 manner,	 to	 transmit	 alternative	 informational	
content	 that	 denounced	 abuses	 by	 the	Ben	Ali	 regime.	 Two	of	 them,	 Slim	 and	 Imen,	were	
living	 abroad	 at	 the	 time	 and	 felt	 that	 the	 risk	 associated	with	 this	was	 relatively	minor	 in	
comparison	to	the	persecution	that	activists	in	the	country	exposed	themselves	to.	The	other	
notable	exception	 to	 this	was	Lobna,	a	 twenty-year	old	student	 in	Tunis,	originating	 from	a	
small	 town	 in	 the	 South	 of	 the	 country,	 where	 she	was	 living	 until	 2011.	 Lobna	 had	 been	
sharing	politically	related	content	on	her	Facebook	account	since	2008	when	she	first	started	
using	social	media.	In	2009,	her	profile	image	on	Facebook	was	a	photo	of	Ben	Ali	with	a	sign	
of	 the	Tunisian	 flag	and	the	word	“no”	 in	Arabic.	Not	only	was	she	unafraid	of	 the	possible	
																																																						
64	According	to	Silver	(2011),	the	regime	had	requested	the	deployment	of	a	systematic	social	media	surveillance	tool	from	the	
same	European	company	that	had	previously	an	email	surveillance	tool	to	the	regime,	but	the	revolution	started	before	this	plan	
could	be	implemented.	As	a	result,	alternative	methods	were	used	by	the	regime	during	the	revolution	to	limit	content	
transmission,	including	the	pirating	of	Facebook	passwords.	Further	details	are	included	in	Chapter	One.	
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repercussions	of	her	online	activities,	but	she	was	using	her	real	name	and	included	photos	of	
herself	on	her	 social	media	profile,	making	her	perfectly	 identifiable	 to	authorities.	 Looking	
back,	 Lobna	 admits	 she	 took	 many	 risks,	 but	 that	 she	 enjoyed	 the	 exhilaration	 of	 such	
activities:	“It	was	adolescence	and	it	had	a	bit	the	taste	of	an	adventure”.	Ironically,	it	is	the	
very	overtness	of	her	online	dissent	that	proved	to	be	a	hurdle	when	she	decided	to	take	her	
political	engagement	further	and	tried	to	join	an	opposition	party.	Her	profile	was	mistaken	
for	one	of	the	fake	accounts	run	by	Ben	Ali’s	regime	to	spy	on	opposition	activities:	
	
And	that’s	why	they	didn’t	take	me	on.	Because	when	someone	uses	his	name	and	surname,	
and	 puts	 his	 pictures,	 and	 then	 puts	 an	 image	 of	 Ben	 Ali	 saying	 no,	 and	 posts	 all	 sorts	 of	
videos,	there’s	always	a	risk	that	it	turns	out	to	be	police.	Because	for	someone	to	oppose	so	
openly,	it	didn’t	make	sense.	
	
It	needs	to	be	noted	that	the	suspicions	raised	about	Lobna’s	engagement	were	possibly	also	
fuelled	by	 the	 fact	 that	her	 father	was	a	policeman.	Her	dissident	activities	may	have	been	
linked	to	rebellion	against	a	 father	 figure	that	embodied	the	police	state,	and	her	apparent	
immunity	 from	 repercussions	may	have	been	 related	 to	his	 position.	 There	 is	 no	means	 of	
verifying	 any	 of	 these	 hypotheses,	 however.	 Conjecture	 aside,	 her	 case	 is	 particularly	
revealing	 of	 the	 climate	 of	 suspicion	 and	 paranoia,	 and	 the	 norms	 for	 public	 engagement	
enforced	directly	and	indirectly	by	the	regime.	These	delineated	clear	boundaries	about	what	
constituted	 permissible	 interactions	 between	 citizens,	 and	 this	 logic	 ironically	 led	 to	 a	
questioning	 of	 the	 authenticity	 of	 Lobna’s	 acting	 on	 the	 opportunities	 that	 social	 media	
provided	to	communicate	alternative	information	and	undermine	the	regime’s	discourse.	
	
This	 preliminary	 overview	 provided	 some	 important	 insights	 into	 the	 political	 and	 media	
contexts	 before	 the	 revolution,	 from	 interviewees	 own	 perspectives	 and	 recollections.	
Although	 not	 comprehensive	 (as	 this	 period	 is	 not	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 the	 thesis),	 this	
assessment	 was	 intended	 to	 complement	 understanding	 of	 the	 pre-revolution	 context	
detailed	 in	Chapter	 1,	 and	 to	 establish	 the	 setting	 from	which	 the	protest	movements	 and	
associated	 changes	 in	 media	 practices	 emerged	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2010.	 In	 pre-revolutionary	
Tunisia,	the	state	rigorously	pursued	a	policy	of	actively	deterring	citizens	from	engagement	
in	public	affairs	and	politics,	 resulting	 in	a	 sense	of	disconnect	 for	many	Tunisians	between	
the	 reality	 of	 their	 everyday	 lives	 and	 the	 mediated	 representation	 of	 their	 socio-political	
reality	on	national	media.		A	common	knowledge	formed	among	citizens	of	the	rules	of	non-
engagement	 with	 such	 matters.	 The	 surveillance	 and	 censorship	 of	 media	 content	
significantly	 restricted	 the	 transmission	 of	 news	 via	 both	 traditional	 media	 (e.g.	 print,	
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broadcasting)	 as	 well	 as	 online	 media	 content	 accessed	 from	 within	 the	 country,	 a	 trend	
further	exacerbated	by	citizens’	self-censorship	in	public	and,	to	some	extent,	in	private.	The	
cumulative	effect	of	this	negative	feedback	loop	was	to	further	inhibit	the	development	of	a	
national	media	sphere.	This	enforced	disengagement	extended	to	the	use	of	social	media	in	
Tunisia	 before	 the	 revolution,	 where	 networked	 communication	 between	 citizens	 was	
generally	 of	 a	 strictly	 non-political	 nature.	 Crucially,	 this	 brief	 sketch	 of	 participants’	
orientations	towards	different	media,	and	other	 information	sources,	 in	their	everyday	lives	
before	the	revolution	highlighted	that	although	this	media	context	failed	to	inform	citizens	in	
terms	of	content	transmission,	 it	played	a	role	in	informing	them	about	the	maintenance	of	
the	 authoritarian	 regime.	 It	 continuously	 reiterated	 a	 core	message	 of	 an	 unchanging,	 and	
arguably	unchangeable,	socio-political	order,	in	which	the	citizen’s	enforced	role	was	one	of	
passivity,	acceptance	and	disengagement	from	the	public	realm	and	the	world	of	politics.	 In	
the	next	 section	of	 this	 chapter,	 I	 explore	how	 this	understanding	was	 challenged	with	 the	
revolution,	 what	 information	 and	 circumstances	 signified	 to	 respondents	 a	 change	 in	 this	
order	and	in	their	reading	of	socio-political	reality,	and	social	media’s	role	in	these	processes.	
	
	
2. Shifting	civic	conceptions	and	media	use	during	the	revolution		
	
The	revolution	period65	represented	a	radical	disruption	of	this	long-standing,	yet	increasingly	
precarious,	 balance	 as	 a	 new	 reality	 established	 itself,	 and	 citizens	united	 in	breaking	 their	
silence	 about	 the	 regime.	 The	 use	 of	 social	media	 to	 share	 information	 about	 the	 protest	
movements	and	 to	 reconnect	 citizens	 to	a	 shared	public	 realm	played	an	 important	 role	 in	
supporting	 the	 revolutionary	 momentum.	 For	 participants	 in	 this	 study,	 this	 period	 was	
broadly	 defined	 as	 exhilarating,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 time	 associated	 with	 much	 anxiety	 and	
uncertainty.	 Paralleling	 this	 transformation,	 media	 practices	 were	 equally	 altered.	 In	 the	
following	 section,	 I	 analyse	 in	 greater	 detail	 how	 research	 participants	 reflected	 on	 this	
period.	In	particular,	I	focus	on	how	their	knowledge	of	these	changes	was	formed,	how	this	
information	 was	 understood	 and	 rationalised,	 and	 what	 role	 different	 modes	 of	
communication	 and	 media	 forms	 –	 including	 social	 media	 –	 played	 in	 reviving	 their	
relationship	with	a	shared	public	realm.	
	
																																																						
65	I	define	this	period	here	as	spanning	from	the	escalation	of	protests	in	Tunisia	and	their	spread	at	the	end	of	December	2010	
to	the	departure	of	former	president	Ben	Ali	on	14th	January	2011,	and	the	immediate	aftermath	of	this	event.	Whilst	
subsequent	protest	movements	that	continued	in	the	following	months	can	equally	be	considered	as	part	of	the	Tunisian	
revolution	as	they	fought	for	the	dismantlement	of	further	structures	and	representatives	of	Ben	Ali’s	regime,	I	have	chosen	here	
to	focus	the	analysis	in	this	part	of	the	chapter	on	the	initial	period	in	terms	of	it	being	the	first	point	of	radical	change	and	break	
with	the	past.	
100	
	
2.1. Shifting	civic	conceptions	
	
The	self-immolation	of	Mohamed	Bouazizi	in	Sidi	Bouzid	on	17th	December	2010	initially	only	
triggered	protests	in	the	locality,	but	gradually	spread	to	other	parts	of	the	country.	The	first	
regions	 to	experience	widespread	public	protests	were	 relatively	deprived,	 in	 the	 Southern	
and	Western	regions,	and	then	followed	by	 larger	cities	 in	the	coastal	areas	and	the	capital	
Tunis	 (see	 Chapter	 1	 for	 more	 details).	 In	 the	 closely	 controlled	 Tunisian	 media	 space,	
knowledge	about	these	movements	was	informed	by	a	number	of	communicative	exchanges	
in	which	digital	media	featured	to	an	important	extent.		
	
When	the	first	round	of	interviews	was	conducted	in	October	2012,	not	all	of	the	participants	
in	 this	 study	were	 able	 to	 remember	 precisely	 how	 they	 first	 found	 out	 about	 the	 protest	
movements	in	the	country;	only	twenty-four	out	of	thirty	did.	But	of	these	respondents,	half	
of	them	remembered	first	becoming	aware	of	the	turmoil	through	photos	and	video	footage	
of	 the	protests	shared	by	their	contacts	on	social	media	platform	Facebook	(P1,	P6,	P8,	P9,	
P10,	P15,	P18,	P19,	P20,	P21,	P23,	P24).	Satellite	broadcaster	Al	Jazeera	also	served	to	initially	
inform	three	of	the	study	participants	about	the	protests	(P3,	P4,	P12),	and	two	of	them	first	
encountered	 this	 information	 on	 other	 Internet	 sites	 (P22,	 P26).	 Oral	 communication	 also	
played	 a	 relatively	 important	 role	 in	 disseminating	 this	 information.	 Indeed,	 one	 third	 of	
these	interviewees	indicated	that	they	had	acquired	this	knowledge	through	word	of	mouth,	
including	 conversations	 with	 colleagues	 at	 work,	 and	 with	 family	 members	 and	 friends	 -	
either	 in	 face-to-face	 interactions,	or	over	 the	 telephone	 (P5,	P7,	P13,	P16,	P27,	P28,	P30).	
This	 initial	observation	serves	to	support	the	view	that,	 for	these	respondents,	social	media	
appears	 to	 have	 contributed	 to	 a	 significant	 extent	 in	 facilitating	 and	 precipitating	 the	
transmission	of	information	on	a	large	scale	during	the	initial	phase	of	the	protests.	
	
However,	it	was	striking	that,	although	many	of	the	respondents	attested	to	feeling	shock	at	
the	 time	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 death	 of	 Bouazizi,	 and	 by	 the	 subsequent	 repressive	 police	
repression	of	 the	protests	 in	 the	 region	of	Sidi	Bouzid,	 the	majority	of	 them	did	not	expect	
the	situation	to	escalate,	or	for	any	meaningful	political	change	to	be	instigated.	For	instance,	
several	of	them	cited	previous	protests	that	had	erupted	in	the	mining	region	of	Gafsa,	in	the	
South	of	the	country,	 in	2008.	These	had	been	equally	as	violently	repressed	by	the	regime	
and	 had	 no	 further	 repercussions.	 Study	 participants	 expected	 the	 protests	 at	 the	 end	 of	
2010	 to	 have	 a	 similar	 outcome.	 Three	 respondents	 also	 mentioned	 that	 there	 had	 been	
precedents	of	young	men	self-immolating	out	of	despair,	to	which	public	reactions	had	been	
101	
	
rather	muted.	As	a	result,	 for	many	of	these	 interviewees,	 initial	knowledge	of	the	protests	
did	not	necessarily	translate	into	immediate,	deeper,	questioning	of	the	maintenance	of	Ben	
Ali’s	regime	in	power,	or	in	a	wider	mass	mobilisation	of	the	population.	
	
This	situation	gradually	shifted	during	the	first	two	weeks	of	January	2011	and,	as	interview	
accounts	revealed,	direct	experience	and	changes	 in	their	everyday	life	context,	rather	than	
mediated	 information,	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 raising	 their	 awareness	 that	 a	 more	
fundamental	 shift	was	underway.	This	was	 to	 result	 in	 radical	 altering	of	 their	perspectives	
on,	 and	 reappraisal	 of,	 the	balance	of	 power	between	 citizens	 and	 the	 regime,	 and	on	 the	
possibility	of	change	in	the	country.	Most	respondents	had	found	out	about	protests	in	other	
parts	of	the	country	through	different	communicative	means.	However,	several	interviewees	
expressed	a	sense	of	disbelief	when	they	first	witnessed	footage	of	the	protests	and	victims.	
One	 of	 the	 respondents,	 Neila,	 recalled	 how	 a	 photo	 that	 a	 friend	 of	 hers	 shared	 on	
Facebook,	showing	the	bloodied	body	of	a	protestor	killed	by	police,	was	met	with	suspicion	
by	some	other	friends	of	hers	on	Facebook.	They	claimed	instead	that	the	photo	was	copied	
from	images	of	war	abroad.	Similar	to	Lobna’s	anecdote	(referred	to	in	an	earlier	part	of	this	
chapter),	where	her	unusual	degree	of	political	activism	was	perceived	as	inauthentic,	some	
Tunisians	were	struggling	to	come	to	terms	with	a	reality	that	was	dissonant	with	the	habitual	
image	 of	 their	 country,	 preferring	 to	 transfer	 the	 mediated	 representation	 of	 these	
geographically	proximate	events	to	the	suffering	of	distant	others	in	remote	conflict	zones.	
	
It	was	equally	significant	that,	even	for	some	of	those	who	joined	the	protests	at	a	relatively	
early	stage	of	the	revolution,	this	participation	was	not	necessarily	associated	with	a	wish	to	
challenge	the	regime,	or	with	belief	in	the	possibility	of	change.	This	was	the	case	for	Anouar,	
who	was	 in	 his	 last	 year	 of	 high	 school	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Thala	when	 the	 revolution	 started.	
Thala	is	a	small	town	in	the	mid-Western	region	of	Kasserine	near	the	border	with	Algeria.	A	
relatively	 deprived	 area,	 it	 was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 regions	 where	 demonstrations	 spread	 and	
where,	at	the	beginning	of	2011,	security	forces	shot	and	killed	a	number	of	protesters.	Like	
many	others,	Anouar	was	initially	alerted	to	the	protests	in	Sidi	Bouzid	via	videos	posted	on	
Facebook	and	did	not	expect	any	particular	outcome.	Nevertheless,	he	joined	his	classmates	
on	the	streets	at	the	beginning	of	January	2011	to	express	solidarity	with	the	people	of	Sidi	
Bouzid.	 For	 Anouar,	 this	 participation	 was	 not	 a	 new	 experience.	 Indeed,	 he	 mentioned	
taking	part	in	a	few	other	small	scale	marches	over	the	previous	years,	principally	in	support	
of	the	Palestinian	cause.		He	explained	that	on	the	day	in	question	he	did	not	expect	leaving	
class	 to	 demonstrate	would	 be	 of	 consequence.	 He	 further	 explained	 that,	 for	most	 of	 his	
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classmates,	joining	the	protests	“started	more	like	a	joke”	as	they	were	not	in	the	right	frame	
of	mind	to	go	back	to	learning	after	two	weeks	of	winter	holidays.	He	failed	to	recognise	the	
difference	 between	 the	 expression	 of	 public	 opinion	 about	 international	 and	 national	
matters,	 or	 between	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 regime	 to	 public	mood	 about	 the	 oppression	 of	
Palestinians	 and	 that	 of	 Tunisians	 citizens.	 Consequently,	 he	 did	 not,	 at	 first,	 ascribe	 this	
expression	of	solidarity	a	particularly	political	character.	However,	the	heavy	police	presence	
on	 the	 streets,	 its	 apparent	 overreaction	 to	 the	 protests,	 and	 the	 dangerous	 escalation	 in	
violence	over	 the	 following	days	 soon	 altered	his	 perspective	on	 these	 events.	His	 political	
stance	became	even	more	pronounced	following	the	death	of	one	of	his	close	friends	during	
the	protests,	who	was	shot	by	the	police.	
	 	
2.2. Making	sense	of	a	changing	reality	
	
This	 trauma	 that	 coloured	 Anouar’s	 experience	 of	 this	 period	 was	 recalled	 as	 profoundly	
shocking	 and	 saddening,	 but	 for	 him,	 this	was	 also	 a	 time	 of	 solidarity	 and	 empowerment	
that	lent	it	an	optimistic,	idealistic	quality:	
	
[Can	you	describe	your	experience	of	the	revolution	period?]	
Those	 days	went	 past…	mind	 you	whenever	 I	 think	 back	 on	 them…	 I	 think	 they	were	 such	
exciting	days.	Not	exciting	because	they	were	persecuting	us	and	killing	us	and	throwing	gas	
at	us,	but	exciting	because	you	felt	that	Thala	was	all	united	you	see…	those	who	know,	those	
who	 read,	 the	 unemployed,	 the	 dope	 heads,	 all	 the	 social	 classes,	 all	 took	 to	 the	 streets	
together.	I	mean	when	you	look	at	it,	you	find	for	example	your	old	neighbour	next	to	you,	or	
even	women	who	went	out	and	got	hurt,	I	mean	you	felt	Thala	was	all	together,	there	was	no	
outsider	to	it.	
	
[How	did	you	think	about	the	police	in	all	this?]	
I	was	looking	at	it	as	if	it	was	Palestinians	fighting	Israelis.	
	
Anouar’s	 depiction	 suggests	 that	 the	 sense	 of	 unity	 and	 common	 purpose,	 which	
spontaneously	emerged	among	the	 local	population	was	out	of	 the	ordinary.	He	associated	
the	 revolution	 with	 the	 breaching	 of	 boundaries	 that	 usually	 ordered	 (and	 limited)	 social	
interactions	 along	 educational,	 class,	 employment	 status,	 gender	 and	 age	 lines.	 These	
distinctions	temporarily	dissipated	and	were	reconfigured	during	this	period	into	a	narrative	
of	 unity	 of	 all	 citizens	 against	 the	 oppression	 of	 a	 state	 seen	 to	 be	 represented	 by,	 and	
embodied	 in,	 its	 security	 forces.	 Anouar’s	 association	 of	 this	 opposition	 with	 the	 Israeli-
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Palestinian	conflict	–	a	conflict	ingrained	in	the	Arab	political	imagination	as	an	unequal	and	
unfair	 struggle	 –	 is	 indicative	of	 the	profound	perceived	 sense	of	 injustice	 that	 fuelled	him	
and	others	 into	resisting	the	regime	so	fiercely.	 In	the	accounts	of	Anouar	and	some	of	 the	
other	 interviewees	who	participated	 in	similar	protests,	 the	potent	 image	of	civic	collective	
protest,	 composed	 of	 a	 victimised	 and	 oppressed	 population	 armed	 only	with	 stones,	was	
often	 constructed	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 classic	 portrayal	 of	 uniformed	 repression.	 Regime	
security	 forces’	use	of	 tear	gas,	 truncheons,	 rubber	bullets	and,	ultimately,	 live	ammunition	
fed	 into	 this	 universally	 recognisable	 depiction	 of	 organised	 state	 brutality,	 bolstering	 the	
narrative	of	a	people’s	struggle.	
	
With	the	escalation	in	violence	during	this	period	(see	Chapter	1),	the	perspectives	of	many	
Tunisians	shifted	as	the	authoritarian	nature	of	the	regime	and	its	apparently	unconstrained	
repression	 of	 protests	was	 increasingly	widely	 publicised.	 Individuals	 broke	 their	 silence	 to	
express	 solidarity	 with	 others	 and	 to	 demand	 an	 improvement	 in	 their	 living	 conditions,	
which	gradually	turned	 into	an	awareness	of	both	the	regime’s	 inherent	weakness	and	that	
the	 political	 status	 quo	 was	 no	 longer	 sustainable.	 Many	 people	 felt	 increasingly	 free	 to	
openly	 call	 for	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 regime.	 	 During	 the	 first	 two	 weeks	 of	 January	 2011,	 the	
combination	of	media	sources,	communicative	exchanges	between	citizens	-	including	across	
trade	union	and	professional	networks	-	as	well	as	direct	experience	of	events,	contributed	to	
a	gathering	momentum	in	favour	of	political	change	as	protests	spread	across	the	country.	
	
Whereas	 Anouar’s	 perception	 of	 the	 socio-political	 reality	 in	 the	 country	was	 affected	 in	 a	
particularly	 traumatic	way,	 for	many	 other	 respondents,	 familiarisation	with	 this	 change	 in	
perspective	 was	 a	 more	 incremental	 process	 during	 the	 first	 two	 weeks	 of	 January	 2011.	
Significantly,	the	understanding	that	events	were	not	a	mere	repetition	of	past	scenarios,	as	
had	 been	 initially	 anticipated,	 was	 often	 associated,	 in	 interviewees’	 accounts	 to	 direct	
experience	and	witnessing	of	events.	Neila,	 for	example,	vividly	recounted	the	moment	she	
walked	 past	 a	 building	 site	 near	 her	 school	 in	 the	 morning	 and	 caught	 a	 glimpse	 of	 men	
methodically	gathering	stones	from	the	site	in	preparation	for	the	days’	battle	with	police,	an	
image	 that	 struck	 her	 as	 surreal	 at	 first.	 She	 claimed	 that	 this	 moment	 marked	 a	 critical	
juncture	in	her	perception	of	the	situation.		For	many,	it	was	signs	of	disruption	to	their	daily	
life	 that	were	memorable	 indicators	 that	 something	was	 fundamentally	 changing.	 Zied,	 for	
example,	 remembered	 seeing	 unusually	 high	 numbers	 of	 protestors	 of	 all	 ages	 in	 his	
neighbourhood,	 an	 image	 that	 directly	 contradicted	 the	 notion	 propagated	 by	 Ben	 Ali	 and	
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state-controlled	 media	 that	 protestors	 were	 a	 “minority	 of	 thugs”66.	 When	 the	 protest	
movement	reached	the	capital	Tunis	on	12th	January	2011,	the	widespread	deployment	of	the	
army	on	the	streets,	the	forced	closure	of	educational	establishments	and	public	institutions,	
were	 for	many	 a	 sign	 that	 a	 critical	 moment	 had	 been	 reached.	 For	Meriem	 and	 Yassine,	
arson	attacks	on	politically	symbolic	buildings	in	their	local	vicinity	-	a	local	supermarket	that	
residents	associated	with	a	member	of	the	Ben	Ali	family,	and	a	police	station	–	were	tangible	
indicators	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 profound	 political	 change.	 Others	 again	 referred	 to	 the	
unusually	tense	atmosphere	in	cafés	or	on	public	transport.	Farah	recalled	the	sense	of	panic	
which	took	hold	in	the	capital	as	people	rushed	to	stock	up	on	food:	
	
[My	daughter	and	I]	could	see	everywhere	on	the	streets	how	the	army	was	deployed,	so	we	
really	 panicked	 seeing	 this	 because	 it	 meant	 something	 really	 serious	 was	 happening.	 We	
were	not	used	to	seeing	this,	it	was	scary	at	first	to	see	big	military	tanks	on	the	streets	and	all	
that.	I	remember	going	to	a	lot	of	shops	but	a	lot	of	them	were	already	closed,	and	the	local	
market	stalls	had	almost	no	food	left	so	I	had	to	buy	whatever	food	I	could	find.	
	
A	closer	connection	for	citizens	to	the	unfolding	revolution	movements	 in	different	parts	of	
the	 country	 was	 partly	 informed	 by	 the	 gradual	 opening	 of	 the	 media	 sphere	 (the	 online	
sphere	 in	 particular)	 to	 the	 transmission	 of	 alternative	 informational	 content	 and	
representations	 of	 the	 socio-political	 reality	 in	 the	 country	 that	 re-established	 an	 affective	
proximity	 between	 citizens	 (Papacharissi	 and	 De	 Fatima	 Oliveira,	 2012).	 However,	 this	
knowledge	 was	 also	 shaped	 by	 direct	 experience	 and	 observation	 of	 the	 changes	 to	 their	
immediate	environment	and	daily	lives,	that	marked,	first	hand,	the	disruption	of	the	status	
quo.	 This	 assessment	 highlights	 again	 that,	 although	 social	 media	 played	 an	 important	
informational	role	during	the	revolution,	this	role	can	only	be	understood	in	the	context	of	a	
more	 profound	 shift	 in	 perspectives	 about	 the	 socio-political	 order	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	
change	 through	 widespread	 collective	 civic	 action,	 a	 shift	 in	 perspective	 that	 direct	
experience	 and	 witnessing	 of	 events	 was	 crucial	 in	 shaping.	 It	 is	 this	 interpretation	 that	
supported	 the	 mass-scale	 participation	 of	 citizens	 in	 the	 expression	 of	 dissent	 offline	 and	
online,	and	in	the	transmission	of	alternative	representations	on	social	media.	
	
2.3. Unity	in	public	and	in	private	
The	 increasingly	 widespread	 public	 expressions	 of	 dissent	 led	 the	 regime	 to	 attempt	
restricting	 contact	 between	 citizens	 through	 the	 imposition	 of	 curfews	 and	 closure	 of	
																																																						
66	A	description	used	by	Ben	Ali	in	his	speech	on	28th	December	2010.	
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universities	 and	 other	 public	 institutions.	 As	 families	 and	 friends	 were	 confined	 to	 their	
homes,	 this	withdrawal	 from	 public	 life	 translated	 into	 two	 options	 for	many	 of	 the	 study	
participants	 interviewed:	 either	 to	 openly	 challenge	 the	 restrictions	 and	 join	 the	 protest	
movement	 on	 the	 streets,	 or	 to	 reconnect	 with	 the	 outside	 world	 through	 all	 the	 media	
technologies	and	means	of	communication	they	had	available	in	their	homes.	
	
Rim:		
We	were	all	at	home	and	 the	 Internet	was	 the	only	contact	with	 the	outside	so	you	had	 to	
constantly	be	connected.	There	was	no	other	way	to	find	out	what	was	really	going	on,	other	
than	 the	 Internet.	 There	was	 very	 little	 information	 on	 other	media	 outlets,	 so	 unless	 you	
were	on	the	streets	directly	witnessing	what	was	going	on,	then	you	only	had	Facebook.	
	
This	 intense	 desire	 for	 information	 under	 circumstances	 which	 precluded	 them	 from	
participating	 in	 normal	 public	 discourse	 was	 a	 recurrent	 theme	 running	 through	 interview	
accounts	of	the	revolution	period.	In	this	transient	state	where	the	old	reality	of	the	regime	
still	existed,	but	also	the	nascent	possibility	of	a	wholly	different	socio-political	order,	media	
practices	 radically	 changed.	 The	 spread	 of	 images	 and	 videos	 captured	 by	 protestors	 on	
mobile	 phones,	 and	 distributed	 across	 social	 networking	 sites	 and	 to	 international	
broadcasters,	contributed	to	mobilising	citizens	on	a	 large	scale	during	the	 last	week	of	 the	
movement	 in	 Tunisia.	 In	 a	 final,	 fruitless,	 attempt	 to	 accommodate	 the	 grievances	 of	 the	
protesters,	 former	president	Ben	Ali	delivered	a	 speech	on	13th	 January67	2011	 in	which	he	
announced	a	series	of	democratising	reforms,	including	the	end	of	Internet	censorship.	In	its	
immediate	 aftermath,	 all	 websites	 previously	 blocked	 became	 accessible,	 including	 video	
sharing	site	Youtube.	However,	by	this	stage,	the	promised	reforms	were	no	longer	sufficient	
to	dissipate	public	discontent	with	the	regime	and	on	14th	January	2011,	Ben	Ali	fled	to	Saudi	
Arabia.	
	
The	 political	 developments	 during	 the	 revolution	 were	 accompanied	 by	 shifts	 in	 media	
practices,	 which	 saw	 a	 transition	 from	 broadly	 non-political	 pre-revolutionary	 content	 to	
more	 overtly	 politicised	 subject	 matters.	 As	 the	 protest	 movements	 reached	 a	 critical	
momentum	over	 the	 first	 two	weeks	of	 January	2011,	a	clear	distinction	emerged	between	
media	 that	 served	 as	 the	 officially	 sanctioned	 voice	 of	 the	 regime	 and	 media	 that	 many	
citizens	 actively	 identified	 with.	 During	 this	 period,	 Tunisian	 state	 television	 Tounes7	 was	
drip-feeding	 information	 to	 its	 audiences	 and	 pursuing	 a	 strategy	 which	 deliberately	
																																																						
67	His	first	speech	in	Tunisian	dialect,	rather	than	classical/standard	Arabic	(see	p.30	for	more	details)	
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underplayed	the	importance	and	scale	of	the	protests.	Marwa	and	Sonia	recalled	the	national	
evening	news	bulletins	as	providing	 little	more	than	a	daily	 list	of	victims	by	region	without	
elaborating	on	the	circumstances	of	their	deaths.	Similarly,	Ahmed	talked	about	the	profound	
sense	of	frustration	generated	by	the	daytime	broadcasting	of	wildlife	documentaries	on	the	
channel	at	the	height	of	the	protests.	In	doing	so,	the	public	broadcaster	adhered	to	a	familiar	
narrative	of	a	regime	in	full	control	of	the	domestic	political	situation,	and	it	failed	to	offer	a	
recognition	of	the	significance	of	citizens’	voices,	and	the	lives	of	those	who	has	died	during	
the	 protests.	 The	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 regime-controlled	 media’s	 discourse	 and	 the	
parallel	 reality	 that	 citizens	 experienced	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives	 before	 the	 revolution	 had	
reached	 a	 new	 level	 of	 incongruity	 with	 these	 events,	 with	 an	 increasingly	 wide	 divide	
between	the	general	population’s	direct	experience	of	the	protests	and	the	official	coverage	
of	unfolding	events.	The	ambivalent	duality	that	many	of	the	respondents	had	described	as	
experiencing	 prior	 to	 the	 revolution	was,	 in	 their	 own	words,	 untenable	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	
violent	reality	with	which	they	were	confronted.		
	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 information	 vacuum	on	Tunisian	media,	 the	 research	participants	 sought	
access	 to	 alternative	 and,	 from	 their	 perspective,	more	 trustworthy	 representations	 of	 the	
changing	socio-political	 reality.	All	 respondents	mentioned	 that,	during	 the	 time	 they	spent	
home	at	the	height	of	the	revolutionary	period,	they	turned	to	any	available	means	in	order	
to	 maintain	 a	 connection	 to	 the	 outside	 world,	 and	 to	 attempt	 to	 follow	 the	 fluid,	 highly	
volatile	 situation	unfolding	 in	 the	country.	 In	 the	 last	 few	days	before	 the	14th	 January,	 the	
interviewees	said	that	they	were	keeping	themselves	informed,	and	forging	opinions	on	the	
events	 in	 the	 country,	 primarily	 through	 telephone	 contact	 with	 friends	 and	 relatives,	
watching	 television,	 and	 viewing	 online	media	 at	 home	 or	 at	 internet	 cafés	 if	 they	 had	 no	
domestic	access.	Sihem	recalled	 that	 the	owner	of	her	 local	 Internet	café	stopped	charging	
customers,	 and	 opened	 the	 premises	 for	 twenty-four	 hours	 a	 day,	 in	 solidarity	 with	 the	
protest	 movements.	 Meriem	mentioned	 during	 her	 interview	 that,	 in	 her	 neighbourhood,	
even	 the	 minaret	 at	 her	 local	 mosque	 was	 used	 to	 disseminate	 information	 to	 the	 local	
population	who	were	confined	to	their	homes	at	the	height	of	the	turmoil.	However,	 it	was	
largely	 through	 broadcast	 media	 and	 the	 social	 networking	 platform	 Facebook	 that	 study	
participants	 gathered	 critical	 information	 during	 the	 final	 few	 days	 prior	 to	 Ben	 Ali’s	
departure,	and	the	regime’s	collapse.	Most	interviewees	stated	that	they	were	permanently	
logged	into	their	Facebook	accounts,	as	well	as	watching	television,	listening	to	the	radio,	and	
if	possible,	accessing	these	different	sources	simultaneously.			
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Whilst	television	was	in	constant	use	during	this	period,	it	was	referred	to	by	respondents	as	
a	media	format	that	was	continually	combined	with,	and	often	framed	as	secondary	to,	the	
social	 media	 platform.	 Content	 was	 perceived	 as	 being	 more	 reliable	 and	 less	 mediated	
because	it	was	transmitted	directly	between	citizens.	Participants	referred	to	Facebook	as	a	
cohesive	 and	 unified	 media	 platform	 rather	 than	 a	 network	 amalgamating	 a	 variety	 of	
different	 sources	 and	 opinions,	 a	 sort	 of	 embodiment	 of	 a	 unified	 citizenship	 to	 which	
national	 television	 in	 particular,	 as	 a	 perceived	 extension	 of	 the	 regime,	 was	 opposed.	
Furthermore,	 this	 narrative	 of	 civic	 empowerment	 through	 social	 media	 was	 strongly	
emphasised	 by	 satellite	 broadcaster	Al	 Jazeera	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 other	 international	
media	organisations,	 depending	on	 their	 level	 of	 reliance	on	 social	media	 content	 for	 their	
coverage.	 As	Ali	 and	 Fahmi	 (2013)	 highlight,	 citizen	 journalism	 and	user-generated	 content	
stemming	from	protest	in	the	Middle	East	and	Arab	world,	provided	a	valuable	resource	from	
which	traditional	media	organisations	and	journalists	were	able	to	choose	and,	in	this	sense,	
they	enabled	them	to	continue	to	exercise	an	important	role	in	gatekeeping	information	and	
shaping	influential	international	narratives	of	such	movements	in	specific	ways.	
	
Research	participants	with	access	 to	 satellite	 television	stated	 that,	 in	addition	 to	 following	
events	online,	 they	primarily	watched	Al	 Jazeera	on	television,	as	 the	channel	was	covering	
the	Tunisian	protests	in	extensive	detail,	broadcasting	looped	recordings	of	amateur	footage	
taken	 by	 protestors	 and	 providing	 additional	 analysis	 and	 commentary	 of	 events.	 As	 the	
broadcaster	 no	 longer	 had	 any	 offices	 in	 Tunisia,	 much	 of	 their	 coverage	 was	 reliant	 on	
content	sent	to	them	directly	by	protestors	in	Tunisia	and	by	cyber-activists.	It	also	needs	to	
be	noted	that	the	role	of	the	broadcaster	was	not	limited	to	citizens	with	satellite	television	
access	 as	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 stream	 the	 channel	 live	 from	 its	 website,	 although	 limited	
Internet	speed	prevented	most	from	doing	so.	However,	shorter	video	clips	from	the	channel	
were	circulated	on	Facebook,	extending	a	circle	of	distribution	that	started	with	 footage	by	
Tunisian	 protestors	 being	 used	 by	 the	 broadcaster	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 In	 addition	 to	 seeing	
images	of	their	protests	circulated	across	social	media	networks,	Tunisians	were	thus	seeing	
the	mediation	of	these	images	on	transnational	television	and	their	further	echoing	on	their	
online	 networking,	 contributing	 to	 the	 amplification	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 momentum	 they	
were	experiencing.	
	
Essentially	 though,	 for	 these	 respondents,	 social	 media	 best	 addressed	 their	 needs	 in	 this	
volatile	 period.	 Facebook	 not	 only	 fulfilled	 an	 important	 informational	 role	 that	 stood	 in	
sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 dearth	 of	 relevant	 content	 being	 broadcast	 by	 established	 Tunisian	
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media,	but	also	served	to	 further	 iterate	a	new	and	drastically	different	narrative	 for	users,	
one	 that	 united	 citizens	 in	 an	oppositional	 role	 as	 victims	 struggling	 to	 liberate	 themselves	
from	an	oppressive	regime.	In	this	context,	the	shift	in	civic	perspective	was	accompanied	by	
a	change	in	media	habits	that	centred,	for	the	majority	of	participants	in	this	sample,	around	
a	 different	 and	more	 politicised	 use	 of	 social	 media.	 On	 Facebook,	 information	 about	 the	
protests	 in	 different	 regions	were	 progressively	 transmitted	 on	 a	 large	 scale	 to	 networked	
citizens.	 The	 content	 circulating	on	 the	platform	was	no	 longer	 referring	 to	 football	 results	
and	 music	 videos,	 but	 was	 instead	 dominated	 by	 posted	 imagery	 of	 the	 protests,	 and	 of	
abused,	injured	or	dead	protesters,	and	by	information	about	protests	and	gathering	points.	
This	 amalgamation	 of	 content	 was	 used	 to	 reinforce	 a	 central	 message,	 repeated	
continuously;	 that	of	 the	need	for	regime	change.	 Interviewees	recalled	the	transition	from	
using	Facebook	as	a	space	for	socialisation	and	entertainment	to	it	becoming	a	central	source	
of	 information	 and	 space	 for	 political	 discussion	 and	 communication	 (this	 is	 elaborated	
further	in	Chapter	5).		
	
Increasing	numbers	of	citizens	were	breaking	their	silence	and	joining	in	the	mass	distribution	
of	such	content	on	their	social	media	networks,	and	in	doing	so	changing	from	a	position	of	
audience	 witnessing	 distant	 events	 to	 constituting	 themselves	 as	 solidary	 public,	 and	
audiences	of	each	other.	Whilst	 those	on	 the	 front	 line	of	 the	violent	 clashes	 (e.g.	 Yassine,	
Sihem,	Neila)	started	to	become	strategically	organised	into	separate	street	and	media	teams	
to	relay	information,	others	were	spending	most	of	their	time	indoors	on	Facebook	to	follow	
and	further	spread	this	content	with	contacts	in	their	networks.	They	connected	to	dozens	of	
new	pages	on	the	platform	during	this	time,	and	sent	or	accepted	befriending	requests	from	
many	strangers	 in	order	to	expand	their	 informational	network.	Within	families,	what	could	
be	 considered	 as	 media	 consumption	 strategies	 developed	 as	 parents	 tended	 to	 follow	
broadcast	media,	whilst	their	children	preferred	online	media,	each	group	updating	the	other	
on	the	latest	political	developments	as	mediated	and	disseminated	through	their	respective	
sources.		
	
This	trend	was	reflective	of	broader	generational	differences	relating	to	media	consumption	
and	technology	adoption	patterns.	However,	the	use	of	social	media	during	this	period	was	
not	exclusive	to	the	younger	generation.	Whereas	young	participants	in	this	study	were	more	
familiar	with	using	social	media,	the	centrality	of	Facebook	to	the	transmission	of	information	
in	this	context	attracted	a	wider	user	base	to	the	platform.	It	is	during	this	period	that	most	
participants	who	did	not	yet	use	social	media	–	older	participants	in	particular	-	registered	a	
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Facebook	account	for	the	first	time	(P7,	P13,	P25,	P28,	P29).	Farah,	for	example,	said	that	she	
had	had	 several	opportunities	 to	 learn	 to	use	a	 computer	before	 the	 revolution	but	 lacked	
the	motivation.	It	was	only	during	the	protests	that	she	changed	her	mind:	
	
By	that	time,	the	kids	were	constantly	on	Facebook,	and	they	were	telling	me	about	what	they	
saw,	how	protesters	were	being	dispersed	with	tear	gas…	the	kids	and	my	husband	showed	
me	all	this	on	Facebook.	[…]	I	started	using	the	computer	with	the	revolution…	I	only	learnt	to	
use	the	computer	when	I	set	up	a	Facebook	account.	
	
Paralleling	observations	about	the	multiplicity	of	roles	that	media	use	fulfilled	in	respondents’	
daily	 lives	 before	 the	 revolution	 (i.e.	 informational,	 supporting	 public	 knowledge	 about	
maintenance	 of	 the	 socio-political	 status	 quo,	 a	 marker	 of	 national	 time	 and	 daily	 habits	
shared	with	others),	the	large-scale	change	in	the	way	social	media	was	used	in	Tunisia	during	
the	 revolutionary	 period,	 as	 assessed	 above,	 points	 to	 interesting	 continuities	 and	
disruptions.	There	was	a	distinct	chronology	that	emerged	from	interviewees’	accounts.	Their	
turn	to	social	media	and	their	participation	in	the	transmission	of	information	through	social	
media,	was	 not	 necessarily	 an	 automatic	 or	 direct	 consequence	 of	 information	 access	 and	
reception,	 but	 rather	 was	 often	 tied	 to	 a	 more	 gradual	 process	 of	 becoming	 aware	 and	
making	 sense	 of	 socio-political	 developments.	 The	 participants’	 personal	 experience	 of	 the	
radical	 disruption	 of	 their	 everyday	 lives,	 the	 enforced	 physical	 disconnection	 from	 the	
possibility	of	experiencing	the	outside	public	world,	and	the	additional	inability	to	re-establish	
such	a	connection	 through	national	media,	 cumulatively	engendered	 radical	 shifts	 in	media	
routines.	In	this	respect,	social	media	also	addressed	a	need	for	information	and	connection	
for	these	respondents	at	a	time	of	heightened	political	uncertainty	and	anxiety.	In	a	different	
context,	Silverstone	(1994),	points	to	the	importance	of	symbols	and	symbolic	repertoires	in	
supporting	a	sense	of	ontological	security	in	everyday	life	in	the	face	of	modern	anxieties68:	
	
	Ontological	security	is	sustained	through	the	familiar	and	the	predictable.	Our	commonsense	
attitudes	and	beliefs	express	and	sustain	our	practical	understandings	of	 the	world,	without	
which	 life	 would	 quickly	 become	 intolerable.	 Common	 sense	 is	 sustained	 by	 practical	
knowledge	 and	 expressed	 and	 supported	 by	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 symbols	 and	 symbolic	
formations	(p.19).	
	
																																																						
68	Silverstone	draws	on	Giddens	(1990)	who	defines	the	notion	of	ontological	security	as	tied	to	the	“confidence	that	most	
human	beings	have	in	the	continuity	of	their	self-identity	and	in	the	constancy	of	the	surrounding	social	and	material	
environments	of	action”	(p.92).	
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Silverstone	 highlights,	 in	 particular,	 the	 place	 of	 television	 and	media	 routines	 in	 ordering	
everyday	life	and	contributing	to	this	sense	of	security.	In	the	crisis	context	of	the	revolution,	
where	national	broadcast	media	failed	to	address	informational	needs	and	to	reflect	citizens’	
understanding(s)	of	a	profoundly	changing	context,	media	 routines	changed	and	reoriented	
themselves	 around	 alternative	 communicative	 spaces.	 Social	 media	 use,	 in	 particular,	
provided	an	important	connection	to	the	new	socio-political	order.	
	
2.4. Immediate	aftermath	of	14th	January	
	
Rumours	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 escape	 started	 to	 circulate	 on	 social	 media	 before	 an	 official	
announcement	 by	 the	 interim	 vice	 president	 confirmed	 the	 event	 in	 a	 live	 broadcast	 on	
national	television	in	the	afternoon.	Habib	vividly	recalled	a	radical	change	in	Tounes7’s	tone	
briefly	before	this	announcement:	
	
They	were	 talking	 differently,	 you	 knew	 the	 channel’s	 director	was	 out	 because	 they	were	
talking	on	TV	as	if	a	revolutionary	committee	had	taken	over.	
	
Over	the	following	days,	media	and	communication	technologies	played	a	significant	role	 in	
reconnecting	Tunisians	to	the	new	reality	in	their	country.	Reflecting	the	variety	of	sources	of	
information	that	had	been	employed	by	the	population	during	the	revolution	period,	a	new	
hierarchy	of	trust	in	media	forms	was	subsequently	established.		
	
The	immediate	aftermath	of	the	14th	January	was	chaotic	and	anarchic	in	many	regions.	Many	
young	male	 study	 participants	 had	 joined	 ad	 hoc	 self-protection	 groups	 in	 their	 local	 area,	
manning	street	barricades	that	were	coordinated	through	phone	calls	and	text	messages	with	
friends	in	the	neighbourhood.	With	a	night	curfew	still	in	place,	media	continued	to	provide	a	
vital	 link	 for	most	 citizens.	 The	 national	 television	 channel	 –	which	 changed	 its	 name	 to	El	
Watanyia69	-	as	well	as	private	television	channels	were,	by	this	point,	openly	covering	events	
and	 discussing	 the	 fall	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 regime.	 Emergency	 phone	 numbers	 were	 circulated	 on	
social	media	as	well	as	on	television	channels.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	meticulously	controlled	
and	constructed	media	 content	of	 the	pre-revolution	period,	 live	programmes	and	debates	
filled	 television	 air	 space,	 and	 citizens	 were	 encouraged	 to	 contact	 television	 channels	 by	
telephone	to	share	their	experiences.	This	denoted	a	marked	shift	away	from	the	its	previous	
alignment	 to	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	 outgoing	 regime	 and	 encouraging	 a	 re-connection,	
																																																						
69	El	Watanyia	means	“the	national”.	
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through	 the	 television	 screen,	 to	 an	 instantaneously	 unfolding	 reality	 (Scannell,	 2014).	
Instead	 of	 directly	 contacting	 the	 authorities	 to	 report	 criminal	 activities,	 many	 citizens	
elected	instead	to	call	television	channels	live	to	broadcast	their	appeals	for	help,	in	the	hope	
that	 citizens	 in	 the	 vicinity	 could	 intervene.	 Similarly,	 on	 social	media	platforms,	 numerous	
messages	and	warnings	were	distributed	between	citizens	on	a	mass	scale.	
	
While	Tunisian	television	played	more	of	a	role	again	in	reconnecting	citizens	and	providing	a	
sense	 of	 collective	 live	witnessing	 of	 a	 shared	 reality,	 it	was	 also	 still	 perceived	with	 some	
suspicion	by	many	 interviewees	due	 to	 its	 close	 association	with	 the	 former	 regime.	 Social	
media	platform	Facebook	 fulfilled	a	similar	 role	 for	citizens	with	 Internet	access,	but	 it	also	
played	a	particular	role	 in	helping	to	make	sense	of,	and	adjust	and	acclimatise	to,	the	new	
situation	in	the	country.	The	initial	period	after	January	14th	had	a	feeling	of	“unreality”	about	
it	 for	 many	 study	 participants.	 They	 were	 able	 to	 collectively	 exchange	 information	 and	
contribute	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 different	 representations	 of	 their	 country,	 a	 process	
facilitated	by	 social	media’s	enabling	of	direct	 contact	between	citizens.	Many	participants,	
for	example,	researched	and	exchanged	Internet	content	previously	censored	under	Ben	Ali’s	
regime	with	other	social	media	users.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
Social	 media	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 contributing	 to	 the	 transmission	 of	
informational	 messages	 between	 geographically	 removed	 Tunisian	 citizens	 during	 the	
revolution,	 but	 its	 role	 was	 not	 restricted	 to	 this.	 Interview	 accounts	 highlighted	 how	 a	
deeper	 shift	 occurred	 in	 study	 participants’	 perspectives.	 Their	 belief	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	
political	 change	was	mainly	 informed	 by	 direct	 experience	 and	 the	 inability	 to	 continue	 to	
inhabit	 the	gap	between	their	experience	of	 socio-political	 reality	and	 its	 representation	by	
the	regime.	With	this	shift	in	perspective	and	the	enforced	disconnection	(in	the	abstract	as	
well	 as	 literal	 sense)	 of	 citizens	 from	 their	 shared	 public	 realm,	 came	 a	 radical	 change	 in	
media	 habits	 for	 these	 research	 participants	 that	 served	 to	 re-establish	 this	 connection.	
Beyond	serving	to	transmit	information,	social	media	played	an	important	role	in	supporting	
this	 connection	 and	 providing	 a	 communicative	 space	 for	 citizens	 to	 reiterate	 and	 enact	 a	
new	 socio-political	 order	 along	 more	 broadly	 democratic	 lines,	 in	 which	 their	 position	 as	
citizens	 mattered.	 The	 shift	 in	 social	 media’s	 use	 during	 the	 revolution	 closely	 associated	
Facebook	with	this	new	civic	role.	
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CHAPTER	4	
	
POLITICAL	KNOWLEDGE	AND		
MEDIATED	REALITIES	AFTER	THE	REVOLUTION	
	
	
Introduction	
	
In	the	first	days	of	my	visit	to	Tunisia	in	the	autumn	of	2012,	‘tornado’	was	the	word	that	was	
on	everyone’s	lips.	A	tornado	was	about	to	make	landfall	near	the	capital	which,	it	was	widely	
believed,	would	devastate	everything	 in	 its	 tracks.	 This	had	never	happened	 in	 the	 country	
and	 in	 fact,	 the	predictions	 turned	out	 to	be	based	on	unsubstantiated	 rumours	 spread	by	
social	 media	 users	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 rumours	 gained	 sufficient	 traction	 to	 hit	 broadcast	
news	 headlines,	 and	 for	 an	 entire	 day	 meteorology	 experts	 and	 officials	 from	 the	
Environment	Ministry	devoted	 their	 time	 to	 reassuring	 the	population	 about	 an	event	 that	
had	not	even	a	remote	possibility	of	occurring.		
	
The	 anecdote	 is	 emblematic	 of	 the	 climate	 of	 confusion	 and	 anxiety	 in	 Tunisia	 during	 this	
period,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 an	 unsettled	 media	 landscape	 in	 this	 post-revolution	 context.	 News	
concerning	 political	 issues,	 public	 figures,	 and	 scandals	 -	 often	 predicated	 on	 baseless	
rumours	-	were	appearing	and	disappearing	from	headlines	on	a	daily,	even	hourly,	basis.	The	
overall	 representation	 of	 developments	 in	 the	 country	 at	 that	 time	 was	 consequently	
indistinct,	 and	 frequently	 incoherent.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 2012,	 a	 year	 after	 Tunisia’s	 first	 free	
elections	 since	 the	 collapse	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 regime,	 the	 political	 landscape	 in	 the	 country	was	
becoming	 increasingly	 fragmented	 and	 contentious	 (see	 Chapter	 1),	 and	 socioeconomic	
indicators	 suggested	 that	 the	much-needed	 post-revolution	 recovery	was	 faltering.	 Against	
this	 backdrop	 and	 amid	 competing	 political	 and	 social	 pressures,	 a	 reconfigured	 media	
landscape	emerged	in	which	access	to	resources	was	still	relatively	constrained.	At	the	same	
time,	 an	expanding	 social	media	 space	provided	 citizens	with	 instant	 access	 to	 information	
(and	misinformation)	during	a	period	characterised	by	recurrent	crises.	
	
The	outcome	of	the	revolution	events	was	a	radical	shift	in	Tunisian	citizens’	relationship	with	
their	shared	public	world.	An	eruption	of	 free	expression	occurred	during	the	revolutionary	
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period,	 following	 years	 of	 enforced	 disengagement	 from	 news	 and	 political	 matters,	 the	
result	 of	 which	 was	 to	 utterly	 transform	 the	 media	 landscape.	 The	 national	 media,	 and	
broadcast	media	 in	particular,	 started	 to	occupy	a	more	 important	 role	again	 in	connecting	
citizens	around	issues	of	common	concern.	Social	media	also	continued	to	play	a	significant	
part	 in	 this	 revived	 sphere	 of	 engagement	 with	 the	 public	 world,	 but	 navigating	 the	 vivid	
post-revolution	media	scene	was	also	problematic.	Many	Tunisians	were	uncertain	as	to	the	
authority,	and	veracity,	of	the	different	voices	which	were	competing	to	be	heard	in	the	post-
revolutionary	context,	and	struggled	to	make	sense	of	a	highly	fluid	socio-political	situation.	
This	chapter	examines	the	relationship	with	this	evolving	media	landscape	as	source	of	public	
knowledge,	 for	 those	Tunisian	citizens	who	participated	 in	 the	study.	More	specifically,	 it	 is	
concerned	with	a	focus	on	social	media	within	this	framework.	It	assesses	participants’	media	
consumption	patterns	in	October/November	2012	(when	interviews	were	first	conducted)	in	
detail,	and	their	reflections	on	the	news	sources	they	trusted	in	forming	an	understanding	of	
their	uncensored	and	rapidly	changing	socio-political	environment.	
	
	
1. Reconnection	to	the	public	realm	
	
1.1 The	informed	citizen	
	
After	the	revolution	Tunisians	were	presented	with	new	freedoms,	and	roles	to	play,	in	civic	
society.	It	thus	became	important	for	many	of	them	to	be	informed	about	the	nature	of	these	
changes,	 to	 develop	 deeper	 knowledge	 of	 the	 nascent	 democratic	 context,	 and	 to	 form	
appropriate	 opinions	 about	 them.	 Accompanying	 these	 changes	 was	 a	 transformation	 in	
terms	 of	 people’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 place	 and	 function	 of	 news	 media,	 political	
communication	and	informational	resources	in	their	daily	lives.	In	liberal	political	theory,	the	
notion	of	 the	 ‘informed	citizen’	 is	 central	 to	debates	on	media’s	 role	 in	citizens’	 relation	 to	
the	 public	 realm,	 and	 to	 their	 political	 socialisation	 in	 a	 democracy.	 Being	 informed	
constitutes	one	of	the	key	features	of	a	citizen’s	involvement	in	the	democratic	process,	and	
one	 of	 the	 elements	 through	 which	 their	 citizenship	 may	 be	 enacted	 (Dahlgren,	 2011;	
Sveningsson,	2015).	This	ideal	is	considered	as	one	of	the	pre-requisites	of	citizenship	insofar	
as	 the	 formation	 of	 political	 knowledge	 and	 opinions	 by	 citizens	 supports	 their	 political	
participation,	and	serves	to	hold	the	political	sphere	and	its	decisions	to	account	(Gurevitch	
et	 al.,	 1991,	 p.195).	 The	 media’s	 potential	 to	 fulfil	 citizens’	 informational	 needs	 is	 thus	
considered	 as	 an	 important	 –	 if	 not	 essential	 -	 contributor	 to	 contemporary	 democratic	
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legitimation,	a	rationale	on	which	the	funding	of	public	service	broadcasting	has	been	based	
in	numerous	established	democracies.	
	
Over	 recent	 decades,	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 informed	 citizen	 has	 been	 of	 particular	 concern	 in	
western	 liberal	 democracies	 where	 political	 indicators	 and	 research	 suggest	 that,	 despite	
increased	availability	and	relative	ease	of	access	to	news	and	informational	resources,	levels	
of	 civic	 and	 political	 engagement	 are,	 and/or	 remain,	 low	 and	 particularly	 so	 among	 the	
younger	demographic	 (Putnam,	1995;	Buckingham,	1999;	Wilkins,	2000;	Loader,	2007).	This	
has	challenged	the	normative	framing	of	news	media	and	public	communication	as	important	
supporters	of	the	relationship	between	citizens	and	the	political	sphere	in	a	democracy,	and	
arguably	 signalled	 a	 crisis	 in	 democratic	 legitimation	 (e.g.	 Entman,	 1989;	 Blumler	 and	
Gurevitch,	1995;	Wolfe,	2006).	
	
The	concept	of	the	informed	citizen	represents	a	commonly	held,	if	idealised,	notion	of	what	
democratic	 citizenship	 should	 entail,	 but	 questions	 over	 its	 translation	 into	 practice	 have	
generated	wide-ranging	debate.	In	this	regard,	part	of	the	argument	has	questioned	media’s	
ability	to	adequately	fulfil	its	informational	role	and	to	support	citizens’	political	engagement.	
The	commercial	prerogatives	under	which	contemporary	mass	media	predominantly	operate	
have	often	been	perceived	as	particularly	problematic,	with	pressure	on	media	organisations	
to	 generate	 revenue	 serving	 to	 limit	 citizens’	 access	 to	 –	 and	 critical	 engagement	 with	 –	
politically	 relevant	 information.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 view	 frequently	 cite	 the	proliferation	of	
entertainment-led	 content,	 as	 supporting	 their	 position.	 Habermas’	 argument	 about	 the	
decline	of	the	public	sphere	(1989	[1962];	see	Dahlgren,	1995	for	a	comprehensive	analysis)	is	
one	of	the	most	notable	contributions	to	this	area	of	debate.	In	a	similar	vein,	Putnam	(1995)	
contends	that,	on	a	more	fundamental	level,	mass	media’s	entertainment	values	erode	social	
capital	and	civil	society	by	contributing	to	individualisation	-	and	atomisation	-	thus	reducing	
the	 effort,	 time	 and	 interest	 that	 citizens	may	 be	 inclined	 to	 invest	 in	 engaging	with	 their	
communities	 and	 the	 wider	 public	 world.	 Another	 dimension	 of	 the	 debate	 surrounding	
media’s	 support	 of	 civic	 knowledge	 more	 specifically	 questions	 the	 role	 played	 by	 news	
media.	 Increasing	 levels	 of	 personalisation,	 tabloidization	 and	 drama-oriented	 coverage	 of	
politics	 have	 raised	 numerous	 concerns	 about	 the	 civic	 value	 of	 contemporary	 news	 and	
journalistic	 practices	 (e.g.	 Cappella	 and	 Jamieson	 1997;	 Bennett,	 2008).	 Although	 it	 is	
frequently	 argued	 that	 the	 boundary	 between	 factual	 and	 entertainment-led	 content	 has	
become	 increasingly	 indistinct	 	 (Delli	 Carpini	 and	 Williams,	 2001;	 Hill,	 2007),	 some	
commentators	have	contended	 	 that	 this	move	 towards	 ‘softer	news’	 (as	opposed	 to	 ‘hard	
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news’	or	hard	facts)	is	a	positive	development	as	the	assimilation	of	journalistic	quality	with	
notions	of	objectivity	and	a	level	of	uninvolved	formality	in	news	delivery	is	misguided,	in	that	
it	 fails	 to	adequately	engage	 the	majority	of	citizens	on	an	emotional	 level	and	 to	 relate	 to	
their	personal	experiences	and	concerns	(e.g.	Langer,	1998;	Macdonald,	2000;	Bas	and	Grabe,	
2013).	
	
A	different	strand	of	 this	debate	has	concentrated	 less	on	media’s	shortcomings,	strengths,	
and	potential,	and	 instead	focused	on	the	notion	of	the	 informed	citizen	per	se,	deeming	 it	
unrealistic	 in	 its	 expectations	 on	 citizens	 to	 be	 adequately	 informed	 about	 -	 and	 to	 fully	
understand	 –	 social	 and	 political	 developments.	 This	 ideal	 has	 been	 considered	 as	 being	
extremely	difficult	–	if	not	impossible	–	for	the	majority	of	members	of	a	society	to	attain	as	it	
necessitates	an	 investment	of	 time,	effort,	 cognitive	 resources	and	depth	of	understanding	
that	 only	 a	 minority	 of	 citizens	 can	 realistically	 achieve.	 A	 number	 of	 findings	 in	 political	
science,	 political	 communication	 and	 political	 psychology	 support	 this	 contention,	
highlighting	important	gaps	in	knowledge	and	differences	in	citizens’	ability	to	follow	complex	
public	 issues	(Sniderman	et	al.,	1991;	Galston,	2001;	Bas	and	Grabe,	2013)	which	cannot	be	
easily	 addressed.	 Equally,	 citizens	 may	 lack	 the	 will	 or	 motivation	 to	 be	 informed,	 invest	
minimal	effort	in	processing	information	(Hewstone	and	Macrae,	1994),	or	alternatively	may	
process	and	interpret	information	relevant	to	their	civic	lives	in	ways	that	bear	little	relation	
to	 the	purported	aim	of	news,	 and	other	 informational,	 sources	 (e.g.	Neuman	et	 al.,	 1992;	
Graber	1988	and	2012).	A	notable	contribution	to	this	area	of	debate	consists	of	Schudson’s	
work	(1998)	on	the	subject,	in	the	context	of	the	United	States.	Schudson	explores	the	views	
discussed	 above	 from	 a	 historical	 perspective,	 and	 develops	 them	 in	 a	 novel	 direction	 by	
arguing	that	the	rationalised	ideal	of	the	informed	citizen	not	only	bears	little	resemblance	to	
reality,	but	that	this	notion,	 its	prevalence	in	contemporary	perspectives	on	citizenship,	and	
the	expectations	it	puts	on	citizens,	have	in	fact	been	damaging	to	civic	life	in	the	second	half	
of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 The	 distance	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	 political	 sphere	 is,	 in	 this	
argument,	 actively	 reinforced	 if	 not	 actually	 created	by	 the	perpetuation	of	 this	 unrealistic	
ideal,	undermining	their	everyday	involvement	and	emotional	investment	in	the	public	arena.	
However,	others	have	argued	that,	although	it	is	an	insufficient	and	often	unfulfilled	element	
of	 citizenship,	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 informed	 citizen	 should	 nevertheless	 continue	 to	 be	
considered	as	one	of	its	most	important	and	necessary	components	(Delli	Carpini,	2000).	
	
Questions	about	media’s	 role	 in	 citizens’	political	 socialisation	continue	 to	be	debated,	and	
different	perspectives	are	offered	on	these	 issues.	However,	a	crucial	development	 in	these	
116	
	
debates	 has	 been	 a	 progressive	 shift	 toward	 more	 contextualised	 assessments.	 One	
dimension	of	this	evolution	has	consisted	of	a	move	away	from	views	that	ascribe	media	too	
much	influence	on	levels	of	civic	and	political	 involvement	(what	Buckingham	(1999)	frames	
as	overly	functionalist	perspectives	on	media’s	role),	which	fail	to	take	into	account	individual	
backgrounds,	everyday	experiences	and	contexts	as	crucial	contributors	to	informing	citizens	
about	 their	 shared	 public	 realm.	 A	 second	 dimension	 has	 consisted	 of	 an	 increasing	
acknowledgement	 in	 these	 debates	 of	 the	 particular	 importance	 of	 the	 political	 context	 in	
shaping	 citizens’	 orientation	 and	 interest	 in	 relation	 to	 public	 and	 political	matters,	 as	 this	
involvement	 is	 strongly	 correlated	 with	 citizens’	 sense	 of	 influence	 over	 such	 matters.	
Citizens’	knowledge	of	their	socio-political	world,	as	informed	by	their	direct	experience	and	
individual	contexts,	as	well	as	by	the	media,	may	have	progressively	led	to	a	withdrawal	and	
disconnection	 from	 the	 political	 sphere	 if	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	 consistently	 fail	 to	 represent	
opinions	and	voices	of	the	citizenry	or	to	remain	unresponsive	to	public	expectations.		
	
Particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 established	 Western	 democratic	 systems,	 this	 alternative	
perspective	points	to	a	potential	widening	gap	between	the	citizenry	of	these	states,	and	the	
political	 figures	and	 institutions	who	claim	 to	 represent	 them.	 In	other	words,	 citizens	may	
well	 consider	 that	 being	 politically	 informed	 is	 important,	 and	 they	 may	 invest	 time	 and	
resources	in	fulfilling	this	role,	but	their	views	might	differ	in	terms	of	the	issues	that	require	
the	greatest	degree	of	attention,	and	of	the	need	to	translate	their	political	knowledge	into	
participation	in	elections	or	institutional	politics.	Citizens’	sense	of	political	efficacy,	and	their	
orientations	towards	existing	democratic	structures,	may	consequently	be	eroded.	Bennett	et	
al.	(2009)	argue	in	this	regard	that	the	way	in	which	citizens	themselves	perceive	the	role	of	
news	 media	 in	 their	 relation	 to	 civic	 and	 political	 involvement	 is	 undergoing	 considerable	
changes,	 as	 the	 notion	 of	 political	 participation	 through	 existing	 electoral	 mechanisms	 is	
being	 steadily	undermined,	 and	with	 it	 the	 turn	 to	 traditional	 news	media	 sources	 to	 keep	
informed	and	form	an	opinion	about	the	sphere	of	institutional	politics.	
	
As	Buckingham	(1999)	contends,	debates	on	the	notion	of	the	informed	citizen	have	evolved	
to	 progressively	 incorporate	 more	 nuanced	 and	 contextualised	 perspectives.	 These	 have	
stressed	 in	 particular	 the	 need	 to	 approach	 discussion	 on	 the	 issue	 through	 alternative	
vantage	points	that	seek	to	query	the	very	definitions	of	news	media,	of	politically-relevant	
information,	and	of	politics	and	democracy	per	 se	 (e.g.	Delli	Carpini,	2000).	Numerous	calls	
have	been	made	(e.g.	Buckingham,	1999,	Schudson,	2008)	in	this	regard	for	a	more	culturalist	
(and	ritual)	 framing	of	news	media	and	political	communication	that	takes	 into	account	the	
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many	ways	 in	which	media	can	 inform	an	understanding	of	citizenship,	of	 citizens’	 role	 in	 -	
and	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 -	 a	 given	 social	 and	 political	 order,	 beyond	 the	 news	 and	
information	that	it	transmits:	
	
Rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 measure	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 news	 in	 communicating	 political	
information,	 we	 should	 be	 asking	 how	 it	 enables	 viewers	 to	 construct	 and	 define	 their	
relationship	with	the	public	sphere.	How	do	news	programmes	`position’	viewers	 in	relation	
to	the	social	order.	For	example,	in	relation	to	the	sources	of	power	in	society,	or	in	relation	to	
particular	social	groupings?	How	do	they	enable	viewers	to	conceive	of	the	relations	between	
the	 `personal’	 and	 the	 `political’?	 How	 do	 they	 invite	 viewers	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 wider	
national	and	international	arena,	and	to	make	connections	with	their	own	direct	experience?	
How,	ultimately,	do	they	establish	what	it	means	to	be	a	`citizen’?	(Buckingham,	1999,	p.175).	
	
However,	 whilst	 the	 parameters	 of	 these	 debates	 have	 shifted	 to	 incorporate	 a	 more	
culturalist	 perspective	 on	 politics,	 and	 on	 media’s	 role	 in	 political	 socialisation	 processes,	
empirical	approaches	to	research	in	the	field	have	not	necessarily	followed	suit.	As	Coleman	
et	al.	(2012)	highlight,	the	value	of	these	debates	continues	to	be	problematised	by	the	fact	
that	 citizens’	own	views	on	what	 role	news	and	media	ought	 to	perform	 is	 rarely	 assessed	
(p.38).	As	their	findings	suggest,	citizens	have	numerous	and	at	times	diverging	expectations	
of	news	media,	and	one	of	 these	 is	 that	news	media	should	serve	 to	support	 them	 in	 their	
civic	 lives	 (p.49).	 In	a	different	context,	empirical	enquiry	 into	these	 issues	by	Hagen	 (1994)	
highlights	how	television	viewers	 in	Norway,	whilst	attributing	a	sense	of	civic	duty	to	their	
news	viewing	practices,	also	experience	a	large	degree	of	ambivalence	in	seeking	to	fulfil	this	
duty.	For	instance,	this	research	reveals	that,	in	this	context,	citizens	internalised	an	ideal	of	
informed	citizenship	from	which	their	actual	viewing	experience	sharply	differed,	 leading	to	
an	ambivalence	that	Hagen	considers	as	characteristic	of	the	news	viewing	experience.		
	
It	 is	 the	 incorporation	of	 citizens’	perspectives	 that	perhaps	best	 renders	 the	complexity	of	
media’s	 role	 in	 citizens’	 orientation	 to	 their	 shared	 public	 realm.	 In	 assessing	 the	 role	 of	
media	as	informational	resource	in	the	new	political	context	after	the	revolution	in	Tunisia,	I	
will	 take	 into	 account	 the	 different	 points	 raised	 in	 the	 discussion	 above,	 starting	 from	
respondents’	own	perspectives	on	what	it	means	to	be	informed.	I	then	examine	their	media	
and	 news	 media	 habits	 in	 detail,	 and	 assess	 the	 range	 of	 issues	 that	 emerge	 from	
interviewees’	 accounts	 of	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 different	 informational	 resources	 in	 their	
everyday	lives,	and	what	motivates	their	choices.	
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1.2. Civic	and	mediated	engagement	after	the	revolution	
	
During	 several	 visits	 to	 Tunisia	 in	 2012,	 I	 was	 always	 struck	 by	 how	 politicised	 everyday	
interactions	were	 in	ordinary	spaces	of	encounters	between	citizens,	and	the	pervasiveness	
of	 public	 engagement	 and	 political	 talk.	 On	 public	 transport,	 at	 queues	 in	 municipal	
administrations,	or	at	the	corner	shop,	simple	observations	about	bus	delays,	food	prices,	or	
the	 accumulation	 of	 rubbish	 on	 the	 streets,	 provided	 triggers	 for	 opinion	 expression	 that	
ranged	from	fiscal	policies	to	gossip	about	politicians.	After	being	silent	for	so	long,	Tunisians	
were	 eager	 to	 exchange	 information	 and	 perspectives	 about	 their	 shared	 public	 realm,	 to	
occupy	the	previously	silenced	public	space	with	their	voices,	and	to	perform	their	new	civic	
roles,	 thereby	 continuously	 reiterating	 the	 new	 political	 state	 of	 affairs.	 The	 revolution	
engendered	 a	 profound	 change	 in	 citizens’	 perspective	 of	 their	 role,	 and	 of	 the	 political	
weight	they	now	carried	as	individuals,	during	this	initial	phase	of	the	democratic	transition.	
In	this	emergent,	popular,	view,	being	a	knowledgeable	and	informed	citizen	was	intrinsic	to	
the	exercise	of	their	new	freedoms.		
	
Interview	 accounts	 indicated	 that,	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 participants	 in	 this	 study,	 being	
informed	and	gaining	knowledge	about	public	and	political	matters,	was	closely	associated	to	
the	fulfilment	of	a	number	of	civic	and	political	roles.	A	recurrent	theme	that	emerged	in	this	
regard,	was	 that	being	 informed	meant	discovering	new	 civic	 freedoms	 formerly	denied	 to	
them,	 and	performing	new	political	 identities	 that	marked	 a	 clear	 break	with	 the	past.	 For	
instance,	Ahmed	mentioned	 in	 this	 respect	 that,	 for	him,	gaining	knowledge	about	political	
developments	was	important	to	ensure	that	history	would	not	repeat	itself	and	that	a	return	
to	 previous	 political	 practices	 and	 abuses	 of	 power	 could	 be	 averted.	 Similarly,	 in	 several	
respondents’	accounts,	their	eagerness	to	acquire	and	exchange	news	and	information	about	
political	 developments	 in	 Tunisia	 starkly	 contrasted	 with	 their	 sense	 of	 civic	 and	 political	
disconnection	 in	 the	 past.	 Reflecting	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 their	 revived	 interest	 in	 current	
affairs,	 references	 to	 the	 enforced	disengagement	 and	 restricted	 information	 access	 of	 the	
past	were	often	drawn	on,	 and	 contrasted	with	a	pervasive	desire	 for	 knowledge	after	 the	
revolution.	Male	respondents	who	expressed	a	keen	interest	in	sports	and	football	in	the	past	
also	pointed	out	that	talk	about	politics	had	now	replaced	talk	about	football.	Such	was	the	
case	for	Yassine	and	Rafik	 for	example,	who	both	referred	to	politics	as	“the	new	football”,	
thereby	also	suggesting	the	popularity	of	political	subject	matters	and	how	being	knowledge	
about	them	was	no	longer	restricted	to	a	limited	elite.	
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Other	 participants	 expressed	more	directly	 a	 link	 between	being	 politically	 informed	 and	 a	
new	sense	of	civic	identity.	For	instance,	Narjes	associated	the	formation	of	this	knowledge	to	
a	sense	of	duty	that	bound	her	to	others.	She	explained	that	it	mattered	to	know	about	social	
and	political	issues	in	the	country	because	she	considered	them	as	common	to	all	citizens,	as	
what	might	affect	her	neighbour	today	may	have	an	impact	on	her	own	life	tomorrow;	thus	it	
could	 not	 simply	 be	 ignored.	 Against	 this	 position,	 she	 contrasted	 the	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	
common	 affairs	 displayed	 by	 a	 few	 people	 in	 her	 social	 circle,	 deeming	 it	 to	 be	 a	
manifestation	of	egocentricity	and	selfishness.	Other	 interviewees	also	made	an	explicit	 link	
between	knowledge	and	a	sense	of	civic	and	political	efficacy.	Youssef,	for	example,	believed	
that	 people	 followed	 the	 news	 so	 closely	 because	 they	 “now	 [had]	 hope”,	 which	 he	
associated	with	change.	Likewise,	Hanen,	who	was	previously	uninterested	in	Tunisian	news,	
considered	that	following	news	on	national	television	was,	since	the	revolution,	no	longer	an	
activity	that	had	“no	point”.	The	revolution	proved	to	citizens	that	their	collective	will	could	
engender	 profound	 political	 change.	 Thus	 the	 subsequent	 period	 was	 marked	 by	 a	 more	
heightened	engagement	as	 citizens’	 influence	on	different	outcomes	 felt	within	 their	 reach	
(this	point	is	developed	further	in	Chapter	5).		
	
After	decades	of	enforced	disengagement,	 citizens	were	able	 to	 turn	 to	 the	national	public	
sphere	as	a	“place	 for	sense-making”	 (Hagen,	1997,	p.413).	Tunisian	media	played	a	crucial	
role	in	supporting	civic	knowledge	and	opinion	formation.	Following	news	and	current	affairs	
provided	a	way	to	understand	a	rapidly	changing	environment,	but	also	a	means	of	grasping	a	
particularly	 complex	 political	 reality	 that	 was,	 at	 times,	 difficult	 to	 read.	 The	 traditional	
national	media	 landscape,	 no	 longer	 serving	 as	 voice	 for	 the	 regime,	 sought	 to	 play	 a	 new	
role	in	the	emerging	democratic	context.	Broadcast	media	content,	in	particular,	catered	for	
the	 need	 for	 citizens	 to	 reconnect	 with	 the	 national	 public	 space	 and	 discourse.	 Evening	
schedules	on	public	as	well	as	private	Tunisian	television	channels	were	dominated	by	news	
and	current	affairs	programming,	as	well	as	political	debates	and	talk	shows.	During	my	visit	
to	Tunisia	in	the	autumn	of	2012,	it	was	striking	that	such	debates	were	hosted	on	the	leading	
television	 channels	 on	 a	 near-daily	 basis.	 Similarly,	 radio	 prime	 time	 programmes	 on	 the	
leading	 stations	 predominantly	 focused	 on	 news	 and	 current	 affairs.	 The	 radical	 change	 in	
media	 content,	 in	 turn,	 also	 played	 a	 role	 in	 attracting	more	 audiences	 and	 sustaining	 an	
interest	 in	 news	 and	 public	 affairs.	 The	 discovery	 of	 new	 freedoms	 of	 expression	 was	
accompanied	 by	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 new	 media	 scene,	 more	 news	 outlets,	 an	 increased	
proximity	 in	programming	choices	 to	social	and	political	 issues	 that	citizens	could	 relate	 to,	
and	the	introduction	to	new	public	figures	that	included	political	leaders,	intellectual	figures	
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and	academics,	civil	society	activists,	as	well	as	talk	show	hosts	and	journalists	now	openly	–	
and	often	fervently	-	expressing	their	political	opinions.		
	
Accordingly,	 participants’	 media	 habits	 became	 more	 centred	 around	 the	 consumption	 of	
Tunisian	 news	media	 content	 than	was	 the	 case	 prior	 to	 the	 revolution.	 In	 fact,	 accessing	
news	 and	 information	 relating	 to	 national	 matters	 formed	 a	 key	 part	 in	 all	 of	 the	
respondents’	 everyday	 lives.	 Those	whose	 attention	was	 previously	 turned	 to	 international	
media	 now	 focused	 on	 national	 matters	 instead.	 For	 example,	 Habib,	 who	 previously	
recounted	how	he	had	followed	the	first	Gulf	war	in	detail	on	satellite	television,	said	that	he	
struggled	to	understand	the	developments	of	the	Syrian	conflict	as	he	spent	most	of	his	time	
following	news	in	Tunisia	instead.	Similarly,	Sonia’s	attention	was	now	more	focused	on	the	
new	programming	 offered	 by	 Tunisian	 channels.	 This	 change	 reflected	 broader	 trends	 at	 a	
national	level,	and	translated	into	a	decline	in	viewing	figures	for	satellite	television	channels	
and	a	corresponding	increase	in	numbers	watching	national	broadcasters.	Notably,	audience	
figures	 for	 satellite	network	Al	 Jazeera	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Arab	uprisings	captured	 this	
tendency.	 The	 broadcaster’s	 role	 during	 the	 revolutions	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 Egypt	 had	 to	 some	
extent,	 somewhat	 paradoxically,	 undermined	 its	 subsequent	 position	 as	 audiences	 sought	
local	coverage	of	events	instead	(The	Economist,	2013).	Equally,	most	other	participants,	who	
had	previously	been	forced	into	disengagement	from	national	news,	and	who	had	expressed	
no	particular	 interest	 in	 following	 international	 events	 in	 the	past,	were	now	articulating	 a	
keen	 interest	 in	 local	and	national	news	and	politics.	When	the	 interviews	were	conducted,	
the	 primary	 motivation	 for	 the	 participants’	 turn	 to	 Tunisian	 media	 content	 (e.g.	 Tunisian	
television	channels,	radio	stations,	websites	relating	to	Tunisian	subject	matters)	was	to	find	
out	 about	 news	 in	 the	 country,	 and	 to	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	 public	 and	 political	
matters.	 Respondents	 also	 used	 media	 to	 seek	 entertainment,	 watch	 drama	 series	 or	
documentaries,	 listen	 to	music	 or	 hear	 about	 celebrities,	 for	 example.	 However,	 news	 and	
current	affairs	dominated	their	descriptions	of	their	national	media	viewing	habits.	
	
The	shift	 in	civic	perspectives	that	accompanied	the	revolution	was	paralleled,	as	evidenced	
in	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 in	 this	 chapter,	 with	 radical	 changes	 in	 media	 habits	 for	 the	
participants	 in	this	study.	Social	media	became	closely	associated	with	the	narrative	of	civic	
empowerment.	 Facebook,	 in	 particular,	 became	 framed	 as	 a	 communicative	 space	 where	
citizens	were	able	 to	 transmit	 information	on	 their	own	terms,	and	 to	share	expressions	of	
civic	 solidarity	 against	 an	 abusive	 regime.	 In	 this	 sense,	 using	 the	 platform	 to	 access	
information	about	the	wider	public	world	was	also	a	way	for	the	participants	to	have	direct	
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access	 to	 other	 citizens,	 and	 to	what	 seemed	 to	matter	 collectively	 to	 Tunisians	who	 used	
social	media.	But	if	social	media	played	an	important	role	for	the	respondents	in	supporting	
this	reconnection	during	the	revolution,	its	role	after	the	revolution	was	less	clearly	defined.	
The	opening	of	 the	national	 traditional	media	 landscape	and	the	multiplication	of	diverging	
mediated	online	and	offline	voices	vying	for	public	attention	after	the	revolution,	gave	rise	to	
a	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 authority	 of	 different	 information	 sources	 and	
interpretations,	and	a	reappraisal	of	the	media	hierarchies	that	accompanied	the	revolution.	
In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 particularly	 important	 to	 determine	 what	 place	 interviewees	 gave	 to	
different	media	as	sources	of	public	knowledge,	and	what	these	orientations	to	various	media	
forms	and	sources	were	motivated	by.		
	
	
2. Everyday	media	practices	and	the	place	of	social	media		
	
2.1. Daily	media	habits	
	
So	what	media	did	 these	respondents	 turn	 to	 in	order	 to	ensure	 they	were	 informed?	As	a	
way	 into	this	discussion,	 I	will	give	an	overview	of	 the	amount	of	 time	that	different	media	
forms	occupied	in	their	daily	lives.	Whilst	media	consumption	in	terms	of	time	length	is	not,	
per	 se,	 necessarily	 reflective	 of	 different	 media’s	 hierarchical	 superiority,	 it	 nevertheless	
provides	a	useful	initial	insight	into	media	habits	and	a	general	indicator	of	significant	trends.	
This	initial	analysis	will	then	be	complemented	by	an	assessment	of	respondents’	reflections	
on	these	choices	and	motivations	underlying	these	media	consumption	habits.	
	
The	 graph	 included	 below	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 average	 time	 that	 different	 media	
occupied	 in	 participants’	 daily	 lives.	 The	 data	 on	 which	 the	 graph	 is	 based	 was	 collected	
during	the	interviews	conducted	in	October	2012	by	asking	the	study	participants	to	provide	
a	 specific	 account	 of	 their	 daily	 media	 routines	 and	 the	 time	 they	 typically	 spent	 with	
different	media	forms.	Where	weekday	and	weekend	routines	differed,	average	daily	values	
were	used.	
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GRAPH	1:	Participants’	average	daily	media	time	(Oct/Nov.	2012)	
	
The	 participants	were	 asked	 to	 differentiate	 between	 the	 time	 they	 spent	 online	 on	 social	
networking	sites	and	on	other	websites,	as	social	media	seemed	to	be	particularly	central	to	
online	routines.	A	few	other	points	need	to	be	elucidated	in	relation	to	the	data	represented	
above.	The	chart	is	not	necessarily	an	accurate	representation	of	participants’	media	habits,	
but	rather	a	representation	of	their	own	description	and	reflection	about	the	time	different	
media	forms	occupied	in	their	daily	lives	in	the	autumn	of	2012.	Secondly,	the	data	is	specific	
to	the	sample	selected	for	this	study.	As	detailed	in	chapter	2,	participants	were	selected	on	
the	basis	of	having	access	 to,	and	making	use	of,	an	 Internet	connection	 in	 their	daily	 lives.	
The	sample	excludes	any	participants	who	do	not	use	the	Internet.		
	
It	 is	also	 important	 to	clarify	at	 this	 stage	 that	 the	data	collected	 refers	 to	 time	 spent	with	
different	 media	 for	 private,	 as	 opposed	 to	 professional,	 reasons.	 Time	 spent	 online	 for	
professional	reasons	was	thus	excluded	from	this	analysis.	There	were	a	few	instances	where	
the	distinction	was	more	difficult	to	draw	as	some	respondents	used	the	Internet	for	private	
purposes	at	work.	For	example,	Asma,	who	worked	in	a	public	service	administration,	made	
use	of	 the	 Internet	connection	at	work	as	she	did	not	have	one	at	home	and	spent	several	
hours	 per	 day	 online	 on	 her	 personal	 Facebook	 account.	 Another	 participant,	 Narjes	 was	
online	all	day	as	she	needed	the	Internet	for	her	research	work,	and	she	occasionally	used	it	
for	personal	purposes	whenever	she	took	short	breaks	throughout	her	working	day.	But	there	
were	also	instances	where	participants	checked	the	news	online	on	their	computers	at	work	
during	their	breaks.	As	Boczkowski	(2010)	highlights,	the	distinction	between	home	and	work	
environments,	 on	 which	 news	 consumption	 research	 was	 based	 in	 the	 past,	 is	 difficult	 to	
sustain	in	regards	to	contemporary	media	routines.	The	distinction	was	discussed	during	the	
interviews	 and,	 in	 such	 cases,	 respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 estimate	 the	 average	 time	 they	
spent	in	total	online	for	non-professional	reasons.		
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Time	 spent	 with	 media	 was	 not	 necessarily	 cumulative,	 as	 accounts	 of	 media	 use	 often	
highlighted	that	several	media	forms	were	being	used	simultaneously.	Younger	respondents	in	
particular	 were	 accustomed	 to	 simultaneously	 browsing	 the	 Internet	 or	 spending	 time	 on	
Facebook	whilst	watching	television	or	listening	to	the	radio	whereas,	for	older	respondents,	
these	 activities	were	more	 clearly	 delineated.	 Interview	 accounts	 also	 revealed	 that	media	
use	was	predominantly	linked	to	indoor	and	static	–	rather	than	mobile	-	consumption	habits,	
with	the	exception	of	radio,	which	was	accessed	both	at	home	and	 in	vehicles.	3G	networks	
were	relatively	new	and	smartphone	penetration	still	comparatively	low	in	the	country	at	the	
time,	which	translated	into	Internet	access	tending	to	be	focused	around	the	home,	at	work,	
in	Internet	cafés	as	well	as	some	cafés	who	had	wireless	networks	available	to	customers.		
	
As	 the	 chart	 clearly	 shows,	 time	 spent	 using	 social	media	was	 on	 average	 far	 greater	 than	
time	spent	accessing	 the	 Internet	generally,	as	well	as	 in	comparison	 to	other	media	 forms.	
Overall,	 participants	 spent	 eighty	 per	 cent	 of	 their	 total	 Internet	 time	 using	 some	 form	 of	
social	media.	Within	traditional	media	habits	(TV,	radio,	print),	time	spent	watching	television	
was	 highest	 according	 to	 interviewees’	 accounts,	 followed	 by	 time	 spent	 listening	 to	 the	
radio,	and	finally	reading	print	media.		
	
Online,	Facebook	was	referred	to	as	the	main	social	media	platform	used	by	participants.	In	
the	 autumn	 of	 2012,	 all	 respondents	 had	 accounts	 set	 up	 on	 this	 social	 media	 platform,	
although	 one	 of	 them	 never	 used	 it.	 Additionally,	 six	 out	 of	 the	 thirty	 participants	 in	 the	
sample	also	had	Twitter	accounts.	Of	 these,	 two	never	used	 it,	 two	used	 it	very	 rarely,	and	
two	 used	 it	 on	 a	more	 regular	 basis.	 All	 concurred	 in	 saying	 that	 Facebook	 was	 the	main	
platform	used	 in	 Tunisia	 at	 the	 time,	whereas	 Twitter	was	 less	 popular	 and	 primarily	 used	
within	a	restricted	circle	of	cyber-activists,	and	by	some	media	and	political	figures.	The	four	
participants	who	did	not	make	much	use	of	their	Twitter	accounts	explained	that	they	“didn’t	
get	 their	 head	 around	 it”	 and	 “didn’t	 get	 into	 it”	 as	most	 of	 their	 friends	were	 not	 on	 the	
platform.	 All	 participants	 watched	 television70	 to	 some	 extent,	 although	 viewing	 habits	
differed	substantially.		
	
																																																						
70	Here	referring	to	watching	live	television	broadcasts	on	a	television	set	or	on	a	computer	through	online	streaming,	as	
opposed	to	on-demand	and	catch-up	television	viewing.	Nearly	all	research	participants	watched	live	television	on	a	TV	set,	
except	one	student	watching	it	online.	No	formal	catch-up	or	on-demand	television	service	existed	in	Tunisia	in	2012.	However,	
as	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter,	many	television	programmes	were	available	online,	either	formally	made	
available	by	broadcasters,	or	informally	copied	to	different	online	websites.	Key	excerpts	from	television	programmes	were	also	
circulated	across	Tunisian	social	media	networks	on	a	large	scale.	These	trends	are	discussed	in	further	detail	under	the	section	
on	social	media	practices	in	this	chapter.	
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Six	respondents	said	they	watched	television	for	twenty	minutes	or	less	on	average	per	day,	
due	to	limited	access,	 lack	of	 interest,	 lack	of	time	or	a	combination	of	these	factors.	Based	
on	 their	accounts,	half	of	 the	participants	 in	 this	 sample	watched	 television	between	 thirty	
and	ninety	minutes	 per	 day.	 Television	 viewing	was	mostly	 associated	with	 following	news	
and	political	debates	and	primarily	viewed	in	the	evening.	By	comparison,	radio	featured	less	
significantly	in	their	media	practices.	Three	interviewees	said	they	never	listened	to	the	radio,	
and	 approximately	 two	 thirds	 listened	 to	 radio	 stations	 for	 less	 than	 an	 hour	 per	 day	 (of	
which	eleven	stated	that	they	listened	for	less	than	twenty	minutes).	Radio	was	associated	to	
some	extent	with	 the	dissemination	of	news,	as	well	as	 to	 listening	 to	music.	 It	 featured	 in	
respondents’	 accounts	 as	 a	 less	 targeted	 activity	 that	 acted	 as	 an	 accompaniment	 to	 daily	
activities.	 Print	 media,	 and	 newspapers	 in	 particular,	 were	 never	 read	 by	 one	 third	 of	
participants,	and	six	of	 them	said	 they	only	had	a	 look	at	 them	occasionally,	 for	example	 if	
they	happened	to	come	across	a	paper	in	a	café,	or	in	the	workplace.	
	
Additionally,	the	same	data,	aggregated	by	age	group,	also	highlights	interesting	trends	as	the	
second	chart	(below)	indicates.	The	majority	of	participants	in	this	study	are	part	of	the	first	
two	age	groups:	nine	are	under	the	age	of	25	years	old	(the	youngest	was	19	years	old	when	
interviews	were	 first	 conducted),	and	12	between	25	and	34	years	old,	whereas	only	 three	
participants	make	up	the	third	age	group	(35-44),	four	are	in	the	fourth	age	group	(45-54)	and	
only	 two	 are	 in	 the	 last	 group	 (over	 54).	 Findings	 relating	 to	 the	 older	 age	 categories	 thus	
need	to	be	interpreted	with	more	caution.		
	 	
	
GRAPH	2:	Participants’	average	daily	media	time,	by	age	category	(Oct/Nov.	2012)	
	
Overall,	the	time	spent	with	media	was	highest	for	respondents	under	the	age	of	24	and	over	
the	age	of	55.	Respondents	 falling	between	 these	age	groups,	particularly	 those	with	more	
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family	 and	work	 commitments,	 spent	 less	 time	with	media	 in	 general.	As	 Sarra	 -	who	had	
recently	become	a	mother	at	the	time	the	interviews	were	conducted	-	said	when	I	enquired	
about	her	media	habits:	“Well	there’s	always	the	‘before	the	baby’	and	the	‘after	the	baby’”	
to	 explain	 that	 having	 her	 child	 had	 transformed	 many	 aspects	 of	 her	 life,	 including	
significantly	 reducing	 her	 media	 consumption.	 Social	 media	 use	 dominated	 time	 spent	 by	
participants	online	for	most	age	groups,	and	the	younger	the	participants	the	more	time	they	
spent	on	social	media,	compared	to	other	sites	online.	Compared	to	other	media,	more	time	
was	spent	on	social	media	than	with	any	other	media	form	for	all	respodents	under	the	age	of	
45.	Participants	under	 the	age	of	24	 spent	more	 time	with	 social	media	 than	all	 traditional	
media	forms	together	(television	and	radio	and	print	media).	Social	media	platforms	appear	
to	occupy	what	is	arguably	an	exclusive	position	for	these	Tunisian	“digital	natives”.	Television	
time	was	highest	for	participants	over	the	age	55,	followed	by	those	under	24,	as	these	two	
groups	had	more	free	time	available.	Total	time	spent	by	all	participants	listening	to	the	radio	
made	up	approximately	a	third	of	time	spent	with	traditional	media	forms	in	total,	and	print	
media	accounted	for	only	about	a	tenth	of	this	time.	Respondents	in	the	‘over	55’	age	group	
were	the	most	inclined	to	spend	time	reading	print	media	(over	half	an	hour	on	average	per	
day),	whereas	participants	under	24	years	of	age	almost	never	read	any	printed	newspaper	or	
magazine.		
	
As	 highlighted	 by	 the	 charts	 discussed	 above,	 social	 media	 -	 and	 Facebook	 in	 particular	 -	
occupied	 a	 dominant	 part	 of	 the	 time	 that	 interviewees	 said	 they	 spent	 online	 (excluding	
Internet	 use	 for	 professional	 purposes)	 during	 this	 period	 and,	 for	 some	 of	 them,	 of	 their	
media	time	more	generally.	Ahmed	for	example	referred	to	only	two	websites	that	he	visited	
regularly	when	he	was	online,	and	said	that	“otherwise	it’s	all	Facebook”.	Salma	divided	her	
online	 time	 between	 watching	 Youtube	 clips	 and	 browsing	 Facebook.	 Farah	 said	 that	 she	
researched	 recipes	 on	 different	 websites	 online	 and	 read	 the	 website	 of	 one	 online	
newspaper,	 spending	 the	 rest	 of	 her	 time	 online	 on	 Facebook.	Meriem	 said	 that	 she	 only	
looked	 at	 sites	 other	 than	 Facebook	 if	 she	 “happen[ed]	 to	 have	 the	 time”.	 Sarra	 explained	
that	she	spent	most	of	her	online	time	on	the	platform	aside	from	time	spent	checking	her	
emails,	 and	 accessing	 maternity	 websites.	 Raouf,	 Asma	 and	 Youssef	 all	 said	 the	 platform	
accounted	 for	 almost	 all	 the	 time	 they	 spent	online.	Habib	even	 remarked	 that	he	used	 to	
look	at	other	websites,	but	that	he	no	longer	felt	that	he	needed	to	do	so,	as	he	considered	
that	 all	 the	 sources	 and	 information	 he	 wished	 to	 access	 were	 available	 to	 him	 through	
Facebook.	On	the	other	hand,	there	were	some	exceptions	to	this	trend,	in	particular	among	
older	participants.	For	example,	Ghada	–	 in	her	sixties	–	started	using	the	platform	in	2012,	
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but	she	continued	to	dedicate	most	of	her	time	online	to	reading	a	number	of	online	news	
websites	 that	 friends	 and	 family	 members	 recommended	 to	 her.	 Among	 other	 sites	 most	
frequently	 cited	 by	 respondents	 were	 blogs	 and	 online	 news	 sites	 such	 as	 Nawaat,	
Businessnews,	Webmanager,	Tuniscope,	Attounsia	and	Babnet,	El	Jerida	and	Tanitpress,	all	of	
which	were	 Tunisian	websites.	 As	 these	 findings	 suggest,	 Facebook	 continued	 to	 occupy	 a	
central	 (but	 not	 exclusive)	 role	 in	 the	 everyday,	 post-revolutionary,	 media	 habits	 of	 the	
majority	of	the	research	participants.		
	
It	 is	 also	worth	 noting	 that	 there	were	 no	 significant	 variations	 between	male	 and	 female	
participants	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 media	 consumption	 patterns	 (nor,	 more	 generally,	 in	 their	
involvement	in	politically	related	interactions	and	discussions	online	and	offline).	There	were	
differences	between	participants,	 but	 these	were	not	 correlated	 to	 their	 gender.	Male	 and	
female	participants	spent	relatively	similar	time	on	average	watching	television	for	example,	
listening	 to	 the	 radio,	or	using	 social	media	 in	 the	highly	politicised	post-revolution	period.	
Although	gender	differences	and	social	norms	relating	to	gender	roles	were	relatively	marked	
in	 Tunisian	 society	 compared	 to	Western	 contexts,	 these	were	 less	marked	 in	 comparison	
with	other	contexts	 in	the	Middle-East	and	North	Africa	region,	making	the	Tunisian	setting	
quite	exceptional	in	this	regard,	as	previously	detailed	in	Chapter	1.	
		
2.2. Why	social	media?	
	
There	were	a	number	of	reasons	why	social	media	occupied	such	an	 important	place	 in	the	
time	 that	 participants	 spent	 using	media	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives.	With	 the	 revolution	 social	
media	became	positioned,	in	the	view	of	the	majority	of	the	interviewees,	as	being	a	superior	
means	 of	 accessing	 information	 concerning	 the	 rapidly	 developing	 and	 relatively	 unstable	
political	situation.	The	participants’	primary	motivation	for	using	the	platform	was	to	access	
news	and	information,	against	which	updates	on	friends’	activities	and	access	to	other	type	of	
content	was	of	secondary	importance.	The	swift	access	to	information,	the	ability	to	connect	
and	 be	 instantly	 updated	 about	 the	 latest	 developments,	 was	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 this	
dynamic,	as	it	provided	users	with	a	sense	of	live	access	to	an	unfolding	reality.	For	instance,	
Habib	 differentiated	 between	 different	 media	 forms	 by	 stating	 that,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
watching	television	or	reading	newspapers	were	activities	mainly	aimed	at	finding	out	about	
various	 opinions	 and	 analyses	 of	 current	 events,	 whereas	 Facebook	 served	 as	 a	 means	 of	
receiving	 information	 ‘hot	off	 the	press’	 (The	 idiom	used	 in	Tunisian	was	 “esskhoun	ejjdid”	
which	 translates	 more	 literally	 as	 ”the	 new	 and	 hot”).	 Anis	 did	 not	 explicitly	 draw	 such	 a	
127	
	
distinction	but	similarly	favoured	using	social	media	platforms	Facebook	and	Twitter	for	the	
speed	at	which	information	could	be	disseminated:	
	
The	 difference	 the	 Internet	 is	 making	 is	 that	 when	 something	 happens,	 the	 information	 is	
circulated	very	quickly.	On	the	radio,	you	have	news	every	hour.	On	TV,	 it	may	be	every	six	
hours.	But	with	the	Internet,	it’s	all	the	time	and	as	soon	as	it	happens.	
	
As	 in	Western	contexts	(e.g.	Sveningsson,	2015),	the	rapidity	of	access	to	this	reality	as	and	
when	 it	 happened,	 was	 positively	 perceived.	 It	 was	 also	 notable	 that	 within	 the	 relatively	
unstable	 Tunisian	 setting	 analysed	 in	 this	 study,	 this	 emphasis	 on	 immediacy	 and	 speed	
contributed	not	only	to	a	sense	that	the	content	encountered	online	was	not	as	mediated	as	
that	in	other	media	formats,	but	also	it	provided	participants	with	a	sense	of	empowerment	
over	the	terms	of	exposure	to	this	reality.	Respondents	preferred	social	media,	contrasting	it	
with	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 mass	 media,	 whose	 terms	 they	 had	 to	 adjust	 to.	 For	 Meriem,	
following	 news	 on	 the	 platform	 was	 more	 convenient	 because	 she	 was	 able	 to	 have	 an	
overview	of	the	main	 issues	at	a	glance,	and	focus	 in	more	detail	on	what	 interested	her	 in	
particular,	rather	than	having	to	listen	to	the	entire	content	of	a	news	broadcast.	Hanen	and	
Sarra	compared	the	platform	to	print	newspapers	and	considered	they	were	quite	redundant	
in	 a	 time	 when	 they	 felt	 they	 were	 able	 to	 access	 all	 content	 through	 their	 Facebook	
accounts.	Salma	made	a	similar	remark	in	relation	to	television	content:	
	
Now	I	get	the	news	more	from	the	Internet	than	from	television.	I	mean	I	don’t	watch	much	
television,	 oooonce71	 in	 a	 while	 a	 programme	 or	 something,	 but	 even	 a	 programme	 if	 it’s	
important	and	all,	and	it	had	a	big	impact	on	people,	you’d	find	it	on	Facebook	and	everyone	
would	be	sharing	it	[…]	everyone	then	watches	that	programme,	but	it’s	not	like	they	all	sit	in	
front	of	the	TV	and	wait	to	see	what	comes	up,	you	understand?	
	
Salma’s	comment	further	illustrates	how	the	comparison	between	different	media	practices	
does	not	only	 relate	 to	a	matter	of	 access	 to	 information	or	media	 content,	but	 also	 to	 its	
social	 and	 political	 relevance	 to	 them	 as	 citizens.	 Social	media	 offered	more	 proximity,	 by	
allowing	 users	 to	 be	 informed	 about	 local	 issues	 for	 example,	 or	 trivial	 events	 relevant	 to	
participants	that	mass	media	did	not	prioritize	or	even	feature	on	its	news	agenda.	Although	
much	of	the	news	and	media	content	that	respondents	viewed	on	Facebook	was	produced	by	
a	minority	of	people,	everyone	could	easily	participate	 in	 its	distribution	(by	“sharing”),	and	
this	had	a	particular	resonance	for	them.		
																																																						
71	Emphasis	made	by	the	interviewee.		
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The	 platform	acquired	 an	 important	 role	 because	 it	 provided	 the	 study	 participants	with	 a	
sense	 of	 access	 to,	 and	 involvement	 with,	 a	 news	 agenda	 that	 mattered	 to	 citizens	
collectively,	 that	 they	 could	 contribute	 to	 producing	 and	 distributing.	 By	 comparison,	
television	 -	 as	 a	media	 form	 that	 allowed	 participants	 in	 this	 study	 to	 be	 informed	 and	 to	
develop	 their	 knowledge	 about	 current	 affairs	 and	politics	 -	 also	 played	 an	 important	 role,	
but	a	number	of	issues	were	raised	about	its	inconvenience	or	inadequacy.	This	was	due	to	a	
variety	 of	 reasons.	 Primarily,	 timing	 issues	 were	 cited.	 The	 fixed	 scheduling	 of	 the	 main	
national	news	programme	did	not	suit	the	routines	of	some	respondents,	or	they	expressed	a	
dislike	of	its	timing.	Interviewees	compared	television	to	the	Internet	as	a	means	of	accessing	
news	where	and	when	it	suited	them	best,	and	on	a	more	frequent	basis	throughout	the	day.	
Radio	was	also	 referred	 to	as	more	 convenient	 in	 this	 sense,	 as	 it	delivered	more	 frequent	
news	broadcasts	over	the	course	of	the	day.	Three	respondents	also	had	issues	with	the	level	
of	 formality	 of	 the	 public	 news	 broadcast	 on	 television.	Meriem,	 for	 example,	 expressed	 a	
particular	dislike	for	the	language	used	in	the	national	television	broadcast	as	it	was	delivered	
in	 classical	 Arabic,	 rather	 than	 Tunisian	 dialect72,	 the	 main	 language	 of	 everyday	
communication	by	a	majority	of	 Tunisians.	 	 Two	 interviewees	 said	 they	generally	preferred	
radio	as	a	media	form	to	follow	news	because	they	did	not	have	to	be	seated	to	watch	the	
news,	 and	 could	 engage	 in	 other	 activities	 whilst	 listening.	 Cumulatively,	 the	 respondents'	
preference	for	social	media	over	‘traditional’	broadcast	media	highlights	the	former’s	ability	
to	provide	a	sense	of	permitting	access	to	a	more	authentic,	instant	and	less	mediated	socio-
political	reality.	
	
Participants’	 perspectives	 on	 what	 it	 meant	 to	 be	 informed,	 as	 previously	 discussed,	
suggested	that	media	played	a	pivotal	role	 in	helping	them	to	familiarise	themselves	with	a	
new	political	sphere,	and	in	the	performance	of	new	civic	roles,	but	also	and	equally	allowing	
them	to	maintain	a	sense	of	control,	not	only	over	their	terms	of	exposure	to	media	content,	
but	 also	 over	 a	 rapidly-changing	 and	 relatively	 volatile	 socio-political	 context.	 For	 many	
respondents,	 the	 initial	 post-revolutionary	 period	was	 both	 a	 time	 of	 hope	 and	 change,	 as	
well	as	of	social,	political	and	economic	 instability.	Being	continuously	up-to-date	about	the	
																																																						
72	Tunisian	is	an	Arabic	dialect	that	differs	quite	substantially	from	classical	Arabic	compared	to	Arabic	dialects	spoken	in	the	
Middle	East.	Furthermore,	like	most	of	these	dialects,	it	is	not	a	written	language.	Classical	Arabic	is	taught	at	schools	and	serves	
as	main	written	language	in	the	country	(e.g.	public	administrations,	services,	legal	documents	etc)	alongside	French.	However,	
Tunisian	dialect	serves	as	the	main	spoken	language	across	the	country.	All	written	media	content	in	Tunisia	is	thus	either	in	
classical	Arabic	or	in	French.	Audio-visual	content	is	mostly	in	Tunisian	dialect.	Some	imported	media	content	is	also	in	Egyptian	
or	other	Arabic	dialects.	However,	news	broadcasts	on	television	and	radio	continue	to	be	mainly	in	classical	Arabic	as	
presenters	need	to	use	written	notes	or	material	as	a	base.	Interviews	and	debates	draw	on	a	mixture	of	Tunisian	dialect	and	
classical	Arabic	depending	on	interlocutors’	linguistic	abilities	and	the	level	of	formality	they	wish	to	associate	to	their	public	
communication.	
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latest	political	developments	was	consequently	extremely	important,	given	the	frequency	of	
ongoing	 crises,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 connecting	 to	 what	 some	 respondents	 (e.g.	 Anis,	 Youssef,	
Khouloud)	 described	 as	 being	 in	 “[their]	 interests”,	 and	 in	 understanding	 their	 collective	
prospects	-	“the	future	of	the	country”,	“where	the	country	is	heading”	and	“what	was	going	
to	happen	to	the	country”.	In	this	sense,	the	turn	to	news	partly	served	to	alleviate	anxieties	
and	 to	 develop	 knowledge	 from	 different	 sources	 about	 scenarios	 that	 were	 difficult	 to	
anticipate.	 For	 Sonia,	 who	 turned	 to	 social	 media	 for	 news	 updates,	 the	 revolution’s	
development	and	the	rapid	escalation	of	protests	 in	January	2011	had	been	experienced	as	
events	so	sudden	and	unexpected	in	their	magnitude	and	effect,	that	constant	monitoring	of	
the	news	was	 arguably	 still	 a	way	 to	 come	 to	 terms	with	 the	 changes	 two	years	 later.	Her	
media	 routine	permitted	her	 to	maintain	 a	 semblance	of	 control	 over	 the	 rapidly	 changing	
socio-political	reality:	
	
I	open	the	 Internet	first	 thing	to	go	through	the	news,	emails	and	Facebook,	so	that’s	every	
day,	 in	 the	 morning.	 Sometimes,	 additionally,	 before	 I	 go	 to	 bed	 I	 have	 to	 check	 in	 case	
something	happened	in	the	meantime.	[…]	With	the	revolution	I	was	 in	a	state	of	shock	 like	
many	people.	Until	now	sometimes,	I	can’t	believe	it,	did	it	really	happen,	the	regime	fell,	and	
it’s	a	new	government?	We	didn’t	expect	it	at	all.	Since	then	I	got	so	into	Facebook	because	
you	miss	nothing.	
	
For	other	participants	such	as	Ahmed,	Rim,	Zied	or	Youssef,	closely	 following	the	news	was	
also	 directly	 linked	 to	worries	 about	 their	 personal,	 professional	 future.	 For	 example,	 Zied,	
who	was	 running	a	 small	business	 selling	household	 textiles	 saw	his	 income	plummet	after	
the	 revolution	 and	 was	 struggling	 to	 make	 a	 living.	 For	 him,	 being	 informed	 also	 meant	
understanding	 if	 his	 financial	 difficulties	 were	 likely	 to	 last.	 	 Similarly,	 Youssef,	 a	 recent	
architecture	graduate	who	was	trying	to	start	a	career	in	the	field,	associated	his	interest	in	
news	during	this	period	with	his	insecure	professional	prospects.	
	
For	a	number	of	respondents,	the	result	of	these	informational	and	social	needs	was	that	the	
connection,	and	proximity,	that	social	media	provided	was	articulated	as	a	type	of	addiction.	
In	nearly	half	of	all	 the	 interviews,	 interviewees	phrased	 their	use	of	 Facebook	 in	 language	
which	implied	necessity;	for	example,	to	be	“constantly	connected”,	always	“up-to-date”,	or	
to	 “never	 miss	 anything”.	 Listed	 below	 are	 samples	 of	 additional	 statements	 that	 further	
illustrate	this	perception:	
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Sihem:	 “Tunisians	 now,	 they	 can’t	 live	without	 Facebook,	 at	 least	when	 it	 comes	 to	 young	
people”.	
	
Nabil:	“I’m	not	big	friends	with	Facebook,	 I	don’t	know,	but	 I	need	to	have	my	daily	dose	of	
Facebook	in	order	to	be	up	to	date	[a	la	page]”.	
	
Hanen:	“I’m	constantly	connected,	always,	 I	 can’t…	even	 if	my	3G	key	ends,	 I	have	to	buy	a	
new	one.	My	Facebook	is	always	on”.	
	
Youssef:	“Always	that	half	hour	[on	Facebook]	first	thing,	with	a	coffee.	I	start	my	day	at	work	
with	that.	If	I	don’t	have	that	half	hour,	I	spend	the	day	thinking	about	it”.	
	
Yassine:	“Facebook,	now,	one	can’t	do	without	it”.	
	
	
However,	beyond	this	it	also	reflects	the	importance	of	knowledge	about	news	and	politics	as	
a	way	of	 connecting	 and	 socialising	with	other	 Tunisians,	 in	 this	 highly	politicised	everyday	
context.	Yassine,	 for	example,	explained	how	his	use	of	social	media	had	changed	since	the	
revolution.	 For	 him,	 the	 platform	was	 no	 longer	 accessed	 “just	 like	 that”	 to	 socialise	 with	
others.	 Using	 the	 platform	 was	 also	 a	 more	 targeted	 activity	 for	 him,	 aimed	 at	 receiving	
developing	 news	 and	 being	 “up-to-date,	 like	 everyone	 else,	 to	 avoid	 missing	 some	 event	
rather	than	finding	it	out	from	people”.	Whilst	the	platform	served,	in	his	case,	to	attune	him	
to	his	politicised	environment,	the	actual	discussion	of	news	and	current	affairs	was	generally	
conducted	 in	 meetings	 with	 his	 friends	 in	 cafés.	 This	 knowledge	 served	 as	 frame	 of	
conversation	for	many	study	participants.	For	Narjes	for	example,	it	was	“important	to	be	up-
to-date,	 even	 just	 to	 be	 able	 to	 discuss	 things”.	 Several	 interviewees	 evoked	 the	 pressure	
they	felt	to	avoid	being	“out	of	synch”	(déphasé73),	to	be	as	aware	of	particular	issues	as	their	
friends	or	colleagues.		
	
Daily	 social	 media	 routines	 were	 established	 to	 fulfil	 this	 need	 to	 be	 ‘in	 synch’.	 Typically,	
these	were	 initiated	with	 the	 study	participants	 logging	 into	 their	 social	media	 accounts	 as	
soon	as	the	Internet	was	accessed	in	the	morning,	when	they	sat	in	front	of	their	computers	
at	home	or	at	work,	 and	 -	 at	 times	 -	on	 their	phones	whilst	 still	 in	bed.	 The	 time	between	
these	points	of	access	was,	 for	many	respodents,	punctuated	by	brief	 scans	of	Facebook	 in	
order	to	receive	the	 latest	 information	throughout	the	day,	depending	on	work	and	private	
commitments.	 Finally,	 this	 routine	was	 completed	by	 a	 second	prolonged	 session	on	 social	
																																																						
73	French	term	that	entered	Tunisian	vocabulary,	particularly	fashionable	among	young	people.	
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media	 in	 the	evening,	 time	permitting,	either	 in	conjunction	with	 television	viewing	or	as	a	
separate	 activity	 before	 going	 to	 bed.	 Whilst	 these	 media	 habits	 differed	 depending	 on	
individual	 domestic	 and	 professional	 circumstances,	 the	 majority	 of	 them	 nevertheless	
highlight	not	only	 the	 inseparability	of	media	use	 from	other	daily	 routines	 (Pink	and	Leder	
Mackley,	 2013),	 but	 also	 the	 importance	 of	 social	 media,	 whether	 in	 terms	 of	 time	 spent	
using	Facebook	 in	comparison	 to	other	media,	 in	 terms	of	 the	combination	of	 social	media	
use	with	evening	television	viewing	habits,	or	 in	terms	of	the	positioning	of	social	media	as	
the	 first	 and/or	 last	 access	 with	 the	 outside	 world	 in	 respondents’	 morning	 and	 evening	
routines.	
	
To	 summarise	 the	 previous	 findings,	 interviews	 conducted	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 2012	
highlighted	 the	 importance,	 for	 the	 study’s	 participants,	 of	 performing	 their	 new	 civic	
identities	by	being	 informed	and	developing	a	 knowledge	and	opinion	about	political	news	
and	public	matters.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	context	before	the	revolution,	the	Tunisian	media	
sphere	 thus	 had	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 supporting	 this	 revived	 sense	 of	 civic	
empowerment	and	engagement.	Although	national	mass	media	outlets	gained	in	popularity	
after	 the	 revolution	 by	 offering	 a	 variety	 of	 new	 journalistic	 content	 and	 political	
programming,	social	media	use	nevertheless	continued	to	occupy	a	particularly	central	place	
in	respondents’	post-revolutionary	daily	media	habits.	The	use	of	social	media	was	relatively	
politicised	since	the	revolution,	and	was	a	notable	 if	not	key	source	of	political	 information	
and	knowledge.	Respondents	stressed	the	rapidity	with	which	social	media	enabled	access	to	
news	in	a	fairly	unstable	socio-political	context	as	one	of	the	motivating	factors	underpinning	
this	trend;	traditional	media	forms	were	perceived	as	being	far	less	responsive	in	this	regard.	
But	equally,	from	a	more	sociological	and	cultural	standpoint,	the	findings	highlighted	the	link	
between	 social	 media’s	 popularity	 and	 a	 newly	 emergent	 political	 culture	 in	 which	 being	
political	 was	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 everyday	 socialisation.	 For	 the	 majority	 of	 these	
respondents,	 social	media	 facilitated	 participation	 in	 this	 socialisation	 not	 only	 by	 enabling	
them	to	keep	up-to-date	about	the	latest	issues	and	controversies,	but	also	by	supporting	a	
sense	of	 connection	 to	 a	 public	 sphere	 that	 seemed	 less	mediated,	more	 instant,	 and	 that	
was	more	directly	shaped	by	their	collective	civic	voice.	
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3. Objectivity,	credibility	and	trust	in	a	polarised	informational	space	
	
Whilst	 these	 participants	 turned	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 traditional	 and	 new	 media	 sources	 to	 be	
informed	and	to	enact	new	civic	identities,	their	actual	experience	and	encounters	with	news	
and	 politically-relevant	 information	 were	 more	 ambivalent,	 paralleling	 previous	 findings	
referred	 to	 earlier	 (see	 Hagen,	 1994).	 In	 the	 fragmented	 and	 frequently	 polarised	 post-
revolutionary	 Tunisian	 media	 and	 political	 landscape,	 respondents	 experienced	 varying	
degrees	 of	 difficulty	 in	 orienting	 themselves	 towards	 different	 information	 and	 public	
knowledge	providers.	This	last	part	of	the	chapter	focuses	in	detail	on	the	choices	they	make	
in	these	orientations	and	how	they	weigh	information	stemming	from	a	variety	of	journalistic	
and	non-journalistic	sources.	
	
3.1. Orientations	toward	traditional	media	as	information	providers	
	
I	will	start	this	assessment	by	exploring	respondents’	perceptions	of	traditional	mass	media	as	
an	information	source,	and	their	expectations	of	professional	journalism.	These,	it	transpired	
from	the	interviews,	were	closely	tied	to	a	conception	of	objectivity.	In	academic	debates	on	
journalism	 and	 the	 mediation	 of	 public	 and	 political	 matters,	 the	 notion	 of	 objectivity	 is	
relatively	contested.	On	the	one	hand,	it	points	to	an	ideal	of	journalists	and	news	media	as	
unbiased	transmitters	of	 information	serving	 in	the	public	 interest	and	supporting	 informed	
citizenship	in	a	democracy.	It	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	facts	can	be	clearly	separated	
from	opinions	and	values	(Hackettt,	1984).	On	the	other	hand,	many	scholars	have	contended	
that	objectivity	should	be	regarded	as	a	social	construct	(Molotch	and	Lester,	1974;	Hallin	and	
Mancini	1984;	Schudson,	1991),	 the	boundaries	of	which	are	often	fluid	whose	definition	 is	
contingent	on	localised	sociocultural	factors.	In	this	respect,	Deli	Carpini	and	Williams	(2001),	
for	example,	note	that	an	objective	standpoint	to	communicate	a	social	and	political	reality	
simply	 does	 not	 exist	 (p.119).	 Part	 of	 the	 argument	 has	 thus	 centred	 on	 assessing	 the	
parameters	under	which	the	negotiation	over	different	representations	of	this	reality	occurs,	
and	the	balance	of	power	that	underpins	 its	mediation	to	citizens.	Beyond	these	 issues	and	
under	a	more	culturally-oriented	perspective,	a	key	question	to	ask	is	how	particular	framings	
of	objectivity	contextually	 relate	 to	an	existing	social,	political	and	 journalistic	culture	 (for	a	
more	 detailed	 overview,	 see	 Schudson,	 1997a,	 p.16-17	 and	Berkowitz,	 2011).	 For	 instance,	
the	work	of	Hallin	and	Mancini	(2004)	highlights	the	links	between	news	media	and	political	
culture	 in	 different	 national	 contexts.	 Equally,	 from	 a	 historically	 comparable	 perspective,	
Mutz	 and	 Young	 (2011)	 argue	 that	 contemporary	 notions	 of	 objectivity	 and	 journalistic	
133	
	
neutrality	 that	 are	 often	 advanced	 are	 very	 different	 from	 the	 ideals	 that	 journalists	were	
meant	to	aspire	to	a	few	decades	earlier	in	the	United	States:		
	
Instead	 of	 an	 emphasis	 on	 facts	 and	 objectivity,	 the	 diversity	 they	 wanted	 was	 one	 of	
antagonistic	 vested	 interests,	 one	 in	 which	 reporters	 were	 advocates	 for	 their	 positions	
without	any	pretense	of	neutrality	(Mutz	and	Young,	2011,	p.1023).	
	
In	this	study,	 interview	accounts	suggest	that	the	notion	of	objectivity	particularly	mattered	
to	the	respondents,	and	that	they	had	relatively	high	expectations	of	journalistic	neutrality	in	
the	 nascent	 democratic	 Tunisian	 context,	 but	 that	 they	 considered	 these	 to	 remain	 largely	
unfulfilled.	 Indeed,	 references	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 objectivity	 were	 recurrent	 in	 participants’	
experiences	with	mass	media.	The	majority	of	them	referred	to	the	overly	politicised	nature	
of	 Tunisian	 media	 and	 journalism,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 balanced	 representations	 of	 news	 and	
socio-political	 matters	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 centrality	 of	 these	 issues	 in	 their	 accounts	 can	
partly	be	explained	by	the	progressive	polarisation	of	the	media	landscape	in	Tunisia	during	
this	period	(a	detailed	account	is	provided	at	the	beginning	of	Chapter	6),	of	which	the	study	
participants	were	relatively	aware.	But	equally,	it	is	partly	reflective	of	a	new	political	culture	
among	citizens	after	the	revolution.	For	most	of	the	participants	being	kept	informed	was	not	
the	only	 issue	at	stake.	They	also	deemed	media’s	role	 in	this	newly	 liberated	public	space,	
and	its	neutrality,	as	key	pillars	supporting	the	principle	of	democratic	citizenship.	However,	
the	interviews	also	highlighted	a	level	of	contradiction	between	participants’	expectations	of	
objectivity	 and	 their	 personal	 preference	 for	media	 that	were	 closely	 aligned	 to	 their	 own	
political	perspectives.	Often,	complaints	about	lack	of	objectivity	tended	to	be	tied	to	media	
coverage	 that	 failed	 to	 reflect	 their	 individual	 political	 views,	 rather	 than	 unbiased	
representations	of	 social	 and	political	 reality.	 This	was	evidenced	by	 their	 reflections	about	
television	programming	in	particular.		
	
Diverging	 perceptions	 of	 objectivity	 were	 relatively	 pronounced	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 national	
public	television	broadcaster	and,	especially,	its	main	channel	Watanyia	174.	Its	evening	news	
broadcast	was	watched	by	the	large	majority	of	the	participants	in	2012,	irrespective	of	their	
political	opinions	and	their	appraisals	of	its	quality,	as	it	provided	a	common	reference	point	
and	continued,	as	was	the	case	before	the	revolution,	to	be	an	important	marker	of	time	and	
daily	routines.	Nevertheless,	concerns	about	the	neutrality	of	the	broadcaster	were	raised	by	
respondents	 on	 all	 sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 	 Habib,	 for	 example,	 who	 was	 an	
																																																						
74	Public	television	consisted	of	two	channels	El	Watanyia	1	and	El	Watanyia	2.	
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opposition	party	supporter	perceived	that	the	editorial	line	of	the	broadcaster	was	becoming	
less	 neutral	 and	 increasingly	 supportive	 of	 the	 government.	 Similarly,	 Khouloud,	 who	 was	
fiercely	 opposed	 to	 Islamist	 party	 Ennahdha,	 had	 regularly	 watched	 the	 national	 news	
broadcast,	 but	 considered	 it	 to	 be	 a	mouthpiece	 of	 the	 government	 and	 thus	 ideologically	
compromised,	 blandly	 echoing	 the	 state’s	 position	 on	 public	 issues.	 She	 subsequently	
stopped	watching	the	news.	Conversely	Ahmed	-	a	supporter	of	Salafist	Islam	–	disapproved	
of	 the	 representation	of	 the	Salafist	movement	 in	 the	news,	 seeing	 coverage	as	one-sided,	
exaggerated	and	manipulative	in	its	scapegoating	of	its	supporters	as	purported	cause	of	all	
newsworthy	problems	in	the	country.	For	Mounir,	the	financial	director	of	a	large	factory,	the	
bias	he	perceived	in	the	national	news	broadcast	was	a	consequence	of	the	powerful	control	
the	 trade	 unions	 exerted	 over	 the	 Tunisian	 public	 broadcaster.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 he	 considered	
that	 the	 broadcaster	 was	 too	 critical	 of	 the	 government	 and	 that	 it	 failed	 to	 sufficiently	
educate	 audiences	 about	 their	 civic	 duties,	 and	 how	 they	 could	 support	 the	 effort	 of	
rebuilding	 the	 country	 after	 the	 revolution,	 rather	 than	 participating	 in	 constant	 protest	
actions	and	strikes.	Mehdi,	who	had	an	unusually	positive	view	of	the	coalition	government,	
also	 considered	 the	 news	 coverage	 as	 being	 overly	 critical	 of	 the	 government,	 and	 not	
fulfilling	its	function	as	a	neutral	public	institution:	
	
In	terms	of	public	television,	that’s	the	same	it	hasn’t	changed.	In	the	same	way	it	used	to	
work	 for	 the	 dictatorship	 to	 make	 the	 news	 reach	 you	 in	 a	 certain	 way,	 now	 it’s	 the	
opposite,	 it’s	a	hundred	and	eighty	degrees	turn,	 it	works	for	people’s	 interests,	 there’s	
no…	there’s	no	neutrality.	Because	I	had	doubts	on	many	occasions.	You	think	you	have	
trust	in	something	but	there	were	many	events	that	happened	since	the	revolution	that	
make	you	have	doubts.	And	there	are	the	presenters,	who	for	example	interrupt	one	of	
the	people	 they	 interview	 too	much,	and	who	always	attack	his	opinion,	 [whereas]	 the	
other	opinion	is	given	time,	and	on	the	contrary	[the	presenters]	may	even	repeat	it.	You	
feel	 that	 the	 channel	 is	 trying	 to	 manipulate	 you	 to	 understand	 something	 specific,	 it	
doesn’t	want	you	to	understand	things.	So	in	terms	of	our	public	media,	it’s	still	far.	In	all	
honesty	it’s	still	far!	
		
Other	 interviewees	 expressed	 less	 pronounced	 opinions	 on	 the	 objectivity	 of	 the	 public	
broadcaster’s	news	broadcasts,	but	nevertheless	 voiced	a	degree	of	 criticism.	 For	example,	
when	 I	 asked	 Sihem,	 a	 student	 in	 her	 early	 twenties	 about	 her	 views	 of	 the	 public	
broadcaster’s	reporting,	she	stated	quite	matter-of-factly	that	“their	news	is	right	and	wrong”	
but	that	she	nonetheless	always	watched	these	broadcasts	with	her	flatmates.	Similarly,	for	
Nabil,	 following	 the	national	news	was	a	matter	of	habit	but,	 rather	 than	serving	 to	 inform	
135	
	
him,	 he	 regarded	 it	 as	 a	 way	 of	 finding	 out	 about	 the	 specific	 political	 perspective	 of	 the	
broadcaster,	which	he	 considered	 to	have	 a	 pro-government	 stance.	 For	Nabil,	 all	 Tunisian	
media	were	politicised	during	this	period,	and	the	public	broadcaster	was	no	exception.		
	
The	 levels	 of	 neutrality	 actually	 achieved	 by	 the	 public	 broadcaster	 were	 in	 fact	 relatively	
inconsistent	 due	 to	 internal	 ideological	 power	 struggles	 as	 well	 as	 a	 result	 of	 external	
pressure	exerted	on	the	editorial	line	of	its	news	and	political	content.	However,	regardless	of	
the	 actual	 subjectivity	 or	 otherwise	 of	 the	 content	 (which	 is	 not	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study),	
participants’	accounts	highlight	two	important	aspects	about	their	understanding	of	the	role	
of	 news	 and	 journalistic	 objectivity.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 consensually	 negative	 view	 held	 by	
respondents	 that	 the	 public	 channels	 failed	 to	 achieve	 the	 required	 level	 of	 journalistic	
objectivity	 to	 some	extent	 indicates	 the	 relatively	high	expectations,	 and	 increased	 level	of	
scrutiny	to	which	the	broadcaster	was	subjected,	considering	its	role	as	a	public	broadcaster,	
and	 its	ties	 in	the	past	to	the	dictatorial	regime.	 In	this	sense,	study	participants	seemed	to	
attach	particular	 importance	to	 -	and	expressed	a	wish	to	be	able	to	rely	on	-	a	democratic	
and	 independent	 journalism	 that	 supported	 them	 in	 their	 new	 civic	 roles.	 Secondly,	 the	
findings	also	highlight	how	these	citizens	themselves	aspired	to	an	ideal	of	objectivity	in	their	
expectations	 of	 media’s	 political	 coverage,	 whilst	 engaging	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 quite	
different	 and,	 at	 times,	 opposing	 definitions	 of	 objectivity	 within	 the	 relatively	 polarised	
informational	space	after	the	revolution.		
	
Additionally,	 a	 number	of	 respondents	 articulated	 criticisms	 concerning	 a	perceived	 lack	of	
objectivity	on	private	Tunisian	television	channels,	and	 in	particular	 the	two	 leading	private	
channels	 at	 the	 time	 -	 Ettounsiya	 and	 Nessma	 TV.	 Opinions	 about	 these	 channels	 varied	
considerably.	Many	participants	enjoyed	their	programming	as	it	was	considered	as	relatively	
innovative,	 dynamic	 and	 more	 appealing	 than	 the	 public	 television	 channel.	 For	 example,	
they	repeatedly	referred	to	a	programme	called	“Lebes”	on	Ettounsiya	channel,	that	tackled	
controversial	 political	 and	 social	 issues	 satirically,	 mixing	 entertainment,	 news,	 music	 and	
celebrity	 coverage	 in	 a	 talk	 show	 format	 that	 was	 considered,	 by	 these	 participants,	 both	
appealing	 and	 informative.	 However,	 respondents	 who	 supported	 the	 government,	
complained	that	these	channels	were	“opposition	media”.	Their	content	was,	in	their	opinion,	
overtly	 biased	 towards	 the	 opposition	 and	 unfairly	 negative	 in	 its	 depiction	 of	 the	
government	and	of	the	parties	in	power.	Some	of	these	respondents	also	considered	this	bias	
to	be	related	to	the	previous	links	between	their	owners	and	the	Ben	Ali	regime75.	
																																																						
75	See	chapter	Six	for	details	on	this	channel,	and	on	the	judicial	issues	its	owner	faced	in	2013.	
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More	 generally,	 expressed	 concerns	 over	 the	 integrity	 and	 quality	 of	 Tunisian	mass	media	
and	journalism	were	relatively	consistent	across	participants	with	differing	political	opinions,	
but	the	areas	perceived	as	problematic	varied	in	accordance	with	their	existing	political	views	
and	 level	 of	 interest	 in	political	matters.	 For	 example,	Raouf	who	was	particularly	negative	
about	Tunisian	journalists’	perceived	lack	of	neutrality	about	government	achievements,	had	
no	 issue	with	subjective	 journalism	when	 it	supported	a	cause	he	was	sympathetic	to,	as	 in	
the	case	of	broadcaster	Al	 Jazeera	whose	coverage	of	 the	revolution	he	regarded	as	having	
been	subjective	inasmuch	as	it	consciously	undermined	the	Ben	Ali	regime,	and	(in	his	view)	
aimed	 at	 its	 ultimate	 overthrow.	 Similarly,	 Nabil	 clarified	 that	 his	 view	 on	 journalistic	
neutrality	was	relative	to	his	opinion	as	an	opponent	of	the	government:	
	
I	 consider	myself	 as	 subjective,	 I’m	 someone	who’s	 quite	 critical	 [of	 the	 government],	 and	
Nessma	for	example	seems	to	me	neutral	because	it	expresses	my	opinions.	
	
Negative	 views	 about	 Tunisian	 mass	 media’s	 perceived	 lack	 of	 objectivity	 were	 also	 the	
catalyst	for	some	of	the	participants	to	reduce	their	exposure	to	news	and	media	content.	As	
mentioned	above,	some	 interviewees	stated	that	 they	started	to	change	their	media	habits	
due	 to	 the	 level	of	 stress	 caused	by	 the	news,	 the	political	 infighting	on	 television	debates	
and	the	recurrent	political	crises	in	the	country.	However,	for	some	of	the	study	participants,	
adjustments	 to	 their	 news	 and	 media	 practices	 in	 2012	 were	 directly	 linked	 to	 their	
dissatisfaction	 with	 perceived	 levels	 of	 subjectivity	 in	 journalistic	 coverage	 of	 events.	
Whereas	 for	 a	 number	 of	 respondents	 who	 did	 not	 side	 with	 the	 government,	 or	 did	 not	
identify	with	any	political	ideology	in	particular,	awareness	of	the	politicisation	of	mass	media	
was	not	articulated	as	problematic,	 the	majority	of	 respondents	who	openly	 supported	 the	
parties	 in	 government	 limited	 their	 exposure	 to	 these	 media	 sources	 to	 some	 extent,	 or	
boycotted	them	altogether	(with	the	exception	of	the	public	television	news	broadcast	which	
remained	 an	 important	 reference	 point	 for	 all	 interviewees,	 as	 noted	 above).	 For	 these	
respondents,	dissatisfaction	with	Tunisian	mass	media,	and	television	in	particular,	translated	
into	a	move	to	satellite	television	channels	and	to	online	media.	
	
For	 participants	 who	 boycotted	 these	 Tunisian	 channels,	 satellite	 broadcaster	 Al	 Jazeera	
offered	a	preferred	alternative.	Paralleling	this	trend	of	selectivity,	several	participants	on	the	
opposite	side	of	the	political	spectrum	said	they	boycotted	Al	Jazeera	because	they	perceived	
it	as	overly	biased	in	favour	of	the	government	and	the	Islamist	party	Ennahdha.	For	instance,	
Neila,	who	had	participated	with	her	friends	in	sending	video	footage	of	protests	in	her	town	
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to	the	broadcaster	during	the	revolution,	felt	that	it	had	changed	and	that,	in	its	coverage	of	
Tunisian	 issues,	 its	main	 channel	 was	 only	 representing	 the	 perspectives	 of	 Ennahdha	 and	
interviewing	its	members.	Similarly,	Farah,	Kamal	and	Zied	thought	that	supporting	Ennahdha	
was	part	of	 the	Qatari-owned	broadcaster’s	 long-term	strategy,	and	 said	 the	channel	 came	
across	as	though	“there’s	someone	behind	it”,	that	it	“served	specific	sides”,	and	that	it	had	
“lost	credibility	in	Tunisia”.		
	
The	 highly	 politicised	 media	 scene	 after	 the	 revolution	 assisted	 in	 reconnecting	 Tunisian	
citizens	 to	 public	 matters	 relating	 to	 their	 country,	 and	 in	 acquiring	 knowledge	 of,	 and	
forming	 opinions	 about,	 political	 issues	 and	 current	 affairs	 within	 an	 unstable	 and	 rapidly	
changing	context.	At	the	same	time,	as	highlighted	above,	respondents	were	generally	aware	
of	 an	 excessive	 lack	 of	 impartiality	 in	 the	 representation	 of	 news	 on	 different	mass	media	
sources	 –	 television	 in	 particular	 –	 although	 they	 did	 not	 necessarily	 perceive	 it	 as	
problematic	 when	 it	 did	 not	 directly	 oppose	 their	 personal	 opinions.	 When	 it	 did,	 the	
research	participants	limited	their	exposure	to	these	channels.	Although	participants	sought	a	
diversity	of	sources	of	information,	the	politicised	mass	media	scene	particularly	antagonised	
respondents	 who	 were	 supportive	 of	 the	 parties	 in	 government.	 Other	 participants	 were	
critical,	to	different	extents,	of	mass	media	content	and	journalistic	practices,	but	found	the	
content	of	these	channels	sufficiently	appealing	to	continue	to	watch	them.		
	
As	these	findings	indicate,	the	participants	in	this	study	expressed	high	expectations	of	news	
media	and	journalistic	neutrality,	but	their	individual	perceptions	of	what	objectivity	actually	
consisted	 of	 were	 relatively	 varied,	 and	 their	 preference	 for	 informational	 sources	 that	
reflected	 their	 political	 opinions	 were	 indicative	 of	 the	 role	 played	 by	 trust	 in	 their	
assessment	of	different	representations	of	social	and	political	reality.	The	function	of	trust	in	
shaping	informational	exposure	was,	as	we	will	see	in	the	next	section,	more	pronounced	in	
the	 social	 media	 space	 where	 a	 more	 pluralised	 and	 divergent	 range	 of	 informational	
resources	was	available,	and	where	users	were	able	to	adjust	their	exposure	to	reflect	their	
personal	preferences.		
	
3.2. Orientations	towards	different	information	sources	on	social	media	
a. Information,	credibility	and	trust	
	
An	important	aspect	of	media’s	role	in	citizens’	everyday	lives	relates	to	the	level	of	trust	they	
invest	 in	 the	 information	 and	 representations	 provided	 to	 them	 by	 journalists	 and	 news	
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media	 organisations,	 as	 this	 trust	 is	 arguably	 experiencing	 an	 ongoing	 shift	 away	 from	
traditional	authority	models	(Lankes,	2008).	The	field	of	journalism	has	undergone	significant	
changes	 in	 the	 new	 media	 era.	 Much	 research	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 changing	 work	 of	
journalists	and	news	media	institutions,	or	on	comparisons	between	citizen-journalism	(Witt,	
2004)	and	traditional	mass	media	journalistic	practices	in	this	respect.	However,	as	a	number	
of	 researchers	have	highlighted	 (Coleman	et	 al.,	 2012;	Hermida	et	 al.,	 2012),	 less	 is	 known	
about	 the	 perspectives	 and	 experiences	 of	 news	 consumers	 in	 this	 rapidly	 changing	
informational	 environment.	 Deuze	 (2003),	 for	 example,	 points	 out	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	
interactivity	in	online	environments	may	profoundly	alter	perceptions	of	journalistic	authority	
and	 values	 associated	 to	 the	 journalistic	 profession.	 Coleman	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 provide	 a	 rare	
insight	 into	 these	 changes	 in	 a	 British	 context.	 Their	 findings	 highlight	 that	 contemporary	
shifts	 in	 how	 citizens	 can	 interact	with	 news	 and	 informational	 content	 has	 implications	 in	
terms	 of	 their	 expectations	 of	 professional	 journalism,	 and	 the	 trust	 they	 invest	 in	 public	
knowledge:	
	
It	 is	 generally	accepted	 that	public	 knowledge	 should	be	authoritative,	but	 there	 is	
not	always	 common	agreement	about	what	 the	public	needs	 to	 know,	who	 is	best	
placed	 to	 relate	 and	 explain	 it,	 and	 how	 authoritative	 reputations	 should	 be	
determined	and	evaluated	(p.50).	
	
The	 assessment	 provided	 by	 Coleman	 and	 his	 colleagues,	 suggest	 that	 in	 a	 time	 of	
informational	 abundance,	 information	 accuracy	 becomes	 a	 scarce	 and	 particularly	 valued	
resource.	This	is	because	this	change	translates	into	increased	uncertainty	for	citizens	about	
what	sources	and	representations	to	believe	in.		
	
In	 a	 number	 of	 related	 academic	 fields	 (e.g.	 journalism	 and	 mass	 communication	 studies,	
computer-mediated	 communication,	 information	 studies),	 much	 attention	 has	 recently	
focused	on	the	question	of	how	information’s	credibility	and	accuracy	is	perceived	in	the	new	
media	 environment	 (e.g.	 Flanagin	 and	Metzger,	 2000	 and	 2014;	 Johnson	 and	 Kaye,	 2004;	
Cassidy,	 2007;	Osatuyi,	 2013;	 Sveningsson,	 2015).	Many	 of	 these	 studies	 are	 quantitatively	
led	and	 tend	 to	 focus	on	 the	 issue	 through	 comparisons	of	perspectives	on	 traditional	 and	
Internet	 news	 environments.	 Some	 commentary,	 for	 example,	 has	 focused	 on	 the	
relationship	of	credibility	perception	and	the	communicative	form	that	informational	content	
takes	 (e.g.	Osatuyi,	2013	on	the	role	of	audio	and	visual	elements).	Others,	 such	as	Cassidy	
(2007),	provide	a	different	perspective	on	the	 issue	by	focusing	on	credibility	perception	by	
journalists	 themselves,	 rather	 than	 news	 consumers,	 to	 point	 out	 that	 even	 within	
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professional	journalism	there	are	significant	differences	in	credibility	perceptions,	that	partly	
relate	to	their	level	of	familiarity	in	working	with	online	news.		
	
Renewed	attention	has	also	been	devoted	to	the	specific	question	of	source	credibility	as	the	
trustworthiness	 and	 expertise	 of	 sources	 are	 complicated	 in	 an	 online	 environment	 (e.g.	
Flanagan	and	Metzger,	forthcoming),	and	particularly	in	a	networked	context.	In	fact,	the	very	
notion	of	what	constitutes	a	source	online	is	open	to	challenge,	and	some	have	called	for	its	
radical	 reconceptualization	 (see	 Sundar	 and	 Nass,	 2001).	 Reviewing	 the	 development	 of	
debates	 in	 this	 field	 since	 the	 fifties,	 Flanagan	 and	Metzger	 (forthcoming)	 note	 that	 a	 key	
distinction	between	previous	informational	environments	and	the	online	environment	is	the	
more	 limited	transparency	of	the	 latter,	concerning	the	 identity	and	underlying	motivations	
of	 those	 producing	 informational	 content.	 Equally,	 they	 note	 that	 despite	 the	 relative	
inconclusiveness	of	studies	 in	the	nascent	field	of	online	source	credibility	perception,	early	
trends	 suggest	 that	 heavier	 Internet	 use	 as	well	 as	 news	 alignment	with	 personal	 political	
views	play	a	role	in	supporting	a	perception	that	sources	are	credible	online.	Furthermore,	as	
Sundar	and	Nass	highlight	 in	 their	 study	 (2001),	 the	 type	of	 source	 to	which	 information	 is	
attributed	 online	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 its	 credibility	 perception	 –	 notably,	 that	 information	
attributed	 to	 other	 online	 users	 is	 perceived	 as	more	 credible	 by	 their	 study’s	 participants	
than	the	same	information	attributed	to	online	news	editors.	Garrett	(2011)	and	Hermida	et	
al.	 (2012),	 identify	 similar	 trends	 regarding	 news	 and	 information	 consumption	 on	 social	
media,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	 role	 played	 by	 other	 users	 in	 people’s	 online	
networks.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 relative	 lack	 of	 transparency	 about	 online	 sources,	 particularly	
tangible	 in	 a	 social	 media	 environment	 (Sveningsson,	 2015),	 translates	 into	 a	 relative	
increased	credibility	perception	when	 information	 is	circulated	across	 trusted	networks	and	
connections,	as	tends	to	be	the	case	on	social	media	platforms.	
	
Research	about	news	and	information	circulation	on	social	media	is	a	relatively	new	field	of	
exploration.	Whilst	studies	such	as	Sveningsson’s	-	referred	to	above	–	provide	 insights	 into	
information	 credibility	 perception	 among	 Swedish	 youth,	 the	 majority	 of	 research	 on	 the	
subject	tends	to	be	focused	on	the	United	States	(Hermida	et	al.,	2012;	Kümpel	et	al.,	2015),	
with	even	fewer	studies	relating	to	non-Western	settings.	Furthermore,	Kümpel	et	al.	(2015)	
highlight	 that	much	 of	 this	 research	 suffers	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 contextualisation,	 as	 it	 tends	 to	
focus	on	quantitative	methods	at	the	expense	of	qualitative	insights	into	the	cultures	of	news	
and	media	consumption	that	findings	emanate	from.	What	this	field	of	research	nevertheless	
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highlights	is	the	importance	of	Facebook	as	platform	among	social	media	news	consumption	
habits	(Olmstead	et	al.,	2011;	Hermida	et	al.,	2012;	Kümpel	et	al.,	2015).		
	
b. An	increasingly	corrupted	informational	space:	
	
As	a	consequence	of	 the	highly	politicized	nature	of	Tunisian	media	content,	of	 the	relative	
lack	of	regulation	of	the	media	sector,	and	of	fledgling	professional	 journalistic	standards	 in	
the	 year	 following	 the	 revolution	 (see	 chapter	 1),	 online	 and	 offline	 media	 content	 were	
providing	relatively	different,	and	at	times	contradictory,	versions	of	news	and	events	in	the	
country.	These	issues	also	routinely	translated	into	the	distribution	of	misinformation	online	
and	offline,	at	 times	 followed	by	subsequent	 rectifications	and	 retractions.	The	central	 role	
played	 by	 Facebook	 during	 this	 period	was	 also	 the	 catalyst	 for	 the	 rapid	 dissemination	 of	
misinformation,	occasionally	on	a	very	large	scale,	which	in	turn	increased	pressure	on	under-
resourced	 journalists	 to	 report	 news	 items	 without	 subjecting	 them	 to	 an	 adequate	
verification	process.		
	
The	Tunisian	social	media	space	 in	which	 the	study	participants	operated	was	naturally	not	
immune	 to	 conflicting	 agendas	 and	 political	 interests.	 In	 fact,	 it	 was	 less	 transparent	 and	
accountable	than	traditional	mass	media.	 In	 this	environment,	hundreds	of	Facebook	pages	
emerged	that	produced	information	and	commentary	on	Tunisian	events	and	current	affairs,	
and	which	supported	different	political	parties	in	an	orchestrated	manner,	yet	affiliations	to	
these	parties	was	not	overt,	and	insights	into	the	identities	of	the	owners	or	administrators	of	
these	pages	were	 very	 limited.	 Some	of	 the	 contextualizing	 interviews	 I	 conducted	 in	2012	
indicated	 that	 a	 number	 of	 Facebook	 pages	 that	 had	 gained	 in	 popularity	 during	 the	
revolution	 had	 been	 acquired	 by	 political	 parties	 as	 a	 means	 of	 reaching	 a	 wider	 online	
audience,	and	 that	administrators	were	 funded	by	parties	 to	 run	a	number	of	 these	pages.	
One	of	the	interviews	with	a	page	administrator	provided,	off	the	record,	an	account	of	how	
these	acquisitions	were	covertly	conducted.	As	the	political	economy	of	 this	online	space	 is	
not	 the	 focus	of	my	 thesis,	 this	 issue	was	not	 further	 investigated.	For	 the	purposes	of	 the	
current	assessment,	it	is	sufficient	to	draw	attention	to	the	lack	of	transparency	in	this	social	
media	 space	and	 its	vulnerability	 to	potential	 infiltration,	unbeknownst	 to	 its	audiences,	by	
different	interests.	
	
The	sense	of	trust	in	media	in	the	Tunisian	context	rapidly	evolved	after	the	revolution.	After	
the	initial	crisis	and	euphoria	of	the	revolution,	during	which	social	media	helped	to	connect	
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citizens	 and	 contributed	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 national	 unity,	 respondents	 started	 to	 perceive	 that	
different	 agendas	 were	 shaping	 content	 to	 their	 advantage.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 spontaneity	
associated	with	 the	 freeing	of	public	expression,	and	collective	exchange	of	 information	on	
social	media,	progressively	dissipated.	The	perception	of	a	possible	control	or	manipulation	of	
media	 content	 by	 vested	 interests	 necessitated,	 for	many	 participants,	 a	 need	 to	 increase	
their	 level	 of	 awareness	 and	 to	 exercise	 a	 degree	 of	 caution	 in	 their	 media	 consumption	
habits.	Social	media	was	also	soon	perceived	as	a	corrupted	informational	space	as	it	started	
to	 be	 used	 to	 transmit	 both	 misinformation	 and	 disinformation,	 rumours	 and	 defamatory	
content.	With	this	realisation,	participants	developed	more	nuanced	interpretations	of	media	
content.	
	
c. Typical	use	of	Facebook	for	information	access	
	
The	way	 that	 research	 participants	 used	 social	media	 to	 access	 news	 and	 information	was	
fairly	 typical.	 On	 Facebook,	 the	 content	 they	 encountered	 originated	 from	 friends	 in	 their	
network	and	 from	pages	 they	had	chosen	to	 follow	on	the	platform	by	 ‘liking’	 them,	and	 it	
appeared	 in	 their	 newsfeed	 based	 on	 Facebook’s	 algorithms	 and	 their	 level	 of	 interaction	
with	 content	 from	 specific	 pages	 or	 friends’	 profiles.	 Participants	who	provided	 consent	 to	
access	their	social	media	accounts	had	between	one	hundred	and	two	hundred	 ‘friends’	on	
the	 platform	 on	 average,	 although	 a	 few	 exceeded	 this	 number	 considerably.	 Based	 on	
interviewees’	accounts,	many	had	accepted	 ‘befriending’	 requests	 from,	or	 in	 turn	asked	to	
connect	 to,	 strangers	 on	 Facebook	 during	 the	 revolution,	 but	 when	 interviews	 were	
conducted	 in	 2012,	 the	 majority	 of	 respondents	 said	 that	 the	 ‘friends’	 they	 had	 on	 the	
platform	at	the	time	primarily	consisted	of	people	they	knew	offline,	and	these	acquaintances	
mainly	included	friends,	family	members	and	colleagues.		
	
Approximately	half	of	 the	participants	 followed	a	significant	number	of	pages	on	Facebook,	
whereas	 the	 remainder	 followed	 a	 far	 lower	 number.	 The	 number	 ranged	 from	 the	 low	
twenties	 to	 nearly	 one	 thousand	 pages	 for	 some.	On	 average,	 approximately	 ninety	 pages	
were	followed	per	participant.	A	number	of	these	pages	related	to	leisure	and	entertainment	
activities	such	as	accounts	of	celebrities	from	the	music	and	film	industry,	as	well	as	sports,	
fashion	 and	 cookery	 related	 pages,	 and	 connections	 also	 included	 numerous	 international	
pages.	However,	content	relating	to	national	news,	 information	and	political	 issues	features	
notably	 in	 the	 list	 of	 pages	 followed	 by	 the	 participants.	 These	 pages	 include	 social	media	
accounts	 of	 political	 and	 public	 figures,	 traditional	 as	 well	 as	 online	media	 and	 journalism	
142	
	
sources,	but	to	an	important	extent	also	the	accounts	of	a	less	clearly	defined	ownership	and	
genre	 that	mixed	 jokes,	photography,	music,	news	stories	and	political	opinions	on	a	single	
page,	 often	 categorised	 by	 its	 administrator(s)	 as	 “community	 page”76.	 When	 questioned	
about	 how	 they	 initially	 discovered	 these	 pages,	 most	 respondents	 explained	 that	 they	
encountered	 them	 through	 content	 that	 others	 in	 their	 network	 had	 distributed	 and	 that,	
having	 enjoyed	 it	 or	 found	 out	 about	 important	 issues	 through	 this	 source,	 they	 chose	 to	
follow	 it.	 The	 act	 of	 ‘liking’	 a	 page	 in	 order	 to	 follow	 it	 was	 often	 taken	 quite	 literally.	
Participants	were	more	 likely	 to	 come	across	 representations	 and	perspectives	different	 to	
theirs	through	content	circulated	by	people	in	their	network	than	through	pages	they	actively	
chose	to	follow.	
	
Study	participants	had	access	to	a	very	wide	range	of	content	on	Facebook.	They	were	able	to	
directly	look	at	specific	social	media	pages	or	accounts,	but	mostly	they	followed	content	that	
appeared	from	these	pages	in	their	Facebook	newsfeed	and	followed	the	typical	tendency	of	
online	news	readers	to	scroll	information	from	top	to	bottom	(Adam	et	al.,	2007).	Compared	
to	 traditional	 media,	 respondents	 enjoyed	 the	 variety	 of	 content	 and	 sources	 that	 social	
media	enabled	them	access	to.	It	was	perceived	as	appealing	and	less	stressful	than	television	
viewing	 in	terms	of	the	mixture	of	news	and	entertainment	content	 it	provided.	 It	was	also	
considered	 as	 appealing	 due	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 sources	 of	 news	 that	 it	 provided.	 For	many	
respondents,	 Facebook	 was	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 convenient	 aggregator	 through	 which	 they	
accessed	 content	 from	 offline	 and	 online	 media	 organisations,	 from	 friends,	 politicians,	
media	 figures,	 bloggers	 and	 celebrities.	 Relatedly,	 two	 participants	 (Sonia	 and	 Youssef)	
compared	their	use	of	Facebook	to	reading	a	personal	newspaper.		
	
Whilst	 variety	 in	 terms	 of	 types	 of	 content	 and	 source	 was,	 as	 referred	 to	 above,	 overall	
positively	 perceived	 by	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 respondents,	 diversity	 in	 terms	 of	 political	
opinions	and	affiliations	 they	were	able	 to	 come	across	on	 social	media	had	 less	 appeal	 to	
them.	Only	a	few	of	the	respondents	(five	in	total)	directly	referred	to	the	latter	as	a	positive	
opportunity.	Most	respondents	instead	stressed	as	positive	the	possibility	to	customise	their	
informational	networks	on	social	media	in	order	to	view	content	they	enjoyed,	and	to	avoid	
exposure	to	media	sources	they	deemed	as	antagonising	or	divergent	from	their	own	views.	
This	 was	 particularly	 evident	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 participants	 who	 supported	 the	 parties	 in	
government.	 The	 time	 spent	 on	 average	 online	 per	 day,	 compared	 to	 other	 media,	 was	
																																																						
76	A	more	detailed	assessment	of	a	sample	of	these	pages,	and	of	political	figures	and	institutions	followed	by	participants,	is	
included	in	Chapters	5	and	6.	
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noticeably	higher	for	respondents	who	felt	particularly	antagonised	by	the	media	content	of	
the	leading	Tunisian	broadcasters.	As	highlighted	by	the	chart	below,	supporters	of	parties	in	
government	 were	more	 inclined	 than	 others	 to	 spend	 their	 time	 using	 online	 rather	 than	
traditional	media	sources.	As	with	the	majority	of	participants,	most	of	this	time	online	was	
occupied	by	 social	media	use	 -	 Facebook	 in	particular,	 as	well	 as	 Twitter	 to	 a	 lesser	extent	
(two	participants).	
	
	
GRAPH	3:	Participants’	average	daily	media	time,	by	political	perspective	(Oct/Nov.	2012)	
	
Rim,	 an	 Islamist	 party	 supporter,	 explained	 that	 she	 spent	 increasing	 amounts	 of	 time	 on	
Facebook	because	she	found	content	that	reflected	her	set	of	 interests.	She	contrasted	this	
to	“other	media”	that	she	felt	was	“ripping	off”	people.	Using	social	media	for	news	content	
consequently	afforded	her	the	possibility	of	accessing	alternative	sources	of	information	and	
opinions	that	she	could	identify	with.	
	
An	analysis	of	the	sources	followed	by	research	participants	on	Facebook,	indicates	that	most	
of	 the	 pages	 followed	 by	 government	 supporters	 were	 pro-government	 pages,	 and	 most	
pages	 followed	 by	 opposition	 supporters	 were	 opposition	 pages77.	 Many	 participants,	
independently	 of	 their	 affiliations,	 described	 that	 they	 were	 conscious	 that	 they	
predominantly	 followed	 Facebook	 pages	 whose	 opinions	 they	 tended	 to	 agree	 with,	 and	
recognised	 that	 problems	 could	 arise	 from	 the	 significant	 discrepancy	 between	 content	 on	
social	media	(these	issues	are	discussed	at	length	in	Chapters	5	and	6).	Zied	described	these	
differences	 as	 “domains”	within	 Facebook.	Others,	 like	 Sonia,	 explained	 that	 they	 came	 to	
																																																						
77	What	is	meant	here	by	pro-government	and	opposition	pages	is	not	necessarily	related	to	official	party	pages,	but	rather	pages	
whose	content	tends	to	be	clearly	aligned	with	one	side	or	the	other	of	the	frequently	polarised	social	and	political	spectrum	in	
the	Tunisian	context.	
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realize	 the	differences	between	 these	online	 ‘territories’	 through	 the	 content	 that	 some	of	
their	Facebook	acquaintances,	of	different	political	opinions,	were	posting:	
	
I	can	see	what	they’re	sharing	and	there	are	huge	differences.	(…)	You	feel	as	if	it	has	become	
a	media	war.	
	
In	 this	 specific	 context,	 these	 findings	 tend	 to	 support	 the	 argument	 that	 exposure	 to	 a	
pluralism	 of	 opinions	 is	 actually	 undermined	 in	 favour	 of	 more	 selective	 and	 opinion-
reinforcing	informational	exposure	on	social	media.	As	the	following	and	final	section	of	this	
assessment	 indicates,	 the	 verification	 strategies	 that	 these	 participants	 develop	 further	
elucidate	 the	 role	 that	 individual	 perceptions	 of	 trust	 play	 in	 orientating	 them	 towards	
different	representations	of	socio-political	reality	in	the	country.	
	
d. Verification	strategies	and	hierarchies	of	trust	in	media	
	
This	issue	of	news	credibility	and	informational	authority	was	particularly	problematic	in	the	
Tunisian	 context	 addressed	 in	 this	 study,	 as	 journalistic	 practices	 were	 evolving	 in	 an	
informational	 environment	 in	 which	 they	 had	 previously	 broadly	 lacked	 credibility,	 and	 in	
which	 citizens’	 relation	 to	 national	 news	 media	 was	 still	 relatively	 ambiguous.	 The	
construction	 of	 public	 knowledge	was	 not	 only	 problematised	 due	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	
informational	landscape	with	new	media	and	related	changes	in	perceptions	of	authority,	but	
further	 complicated	 by	mass	media’s	 identification	 with	 the	 state’s	 propaganda	 apparatus	
under	the	Ben	Ali	regime,	and	–	conversely	–	social	media’s	positive	(for	many)	associations	
with	revolutionary	movements	in	the	country.	The	following	analysis	thus	seeks	to	establish	
what	 hierarchies	 of	 trust	 in	 information	 and	 public	 knowledge	 emerged	 from	 this	 context,	
and	on	what	basis	the	respondents	placed	their	belief	in	the	accuracy	of	the	representations	
of	their	socio-political	reality	that	they	came	across.	
	
All	 the	 participants	 in	 this	 sample,	 except	 one,	 were	 aware	 that	 misinformation	 was	
transmitted	on	Facebook	during	the	initial	period	of	interviews,	and	most	of	them	referred	to	
the	issue	before	I	had	an	opportunity	to	ask	them	about	it.	Participants	developed	a	number	
of	 strategies	 and	 routines	 to	 verify	 the	 information	 they	 came	 across	 when	 they	 were	 in	
doubt	about	its	veracity.	Many	of	them	had	at	some	point	come	across	or	shared	information	
on	 the	platform	 that	 they	believed	at	 the	 time	of	 posting	 to	be	 true,	 only	 to	 subsequently	
discover	 that	 it	was	not.	Mounir,	 for	example,	 recalled	what	he	 referred	 to	as	 the	Abdellia	
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affair.	 El	 Abdellia	 is	 a	 palace	 in	 the	 suburbs	 of	 Tunis	 that	 hosted	 an	 art	 exhibition	 in	 June	
2012.	 This	 exhibition	 was	 the	 centre	 of	 controversy	 because	 a	 number	 of	 art	 works	 were	
deemed	religiously	offensive.	A	group	of	Salafists	 stormed	the	exhibition	and	vandalised	 its	
contents.	Much	of	this	controversy	unfolded	on	social	media	where	photographs	of	the	works	
were	widely	disseminated.	Several	of	 these	 images	were	 later	 revealed	 to	have	been	taken	
from	different	exhibitions	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	Mounir	recounted	being	among	those	
who	believed	the	images	were	genuine,	and	actively	involving	himself	in	debate	surrounding	
the	controversy.	He	considered	the	issue	an	important	indicator	of	how	easily	public	opinion	
could	be	manipulated.	
	
Whether	or	not	to	question	the	veracity	of	media	content	and	 information	encountered	on	
social	 media	 was	 largely	 a	 matter	 of	 personal	 judgement	 for	 participants.	 Half	 of	 them	
considered	that	significant	factors	in	trusting	what	they	came	across	were;	the	extent	–	real	
or	otherwise	-	of	their	own	knowledge;	their	‘gut	feeling’,	or;	a	matter	of	logic	or	plausibility.	
Much	of	 this	also	related	to	the	degree	of	 trust	 that	respondents	placed	 in	 individuals	 they	
were,	 or	 perceived	 to	 be,	 relatively	 familiar	with.	 For	 instance,	 only	 two	 interviewees	 said	
that	they	checked	the	source	of	the	information	(e.g.	Facebook	page,	website,	journalist)	and	
subsequently	based	their	trust	 in	the	content	on	what	they	knew,	or	had	discovered,	about	
this	 source;	whereas	 eight	 of	 them	 instead	 stated	 that	 their	 judgement	was	 based	 on	 the	
person	in	their	network	who	shared	the	content.	For	example,	Rafik	stated	that	he	knew	that	
some	of	his	 friends	 could	not	be	 relied	on	as	 they	often	 inadvertently	 shared	 rumours	and	
misinformation,	whereas	others	were	more	cautious	about	the	information	they	posted.	Two	
respondents	 also	 mentioned	 public	 figures	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 assessment,	 but	 not	
necessarily	of	their	trust.	Meriem,	for	example,	referred	to	the	case	of	a	politician	she	did	not	
trust,	whose	version	of	events	about	an	incident	in	her	town	helped	her	assess	the	veracity	of	
the	 news	 about	 this	 incident.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Mehdi,	 part	 of	 this	 judgement	 was	 based	 on	
factors	 such	 as	 the	 tone	 of	 the	media	 content	 and/or	 how	 rational	 or	 emotive	 its	 author	
seemed,	 and	also	 rested	on	an	assessment	of	 the	profiles	of	other	 social	media	users	who	
shared	 the	 same	 content.	 However,	 this	was	 a	 rather	 unusual	 process	 of	 verification.	 Two	
interviewees	 (Anis	 and	 Youssef)	 also	 grounded	 their	 degree	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 veracity	 of	
information	 on	 the	 social	 media	 platform	 accessed,	 considering	 Twitter	 users	 to	 be	 more	
“educated	 and	 responsible”	 (Anis),	 or	 less	 “ignorant”,	 and	 more	 “noble”	 (Youssef).	 Both	
respondents	considered	Facebook	to	have	become	a	mainstream	platform,	used	by	too	many	
people	lacking	adequate	political	knowledge	and	expertise,	in	contrast	to	a	minority	of	more	
educated,	discerning	and	informed	social	media	users	who	used	Twitter.		
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One	third	of	research	participants	also	referred	to	the	role	of	repetition	of	information	across	
different	sources	as	indicative	of	the	likelihood	of	its	veracity.	Respondents	had	come	across	
misinformation	 on	 so	 many	 different	 media	 outlets	 and	 social	 media	 accounts,	 that	 they	
found	it	difficult	to	fully	trust	any	media	source	in	particular.	As	a	result,	they	tended	to	seek	
exposure	 to	a	 variety	of	 sources.	 The	 repetition	of	news	across	 different	online	and	offline	
networks	 and	 its	 resonance	 on	 a	 large	 scale	 played	 a	 part	 in	 forming	 their	 assessment	 of	
news.	Only	one	participant	 (Anis)	 specifically	 referred	 to	 repetition	as	an	unreliable	way	 to	
judge	whether	news	 items	were	correct	or	not.	However,	many	said	that	regardless	of	how	
they	 tried	 to	 verify	 information,	 for	 some	 content	 there	was	 simply	 no	way	 of	 adequately	
judging	its	veracity.	Four	participants	also	stated	that	they	had	no	trust	in	any	media	source,	
whether	 online	 or	 offline.	 In	 the	 occasional	 occurrences	 where	 respondents	 encountered	
news	content	relating	to	their	local	area,	they	directly	verified	information	and	sought	more	
details	through	their	networks	of	friends	and	families.	This	was	usually	established	over	the	
telephone,	and	a	third	of	 interviewees	mentioned	that	they	adopted	this	approach	of	 ‘first-
hand’	verification,	where	feasible.	
	
Two	further	points	in	relation	to	participants’	trust	in	news	are	particularly	emblematic	of	the	
difficulties	encountered	 in	making	sense	of	news	and	 information	 in	this	media	sphere.	The	
first	point	relates	to	the	level	of	trust	that	respondents	had	in	visual	content.	It	was	striking	
that	 as	 many	 interviewees	 said	 they	 trusted	 news	 more	 when	 it	 was	 supported	 or	
complemented	by	 still	 or	moving	 imagery,	 as	 those	who	 said	 they	 did	 not.	 Indeed,	 several	
respondents	explained	that	they	had	come	across	images	or	videos	that	were	later	revealed	
to	them	as	 fake,	“photoshopped”	or	edited	 in	a	misleading	manner.	Ahmed,	a	supporter	of	
the	Salafi	movement,	 referred	 in	 this	 context	 to	 the	example	of	 the	photo	of	a	young	man	
purportedly	 beaten	 by	 Salafist	 extremists.	 The	 photo,	 he	 said,	 was	 largely	 transmitted	 on	
Facebook	 as	 part	 of	 a	 campaign	 to	 vilify	 the	 movement,	 but	 some	 of	 his	 friends	 on	 the	
platform	proved	 to	him	 that	 the	 image	was	 taken	 in	Morocco	 instead.	Similarly,	he	quoted	
the	 case	 of	 a	 video	 showing	 the	 Interior	 minister	 supposedly	 engaging	 in	 homosexual	
activities	when	he	was	in	prison	under	the	Ben	Ali	regime,	and	Ahmed	described	how	another	
Facebook	user	revealed	that	images	in	the	video	had	been	modified.	The	same	example	was	
equally	quoted	by	two	other	participants	to	explain	their	mistrust	of	visual	content.	
	
The	second	point	relates	to	the	role	of	mass	media	 in	this	context.	Only	seven	respondents	
directly	 referred	 to	 mass	 media	 sources,	 radio	 and	 television	 in	 particular,	 as	 a	 way	 of	
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establishing	the	veracity	of	a	news	item	they	accessed	on	social	media.	As	already	discussed	
earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 a	number	of	participants	 felt	 antagonised	by	 traditional	mass	media	
coverage,	 in	 particular	 government	 supporters.	 A	 few	 of	 them	 expressly	 emphasised	 that	
they	 did	 not	 trust	mass	media	 and	 professional	 journalists.	 Other	 interviewees	 articulated	
fewer	reservations	in	this	regard.	In	this	context,	Sarra	commented:			
	
[Do	you	trust	the	information	you	come	across	on	Facebook?]		
I	mean,	Facebook,	if	it’s	urgent	news	[khabar	aajil],	it	always	has	to	be	verified.	
	
[How	do	you	verify?]	
No,	I	mean,	if	you	find	it	on	[online	newspapers	like]	Businessnews	or…	or	Tanit	Press,	those	
ones	mmm…	you	have	to	take	it	with	a	pinch	of	salt,	but	it’s	really	when	you	find	it	on	Shems	
FM	 [radio],	 when	 it’s	 relayed	 by	 the	 media,	 or	 when	 really	 you	 find	 the	 information	
eeeeeveryhwere78	then	maybe,	but	other	than	that	you	have	to	always	check.	
	
[So	 if	 you	 find	 the	 information	 on	 TV	 or	 on	 the	 radio	 then	 it’s	 confirmed	 because	 it’s	
journalists	who	relay	it?]		
Yes	but	even	then	[laughs],	it	depends,	is	it	something	too	pro-Ennahdha?…	If	it’s	something	
that	is	too	pro-government,	you	have	to	be	wary	also.	I	mean	because	I	have	the	impression	
that	we’re	going	back	a	little	bit	to	propaganda	[tbendir]	you	see,	but	ok	in	general	 if	 it’s	on	
the	radio	and	all	that…	
	
The	 closing	 comments	 in	 the	 above	 extract,	 indicating	 the	 participant’s	 mistrust	 of	 overly	
positive	news	about	the	government,	are	particularly	revealing,	being	explicitly	anchored	 in	
her	 knowledge	 and	 prior	 experience	 of	 propaganda	 under	 past	 regimes	 in	 Tunisia.	 Beyond	
this,	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 trust	 she	 establishes	 is	 significant,	 where	 online	 newspapers	 always	
assume	 a	 lesser	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 mass	 media	 sources	 -	 radio	 journalism,	 in	
particular,	which	is	seen	as	a	more	reliable	source.	However,	this	trust	was	heavily	contingent	
on	 the	 alignment	 of	 the	 media	 message	 with	 her	 existing,	 highly	 critical,	 views	 of	 the	
government.	
	
This	 contrasted	 starkly	 with	 the	 opinion	 of	 Rim,	 who	 supported	 Ennahdha.	 Rim	 held	 little	
regard	for	Tunisian	journalists	in	general:	
	
The	problem	with	journalists	in	Tunisia	is	that	all	the	ones	I	have	come	across	are	subjective.	
Whether	we	are	talking	about	newspapers	or	television	or	Internet,	I	have	lost	trust	in	all	of	it.	
																																																						
78	Emphasis	by	interviewee.	
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She	recalled	reading	one	of	the	national	and	publicly	owned	Tunisian	newspapers	and	feeling	
very	upset	 about	 an	 article	 that	 she	 considered	 to	be	providing	 an	extremely	 exaggerated,	
one-sided	and	negative	representation	of	events	that	were	linked	to	the	party.	This	incident	
was	 the	 last	 time	 that	 Rim	 read	 this	 newspaper.	 Her	 use	 of	 most	 traditional	 mass	 media	
sources	had	been	affected	in	similar	ways	over	time	and	her	exposure	to	media	was	almost	
exclusively	 limited	to	what	she	came	across	on	Facebook.	She	did	not	place	her	trust	 in	the	
information	she	came	across	online	either.	Her	verification	strategies	 relied	on	networks	of	
people	she	felt	she	could	trust	and	these	primarily	consisted	of	supporters	of	Ennahdha	that	
she	communicated	with	online	and	offline.	She	further	explained:	
	
To	 check	 if	 an	 information	 is	 true	 or	 not,	 usually	 I	 start	with	 using	my	 own	 logic,	 whether	
something	makes	 sense	 or	 not.	 Then	 as	 a	 second	 step	 if	 I’m	 not	 sure,	 then	 I	 would	 go	 to	
people	I	know	to	check	with	them	by	asking	them	directly	if	something	had	happened	or	not,	
and	these	are	people	in	whom	I	trust.	
	
For	Rim,	a	perspective	shift	came	when,	earlier	that	year,	she	found	temporary	employment,	
and	 was	 exposed	 to	 the	 opinions	 of	 numerous	 colleagues	 who,	 to	 her	 surprise,	 held	 very	
different	 viewpoints	 to	 hers.	 This	 led	 her	 to	 question	 her	 informational	 practices.	 She	
continued:		
	
[These]	 people	were	 really	 against	Nahdha	and	 some	of	what	 they	 said	 appeared	 to	me	 to	
make	sense	at	times.	There	were	several	times	though	when	I	felt	that	what	they	were	saying	
sounded	like	what’s	in	the	media,	that	they	were	influenced	by	the	media.	I	can’t	fully	follow	
their	reasoning	but	they	showed	me	another	point	of	view	on	politics,	and	it	got	me	thinking	–	
ok	I	trust	the	Nahdha	people	whom	I	get	information	from	and	I	trust	that	they’re	not	lying	to	
me,	 but	 I	wonder	 sometimes	 how	did	 they	 get	 their	 information	 to	 start	with?	 […]	 So	 that	
meant	for	me	that	I	was	only	following	one	angle	on	things,	in	the	same	way	that	the	article	I	
was	talking	about	earlier	was	very	one-sided.	
	
Despite	this	awareness	for	a	need	to	be	exposed	to	alternative	points	of	view,	she	admitted	
that	“in	reality,	I	don’t	manage	to	do	it”.	She	explained	that	this	was	due	to	the	fact	that,	on	
social	media,	the	large	majority	of	her	contacts	and	acquaintances	were	closely	aligned	to	her	
perspective,	 and	 that,	 additionally,	 she	 found	 no	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 media	 sources	 that	
supported	opposing	perspectives.	
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Conclusion	
These	 findings	 underline	 the	 important	 role	 played	 by	 trust	 in	 how	 different	 sources	 of	
information	 and	 news	 were	 perceived	 on	 social	 media.	 	 Selective	 media	 exposure	 was	
apparent	in	the	research	participants’	traditional	media	practices,	but	was	more	pronounced	
in	their	social	media	usage,	as	they	were	able	to	align	their	informational	exposure	with	their	
own	judgements	and	opinions	amid	a	significant	plurality	and	divergence	of	representations	
of	their	public	world.	A	large	majority	of	participants	were	aware	of	the	increasing	corruption	
of	 the	 informational	 space	 in	 Tunisia,	 including	 on	 social	 media,	 and	 they	 developed	 a	
number	 of	 verification	 strategies	 to	 orient	 themselves	 in	 this	 sphere.	 However,	 in	 an	
increasingly	polarised	context,	as	the	interviews	and	online	data	highlight,	existing	notions	of	
journalistic	authority	seemed	to	be	undermined	in	favour	of	drawing	on	sources	that	broadly	
reflected	 the	 political	 stance	 of	 the	 respondent.	 It	 was	 also	 noteworthy	 that,	 in	 most	
verification	 strategies,	personal	 value	 judgement	and	political	opinion	assumed	precedence	
over	other	 factors;	equally	 that	 the	Facebook	pages	 from	which	much	of	 this	 informational	
(and	 ‘misinformational’)	 content	 emanated	were	 rarely	 quoted	 as	 part	 of	 their	 assessment	
criteria,	whereas	such	source	mattered	when	it	came	to	mass	media,	and	to	a	 lesser	extent	
also,	 to	 online	 news	 sites.	 In	 the	 social	 media	 context,	 the	 distributor	 of	 such	 content	
frequently	 appeared	 to	 be	 of	 greater	 relevance	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process	 than	 the	
information	producer.	Within	this	polarised	political	and	media	space,	choices	and	habits	of	
informational	exposure	were	relatively	polarised	too.	Whilst	it	mattered	to	be	informed	and	
politically	 engaged	 after	 the	 revolution,	 respondents	 had	 very	 different	 and	 at	 times	 quite	
opposing	perspectives	on	what	constituted	objective,	credible	and	trustworthy	 information.	
The	 next	 chapter	 examines	 how	 these	 diverging	 informational	 resources	 serve	 to	 support	
participation	 in	 political	 talk	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 communication	 and	 interaction	 between	
citizens.	
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CHAPTER	5	
	
POLITICAL	INVOLVEMENT	AND	THE	NETWORKED	SPHERE	
	
	
1. Introduction	and	theoretical	framing	
		
1.1. Introduction	
	
I	 vividly	 remember	 seeing	 one	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 last	 speeches	 prior	 to	 his	 self-imposed	 exile,	 in	
January	 2011.	 I	 was	 visiting	 Tunisia	 at	 the	 time,	 and	meeting	 a	 cousin	 in	 one	 of	 the	 new	
mixed-gender	cafés	in	the	capital.	The	atmosphere	was	lively,	as	a	football	match	was	being	
broadcast	live	on	a	large	projector	screen,	and	the	place	was	buzzing	with	conversation.	My	
cousin	and	I	were	not	paying	particular	attention	to	the	football	match,	but	at	some	point	we	
noticed	 that	 the	noise	had	abruptly	died	down.	When	we	 turned	around,	we	saw	 that	Ben	
Ali’s	figure	had	filled	the	screen.	His	impromptu	address	to	the	nation	was	in	response	to	the	
rising	protest	movements	in	the	country.	This	speech	was	to	be	the	last	one	in	which	Ben	Ali	
spoke	 in	classical	Arabic	 to	his	people.	 In	another	announcement	a	week	 later,	he	spoke	to	
the	nation	 in	 the	 local	Tunisian	dialect	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	his	presidency;	an	apparent	 last	
ditch	attempt	to	appeal	directly	to	the	population,	and	to	regain	their	trust.	Two	days	later	he	
fled	 the	country	 to	what	was	 to	become	permanent	exile	 in	Saudi	Arabia.	 In	 scheduling	his	
speech	 to	 air	 in	 the	middle	of	 a	 national	 sports	 event,	 the	 former	president	was	 seeking	 a	
wider	reach	and	proximity	to	Tunisians,	and	in	particular	the	youth	demographic	who	were	at	
the	heart	of	the	protests.	The	decision	was	also	arguably	an	attempt	to	reassert	his	authority,	
by	demonstrating	that	he	still	possessed	the	capability	to	intrude	into	their	personal	space	by	
appearing,	unannounced,	within	one	of	 the	 few	public	 spaces	of	 social	 interaction	 in	which	
they	 could	 gather	 relatively	 freely.	 After	 the	 short	 speech,	 the	 channel	 returned	 to	 the	
football	 match,	 yet	 it	 was	 apparent	 that	 the	 atmosphere	 had	 dramatically	 changed.	
Everybody	in	the	café	was	staring	at	each	other	in	silence,	and	no-one	openly	commented	on,	
or	even	 referred	 to,	 the	 speech.	Eventually	 the	 silence	gave	way	 to	 the	murmur	of	hushed	
conversations	 amid	 a	 general	 sense	 of	 unease	 and	 suspicion.	 This	 experience	 starkly	
contrasted	 with	 that	 of	 my	 next	 visit	 to	 Tunisia,	 two	 months	 after	 the	 revolution,	 when	
private	 and	 public	 spaces	were	 completely	 dominated	 by	 discussions	 about	 current	 affairs	
and	politics.		
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This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 forms	 of	 political	 expression	 and	 involvement	 that	 research	
participants	adopted	 in	the	post-revolution	Tunisian	context.	Whereas	the	previous	chapter	
assessed	how	they	accessed	news	and	other	matters	of	public	concern,	and	the	role	of	social	
media	within	this	process,	this	chapter	extends	the	discussion	to	how	the	participants	acted,	
interacted	and	communicated	in	relation	to	their	knowledge	of,	and	interest	in,	these	issues.	I	
explore	the	various	communicative	possibilities	provided	by	social	media,	and	whether	they	
made	 any	 difference	 to	 the	 participants’	 ability	 to	 act	 on	 their	 opinions,	 or	 possibly	 even	
influence	 their	 shared	 public	 world.	 Whereas	 the	 previous	 chapter	 addressed	 content	
reception	issues	(news	in	particular),	here	I	focus	on	questions	of	production	and	distribution	
of	 communicative	 messages	 and	 media	 content.	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	 ways	 an	
understanding	of	socio-political	reality,	and	the	civic	and	political	 identities	 it	relates	to,	are	
expressed	and	externalised	in	the	networked,	and	ambiguous,	public-private	communicative	
context.	 I	 aim	 to	 better	 clarify	 how	 this	 process	 unfolds	 in	 relation	 to	 social	 media’s	
communicative	possibilities,	and	what	meanings	respondents	attach	to	these	opportunities	in	
what	could,	arguably,	be	termed	a	public	sphere.	
	
I	 approach	 this	 analysis	 through	 three	 main	 areas	 of	 enquiry.	 First	 I	 explore	 forms	 of	
participation	 in,	 and	 connection	 to,	 the	 formal	 political	 sphere.	 My	 aim	 is	 to	 establish	
whether	the	heightened	politicized	context	 in	Tunisia	translates,	 for	the	respondents	 in	this	
sample,	into	involvement	with	formal	organized	political	structures	and	institutions	and	what	
this	form	of	participation	is	motivated	or	undermined	by.	This	contextualization	provides	an	
important	 background	 to	 the	 subsequent	 question	 of	 whether	 social	 media	 makes	 a	
difference,	for	the	study	participants,	in	terms	of	proximity	to	this	formal	political	sphere.	My	
second	area	of	enquiry	focuses	on	the	communicative	space	between	citizens.	 I	explore	the	
participative	 dimensions	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 political	 talk	 and	 communication	 between	
citizens	online	and	offline,	and	seek	to	assess	the	meanings	and	purposes	that	respondents	
associate	 with	 these	 forms	 of	 interactions	 with	 other	 citizens	 in	 both	 communicative	
contexts.	My	 third	 strand	 of	 inquiry	more	 specifically	 examines	 the	 differences	 in	 levels	 of	
privacy	and	publicness	of	this	communicative	space	on	social	media,	and	what	the	visibility	of	
citizens’	political	opinions	and	 identity	expressions	on	 social	media	means	 in	 terms	of	 their	
sustained	communicative	participation	in	this	networked	sphere.	
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1.2. Action,	participation	and	communication	
	
At	 heart,	 this	 chapter	 explores	 what	 forms	 of	 participation	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 public	 and	
political	 spheres,	 has	 translated	 into,	 after	 decades	 of	 authoritarian	 control,	 for	 the	 web-
connected	 Tunisian	 citizens	 who	 took	 part	 in	 this	 study.	 	 It	 is	 consequently	 important	 to	
better	 frame	 the	 notion	 of	 participation,	 its	 relation	 to	media,	 and	 the	 debates	 that	 arose	
about	social	media’s	participative	potential.	Whilst	 the	scope	and	focus	of	 this	project	does	
not	allow	for	a	detailed	theoretical	examination	of	the	notion	of	participation	-	an	extensive	
area	of	debate	in	a	number	of	academic	fields79	-	the	following	discussion	provides	a	sketch	of	
the	main	elements	relevant	to	this	chapter.	
	
In	political	theory,	the	notion	of	political	participation	emphasises	the	possibility	for	citizens	
to	 influence	 decision-making	 processes	 (Verba	 et	 al.,	 1978),	 opportunities	 that	 need	 to	 be	
distributed	relatively	equally	for	democratic	governance	to	be	effective.	However,	it	can	also	
generate	extremely	varied	understandings	of	what	constitutes	forms	of	citizens’	involvement	
in	a	democracy	(Carpentier	and	Dahlgren	2011).	These	variations	relate	to	different	ways	of	
conceiving	the	balance	and	distribution	of	power	between	citizens	and	their	representatives	
in	 a	 democracy,	 ranging	 from	 what	 Carpentier	 (2011a)	 calls	 ‘maximalist’	 to	 ‘minimalist’	
perspectives	 on	 participation.	 In	 simplified	 terms,	 minimalist	 viewpoints	 consider	 that	
citizens’	 democratic	 participation	 ought	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 voting	 and	 that	 power	 should,	
thereafter,	 be	 exclusively	 delegated	 to	 designated	 political	 representatives,	 a	 political	 elite	
who,	under	this	viewpoint,	is	considered	as	uniquely	positioned	to	evaluate	decision-making	
processes	 (e.g.	 Schumpeter,	 1976).	 At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 this	 continuum,	 the	 maximalist	
viewpoint	considers	that	it	is	important	for	citizens	at	large	to	be	involved	in	relevant	public	
matters	and	decision-making	processes,	and	 that	 their	participation,	even	at	a	minimal	and	
indirect	level,	is	crucial	to	sustaining	democratic	citizenship	and	to	holding	decision-makers	to	
account.	Within	 this	 range,	 participation	 includes	what	 is	more	 traditionally	 understood	 as	
forms	 of	 involvement	 in	 formal	 democratic	 processes	 and	 structures	 (e.g.	 voting,	
participation	 in	 political	 parties	 and	 civil	 society	 associations),	 as	 well	 as	 less	 structured	
activities	 such	 as	 participation	 in	 protests,	 or	 the	 signing	 of	 petitions.	 The	 maximalist	
perspective	 equally	 incorporates,	 as	 a	 form	 of	 participation,	 citizens’	 involvement	 in	 the	
public	 sphere,	 where	 information	 and	 opinions	 related	 to	 matters	 of	 shared	 concern	 are	
communicated,	a	sphere	in	which	media	are	thus	central	as	they	“are	the	main	mechanisms	
of	creating	voice	and	visibility	in	society”	(Fuchs,	2014a,	p.70).	
																																																						
79	For	an	overview,	see,	for	instance,	Lamprianou	(2013)	and	Carpentier	(2011b).	
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Two	 categories	 of	 participation	 can	 be	 distinguished	 in	 relation	 to	 media,	 what	 is	 termed	
‘participation	 in	media’	 on	 one	 hand,	 and	 ‘participation	 through	media’	 on	 the	 other.	 The	
former	 refers	 to	 citizens’	 direct	 involvement	 in	 media	 structures	 and	 content	 production,	
whereas	the	latter	points	to	the	way	that	the	media	supports	citizens’	participation	in	a	more	
oblique	 manner	 by	 providing	 an	 informational	 and	 communicative	 space	 in	 which	 public	
debate,	 opinion	 expression	 and	 self-representation	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 can	 be	 based	
(Carpentier,	2007	and	2011b).	As	resources	available	to	citizens	for	the	production	of	media	
content	 have	 been,	 traditionally,	 relatively	 limited,	 and	 as	 symbolic	 resources	 have	 been	
predominantly	 concentrated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 limited	 number	 of	mass	media	 institutions,	
media’s	 role	 in	 supporting	participation	has	mainly	been	considered	as	 relating	 to	 forms	of	
participation	 through	 media.	 In	 other	 words,	 media’s	 participatory	 dimension	 was,	
traditionally,	 mainly	 identified	 as	 mass	 media’s	 provision	 of	 a	 communicative	 space	 that	
informs	citizens,	 supports	public	debate,	 represents	public	opinion,	and	contributes	 to	civic	
and	political	culture	more	broadly.	However,	this	paradigm	has	been	increasingly	challenged	
over	 recent	 decades	 (Blumler	 and	 Coleman,	 2013)	 as	 disengagement	 from	 institutional	
politics	 and	 electoral	 processes	 reached	 unprecedented	 levels	 in	 western	 post-industrial	
societies,	most	notably	among	the	younger	generation	(Fieldhouse	et	al.,	2007).	Among	other	
things,	this	has	suggested	an	apparent	failure	of	the	media	sphere	in	supporting	democratic	
citizenship,	insofar	as	sustaining	the	relationship	between	citizens	and	their	representatives	-	
and	encouraging	active	participation	through	media	-	is	concerned.		
	
Against	this	backdrop,	the	drastic	increase	in	opportunities	for	citizens	to	participate	directly	
in	media,	through	new	digital	communication	technologies,	has	raised	many	hopes	about	the	
emergence	 of	 new	 social	 movements	 and	 of	 alternative	 structures	 through	 which	 citizens	
may	able	to	exercise	a	more	tangible	influence	on	the	decision-making	process,	and	engender	
a	new	 form	of	power	 that	 is	 autonomous	 from	 institutional	political	 structures	and	 control	
(Sormanen	 and	 Dutton,	 2015).	 These	 changes	 have	 often	 been	 captured	 by	 a	 shift	 in	
terminology	from	mass	media	reception	to	new	media	usage,	and	‘produsage’	(Bruns,	2006),	
and	from	passive	media	consumerism	to	online	activism.	The	possibility	of	realising	this	has	
been	 heightened	 in	 the	 networked	 Internet	 age,	 in	 which	 the	 opportunities	 for	 public	
communication	have	been	vastly	expanded,	coordination	of	political	action	and	mobilisation	
facilitated,	 and	 where	 citizens’	 access	 to	 alternative	 information	 sources,	 or	 the	 ability	 to	
produce	 and	 distribute	 media	 content,	 is	 far	 greater.	 Social	 media	 carry	 the	 potential	 to	
substantially	 extend	 participative	 opportunities,	 to	 increase	 and	 diversify	 democratic	
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mobilisation,	 and	 to	 facilitate	 a	 path	 towards	 more	 personalised	 and	 flexible	 networked	
action	(Shirky,	2009;	Carty,	2010;	Castells,	2012;	Bennett,	2012).	Perhaps	most	notably,	it	has	
a	 marked	 potential	 to	 counter	 the	 issue	 of	 voter	 disengagement	 and	 to	 support	 the	
politicisation	of	new	sections	of	the	citizenry	(Anduiza	et	al.,	2012).		
	
New	media	 can	 support	 the	emergence	of	 alternative	 communicative,	 affective,	 and	 socio-
political	 structures,	 and	 spaces	 for	 action	 among	 activist	 groups,	 as	 well	 as	 among	
uncoordinated	 groups	 of	 citizens.	 Furthermore,	 it	 destabilizes	 the	 hierarchies	 of	 political	
communication	 in	 substantial	 ways,	 not	 only	 by	 altering	 opportunities	 for	 horizontal	
communicative	 interactions	 between	 citizens	 and	 supporting	 civic	 culture	 (Dahlgren	 and	
Alvares,	 2013),	 but	 also	 by	 framing	 in	 new	ways	 communication	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	
institutional	 political	 sphere	 (e.g.	 Blumler	 and	 Gurevitch,	 2001),	 with	 potentially	 important	
ramifications	 for	 how	 politics,	 and	 the	 role	 of	media	within	 it	 are	 conceived.	 For	 example,	
possibilities	for	new	forms	of	less	centralised	digital	or	electronic	government	have	been	the	
focus	 of	 much	 attention,	 and	 been	 heralded	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 a	 profound	 shift	 in	 citizens’	
relationship	 with	 institutional	 politics.	 The	 implementation	 of	 this	 vision	 continues,	 in	
practice,	 to	 be	 relatively	 limited,	 however,	 and	 it	 still	 faces	 a	 number	 of	 unresolved	
challenges	(e.g.	Di	Maria	and	Rizzo,	2005;	Rios	Insua	and	French,	2010;	Gil-Garcia,	2013).		
	
Most	 prominently	 perhaps,	 new	 media’s	 communicative	 opportunities	 revived	 hopes	 of	 a	
thriving	and	more	egalitarian	online	public	sphere,	as	alternative	and	citizen-led	 journalistic	
initiatives	 emerged	 (Forde,	 2011),	 news	 distribution	 possibilities	were	 radically	 overhauled,	
and	spaces	for	public	debate	and	deliberation	were	significantly	expanded.	The	notion	of	the	
public	 sphere	 –	 in	 its	 original	 Habermasian	 conceptualisation	 (1989	 [1962])	 or	 its	 various	
reassessments	 (e.g.	Fraser,	1992;	Dahlgren,	1995;	Meyer	and	Moors,	2006;	Dahlberg,	2007;	
Murphy,	2011)	 -	 has	 served	as	one	of	 the	dominant	 frameworks	 for	 the	exploration	of	 the	
media’s	 role	 in	 supporting	 citizens’	 communicative	 involvement	 in	 political	 matters	 they	
consider	to	have	in	common.	As	a	sphere	that	mediates	between	state	and	society,	in	which	
individuals	and	groups	coalesce	to	form	public	opinion,	the	Habermasian	public	sphere	(1989	
[1962],	 1996)	 provides	 an	 ideal	 of	 how,	 within	 a	 deliberative	 democratic	 model,	 political	
power	can	be	counter-balanced	through	communicative	means.	Habermas	conceived	of	this	
sphere	as	relating	“neither	to	the	functions	nor	to	the	contents	of	everyday	communication”,	
but	 instead	 “to	 the	 social	 space	 generated	 in	 communicative	 action”	 (1996,	 p.360).	 He	
defined	the	terms	of	this	concept	as	follows:	
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By	the	public	sphere	we	mean	first	of	all	a	realm	of	our	social	life	in	which	something	
approaching	public	opinion	can	be	formed.	Access	is	guaranteed	to	all	citizens.	A	portion	of	
the	public	sphere	comes	into	being	in	every	conversation	in	which	private	individuals	
assemble	to	form	a	public	body	(…).	In	a	large	public	body	this	kind	of	communication	requires	
specific	means	of	transmitting	information	and	influencing	those	who	receive	it.	Today	
newspapers	and	magazines,	radio	and	television	are	the	media	of	the	public	sphere	(1974	
[1964],	p.49).	
	
Habermas’	original	account	of	the	public	sphere	was	anchored	in	a	discussion	of	the	historical	
transformation	of	the	structure	of	private	and	public	realms.	He	framed	the	emergence	of	the	
public	sphere	by	tracing	the	fall	of	a	feudalized	social	order,	and	the	concurrent	emergence	of	
an	 alternative	 political	 space	 through	 the	 development	 of	 a	 new	 communicative	 sphere	
where	critical	exchanges	on	public	issues	took	place,	thus	a	space	that	carried	the	potential	of	
holding	 political	 institutions	 to	 account.	 This	 idealised	 conceptualisation	 has	 been	 widely	
debated	 and	 critiqued80,	 giving	 rise	 to	 alternative	 concepts	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 public	
sphere.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 continues	 to	 serve	 as	 an	 important	 reference	 point	 and	 useful	
framework	 for	 discussions	 on	 the	 participatory	 affordances	 of	 citizens’	 communicative	 and	
politically-oriented	activities,	 and	 the	notion	has	once	again	gained	currency	 in	 conjunction	
with	the	expansion	of	new	media	use.	
	
Indeed,	 if	 print	media	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 and	 development	 of	 a	 public	 sphere,	 a	 space	
subsequently	 re-feudalised	 -	 as	 per	 Habermas’	 account	 -	 by	 a	mass	media	 industry	 driven	
primarily	by	profit,	many	have	seen	in	the	emergence	of	new	media	the	hope	of	the	rise	of	a	
new	online	public	sphere.	Under	this	perspective,	new	media	can	support	the	destabilisation	
of	 and	ultimate	 transcendence	over	 the	dominant	 influence	of	media	 and	political	 elites	 in	
the	production	of	media	content	and	 the	framing	of	public	discourse.	For	 instance,	Benkler	
(2006)	 argued	 that	 the	 Internet	 has	 a	 profoundly	 democratising	 impact	 as	 it	 transforms	
citizens’	 relationship	 to	 the	 public	 sphere,	 facilitating	 their	 communicative	 participation	 in	
public	 conversation	 and	 freeing	 them	 from	 former	 passive	 consumer-oriented	 modes	 of	
engagement	with	media	content	(p.272).	In	The	Wealth	of	Networks,	Benkler	frames	the	shift	
from	a	mass-mediated	public	sphere	to	a	new	networked	public	sphere	(2006,	p.10),	whose	
democratising	 impact	 stems	 from	 overcoming	 a	 number	 of	 obstacles	 which,	 he	 considers,	
face	 traditional	 media	 forms	 in	 liberal	 contexts.	 Benkler	 considers	 mass	 media	 to	 be	
characterised	by	a	limited	representativeness,	a	disproportionate	influence	in	shaping	public	
																																																						
80	In	particular,	its	historical	accuracy	has	been	contested,	as	well	as	its	narrow	and	exclusionary	delineation	of	the	social	actors	
participating	in	this	sphere,	and	the	rationalist	terms	under	which	deliberation	ought	to	be	conducted.	
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opinion,	 and	as	having	a	 vested	 commercial	 interest	 in	avoiding	 in-depth	engagement	with	
political	matters.	Instead,	he	argues,	the	newly	opened	avenues	for	the	use,	production	and	
diffusion	 of	 information	 now	 offer	 “a	 range	 of	 possibilities	 for	 pursuing	 the	 core	 political	
values	of	liberal	societies”	(ibid,	p.8).	The	power	of	mass	media	to	set	the	agenda	for	political	
deliberation	is	gradually	being	challenged	by	an	increasingly	organised	new	communications	
field	where	 “non-market,	peer-produced	alternative	 sources	of	 filtration	and	accreditation”	
(ibid,	p.12)	are	emerging	and	allowing	 individuals	and	groups	 to	engage	 in	 issues	of	 shared	
concern.		
	
The	 emergence	 of	 social	 media	 has	 further	 facilitated	 and	 expanded	 access	 to	 new	
opportunities	 for	 civic	 and	 political	 engagement	 (Freezell	 et	 al.,	 2009)	 that	 include	 swifter,	
easier,	and	cheaper	means	of	opinion	expression,	creative	exchange,	support,	collaboration	
and	 self-representation,	 and	 concomitantly,	 it	 has	 intensified	 the	 debate	 about	 the	
participative	 merits	 of	 online	 communication	 and	 interaction	 (Theocharis,	 2015).	 Jenkins	
(2006),	 Castells	 (2009)	 and	 Papacharissi	 (2010)	 saw	 in	 social	 media’s	 reconfiguration	 of	
communicative	 flows	 in	 society	 an	 important	 democratising	 feature	 that	 supports	 the	
emergence	and	development	of	new	virtual	spheres	 for	political	expression	among	citizens,	
and	 the	 integration	 of	 private	 political	 identities	 to	 new	 public	 spheres.	 The	 role	 of	 social	
networking	 platforms	 such	 as	 Facebook	 has	 been	 of	 particular	 interest	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
facilitation	of	civic	and	political	exchange,	and	their	broadening	of	this	space	to	social	groups	
formerly	 considered	 as	 politically	 marginalised	 and/or	 disengaged	 (e.g.	 Fernandes	 et	 al.,	
2010;	Christensen	and	Bengtsson,	2011;	Bode	et	al.,	2013).	
	
However,	 whilst	 possibilities	 for	 involvement	 in	 the	 networked	 public	 sphere	 are	
unparalleled,	 numerous	 limitations	 to	 this	 line	 of	 argument	 have	 also,	 rightly,	 been	
highlighted	 by	 a	 number	 of	 researchers	 and	 academics	 in	 the	 field.	 For	 instance,	 as	 Fuchs	
(2014a)	 argues,	 the	materiality	 and	 political	 economy	 of	 public	 spheres	 online	 tend	 to	 be,	
somewhat	 alarmingly,	 overlooked	 in	 idealistic	 readings	 of	 the	 new	 communicative	
opportunities	 that	 social	media	 can	offer.	 Furthermore,	 traditional	mass	media	 continue	 to	
play	 a	 relatively	 important	 role	 in	 framing	 the	 representation	 of	 public	 issues	 and,	 thus	
implicitly	 also	 in	 shaping	 public	 perceptions	 and	 opinions	 (Redden,	 2011).	 As	 evidenced	 by	
the	previous	chapter	 in	this	study,	access	to	alternative	media	and	information	sources	also	
generates	a	number	of	problematic	 issues	as	hierarchies	of	 trust	 in	new	and	old	media	are	
altered,	 news	 consumption	 practices	 are	 more	 fragmented,	 and	 opinion	 enclaves	 are,	 at	
times,	 reinforced.	 Assessments	 of	 the	 theory	 and	 practice	 of	 democratic	 debate	 on	 the	
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Internet	have	also	progressively	drawn	a	much	more	nuanced	picture	than	early	hopes	of	a	
revived	online	public	sphere	had	initially	raised	(Jankowski	and	Van	Selm,	2000;	Papacharissi,	
2010).	 The	quality	of	democratic	exchange	 taking	place	 in	 this	 context,	 and	 the	 capacity	of	
this	 sphere	 to	generate	constructive	debate	have	been	an	area	of	concern.	Howard	 (2006),	
for	example,	argues	that,	rather	than	expanding	opportunities	for	exchange	and	deliberation,	
the	online	 communicative	 space	may	 favour	expressions	of	outrage	by	 the	opinionated	 (as	
opposed	to	the	informed),	thus	thinning	citizenship	roles.		
	
Paralleling	 previous	 debates	 about	 traditional	 mass	 media’s	 role	 in	 citizens’	 political	
involvement,	questions	arise	about	the	meaningfulness	and	participative	merits	of	different	
forms	and	 formats	of	online	 communication	 in	 relation	 to	 the	broader	political	 realm.	 	 For	
example,	a	number	of	critiques	of	over-simplified	and	de-contextualised	positive	accounts	of	
so-called	 ‘clicktivism’	 (activism	 through	 clicks)	 have	 emerged	 in	 this	 context	 (e.g.	 Gladwell,	
2011;	 Morozov	 2013),	 as	 well	 as	 calls	 for	 more	 cautious	 appraisals	 of	 the	 participative	
opportunities	 facilitated	 by	 social	 media	 (Loader	 and	 Mercea,	 2011).	 Beyond	 this,	 doubts	
have	 also	 been	 shed	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 online	 media	 use	 supports	 democratisation	
rather	 than	 empowering	 authoritarian	 regimes’	 control	 over	 their	 populations	 (Morozov,	
2011),	 and	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 online	 space	 simply	 reflects	 offline	 political	 hierarchies	
(Hindman,	2009).	 Some	have	even	argued	 that	 the	use	of	new	media	may	be	undermining	
people’s	very	capability	to	intellectually	engage	with	their	surroundings	(Carr,	2010).		
	
Equally,	 these	 developments,	 perhaps	 most	 markedly	 than	 before,	 threaten	 traditional	
notions	of	what	political	action	actually	consists	of,	and	 intensify	contemporary	debates	on	
what	 can	 be	 characterised	 as	 political	 participation	 (Hoffman,	 2012;	 Della	 Porta,	 2013;	
Hooghe	et	al.,	2014;	Zuckerman,	2014;	Frame,	2016).	Although	the	exact	delineation	of	 the	
term	 has	 always	 been	 open	 to	 debate	 (as	mentioned	 earlier),	 its	 definition	 becomes	 even	
more	problematic	in	the	new,	networked	media	age,	making	it	increasingly	over-stretched,	as	
Carpentier	 (2011b)	observes.	Not	only	 is	 it	 	difficult	 to	reach	a	consensus	over	the	forms	of	
online	behaviour	that	can	be	considered	reflections	of,	or	equivalent	to,	formerly	recognised	
offline	participatory	actions,	but	arguments	are	being	raised	in	favour	of	the	inclusion	in	the	
definition	 of	 new	 forms	 of	 action	 specific	 to	 the	 digitally	 networked	 environment.	 Bennett	
and	 Segerberg	 (2012),	 for	 instance,	 identify	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 form	 of	 action	 with	
social	 media	 use,	 which	 they	 characterise	 as	 “recombinant	 digitally	 networked	 action	
(RDNA)”.	This	large-scale	form	of	participation,	they	contend,	at	once	facilitates	personalised	
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engagement	and	collective	action,	whilst	being	largely	freed	from	the	challenges	inherent	in	
the	organisation	and	management	of	large	group	actions	and	ideological	collectiveness.		
	
Conversely,	issues	also	arise	when	widening	the	definitional	scope	of	participation.	Carpentier	
(2011b),	 for	 instance,	 highlights	 that	 mere	 access	 to,	 and	 interaction	 with,	 media	 do	 not	
necessarily	 constitute	 forms	 of	 participation,	 albeit	 being	 preconditions	 of	 media-related	
participation.	 Instead,	 he	 contends	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 participation	 should	 continue	 to	
emphasize	dynamics	of	 power,	 influence,	 and	 their	 distribution	 in	 society81.	 The	distinction	
between	participation	and	access/interaction	 is	 located,	according	to	Carpentier,	within	the	
“key	role	attributed	to	power”	(2011b,	p.174),	arguably	a	crucial	distinction,	but	one	that	also	
leaves	 unexplored,	 in	 my	 opinion,	 the	 question	 of	 whose	 perspective	 this	 attribution	 of	
power	 is	 based	 on.	 Indeed,	 whilst	 I	 agree	 that	 many	 media	 interactions	 may	 have	 no	
participatory	 dimension,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 an	 outside	 observer	 to	 evaluate	 the	 impetus	
underlying	some	online	interactions	and	the	intended	influence	‘those	doing	the	interacting’	
may	attribute	 to	 their	acts,	 a	perspective	 that	 remains	under-explored	 in	debates	on	 social	
media	 and	 participation.	 This	 question	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 networked	
online	communications	where	user	 interactions	and	modes	of	communication	are	relatively	
new,	 unestablished	 and	 susceptible	 to	 rapid	 change.	 Such	 new	 communicative	 forms	 also	
serve	 to	 blur	 the	 distinctions	 between	 not	 only	 interaction	 and	 participation,	 but	 also	 the	
private	and	public	spheres,	identity	expression	and	political	act,	as	well	as	the	delimitation	of	
the	intended	audience	of	a	specific	communicative	act	(Marwick	and	boyd,	2011;	Baym	and	
boyd,	2012).	In	exploring	questions	relating	to	social	media	participation,	it	thus	matters	for	
the	purposes	of	this	study	to	adopt	a	particularly	wide	definitional	scope	of	what	constitutes	
participation,	 but	 furthermore	 to	 query	 the	 level	 of	 power	 and	 influence	 that	 users	
themselves	attribute	to	their	online	practices	and	interactions	on	social	media.	
	
	
2. Participation	in	formal	politics	online	and	offline	
	
To	 start	 this	 exploration,	 I	 first	 turn	 to	 forms	 of	 involvement	 and	 activism	 in	 institutional	
politics.	 I	 aim	 to	 assess	 respondents’	 engagement	 and	 participation	 with	 formal	 political	
processes,	 parties,	 organisations,	 and	 representatives	 in	 order	 to	 determine,	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	 to	 what	 extent	 their	 interest	 in	 developments	 in	 the	 country	 and	 their	 desire	 to	
																																																						
81	The	distinction	between	participation	and	access/interaction	is	located,	according	to	Carpentier,	within	the	“key	role	
attributed	to	power”	(2011b,	p.174),	but	the	question	of	whose	perspective	this	attribution	of	power	is	based	on,	is	not	
explored.		
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influence	them	translate	 into	 involvement	on	this	 level,	and	on	the	other	hand,	what	forms	
this	 involvement	 takes	 offline	 and	 online.	 I	 argue	 that,	 overall,	 the	 highly	 politicised	 post-
revolution	 context	 does	 not	 translate	 into	 heightened	 levels	 of	 participation	 in	 formal	
political	structures	and	institutions	due	to	a	number	of	obstacles	(distrust	of	political	sphere,	
perceived	 freedom	 restriction,	 difficulties	 of	 access,	 unwelcoming	 environment	 for	
newcomers),	 but	 that	 social	 media,	 beyond	 opportunities	 for	 the	 organisation	 and	
coordination	of	political	actions,	enables	more	proximity	for	citizens	in	their	everyday	lives	to	
the	formal	political	sphere.	
	
2.1. Participants	involved	in	formal	politics	
	
At	first	glance,	 it	appears	that	a	non-negligible	proportion	of	participants	 in	the	sample	had	
acted	 on	 their	 interest	 in	 the	 socio-political	 developments	 in	 the	 country	 by	 seeking	
involvement	with	 formal	political	 structures.	Although	 the	majority	of	participants	 (twenty-
one	 out	 of	 thirty)	 did	 not	 pursue	 this	 form	 of	 participation,	 seven	 research	 participants	 in	
total	indicated	that	they	had	been	involved,	or	experimented	with	involvement,	in	a	political	
party	 since	 the	 revolution.	 Additionally,	 two	 respondents	 had	 participated	 in	 civil	 society	
associations.	Levels	of	participation	in	party	structures	varied.	For	example,	one	respondent	
(Sarra)	had	temporarily	campaigned	for	a	party	during	the	election	period	 in	October	2011,	
but	 was	 no	 longer	 involved;	 two	 were	 not	 registered	 with	 a	 party	 but	 regularly	 attended	
party	meetings,	 and	 four	were	 registered	and	active	party	members.	 The	majority	of	 these	
interviewees	 had	 no	 previous	 experience	 of	 participation	 in	 politics.	 The	 early	 post-
revolutionary	 phase	 in	 Tunisia	 engaged	many	 citizens	 in	 the	 political	 developments	 of	 the	
country	 and	 provided	 new	 opportunities	 to	 become	 part	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 institutional	
politics.	The	first	elections	after	the	revolution	(October	2011)	saw	a	total	of	81	parties	and	
hundreds	of	independent	candidates	present	themselves	on	the	electoral	lists82.	Only	Habib,	
the	oldest	participant	 in	this	particular	group,	had	been	politically	active	 in	the	past.	All	 the	
others	were	under	the	age	of	thirty-five	and	new	to	party	politics.	
	
The	 participants’	 reflections	 on	 their	 motivations	 for	 becoming	 politically	 involved	 in	 this	
manner	illustrated	-	with	some	poignancy	-	the	depth	of	emotional	connection	and	sense	of	
idealism	 that	 individuals	 associated	 with	 their	 activities.	 Although	 some	 of	 them	 were	 at	
opposite	ends	of	 the	political	 spectrum,	 shared	aspirations,	 and	 similar	notions	of	 freedom	
and	justice	were	nevertheless	expressed.	Those	affiliated	with	the	governing	Islamist	party	at	
																																																						
82	A	total	of	11,686	candidates	across	1,517	electoral	lists.
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the	time	of	the	interviews	in	2012	referred	to	the	injustices	suffered	by	Islamist	supporters	in	
the	 past.	 A	 heightened	 sense	 of	 identification	with	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 repression,	many	 of	
whom	were	imprisoned	or	were	forced	to	live	in	exile	or	in	hiding	during	the	latter	half	of	Ben	
Ali's	regime,	gave	a	particular	sense	of	urgency	to	the	party’s	supporters	to	value	the	political	
freedom	gained	with	the	revolution,	and	to	participate	in	the	construction	of	a	new	social	and	
political	project.	Rim,	who	was	twenty-six	years	old	when	I	first	 interviewed	her,	articulated	
this	motivation	 by	 sharing	 the	 story	 of	 one	 of	 her	 close	 relatives	who	was	 affected	 by	 the	
Islamist	 persecution	 in	 the	 nineties.	 Reflecting	 on	 her	 involvement	 with	 the	 Islamist	 party	
after	the	revolution,	she	did	not	refer	to	any	particular	aspects	of	its	political	programme	or	
activities,	 but	 instead	 to	 her	 hope	 for	 change	 and	 prior	 inability	 to	 express	 that	 need.	 Her	
political	activities	with	the	party	thus	offered	a	real	emotional	release:	
	
As	soon	as	the	revolution	happened,	for	me,	something	had	to	be	done	for	those	people	who	
suffered	 so	much	 and	were	humiliated	 so	much,	 including	 [my	 family	member].	 So	 for	me,	
personally,	after	the	revolution,	I	felt	like	I	could	breathe	again.	I	have	always	been	looking	to	
solve	that	problem,	so	for	me	to	adhere	to	a	political	party	seemed	to	be	one	of	the	possible	
solutions	I	was	looking	for.	
	
Political	involvement	in	this	instance	appears	to	offer	a	solution	for	Rim	that	fulfils	both	socio-
political	and	personal	needs.	Paralleling	this	discourse	on	the	other	side	of	the	political	range,	
a	similar	lack	of	reflection	on	the	political	merits	of	party	programmes	or	activities	was	found.	
Instead,	subjects	often	placed	more	emphasis	on	identification	with	social	groups	positioned	
as	 victims,	 and	 they	 referred	 to	 the	 threat	 they	perceived	 to	 stem	 from	 the	party	 coalition	
then	in	power.	Nabil	reflected	on	his	attendance	of	an	opposition	party's	meetings	as	follows:	
	
Now	there	are	almost	no	people	who	are	 inactive	any	 longer,	they	are	all83	 in	a	party,	 in	an	
association,	 it's	 become	 like	 an	 automatic	 thing	because...	 in	 order	 to	 express	 your	opinion	
and	defend	yourself,	because	we	feel	we	have	to	defend	ourselves.	
	
In	 both	 examples,	 political	 affiliations	 are	 based	 on	 existing	 identifications	 and	 a	 sense	 of	
group	belonging,	rather	than	an	articulation	of	social	or	political	goals	and	strategies.		
	
																																																						
83	This	was	not	reflected	in	the	study	findings.	As	previously	mentioned,	under	one	third	of	the	sample	was	politically	active	in	
this	way.	Research	by	the	UNFPA	(2015)	and	the	National	Youth	Observatory	/	Observatoire	National	de	la	Jeunesse	(2013)	
indicate	an	even	more	pronounced	trend	among	Tunisian	youth	in	subsequent	years	with	ninety	per	cent	of	respondents	
considering	participation	in	public	and	political	life	as	important,	but	only	six	per	cent	participating	in	civil	society	organizations	
and	three	per	cent	in	political	parties.	
161	
	
Furthermore,	 a	 closer	 assessment	 of	 the	 backgrounds	 and	 motivations	 of	 this	 group	 of	
respondents	 indicates	 that	 their	 political	 participation	 is	 heavily	 tied	 to	 political	 activism	
within	their	families.	Indeed,	when	I	enquired	where	their	above-average	engagement	in	the	
political	scene	stemmed	from,	most	of	them	referred	to	family	members	with	a	keen	interest	
in	 politics,	 and	 four	 of	 them	 had	 family	 members	 who	 were	 also	 active	 supporters	 or	
members	of	the	same	party	as	them.	Thus,	despite	the	politicised	transitional	environment,	
the	strong	emotional	impetus	to	motivate	involvement,	and	the	new	opportunities	available	
for	 participation	 in	 institutional	 politics,	 making	 the	 step	 to	 cross	 over	 to	 activism	 on	 the	
ground,	whether	within	a	party	 framework,	or	 independent	civil	 society	organisation,	often	
seemed	to	be	linked	to	an	instilled	political	awareness	for	the	need	to	act	within	these	types	
of	structures,	rather	than	coming	from	a	more	autonomously	articulated	reflection.	 Indeed,	
party	politics	in	particular	seems	to	be	a	rather	difficult	and	intimidating	world	to	enter.	Rim	
encapsulated	this	rather	well	 in	her	account	of	how	she	came	to	join	her	party.	Despite	her	
motivation	 and	 her	 family's	 encouragement,	 actually	 attending	 party	 meetings	 and	
registering	with	 the	party	was	not	easily	achievable.	She	 revealed	 that	 the	main	 reason	 for	
her	to	finally	concretise	this	was	largely	accidental,	as	the	party	happened	to	open	an	office	in	
her	area.		
	
2.2. Distrust	and	disillusion	with	politics	
	
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 study	 participants	 were	 not	 involved	 with	 political	 parties	 or	 civil	
society	 associations.	 Although	 a	 large	 majority	 of	 them	 considered	 themselves	 to	 be	
interested	 in	 politics,	 following	 current	 affairs	 or	 discussing	 socio-political	 issues	 in	 their	
everyday	 lives,	 most	 were	 not	 interested	 in	 getting	 involved	 with	 institutional	 politics	 or	
organised	 forms	 of	 participation	 beyond,	 for	 some,	 voting	 or	 occasional	 participation	 in	
protests.		
	
A	 great	 variety	 of	 civic	 and	 political	 actions	 occurred	 after	 the	 revolution,	 in	 support	 or	
against	a	number	of	social,	political,	and	economic	causes.	These	included	marches	in	support	
of	women’s	rights;	protests	and	strikes	at	work	to	change	management;	boycotts	by	students	
to	ask	for	changes	in	curriculum	or	examination	processes;	strikes	by	employees	to	demand	
pay	 rises;	 road	 blockades	 and	 protests	 to	 denounce	 poor	 living	 conditions	 and	 demand	
employment;	 protests	 about	 unfair	 dismissals;	 counter-protests	 by	 students	 against	 their	
teachers’	strikes;	and	sieges	of	media	institutions	to	protest	against	their	coverage	etc.	They	
also	included,	for	example,	civic	campaigns	in	support	of	charitable	causes,	to	clean	streets	or	
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beaches,	or	to	commemorate	historical	events.	During	my	visits	to	Tunisia	between	2012	and	
2014,	 such	 actions	were	 very	 frequent	 and	 reported	 on	 a	 nearly	 daily	 basis.	 These	 actions	
were	organised	through	offline	as	well	as	online	communicative	means	and	networks.		
	
Participants	in	the	sample	referred	to	taking	part	in	such	actions	occasionally.	However,	these	
references	 did	 not	 feature	 in	 a	 significant	 manner	 in	 their	 reflections	 on	 their	 political	
involvement.	 Often,	 a	 sense	 of	 disillusion	 and	 fatigue	 transpired	 relating	 to	 the	 context	 of	
recurrent	 crises,	 protests	 and	 strikes.	 When	 I	 asked	 about	 levels	 of	 participation,	 several	
research	 participants	 also	 expressed	 a	 wish	 to	 get	 involved	 in	 civil	 society	 and	 charity	
organisations	but	admitted	to	lacking	time	or	motivation	to	act	on	these	aspirations.	None	of	
them	however	expressed	the	wish	to	participate	in	political	parties.	For	example,	for	Mehdi	-	
who	 overall	 supported	 the	 coalition	 government	 and	 could	 identify	 with	 much	 of	 the	
discourse	of	 Ennahdha	 -	 joining	 the	party	was	 considered	as	 a	 limitation	of	his	 freedom	 to	
express	his	feelings	about	politics	and	public	matters,	as	he	felt	he	would	then	have	to	act	as	
a	spokesperson	for	it	and	defend	all	its	activities	and	choices.	Neila	made	a	similar	point	upon	
reflecting	on	her	disinterest	in	participation	in	formal	political	structures:	
	
I	don’t’	belong	to	a	party,	I	never	accepted	that	a	person	comes	to	dictate	what	I	do	and	puts	
himself	higher	than	me.	
	
In	this	regard,	political	participation	also	needs	to	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	specific	
dynamics	 of	 citizens’	 past	 relationship	 with	 politics.	 Due	 to	 the	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	
previous	 regimes,	 and	 the	 different	 structures	 that	 served	 to	 uphold	 its	 power,	 a	 rather	
narrow	interpretation	of	party	membership	and	of	its	problematic	nature	still	prevailed.		
	
Equally	a	distrust	of	the	political	sphere	was	particularly	pronounced	in	this	Tunisian	context.	
Whilst	interest	in	politics	was	framed	as	an	important	civic,	and	even	religious	duty	at	times,	
respondents	were	not	particularly	motivated	to	act	on	their	political	convictions	by	joining	or	
supporting	a	political	party.	Partly,	this	was	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	experience	of	part	of	
the	 political	 class	 in	 the	 newly	 democratic	 post-revolution	 context,	 as	 it	 contributed	 to	
demystifying	 and	de-legitimating	 its	 authority.	 For	 instance,	 during	 debates	 in	 the	National	
Constituent	Assembly84,	as	well	as	a	number	of	political	programmes,	political	figures	at	times	
lacked	the	skills	to	articulate	their	arguments	with	clarity	and	others	resorted	to	raising	their	
voices	 or	 to	 verbal	 abuse	 to	 impose	 their	 perspectives.	 But	 often,	 organised	 politics	 also	
																																																						
84	Some	of	which	were	transmitted	on	national	television.	
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continued	 to	 be	 perceived	with	 suspicion,	 as	 something	 potentially	 risky	 or	 to	 be	 avoided,	
indicating	that	many	interviewees	did	not	regard	the	new	political	groupings	as	having	either	
adequately	 severed	 their	 connection	 with	 past	 (mal)practice,	 or	 sufficiently	 re-established	
trust	in	the	political	system.	Youssef,	for	example,	who	had	been	keenly	following	the	political	
developments	 of	 the	 transitional	 period,	 reflected	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 participation	 in	 the	
following	terms:	
	
In	my	personal	opinion,	now	is	not	the	time	to	take	a	specific	political	orientation.	I	wait,	and	
then	 I	wait	 some	more,	and	 I	wait	 longer,	until	 the	 time	comes	where	 I	 can	affiliate	myself	
with	a	particular	direction.	Why?	Because	there	will	come	a	time	when	the	country	will	need	
clean	 people.	What	 does	 it	 mean	 clean	 people?	 It	 means	 people	 who	 didn’t	 enter	 politics	
before,	who	didn’t	need	politics	before,	nor	who	got	dirty	with	politics	before.	
	
Ahmed	also	drew	on	metaphors	of	cleanliness,	similarly	referring	to	murky	or	corrupt	party	
politics	as	justification	for	maintaining	a	distance	from	this	sphere:	
	
I	don’t	have	any	party,	I	don’t	belong	to	any	party.	Preferably	I	draw	my	views	from	someone	
who	works	for	the	interests	of	Tunisia	and	not	someone	who’s	calculating	and	wants	to	sit	in	
government.	 I	want	clean	people,	 I	want	 technocrats,	 I	want	people	who	want	 to	serve	 the	
country.	I	want	them	to	do	a	bit	for	the	young	kids	and	for	the	poor	who	are	dying	of	hunger	
and	that’s	 it.	But	 to	say	 I	point	 to	that	one	there	and	 I	want	him	to	stay	there,	 I	don’t	have	
anyone.	I	would	rather	not	follow	any	of	them.	
	
Similarly,	Zied	who	ran	a	small	business	selling	household	textiles,	considered	that	it	was	too	
early	 for	 him	 to	 actively	 participate	 in	 party	 politics,	 as	 bitter	memories	 of	 Ben	 Ali’s	 party	
practices	still	lingered	in	his	mind:	
		
[Before	 the	 revolution]	 there	 was	 no	 choice	 and	 in	 a	 way	 many	 like	 me	 were	 forcefully	
involved	 in	 supporting	 the	RCD	 [party].	 I	used	 to	 regularly	get	visits	by	 the	party	mobs	 that	
took	whatever	they	wanted	in	goods	from	my	shop	or	money	and	there	was	nothing	I	could	
say.	One	day	they	did	so	and	I	was	quite	angry,	so	less	than	fifteen	minutes	after	they	left,	 I	
received	a	visit	from	the	police,	just	to	pass	on	a	clear	message	to	me	that	I	better	play	their	
game.	[…]	Now	I	don’t	want	to	support	anything,	I	follow	more	and	more,	whoever	is	closest	
to	my	way	of	thinking	or	who	could	get	the	country	out	of	the	current	situation.	And	it	may	be	
that	later	I	will	join	a	party,	why	not.	
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It	is	also	interesting	how	some	of	these	views	place	technocratic	values	in	opposition	to	party	
politics.	This	was	 reflective	of	a	growing	dissatisfaction	with	 the	 transitional	political	 scene,	
leading	an	 increasing	number	of	 individuals	 to	question	 the	 rules	of	democratic	 legitimacy,	
both	 on	 the	 sides	 of	 people	 who	 voted	 for	 the	 governing	 parties	 and	 subsequently	 felt	
disillusioned,	 and	people	who	 voted	 for	opposition	parties	 to	 start	with.	 The	perception	of	
legitimacy	 and	 trust	 in	 political	 institutions	 are	 crucial	 elements	 for	 understanding	 citizen	
involvement	with	politics.	Whereas	study	participants	who	were	more	politically	active	within	
organised	 political	 structures	 tended	 to	 have	 previous	 knowledge	 and	 access	 to	 this	world	
through	 family	 and	 kinship	 connections,	 those	 less	 involved	 here	 tended	 to	 have	 some	
commonalities	 in	 their	 views,	 and	 shared	 perceptions	 of	 this	 world	 as	 inherently	
untrustworthy	and	consequently	less	legitimate.		
	
Anouar,	who	had	risked	his	life	and	lost	a	close	friend	through	participation	in	the	revolution	
protests,	 expressed	 no	 interest	 in	 any	 further	 involvement.	He	 had	 not	 participated	 in	 any	
other	protests	 since	and	had	not	voted	 in	 the	2012	elections	either.	He	was	deeply	 cynical	
about	 the	 Tunisian	 political	 scene	 after	 the	 revolution,	 and	 considered	 that:	 “Politics	 in	
general	 now	 it’s	 a	 mess.	 We	 don’t	 have	 politics	 in	 Tunisia.”	 He	 further	 complained	 that	
everyone	 talked	 about	 politics	 despite	 their	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 about	 political	matters	 and	
democratic	 conduct,	 and	 preferred	 to	 abstain	 from	 any	 such	 involvement.	 Khouloud,	 who	
was	unsuccessfully	attempting	to	shield	herself	from	news	and	talk	about	politics,	expressed	
her	disillusion	with	the	lack	of	change	and	the	difficult	transition	to	a	more	egalitarian	society	
after	 the	 revolution.	 She	 considered	 that	 the	 sense	 of	 unity	 and	 hope	 she	 identified	 with	
during	the	revolution	gave	way	to	political	account	setting,	manipulation,	and	the	return	of	
corruption	 and	 similar	 abuses	 by	 those	 in	 positions	 of	 authority	 to	what	 characterised	 the	
situation	 before	 the	 revolution.	 The	 outcome	 of	 the	 elections	 in	 2012	 marked	 a	 further	
turning	point	 in	her	 interest	 in	politics.	 Prior	 to	 these	elections,	 she	had	made	an	effort	 to	
inform	herself	about	different	parties	and	went	to	vote,	but	her	lack	of	identification	with	the	
electoral	 outcome	 increased	 her	 sense	 of	 disillusion	 and	 disconnection	 from	 the	 political	
scene.	
	
Not	 all	 research	 participants	 had	 such	 pronounced	 negative	 opinions	 about	 the	 political	
sphere.	Those	who	positioned	 themselves	as	being	 in	opposition	 to	 the	governing	coalition	
claimed,	 perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	 to	 being	 more	 frequent	 participants	 in	 protests.	 Many	
protest	 actions	 were	 organised	 to	 denounce	 negative	 developments	 occurring	 during	 the	
transitional	period	that	the	parties	in	power	were	perceived	to	be	responsible	for.	However,	
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participation	 in	 such	 protests	 was	 usually	 framed	 in	 these	 interviewees'	 views	 as	 being	
independent	 of	 any	 affiliation	 to	 political	 parties.	 This	 was	 particularly	 evident	 in	 young	
interviewees'	 reflections	 on	 this	 participation.	 Hanen,	 a	 twenty-two-year	 old	 student,	
described	her	participation	in	protests	with	most	of	the	other	students	in	her	university	class	
as	follows:	
	
When	we	hear	about	some	protest,	we	always	go.	We	try	to	find	out	about	them.	Like	once,	I	
don't	know	if	you'd	heard	about	the	woman	who	got	raped	by	policemen,	we	came	across	a	
protest	in	her	support,	and	we	didn't	go	to	class	and	joined	the	protest	instead,	we	talked	to	
the	 people	 there,	 and	 later	 we	 went	 to	 study.	 But	 in	 general,	 you	 don't	 find	 that	 many	
students	go	to	political	meetings	or	other	activities,	it's	all	on	Facebook.	The	other	day,	there	
was	a	meeting	of	 the	 Jebha	 [party],	 I	wanted	 to	go	 to	 find	out	 and	 I	mentioned	 it	 to	other	
students	 but	 they	 found	 it	 really	 stupid,	 they	 couldn't	 understand,	why	would	 you	 go	 to	 a	
meeting	they	were	saying.	And	these	are	the	same	people	that	you'd	find	on	Facebook	talking	
about	nothing	but	politics.	Even	normal	things	they	would	make	them	political.	
	
The	 above	quote	 can	be	 seen	 to	 tie	 in	with	 issues	of	 youth	disengagement	 from	 -	 and	 the	
unpopularity	of	-	 institutional	politics,	a	pervasive	distrust	of	ruling	elites	and	structures	not	
dissimilar	from	some	Western	democratic	contexts.	However,	what	is	particularly	noteworthy	
about	 the	 above	 quote	 is	 the	 apparent	 (extreme)	 disconnect	 between	 Hanen’s	 fellow	
students’	engagement	with	party	politics	as	opposed	to	political	activism	on	Facebook,	as	per	
her	framing.	However,	particular	care	should	be	exercised	to	avoid	an	unequivocal	support	of	
this	 reading,	 implying	 as	 it	 does	 a	 separation	 between	 online	 and	 offline	 participation.	
Instead,	 such	 differences	 in	 views	 on	 political	 participation	 may	 reflect	 the	 disassociation	
between	structured	party	politics	 in	 this	case	and	everyday	discussion	about	political	 issues	
which	can	equally	take	place	online	or	offline,	although	its	online	forms	are	more	prevalent,	
according	to	her	account.	Nevertheless,	her	last	comment,	on	how	seemingly	apolitical	issues	
become	political	online,	is	perhaps	indicative	of	how	communicative	parameters	online	may	
increase	 the	 level	 of	 politicisation	 of	 everyday	 communicative	 exchanges	 (a	 point	 further	
developed	later	in	this	chapter).	
	
2.3. Connections	to	the	sphere	of	politics	online	
	
As	contextualised	in	the	previous	chapter,	political	matters	formed	part	of	these	respondents’	
everyday	 lives	 during	 the	 transitional	 period,	 both	within	 and	 outside	 of	 the	media	 frame.	
However,	as	I	have	so	far	suggested	in	this	chapter,	taking	the	further	step	to	act	on	political	
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beliefs	 through	 involvement	 in	 institutional	 or	 organised	 politics	 represented	 a	 form	 of	
participation	 that	 most	 respondents	 did	 not	 necessarily	 wish	 to	 pursue.	 Against	 this	
backdrop,	 the	 analysis	 will	 now	 compare	 these	 trends	 with	 forms	 of	 interaction	 and	
involvement	 with	 institutional	 politics	 online.	 The	 popularity	 of	 social	 media	 in	 the	
transitional	 phase	 in	 Tunisia,	 as	 contextualised	 in	 earlier	 parts	 of	 this	 study,	 offered	 new	
possibilities	for	ordinary	citizens	to	engage	with	political	developments	in	the	country.	I	have	
previously	 referred	 to	 the	 role	played	by	 social	networking	platform	Facebook	as	 source	of	
news	and	information	on	the	transitional	political	scene.	Similarly,	the	use	of	Facebook	seems	
to	be	making	a	difference	in	terms	of	increased	possibilities	for	connection	and	proximity	to	
the	 political	 sphere	 as	 many	 study	 participants	 specifically	 chose	 to	 follow	 a	 number	 of	
political	figures,	parties	and	institutions	through	their	social	media	accounts.	
	
Unsurprisingly,	respondents	who	were	politically	active	offline	(as	previously	discussed)	were	
generally	 more	 involved	 than	 other	 interviewees	 in	 connecting	 with	 the	 political	 sphere	
through	 their	 social	 media	 accounts.	 They	 generally	 did	 so	 via	 discussion	 groups,	 and	 by	
‘liking’	or	‘following’	a	very	large	number	and	broad	range	of	social	media	profiles	associated	
with	political	figures,	parties	and	institutions.	The	interviews	suggest	a	more	strategic	use	of	
such	network	 formation	aimed	at	 increasing	 their	knowledge	of	political	developments	and	
official	 discourses.	 Their	 activities	 within	 political	 party	 structures	 tended	 to	 also	 be	
coordinated	 and	 discussed	 via	 closed	 online	 groups.	 However,	 these	were	 not	 assessed	 in	
more	detail	as	they	are	not	the	specific	focus	of	this	study.		
	
Interestingly,	 respondents	 who	 were	 less	 active	 in	 party	 politics	 also	 made	 numerous	
connections	 to	 this	 sphere	 on	 social	media.	 These	 tended	 to	 be	 less	 strategically	 informed	
and	more	tied	to	personal	identifications	and	forms	of	political	fandom.	Online	practices	for	
this	group	varied	quite	extensively.	Research	participants	were	occasionally	part	of	Facebook	
groups	that	discussed	political	 issues,	but	not	party-related	ones.	A	number	of	 interviewees	
also	mentioned	 occasionally	 finding	 out	 about	 protest	 actions,	 charity	 organisations	 and	 a	
number	 of	 civic	 campaigns	 online	 through	 pages	 they	 followed.	 About	 half	 of	 them	 also	
‘liked’	 or	 ‘followed’	 social	 media	 accounts	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 political	 figures	 and	 state	
institutions.	This	could	arguably	be	viewed	as	confirming	the	availability	of,	and	indeed	partial	
acting	 upon,	 new	 possibilities	 to	 connect	 to	 the	 political	 realm	 in	 a	 way	 that	 was	 not	
previously	possible.	Access	and	proximity	 to	this	sphere	may	be	seen	as	 facilitated	to	some	
extent	 by	 platforms	 such	 as	 Facebook.	 However,	 it	 was	 striking	 that	 research	 participants	
were	 also	 shaping	 and	 individualising	 their	 exposure	 and	 connection	 to	 institutionalised	
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politics,	 being	 more	 inclined	 to	 follow	 political	 leaders	 rather	 than	 parties.	 This	 paralleled	
similar	 type	of	 connections	established	by	 respondents	with	a	diverse	array	of	other	public	
figures,	 from	musicians,	 film	stars,	TV	presenters	and	other	forms	of	celebrity	to	 individuals	
who	 had	 recently	 acquired	 special	 status	 in	 the	 post-revolution	 public	 arena.	 These	 new	
voices	 articulated	 their	 ideas	 primarily	 through	 social	 media,	 and	 included	 bloggers,	 civil	
society	activists	or	academics	who	effectively	assumed	the	roles	of	public	intellectuals.		
	
Research	 participants	 were	 also	 more	 inclined	 to	 follow	 political	 pages	 on	 Facebook	 that	
mirrored	their	opinions.	There	were	exceptions	to	this,	such	as	the	page	of	the	leader	of	the	
Islamist	 party,	 Rached	Ghannouchi,	whose	 political	 stature	was	 such	 that	many	 individuals	
from	 all	 sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	 connected	 to	 his	 profile.	 However,	more	 generally,	
individuals	were	 Facebook	 ‘fans’	 of	 parties	 or	 politicians	 they	 actually	 liked.	 This	 correlates	
with	the	interview	data	referred	to	in	the	previous	chapter,	suggesting	the	individualisation	of	
informational	environments	 formed	by	 social	media	users	who	chose	not	 to	be	exposed	 to	
sources	in	their	newsfeed	that	differed	significantly	from	their	own	opinions.	The	wording	of	
the	‘like’	button	that	participants	needed	to	click	on	in	order	to	follow	these	pages	tended	to	
be	taken	literally	in	such	acts.	In	this	regard,	Meriem	for	example,	explained	that	she	did	not	
chose	 to	 follow	pages	 related	 to	a	political	party	 she	did	not	 identify	with	as	 this	might	be	
interpreted	as	siding	with	it.	Although	she	occasionally	had	a	look	at	such	pages,	she	did	not	
chose	to	have	them	as	part	of	the	sources	she	followed	and	received	regular	updates	from.	
Her	dislike	of	the	party	thus	translated	into	a	lack	of	public	recognition	of	a	connection	with	
it,	 even	 though	 she	 did	 at	 times	 access	 such	 accounts	 to	 form	 a	 more	 complete	 political	
perspective:	
	
I	 don’t	 put	 that	 I	 like	 the	 Ennahdha	 pages	 because	 anyway	 everybody	 knows	 that	 I’m	 not	
Ennahdha	so	even	if	I	put	that	I	like	it	no	one	would	believe	me.	But	anyway	I	don’t	put	it	because	I	
don’t	like	it.	I	want	to	be	a	little	sincere	in	my	Facebook,	because	it’s	me,	because	it	talks	about	me	
so	I	want	to	be	honest	with	it.	
	
It	 was	 further	 observed	 that	 politicians	 had	 occasionally	 been	 expressing	 their	 opinions	
exclusively	 through	 their	 social	 media	 profiles,	 supporting	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 social	
media	space	as	enabling	a	new	form	of	proximity	 to	 the	political	 sphere.	 In	 such	 instances,	
particularly	when	their	views	related	to	controversial	issues,	content	from	their	social	media	
account	was	transmitted	virally	online	and	further	brought	to	the	public’s	attention	through	
mass	media	outlets.	For	instance,	on	a	regular	basis,	radio	and	television	news	bulletins	were	
directly	quoting	Facebook	status	updates	by	politicians.	Thus,	regardless	of	individual	choices	
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to	 follow	 particular	 political	 figures	 via	 social	media,	 such	 platforms	were	 partly	 extending	
political	 communication	 possibilities,	 and	 perhaps	 narrowing	 the	 perceived	 gap	 between	
citizens	and	party	politics.	Concurrently,	it	has	also	exposed	political	figures	to	new	risks	and	
challenges	 in	 an	 environment	 where	 communicative	 parameters	 and	 citizens’	 perceived	
proximity	to	political	figures	were	more	difficult	to	control.	On	a	few	occasions,	for	example,	
large-scale	 ‘flaming’	 actions	 by	 groups	 of	 dissatisfied	 citizens	 directly	 expressing	 their	
discontent	 on	 politicians’	 social	 media	 pages	 temporarily	 disabled	 their	 activity.	 Similarly,	
violent	 and	 derogatory	 language	 was	 at	 times	 used	 by	 social	 media	 users	 in	 this	 context.	
However,	more	generally,	connections	to	the	field	of	institutional	politics	tended	to	be	used	
as	a	means	of	a	more	disengaged	 reception	of	updates	 from	these	 feeds	 rather	 than	more	
active	forms	of	online	interactions.	
	
A	 few	other	 interesting	points	 can	also	be	deduced	 regarding	 the	 type	of	politically-related	
pages	 followed	 by	 the	 research	 participants.	 Most	 of	 the	 connections	 established	 by	
respondents	 with	 politicians	 on	 social	 media	 related	 to	 the	 Tunisian	 political	 sphere,	 but	
there	were	a	 few	exceptions.	For	 instance,	 the	Facebook	page	of	Barack	Obama	repeatedly	
featured	 among	 pages	 followed	 by	 study	 participants,	 and	 was	 ranked	 as	 the	 third	 most	
followed	political	page	in	the	country,	with	almost	as	many	followers	in	Tunisia	as	the	leader	
of	 the	Tunisian	 Islamist	party	 (Socialbakers,	2013).	Similarly,	 several	of	 the	participants	also	
followed	 the	 social	media	 feeds	of	political	 leaders	 in	other	Arab	countries,	 such	as	 former	
Egyptian	president	Mohamed	Morsi.	Very	few	connections	and	interactions	were	made	with	
social	 media	 feeds	 from	 government	 institutions.	 These	 tend	 to	 be	 managed	 by	
administrators	 and	 adopt	 a	 particularly	 formal	 style,	 primarily	 communicating	 with	 its	
audience(s)	 through	official	press	 releases	and	statements.	 	A	notable	exception	within	 this	
type	 of	 social	 media	 accounts	 was	 that	 of	 the	 Interior	 ministry,	 which	 had	 a	 significant	
following.	 The	 Ministry’s	 page	 on	 Facebook	 had	 the	 highest	 following	 among	 all	 pages	
relating	to	institutional	politics	in	the	country,	with	over	400,000	followers	in	2013	(ibid).	This	
can	be	partly	explained	by	the	historical	importance	of	this	ministry	in	Tunisian	politics	as	well	
its	particularly	active	use	of	social	media	to	release	 important	updates	and	safety	advice	to	
citizens	directly	 through	 its	 Facebook	page	during	 the	 transitional	period	 that	 saw	at	 times	
very	 rapid	 political	 developments.	 To	 contextualise	 this,	 according	 to	 the	 same	 source	 the	
second	 most	 followed	 page	 in	 this	 category,	 that	 of	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 Ennahdha	 party,	
attracted	roughly	half	the	number	of	followers	at	the	time.	
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To	 summarise	 so	 far,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 assessment	 of	 participants’	 engagement	 and	
involvement	 with	 institutional	 politics,	 a	 number	 of	 preliminary	 findings	 emerge.	 The	 new	
political	freedoms	available	to	Tunisian	citizens	after	the	revolution	include	opportunities	for	
involvement	 in	 the	 emerging	 political	 landscape.	 Although	 the	 degree	 of	 interest	 and	
engagement	 with	 public	 affairs	 was	 high	 during	 the	 initial	 post-revolution	 period,	 more	
specific	 involvement	 within	 formalised	 party	 or	 civil	 society	 structures	 tended	 to	 be	 low	
overall.	 It	appeared	that	the	psychological	and	practical	steps	that	this	form	of	engagement	
necessitated	as	well	as	a	wider	distrust	of,	and	disillusion	with,	the	newly	emerging	political	
sphere	were	problematic	for	many	research	participants.	Connections	to	the	political	sphere	
were	facilitated	within	the	predominantly	social-media-centred	online	environment,	and	not	
as	narrowly	tied	to	formal	participation	in	this	sphere.	There	was	some	evidence	that	social	
media	use	enabled	closer	connection	with	this	sphere.	However,	such	connections	primarily	
consisted	 of	 passive	 forms	 of	 interactions	where	 participants	 chose	 to	 follow	 social	media	
feeds	 from	 political	 figures	 as	 part	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 individualised	 informational	 and	
fandom	 networks.	 Overall,	 the	 level	 of	 engagement	 with	 such	 pages	 beyond	 the	 act	 of	
becoming	a	‘follower’	was	rather	restricted.	
	
	
3. Political	communication	between	citizens	
	
As	 a	 space	 within	 which	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 bring	 their	 opinions	 into	 ‘the	 open’85	 and	
debate	 them,	 the	 public	 sphere	 (in	 a	 broad	 sense)	marks	 a	 significant	 transition	 from	pre-
political	 forms	 of	 subjective	 engagement	 to	 participation,	 a	 more	 tangible	 and	 visible	
manifestation	 of	 civic	 agency	 (Dahlgren,	 2009;	 Dahlgren	 and	 Alvares,	 2013).	 Although	 the	
notion	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 (again,	 in	 a	 broad	 sense)	 points	 to	 citizens’	 communicative	
participation	 in	 a	wider	 public	 deliberative	 space,	 in	 practice	 the	 translation	of	 this	 ideal	 is	
often	 reduced	 to	 involvement	 in	 political	 talk	 and	debate	 about	 public	 issues	 that	 occur	 in	
relatively	private	or	 semi-private	 spaces,	 such	as	 the	home	or	work	environment	 (Wyatt	et	
al.,	 2000;	 Mutz	 and	 Mondak,	 2006),	 and	 within	 a	 relatively	 limited	 zone	 of	 interaction	
between	citizens	who	are	usually	familiar	with	each	other.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	much	of	
this	discourse	occurs	in	the	home	or	at	work,	the	two	locations	in	which	many	people	spend	
the	majority	of	their	time.		These	are	also	areas	of	encounter	with	other	citizens	with	whom	
specific	links	-	whether	professional,	or	in	terms	of	kinship	or	friendship	-	have	already	been	
																																																						
85	To	parallel	the	original	term	used	in	German	by	Habermas	‘oeffentlichkeit’,	literally	openness,	later	translated	in	English	as	
‘public	sphere’	
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forged,	and	can	be	assumed	to	at	least	partially	matter.	The	existence	of	ties	between	those	
taking	part	in	political	talk	and	debate	may	at	the	same	time	facilitate	its	occurrence	thanks	
to	the	existence	of	a	greater	degree	of	trust	between	interlocutors,	and	limit	it	when	it	may	
threaten	socialisation.	But	a	number	of	observers	have	also	pointed	out	the	difficulties	that	
the	 expression	 of	 political	 talk	 in	 public	 space	 can	 be	 fraught	 with	 (e.g.	 Eliasoph,	 1998;	
Conover	et	al.,	2002).	
	
The	Internet	now	challenges	how	these	questions	can	be	understood.	From	one	perspective,	
contact	 and	 direct	 communication	 between	 distant	 citizens	 is	 enabled	 on	 a	 formerly	
unparalleled	scale,	and	signifies	the	potential	attainment	of	a	more	public	sphere	than	that	of	
the	mass	media	 age.	However,	 the	 extension	of	 the	public	 sphere	 through	new	media	 can	
also	be	problematic,	both	in	terms	of	extension	to	a	wider	public,	and	in	terms	of	the	public	
character	 of	 the	 space	 in	 which	 political	 talk	may	 occur	 (Jang	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Thorson	 et	 al.,	
2015).	 New	 questions	 arise	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 social	 media’s	 extension	 of	
communicative	and	deliberative	 spaces,	 as	 the	boundaries	between	public	and	private	also	
become	more	indistinct,	and	a	new	form	of	“networked	publicness”	(Baym	and	boyd,	2012)	
emerges	whose	nature	is	particularly	ambiguous.		
	
Social	media	 also	 destabilises	 previously	 held	 conceptions	 of	what	 it	means	 for	 citizens	 to	
participate	 as	 a	 ‘public’.	Media	 content	 and	 news	 coverage	 have	 traditionally	 provided	 an	
important	 basis	 for	 political	 discourse	 between	 citizens,	 in	 setting	 the	 agenda	 on	 what	
matters,	raising	 issues	and	providing	“conversational	resources”	for	citizens	(Gamson,	1992,	
p.117).	 Audiences	 of	 news	 and	 other	media	 formats,	 in	 articulating	 their	 opinions	 on	 such	
content	 and	 engaging	 in	 political	 talk	 about	 it,	were	 then	 perceived	 as	 becoming	 part	 of	 a	
public.	 In	this	respect,	Dayan	(2005)	makes	an	 interesting	distinction	between	what	he	calls	
audience-talk	and	public-talk,	a	distinction	that	parallels	Schudson’s	differentiation	between	
conversation	 and	 formal	 debate	 (1997b,	 1998).	 But	 for	 Dayan,	 this	 distinction	 is	 more	
specifically	 related	 to	 the	 communicative	 circumstances	 under	 which	 such	 talk	 occurs.	
Although	 the	 two	modes	can	 resemble	one	another,	and	audience-talk	may	 indeed	 lead	 to	
public-talk,	a	distinction	between	them	nevertheless	exists	which	is	predicated	on	the	degree	
of	 privacy	 and/or	 public	 visibility	 of	 such	 talk.	 Dayan	 highlights	 that	 the	 theoretical	
construction	of	the	public	is	intrinsically	tied	to	the	question	of	its	visibility,	and	the	visibility	
of	 its	performance	as	a	public,	 for	“any	public	requires	another	public	watching	 it	perform”	
(Dayan,	 2005,	 p.52).	 In	 consequence,	 public-talk	 (or	 talk	 by	 publics)	 is	 similar	 to	 a	
performance	on	stage	and	typically	requires	mediation,	whereas	audience-talk	forms	invisible	
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‘backstage’	 activity.	 More	 private	 backstage	 forms	 of	 political	 talk,	 traditionally	 associated	
with	audiences’	conversations	and	everyday	discussions	in	relation	to	news	and	other	media	
content	 of	 shared	 relevance,	 is	 of	 interest	 here	 as	 this	 dissertation	 explores	 notions	 and	
manifestations	of	citizenship	in	everyday	life	on	social	media.		
	
One	 of	 its	 focal	 areas	 is	 the	 transition	 of	 these	 prevalent,	 but	 previously	more	 concealed,	
forms	of	 communication	between	ordinary	citizens	 to	a	networked	online	 space	where	 the	
boundaries	between	the	private	and	public,	the	stage	and	backstage,	and	between	audiences	
and	publics	are	obscured;	where	every-day	political	communication	between	citizens	occurs	
under	 very	 different	 conditions	 of	mediation;	 and	where	 communicative	 acts	 of	 audience-
publics	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 speech,	 but	 further	 extended	 to	 new	 forms	 of	 symbolic,	 audio-
visual,	 and	 digital	 communicative	 acts	 whose	 meanings	 are	 arguably	 even	 more	 open	 to	
interpretation	and	negotiation	than	any	previous	modes	of	 interaction.	These	changes	may,	
for	 instance,	 require	 the	 development	 of	 very	 different	 communicative	 strategies	 by	 social	
media	 users	 in	 managing	 politically-related	 interactions,	 as	 some	 research	 highlights	 (e.g.	
Mor	et	al.,	2015).	The	political	implications	of	these	shifts	in	a	variety	of	contexts	constitute	a	
relatively	 new	 area	 of	 debate	 that	 requires	 further	 investigation	 and	 more	 detailed	
exploration.	
	
The	majority	of	social	media	users	today	base	their	online	accounts	on	their	offline	identity,	
in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 often	 use	 their	 real	 names,	 share	 information	 that	 relates	 to	 their	
everyday	lives,	and	connect	to	people	they	relate	to	on	some	level,	even	if	they	have	actually	
never	met	in	person	(e.g.	family	and	friends,	professional	links,	common	interests,	fandom).	
In	other	words,	the	identities	they	represent	online	tend	not	to	be	anonymous,	nor	fictional,	
but	 to	 some	 degree	 reflect	 personal	 identity	 and	 opinion.	 In	 this	 sense,	 communicating	
politically	 enables	 individuals	 to	 tap	 into	 these	 networks	 to	 raise	 awareness,	 engage,	 or	
mobilize	others,	for	example.	It	is	the	link	that	social	media	provides	between	the	online	and	
offline	worlds	that	has	proven	particularly	empowering	for	a	number	of	social	movements	in	
recent	years.		
	
However,	as	boyd	and	Marwick	(2009)	have	pointed	out,	it	also	introduces	a	“conundrum	of	
visibility”	as	hierarchies	of	online	and	offline	attention	become	reconfigured.	As	a	result,	new	
pressures	 have	 been	 placed	 on	 offline	 actors	 to	 increase	 their	 online	 visibility,	 primarily	 in	
order	to	maintain	a	 level	of	 influence,	but	also	for	social	media	users	to	adopt	and	develop	
strategies	 to	 manage	 their	 reputation	 and	 present	 a	 coherent	 identity	 across	 online	 and	
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offline	social	space	(Ellison	and	boyd,	2013).	Furthermore,	where	political	opinion	is	relatively	
consensual,	 such	 networks	 have	 allowed	 engagement	 for	 like-minded	 citizens	 to	 be	
emboldened,	 for	 participatory	 actions	 to	 be	 aggregated,	 and	 for	 belief	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	
change	 through	 political	 involvement	 to	 be	 revived.	 The	 “collective	 externalized	 mind”	
(Naughton,	 2012)	 that	 networked	 online	 communication	 enables	 is	 potentially	 profoundly	
transformational	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 citizens	 and	 political	 institutions.	 Yet	 when	
opinions	are	more	divided,	 it	 is	questionable	as	 to	whether	or	not	political	communication,	
expression,	discussion,	and	 interaction,	between	citizens	 in	 their	public-private	networks,	 is	
genuinely	 empowering	 (Thorson,	 2014;	 Fox	 and	 Warber,	 2014;	 John	 and	 Dvir-Gvirsman,	
2015).	Being	political	 in	 this	 space	may	also	entail,	 for	citizens,	 the	management	of	a	more	
public	 image	 and	 identity,	 necessitating	 the	 accommodation	 of	 everyday	 socialization	with	
differences	in	political	identifications,	and	require	the	legitimation	of	opinions	as	well	as	the	
right	to	author	them.	Furthermore,	political	communication	between	citizens	in	this	context	
can	no	longer	simply	be	equated	to	what	is	said,	nor	be	restricted	to	what	is	written.	Through	
their	 externalization	 and	 projection	 across	 networked	 publics,	 citizens’	 opinions	 become	
doubly	articulated	as,	on	the	one	hand,	a	form	of	political	communication	through	which	they	
can	advance	their	own	voices	and	seek	to	influence	decision-making,	and	on	the	other	hand,	
as	its	mediated	image	over	which	they	are	able	to	exercise	considerably	less	control.		
	
Novel	 forms	 of	 communicative	 relations	 also	 emerge.	 Through	 clicks	 such	 as	 ‘likes’	 and	
‘retweets’,	new	ways	 for	citizens	 to	express	consent,	 solidarity,	differences	and	oppositions	
toward	each	other	become	part	of	a	new	vocabulary	whose	political	implication	and	meaning	
are	 open	 to	 negotiation.	 The	 image	 that	 is	 constructed	 from	 such	 communicative	 forms	
within	networked	publicness,	 frames	 citizens’	 political	 identity	 and	 fixes	 it	 in	 new	ways.	 Its	
digital	 inscription	 blurs	 the	 lines	 between	 engagement,	 as	 pre-political	 subjectivity,	 and	
participation	 as	 its	 enactment.	 These	 changes	 can	 be	 understood	 on	 one	 level	 as	 the	
continuation	of	the	rise	in	mediated	visibility	that	Thompson	(2005)	highlights	as	a	source	of	
empowerment	for	politicians,	but	which	equally	 leaves	them	more	exposed	to	criticism	and	
scandal	in	an	age	of	image	politics.	With	social	media,	these	opportunities	and	pressures	are	
naturally	extended	to	a	broader	citizen	base.	
	
3.1. Political	talk	in	offline	public	space	
	
The	 freeing	 of	 public	 expression	 and	 the	 highly	 politicised	 context	 in	 Tunisia	 after	 the	
revolution	translated	into	a	vivid	and	inescapable	engagement	with	political	and	public	issues	
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in	 everyday	 life.	 Whilst	 citizens’	 participation	 in	 politics	 (in	 the	 formal	 sense)	 and	 their	
interactions	with	the	political	sphere	faced	a	number	of	limitations,	communication	between	
citizens	about	public	and	political	matters	was	widespread.	In	this	sense,	 it	can	be	regarded	
as	 offering	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 political	 will	 within	 a	 more	 trusted,	 less	
hierarchical	 and	 more	 easily	 accessible	 communicative	 environment.	 Political	 talk	 and	
interactions	 were	 evident	 in	 both	 offline	 and	 online	 environments	 and	 served	 for	 the	
exchange	of	news,	 information	and	opinions	about	 these	matters.	 Interviewees	 referred	 to	
the	pervasiveness	 of	 politicised	 talk	 and	 communication,	 and	 there	was	 ample	 evidence	of	
their	participation	in	such	conversations	and	communicative	exchanges,	except	in	some	cases	
where	 respondents	 –	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Khouloud	 –	 who	 was	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter	–	took	active	steps	to	limit	exposure	to,	and	involvement	with	such	issues.	
	
In	a	marked	contrast	to	the	pre-revolutionary	context	of	enforced	silence,	citizens	were	not	
only	 openly	 talking	 about	 public	 and	 political	 matters,	 but	 much	 of	 this	 communication	
occurred	 in	 public	 spaces.	 For	 instances,	 participants	 referred	 to	 shops,	 streets,	 bus	 stops,	
outside	 mosques,	 bank	 queues,	 and	 university	 campuses	 as	 settings	 for	 some	 of	 these	
conversations.	 Cafés	 –	 most	 of	 which	 are	 only	 attended	 by	 men	 in	 Tunisia	 –	 were	 also	
important	spaces	for	such	exchanges,	and	these	were	referred	to	in	the	interview	accounts	of	
eight	(out	of	fourteen)	male	participants.	However,	overall,	there	was	limited	data	to	suggest	
that	 political	 talk	 and	 exchanges	 were	 more	 broadly	 gender-specific.	 During	 interviews	 in	
2012,	most	 research	 participants,	male	 and	 female,	 articulated	 a	 level	 of	 interest	 in	 these	
issues	and	their	participation	in	exchange	and	opinion	expression	related	to	them,	although	
there	were	less	public	spaces	available	for	such	expression	to	take	place	on	a	larger	scale	for	
women	than	for	men.		
	
More	private	environments,	such	as	the	home,	were	often	indirectly	implied	as	spaces	where	
political	 talk	 took	 place,	 but	 mostly	 these	 were	 not	 explicitly	 demarcated	 as	 such.	 For	
example,	 Hanen	 who	 lived	 with	 other	 students	 in	 a	 flat-share	 said	 that	 they	 often	 talked	
about	 events	 and	 socio-political	 developments	 and	 watched	 the	 televised	 news	 bulletin	
together	in	the	evening,	but	most	of	her	references	to	political	discussions	offline	related	to	
more	public	spaces	(“at	university	and	everywhere”).	Kamal,	in	turn,	referred	to	his	family	as	
being	 “like	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly	 [mejless	 ta’sissi]”	 to	 describe	 the	 variety	 of	 political	
opinions	it	comprised,	implying	that	debating	them	also	occurred	in	the	home	environment,	
but	 asked	 where	 he	 talked	 about	 politics,	 other	 than	 online,	 he	 only	 mentioned	 cafés.	 It	
matters	 that	 this	 talk	 was	 framed	 as	 a	 public	 activity.	 Whereas	 in	 the	 Ben	 Ali	 era,	 the	
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expression	of	a	political	opinion	was	associated	with	a	level	of	risk,	even	in	the	most	private	
of	settings,	the	post-revolutionary	effervescence	marked	a	way	for	citizens	to	reclaim	public	
space	and	occupy	it	through	the	exercise	of	their	newly	acquired	political	freedom.	
	
3.2. Forms	of	civic	and	political	communication	on	social	media	
	
The	 other	 context	 that	 the	 large	majority	 of	 respondents	 referred	 to	 as	 space	where	 such	
political	 talk	 and	 communicative	 exchanges	 occurred	 was	 on	 Facebook,	 a	 space	 of	 an	
ambiguous	 public-private	 nature	 (a	 point	 I	 will	 consider	 more	 extensively	 later	 in	 this	
chapter).	Politically-related	communication	between	citizens	took	a	number	of	forms	on	the	
platform	that	further	blur	the	 lines	between	talk	and	action,	engagement	and	participation,	
private	 identity	expressions	and	publicly-oriented	political	messages.	 I	will	consider	some	of	
these	forms	in	more	detail.	
	
a. Written	political	talk	
	
One	such	form	consisted	of	the	written	equivalent	of	political	talk	and	conversations.	None	of	
the	participants	in	this	sample	included	oral	forms	of	their	political	opinion	captured	on	video	
or	audio	messages,	or	exchanged	opinions	in	this	way86.	Primarily,	written	exchange	took	the	
form	of	comments	typed	by	respondents	in	reaction	to	content	from	Facebook	pages	or	from	
other	users	 in	 their	 social	media	network.	 For	example,	where	a	participant	 shared	a	news	
item	on	his/her	 social	media	account,	 contacts	 in	his/her	network	occasionally	 commented	
on	 it	 to	support	or	contest	the	political	perspective	 it	 related	to,	and	a	written	exchange	at	
times	ensued	between	the	participant	and	this	contact,	that	others	in	this	network	reacted	to	
or	 supplemented	 with	 their	 own	 opinions.	 To	 a	more	 limited	 extent,	 participants’	 opinion	
expression	 also	 included	 status	updates	 and	 “Facebook	notes”	written	by	 respondents	 and	
published	 on	 their	 Facebook	 wall,	 as	 well	 as	 private	 messages	 they	 sent	 to	 friends	 to	
exchange	news	and	political	perspectives.	Overall,	politically-related	communication	was	less	
frequent	 in	 secluded	 communicative	 settings	 such	 as	 through	 the	 exchange	 of	 private	
messages	 on	 the	 platform.	 Instead,	 it	 tended	 to	 occur	 in	 more	 public	 contexts,	 such	 as	
community	 Facebook	 pages	 they	 followed	 and	 the	 personal	 walls	 of	 their	 contacts,	 a	
communicative	 space	 more	 visible	 to	 users’	 wider	 social	 media	 network	 than	 bounded	
communicative	exchanges.	
	
																																																						
86	Audio-visual	exchange	through	‘Facetime’	was	not	accessible	to	participants	at	the	time	interviews	were	conducted.	
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b. Politicised	profile	images	
	
Political	 talk	 between	 citizens	 on	 social	 media	 was	 not	 restricted	 to	 verbal	 forms	 of	
communication.	 A	 number	 of	 communicative	 forms	 stood	 out	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 the	
possibilities	that	social	media	offers	were	used	by	respondents	to	express	their	involvement,	
positions,	 opinions	 and	 identities	 in	 the	 post-revolution	 Tunisian	 public	 sphere.	 The	 use	 of	
imagery	 in	 research	 participants’	 personal	 profile	 pictures	 to	 present	 themselves	 on	 their	
social	media	accounts	was	one	noteworthy	form	in	this	respect.	Indeed,	the	revolution	period	
marked	a	turning	point	in	the	use	of	this	 imagery	by	many	participants	to	express	collective	
identities,	 affiliations	 and	 political	 opinions.	 Based	 on	 social	media	 data	 I	 had	 access	 to,	 it	
transpired	 that,	 in	 2011	 and	 2012,	 only	 one	 fifth	 of	 participants	 exclusively	 used	 personal	
photos	 (e.g.	 of	 themselves,	 their	 children)	 as	 their	 profile	 picture.	 The	 other	 participants	
employed	 a	 mix	 of	 personal	 photos	 and	 abstract	 images,	 photos	 from	 nature,	 text	 and	
different	symbols	including	religious	references,	as	well	as	images	carrying	civic	and	political	
messages.	 The	 majority	 of	 participants	 used	 their	 profile	 image	 to	 express	 an	 opinion	 or	
identity	in	this	way	at	some	point	during	this	period.	The	use	of	this	imagery	varied	over	time,	
respondents	switched	their	profile	images,	in	particular	during	times	of	crisis	to	express	their	
identification	 with	 particular	 causes	 or	 perspectives.	 At	 other	 times,	 they	 changed	 their	
images	back	to	personal	photos.	A	few	interviewees	suggested	that	they	disliked	using	their	
own	photos	for	their	account	profiles	and	preferred	instead	the	use	of	abstract	images.	This	
was	particularly	the	case	for	older	research	participants.	However,	they	also	tended	to	switch	
between	 images	 of	 nature,	 for	 example,	 and	 more	 politically-related	 imagery.	 In	 January	
2011,	when	 the	 revolution	was	 underway,	 nearly	 two	 thirds	 of	 participants	 switched	 their	
profile	picture	to	one	that	contained	the	Tunisian	flag	 in	various	 forms.	Some	examples	are	
provided	below:	
	
FIG.1:	Participants	Facebook	profile	images	in	Jan.2011	
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Accounts	from	interviews	conducted	in	2012	indicated	that,	in	switching	their	profile	to	these	
images,	 respondents	 were	 seeking	 to	 express	 their	 solidarity	 with	 other	 Tunisian	 citizens	
across	the	country.	For	example,	Imen	recalled	the	different	stages	of	this	image	use	during	
the	 revolution	 period.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 January,	 when	 she	 started	 to	 hear	 about	 the	
increasing	 number	 of	 citizens	 killed	 during	 protests,	 she	 changed	 her	 profile	 picture	 to	 a	
“black	 flag”	 to	 express	 her	 sadness	 and	 mourning.	 With	 the	 14th	 January,	 she	 joined	 in	
switching	 her	 profile	 to	 the	 image	of	 the	 Tunisian	 flag	whose	 central	 circle	was	 formed	by	
hands	holding	each	other	(as	illustrated	above)	-	a	symbol	of	patriotic	unity	and	solidarity	that	
was	used	on	a	mass	scale	on	the	platform	at	this	point	in	time.	Later	that	month,	she	changed	
her	 profile	 image	 to	 the	 photo	 of	 a	 Tunisian	 flag	 surrounded	by	 candles	 in	memory	 of	 the	
victims.	For	Kholoud,	using	the	Tunisian	flag	was	a	way	of	expressing	solidarity	as	well	as	her	
happiness	 to	 “have	 [her]	 country	back”.	Most	of	 the	 interviewees	 referred	 to	 changing	 the	
use	of	their	profile	imagery	with	the	revolution	and	continued	to	use	it	to	express	a	national	
and	 political	message	 in	 this	manner	 for	 a	 period	 of	 time	 after	 the	 revolution.	Marwa,	 for	
instance,	kept	using	the	Tunisian	‘solidarity	flag’	for	a	year	before	returning	her	own	photo	as	
profile	 identifier.	 A	 few	other	 respondents,	 such	 as	 Rim,	 continued	 to	 occasionally	 use	 her	
profile	image	to	represent	her	opinion	and	identification	with	a	number	of	public	issues	that	
she	 felt	 related	 to,	 and	 that	 extended	 beyond	 the	 national	 realm,	 such	 as	 the	 Lybian	 and,	
later	the	Syrian,	protests	for	instance.	
	
However,	overall,	most	of	these	forms	of	 identity	expressions	revolved	around	national	and	
local	public	matters.	A	few	research	participants	also	drew	on	this	communication	option	to	
express	 party	 political	 allegiances.	 This	 was	 particularly	 the	 case	 during	 the	 elections	 in	
October	2011	where	they	changed	their	profile	 images	to	 logos	of	 the	political	parties	 they	
supported.	 This	 trend	was	 not	 particularly	 prevalent	 and	 was	 only	 observed	 in	 relation	 to	
respondents	who	were	active	in	formal	politics.	
	
c. Sharing	practices	
	
Research	 participants	 also	 used	 other	 communicative	 possibilities	 on	 Facebook	 to	 express	
their	 support	of	different	political	causes	or	opinions	such	as	by	clicking	 the	 ‘like’	button	 in	
reaction	 to	 content	 they	 came	 across	 on	 the	 platform	 through	 the	 pages	 they	 followed	 or	
other	users	in	their	networks.	Particularly	noteworthy	was	the	content	they	chose	to	“share”	
as	 it	formed	the	major	part	of	the	social	media	activities	that	were	visible	to	others	 in	their	
network.	 Interviewees	 repeatedly	 referred	 to	 drastic	 changes	 in	 the	 way	 they	 used	 social	
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networking	 site	 Facebook	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 January	 2011	 uprising,	 and	 in	 the	 type	 of	
content	 they	 shared.	 The	 interviewees	 all	 stated	 that,	 prior	 to	 the	 revolution,	 there	was	 a	
generalised	fear	of	posting	any	content	related	to	politics	on	the	platform,	and	it	was	instead	
utilised	for	relatively	innocuous	social	interaction	such	as	contacting	friends,	sharing	music	or	
discussing	football	results.	However,	during	the	two	weeks	prior	to	the	14th	January87	and	in	
the	ensuing	few	days,	nearly	all	of	them	published	content	relating	to	the	political	situation	
on	 their	 personal	 profile	 page	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 Like	 many,	 Khouloud	 had	 mostly	 used	
Facebook	 to	 share	 personal	 photos,	 but	 from	 mid-January	 2011	 the	 content	 of	 her	 posts	
changed	 as	 she	 started	 to	 upload	 patriotic	 songs	 and	 political	 caricatures	 to	 her	 wall.	
Similarly,	 prior	 to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 widespread	 civil	 disorder,	 Narjes	 had	 used	 her	 page	 to	
entertain	 friends	 in	 her	 network	 by	 regularly	 posting	 proverbs,	 amusing	 quotes	 and	music	
videos	 on	 her	 profile.	 As	 in	 Khouloud’s	 case,	 this	 pattern	 dramatically	 changed	 in	 January	
2011	when	political	commentary	made	 its	 first	appearance	on	her	personal	profile,	content	
which	 became	 increasingly	 prevalent	 over	 the	 following	months	 as	 the	 graph	 on	 the	 next	
page	illustrates88:	
	
	
	
GRAPH	4:	P.14:	Changes	in	political	content	sharing	on	Facebook	(Dec.2010	-	Mar.2011)	
	
																																																						
87	Date	of	the	departure	of	Ben	Ali	from	power.	
88	The	separation	between	what	constitutes	political	and	‘other’	content,	in	this	graph,	can	be	seen	as	quite	an	artificially	
enforced	delineation	here.	For	example,	can	the	publication	of	religious	text	on	a	participant’s	personal	wall	be	considered	as	
political,	religious,	personal,	or	other?	Should	the	distinction	be	made	only	on	the	basis	of	the	media	text	itself,	or	further	
contextualising	parameters?	How	should	the	example	of	a	research	participant	sharing	a	love	song	be	categorised	when	the	
seemingly	non-political	lyrics	about	regret	and	making	up	for	past	mistakes	strike	a	particularly	political	chord	on	the	first	
anniversary	of	the	elections?	Clearly,	there	is	no	easy	answer	to	such	questions	and	in	a	sense	the	sharing	of	every	piece	of	
content	within	each	individual’s	network	has	an	element	of	public	communication	and	potential	political	dimension.	However,	
through	the	categories	of	‘political’	and	‘other’	issues,	I	have	attempted	here	to	distinguish	on	a	case-by-case	basis	between	
forms	of	expression	of	knowledge	and	opinion	related	to	socio-political	developments	in	the	country,	and	forms	where	no	such	
dimensions	could	be	clearly	distinguished.	Thus,	for	example,	religious	text	was	mostly	categorised	as	“other”,	except	when	it	
was	quoted	to	directly	address	a	political	issue.	
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An	even	more	striking	example	of	this	trend	was	evidenced	in	the	case	of	Sonia	whose	visible	
activities	 on	 her	 Facebook	 profile	 before	 January	 2011	were	 extremely	 limited.	 Before	 the	
revolution,	 she	 mostly	 consulted	 her	 account	 to	 communicate	 with	 friends	 and	 family	
members,	 some	 of	 whom	 had	 migrated	 abroad.	 Most	 of	 her	 activity	 on	 the	 platform	
consisted	of	chatting	with	 them	via	private	messages,	occasionally	 she	wrote	more	publicly	
visible	comments	to	congratulate	friends	on	their	birthdays	for	example,	but	she	hardly	ever	
posted	 any	 content	 at	 all	 on	 her	 personal	 wall.	 As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 graph	 below,	 Sonia	
shared	no	content	 in	December	2010.	This,	however,	changed	dramatically	 in	 January	2011	
during	which	she	shared	over	one	hundred	and	twenty	pieces	of	content	on	her	wall,	nearly	
all	of	which	related	to	national	issues,	news	items	and	political	commentary:		
	
	
GRAPH	5:	P.1:	Changes	in	political	content	sharing	on	Facebook	(Dec.2010	-	Mar.2011)	
	
	
The	 visible	 levels	 of	 engagement	 with	 material	 relating	 to	 the	 socio-political	 situation	 on	
participants’	social	media	accounts	were	very	pronounced	in	most	cases.	The	type	of	content	
included	in	this	category	varied:	some	consisted	of	a	status	update	written	by	the	participant	
on	his/her	personal	wall	to	assert	a	political	opinion	for	example;	other	content	assumed	the	
form	of	longer	‘Facebook	notes’.	However,	political	content	principally	consisted	of	text	and	
still	 or	 moving	 imagery	 forwarded	 by	 participants	 from	 other	 sources.	 In	 fact,	 less	 than	
twenty	per	 cent	of	 content	 shared	by	participants	on	 their	personal	wall	was	generated	by	
them.	Rather	than	the	expression	of	a	personal	political	voice,	the	large	majority	of	politically-
related	 media	 content	 on	 participants’	 personal	 accounts	 instead	 consisted	 of	 giving	
resonance	to	the	opinions	and	representations	of	others,	to	which	they	occasionally	added	a	
brief	 contextualising	 comment	 or	 reaction.	Most	 of	 this	 content	 stemmed	 from	pages	 that	
participants	followed	or	were	‘fans’	of.	A	closer	analysis	of	these	sources	revealed	the	large	
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
dec'	10 jan'	11 feb'	11 mar'	11
Number	of	'shares'	relating	to	political	situation
Number	of	'shares'	relating	to	other	issues
179	
	
number,	and	diverse	array,	of	pages	from	which	the	content	was	sourced.	These	included	the	
pages	of	other	friends	in	participants’	networks,	public	figures’	pages,	or	pages	of	traditional	
mass	media	 broadcasters	 and	newspapers.	However,	 the	 shared	 content	mostly	 originated	
from	 online	 news	 sources,	 blogs,	 and	 Facebook	 pages	 unique	 to	 the	 platform.	 Their	 titles	
frequently	encouraged	 individuals	to	cluster	around	shared	socio-political	stances.	Although	
content	from	such	pages	tended	to	have	a	clear	political	orientation,	nothing	in	their	titles	or	
the	 information	 about	 the	 pages	 provided	 insights	 into	 their	 ownership	 or	 political	
affiliations.	Some	of	their	titles	are	listed	below	to	exemplify	this	point:		
	
Smile	a	lot	you’re	not	from	Sidi	Bouzid	89	
	 	
Ennahdha	Dégage	90	
	
Haters	of	Bourguiba	and	Zine	and	RCD	91	 	
	
	
	
Secularism	scandals	92	 	 	 	 	
	
It	could	be	argued	that	this	very	lack	of	transparency	and	identifiable	political	allegiances	was	
part	of	their	appeal,	compared	to	pages	of	political	parties	for	example,	although	many	of	the	
contextualising	interviews	I	conducted	in	2012	and	2013	indicated	that	political	parties	were	
in	 fact	 behind	 the	 financing	 of	 a	 number	 of	 popular	 and	 seemingly	 unaffiliated	 Facebook	
pages	at	the	time.		
	
The	high	level	of	politicisation	of	content	that	research	participants	shared	was	not	sustained	
and,	over	time,	 it	became	a	more	varied	mix	 including	more	entertainment-led	content	and	
references	to	personal	matters.	However,	news	and	politically-related	content	continued	to	
																																																						
89	My	translation	from	classical	Arabic	(fous’ha).	Sidi	Bouzid	is	the	town	from	which	Bouazizi	came	and	where	he	set	himself	on	
fire,	which	triggered	the	first	wave	of	protests	of	the	revolution.	The	name	makes	a	statement	about	regional	inequalities	in	
Tunisia	and	continually	difficult	living	conditions	in	Sidi	Bouzid,	despite	its	crucial	role	in	triggering	the	civil	unrest.	
90	Original	name	in	French.	‘Dégage’	is	the	slogan	chanted	by	protesters	during	the	revolution	to	demand	that	Ben	Ali	‘go	away’.	
Ennahdha	is	the	name	of	the	Islamist	party	that	led	the	transitional	government	coalition.	The	page	calls	for	the	party	to	be	
ousted	just	as	Ben	Ali	had	been.	Its	French	title	suggests	closeness	to	urban	middle	classes.	
91	My	translation	from	Tunisian	Arabic	dialect	(derja).	Bourguiba	is	the	former	president	of	Tunisia	from	1956	to	1987,	regarded	
by	some	as	national	hero	for	his	role	in	the	liberation	of	Tunisia	from	colonialism	and	his	subsequent	very	pronounced	
modernising	agenda,	and	disliked	by	others	who	saw	this	modernisation	as	an	imposition	and	critiqued	his	long	stay	in	power.	
Zine	refers	to	Ben	Ali’s	first	name,	and	RCD	to	his	party	(see	Chapter	1).	
92	My	translation	from	classical	Arabic	(fos’ha).	
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feature	 to	 a	 significant	 extent	within	 this	mix,	 and	more	 prominently	 so	 during	 periods	 of	
heightened	crisis.	 In	 the	case	of	Sonia	–	referred	to	earlier	–	a	closer	 look	at	 the	politically-
related	content	she	shared	in	2011	and	2012	shows	these	peaks	in	activity	during	important	
events,	whereas	her	holiday	periods	during	the	summer	were	particularly	quiet,	as	the	figure	
below	suggests:	
	
	
GRAPH	6:	P.1:	Changes	in	political	content	sharing	on	Facebook	(Dec.2010	–	Aug.2012)	
	
	
In	this	graph,	we	can	see	very	high	peaks	of	activity	in	2011,	during	the	revolution	period,	as	
well	as	during	the	election	period,	and	later	 in	March	and	April	2012	following	a	number	of	
incidents	that	were	indicative	of	a	rising,	and	increasingly	violent,	political	polarisation	in	the	
country93.	
	
3.3. A	networked	public	sphere?	
	
To	 some	 extent,	 this	 networked	 communicative	 context	 and	 the	 new	 forms	 of	 political	
discussion	 and	 interactions	 it	 supports,	 suggest	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 vivid	 online	 sphere	 for	
public	exchange	between	citizens.	Overall,	as	a	space	 for	 the	communication	of	opinions	 in	
relation	 to	 news	 content	 and	 mediated	 representations	 of	 the	 socio-political	 issues	 that	
respondents	considered	to	be	of	common	concern,	it	could	be	referred	to	as	a	form	of	public	
sphere.	Communicative	participation	in	this	sphere	enabled	the	expression	of	individual	and	
collective	 opinions	 as	 well	 as	 political	 subjectivities,	 identifications	 and	 allegiances.	
Furthermore,	in	its	networked	form,	this	sphere	seemed	to	extend	deliberative	opportunities	
by	 enabling	 communication	 on	 a	 larger	 scale	 than	what	 tended	 to	 be	 possible	 offline,	 and	
between	 Tunisian	 citizens	 of	 a	 plurality	 of	 backgrounds	 and	 opinions	 across	 distance.	
																																																						
93	These	related	to	the	lack	of	reaction	by	authorities	to	the	rise	of	a	more	radical	Salafism	in	the	country,	as	well	as	a	number	of	
developments	considered	by	part	of	the	opposition	as	indicative	of	the	coalition	government’s	increasingly	undemocratic	nature.	
These	included,	for	example,	the	violent	repression	of	protests	by	police	forces	during	the	celebration	of	the	national	Martyr’s	
day	in	the	capital	in	April	2012,	and	the	sentencing	of	a	blogger	to	seven	years	in	prison	in	March	2012	for	the	online	publication	
of	Mohammed	cartoons	and	other	content	supporting	atheism.	
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However,	it	would	be	simplistic	to	consider	the	occurrence	of	such	communicative	exchanges	
online	 as	 a	 mere	 reflection	 of	 face-to-face	 political	 conversation	 and	 exchanges,	 or	 an	
extension	of	offline	deliberative	possibilities.	By	the	nature	of	its	communicative	architecture,	
this	 social	 networking	 platform	 mediated	 and	 transformed	 politically-related	 talk	 and	
communication,	and	a	number	of	issues	arose	out	of	this	context.		
	
Whereas	the	majority	of	respondents	considered	that	the	role	of	social	media	was	-	despite	
the	 issues	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 (misinformation	 and	 propaganda)	 -	 relatively	
positive	 in	 terms	 of	 enabling	 and	 supporting	 the	 dissemination	 of	 news	 and	 information,	
opinions	about	 its	role	as	space	for	opinion	exchange	and	debate	between	citizens	was	 less	
optimistic.	 There	 were	 some	 exceptions	 to	 this	 perspective.	 In	 articulating	 their	 thoughts	
about	what	they	perceived	as	the	difference	between	this	type	of	communication	online	and	
offline,	only	two	interviewees	(Rafik,	Kamal)	considered	that	social	media	offered	a	reflection	
of	offline	interactions	in	this	respect.	Additionally,	for	Raouf	and	Ahmed,	a	number	of	positive	
aspects	 regarding	 such	exchanges	on	 Facebook	were	pointed	 to.	Raouf	 considered	 that	his	
use	of	social	media	enabled	exposure	to	-	and	communication	with	-	people	of	more	varied	
opinions	than	he	was	used	to	offline.	His	rejection	of	much	mass	media	content	and	reliance	
on	social	media	 to	access	news	and	 information	often	 led	 in	his	opinion	 to	challenging,	yet	
constructive,	 exchanges	 with	 people	 he	 chose	 to	 engage	 and	 have	 a	 conversation	 with.	
Ahmed,	in	turn,	considered	that	social	media	was	a	powerful	tool	to	share	religious	content	
and	 communicate	 with	 others	 through	 more	 visual	 means	 that	 enabled	 better	 emotional	
connection	 than	 would	 be	 possible	 offline.	 However,	 overall,	 participants	 were	 far	 more	
ambivalent,	and	often	negative,	about	the	role	of	social	media	in	supporting	political	opinion	
exchange.	
	
One	 of	 the	 key	 obstacles	 to	 more	 sustained	 and	 constructive	 political	 conversations	 and	
interactions	was,	from	respondents’	point	of	view,	the	opening	of	such	exchanges	to	citizens	
with	 a	 varying	 range	 of	 political	 knowledge	 and	 familiarity	with	 debating	 political	matters.	
Unrestricted	 freedom	 to	 express	 and	 the	 extension	 of	 political	 communication	 to	 larger	
publics,	paradoxically,	also	undermined	this	public	sphere.	This	complaint	applied	to	political	
talk	 in	 general,	 in	 both	 offline	 and	 online	 contexts.	Whereas	 the	majority	 of	 interviewees	
indicated	 that	 the	 freedom	 of	 expression	 since	 the	 revolution	 was	 a	 very	 positive	
development,	for	many,	the	downside	of	the	equation	related	to	the	poor	quality	of	debate	
and	 difficulties	 of	 discussing	 issues	 that	 everybody	 had	 opinions	 on	 and	 different	 levels	 of	
knowledge	about,	depending	on	 the	news	and	 information	 they	 followed.	Frequently,	male	
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respondents	 were	 making	 an	 analogy	 between	 talk	 about	 football	 and	 politics,	 the	 latter	
having	 replaced	 the	 former	 in	 everyday	 exchanges	 regardless	 of	 knowledge	 and	 familiarity	
with	 subject	 matters.	 Raouf,	 Yassine,	 Anis,	 Youssef	 and	 Ahmed	 engaged	 in	 conversations	
about	public	and	political	affairs	to	different	levels,	but	all	made	similar	points	relating	to	the	
responsibility	that	came	with	the	new	freedom	of	expression.	In	this	sense,	they	considered	
that	abstaining	from	talk	was	preferable	when	people	lacked	adequate	knowledge.	Whereas	
they	 all	 considered	 that	 such	 knowledge	 legitimated	 opinion	 expression,	 they	 always	
considered	 others	 (“people”,	 “they”,	 “some	 people”)	 –	 never	 themselves	 -	 as	 being	
“ignorant”,	“not	understand[ing]	a	thing”,	or	“not	hav[ing]	a	clue”.	In	this	sense,	the	terms	of	
inclusion	in	this	legitimation	of	opinions	tended	to	be	aligned	to	their	personal	opinions.	On	
social	media,	these	issues	were	reinforced,	partly	because	exposure	extended	outside	of	the	
network	 of	 connections	 that	 participants	 had	 personally	 chosen	 to	 form	 (for	 example	 they	
were	at	times	exposed	to	the	opinions	of	people	in	their	friends’	networks,	or	to	comments	
by	 strangers	 on	 pages	 they	 followed).	 Here,	 social	 media’s	 networked	 nature	 posed	 new	
issues	 in	 terms	 of	 maintaining	 control	 over	 their	 exposure	 and	 involvement	 in	 political	
commentary	and	interactions.	Even	more	problematic	was	the	fact	that	they	were	exposed	-	
within	 their	 personal	 networks	 on	 social	 media	 -	 to	 opinions	 of	 people	 they	 were	 not	
necessarily	close	 to	 (work	colleagues,	distant	acquaintances,	members	of	 their	wider	 family	
circle).	This	 translated	at	 times	 into	difficult	 social	negotiations	when	opinions	differed.	But	
even	among	closer	contacts,	the	balance	between	political	talk	and	socialisation	was	at	times	
difficult	to	maintain.	
	
This	 form	of	communication	 in	 the	networked	sphere	 led	 to	problematic	 issues	 in	 terms	of	
occasional	 exposure	 to	 unwelcome	 political	 opinions	 and	 uninvited	 interlocutors,	 but	 also	
meant	 that	 users	 had	 less	 control	 over	 the	 subjects	 of	 conversations	 they	 encountered.	
Unlike	 political	 communication	 between	 citizens	 in	 an	 offline	 context	 where	 conversation	
occurred	 around	 chosen	 topics	 of	 common	 concern,	 social	media	 users	were	 exposed	 to	 a	
significant	 number	 of	 unsolicited	 politically-related	 content.	 As	 nearly	 all	 research	
participants	typically	used	Facebook	by	scrolling	through	their	newsfeed	rather	than	seeking	
content	from	specific	sources,	they	encountered	a	variety	of	content	that	also	diverged	from	
their	 sought	 interests	 and	perspectives.	 Furthermore,	 respondents	 articulated	 a	 number	of	
problematic	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	 talking	 about	 politics	 and	 current	 affairs	 on	 social	 media	
compared	 to	 a	 face-to-face	 offline	 environment.	 The	 limited	 moderation	 of	 debates	 and	
political	communication	between	citizens	on	the	platform	translated	into,	at	times,	the	use	of	
aggressive	 terms	and	abusive	 language	by	 some	users	of	 the	platform,	 and	generally	more	
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difficulties	in	managing	the	terms	and	boundaries	of	such	exchanges	than	in	offline	and	face-
to-face	 communication.	Over	half	of	 the	 interviewees	made	 reference	 to	 the	 rising	 level	of	
aggression	in	political	communication	on	the	platform,	the	majority	of	them	having	had	direct	
experience	of	it	in	their	interactions	online,	whilst	others	had	witnessed	such	arguments	and	
abuse	in	interactions	between	contacts	or	other	sources	they	followed	on	their	networks.	
	
I	have	so	far	assessed	the	relationship	that	respondents	had	to	the	political	and	public	realm	
and	 have	 highlighted	 that,	 in	 the	 initial	 post-revolution	 context	 of	 Tunisia,	 levels	 of	
involvement	and	participation	in	formal	politics	remain	relatively	limited,	but	that	expression	
and	 communication	 between	 citizens	 about	 public	 and	 political	 matters	 was	 highly	
politicised.	 Interactions	on	social	media	 reflected	 this	 context,	but	also	extended	 the	 forms	
that	political	talk	took	in	an	offline	context,	providing	new	opportunities	for	civic	and	political	
communication,	 albeit	 ones	 that	 were	 not	 necessarily	 supportive	 of	 deliberation	 and	
constructive	debate.	Most	 of	 the	 issues	 identified	 at	 first	 glance	 in	 relation	 to	political	 talk	
and	communication	on	social	media,	related	to	the	publicness	of	this	communicative	space.	
In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	why	 these	 issues	 arose	 in	 this	 context,	 I	will	 now	analyse	 in	
more	detail	how	research	participants	used	the	platform	to	exchange	political	opinions	and	
communicate	about	matters	of	shared	concern,	and	what	meanings	they	associated	with	the	
new	and	different	forms	of	communication	and	interaction	available	to	them	on	Facebook.	As	
I	 will	 highlight,	 the	 publicly-oriented	 use	 of	 the	 platform	 in	 this	 Tunisian	 context,	 whilst	
empowering	individual	and	collective	expression,	also	reinforced	divisions.	
	
	
4. Political	identity	and	visibility	in	the	networked	sphere	
	
As	discussed	earlier,	an	understanding	of	the	meanings	and	participative	character	that	social	
media	users	ascribe	to	their	online	interactions	is	of	key	importance	to	this	study,	as	content	
to	which	an	outside	observer	may	assign	a	political	character	may,	in	fact,	have	been	created	
with	no	such	intention	in	mind.	The	notion	of	intent	is	incorporated	in	the	definition	provided	
by	Theocharis	(2015),	who	argues	that	a	revised	conceptualisation	of	political	participation	is	
necessary	in	order	to	account	for	new	and	digital	forms	of	action:		
	
[…]	digitally	networked	participation	can	be	understood	as	a	networked	media–based	
personalized	action	that	is	carried	out	by	individual	citizens	with	the	intent	to	display	their	
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own	mobilization	and	activate	their	social	networks	in	order	to	raise	awareness	about,	or	
exert	social	and	political	pressures	for	the	solution	of,	a	social	or	political	problem	(p.6).	
	
For	Theocharis	then,	a	crucial	element	in	defining	participation	is	not	only	tied	to	intent,	but	
also	to	the	act	of	publicising,	or	making	visible,	one’s	own	engagement	and	positioning	vis-à-
vis	a	given	cause.	But	what	also	emerged	from	the	previous	discussion	is	the	need	to	account	
for	online	interactions	that	unintentionally	acquire	a	political	character	as,	in	the	networked	
age,	social	media	users	are	not	 in	full	control	of	the	mediation	of	their	expression	on	social	
media.	
	
The	 way	 in	 which	 social	 media	 challenges	 pre-existing	 conceptual	 frameworks	 of	 political	
participation,	and	the	findings	so	far,	call	for	an	equally	extended	delineation	of	what	may	be	
considered	as	political.	There	are	naturally	limitations	to	how	specific	any	such	definition	can	
be	in	the	context	of	research	that	seeks	to	account	for	new	modes	of	being	politically	active.	
Distinctions	between	 the	 social,	 the	political	and	other	 realms,	 could	be	 seen	as	 specific	 to	
western	conceptions	of	society	as	Lefort	(2001),	among	others,	has	highlighted.	Nevertheless,	
the	 establishment	 of	 certain	 parameters	 is	 useful,	 I	 contend,	 in	 order	 to	 examine,	 and	
elucidate,	 the	 dynamics	 and	 processes	 under	 consideration.	 As	 Carpentier	 (2011a,	 p.20)	
highlights,	 concepts	 such	as	Giddens’	 “life	politics”,	Beck’s	 “sub-politics”	or	cultural	 studies’	
use	of	 the	 term	all	highlight	 the	significance	of	a	broader	 framing	of	what	politics	 involves,	
but	perhaps	Mouffe’s	differentiation	between	formal	politics	and	‘the	political’	(2000,	2005)	
has	been	particularly	pertinent	in	recent	debates	around	the	Internet	and	democratic	politics,	
providing	a	powerful	contrast	to	the	deliberative	Habermasian	definition	of	the	public	sphere.	
Mouffe	 rejects	 a	 view	 of	 democracy	 that	 is	 consensus-driven,	 pointing	 out	 the	 potential	
dangers	inherent	in	a	conception	that	fails	to	recognise	antagonism	as	an	inherent	dimension	
of	 social	 relations.	 She	 calls	 instead	 for	 an	 agonistic	 model	 of	 democracy	 where	 this	
antagonism	 can	 be	 positively	 transformed.	 Her	 differentiation	 between	 the	 social	 and	 the	
political	is	equally	helpful	in	clarifying	what	the	political	refers	to.	For	her,	the	social	refers	to	
the	 “realm	 of	 sedimented	 practices”	 whereas	 the	 political	 relates	 to	 “acts	 of	 hegemonic	
institution”	 (2005,	 p.17).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 origins	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 order	 are	
politically	 instituted,	but	 in	becoming	widely	accepted	and	taken	for	granted	they	 lose	their	
political	character.	These	sedimented	practices	remain	contestable,	however,	and	retain	the	
potential	to	be	reactivated	and	once	more	become	political	(Carpentier,	2011b).	In	Mouffe’s	
model,	the	latter	situation	is	triggered	when	a	querying	of	the	social	status	quo		occurs.	This	
perspective	goes	some	way	to	elucidating	how	the	political	may	arise	through	the	circulation,	
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on	a	much	larger	scale,	of	cultural	and	symbolic	representations	of	the	social	on	social	media;	
it	 also	 serves	as	 a	prism	 through	which	 to	 view,	 and	understand,	 the	possibilities	 that	new	
communications	 technologies	 and	 channels	 afford	 in	 making	 alternatives	 visible	 that	 may	
challenge	the	widely-held	acceptance	of	particular	meanings.	However,	this	line	of	argument	
also	leaves	open	to	question	forms	of	power	that	continually	reassert	or	legitimate	the	social	
as	non-political,	or	'only'	social,	in	everyday	life.	
	
To	explore	what	being	political	means	in	this	context,	different	conceptions	of	citizenship	can	
also	be	drawn	upon.	Isin’s	work	(2002,	2005,	2008)	in	this	area	helps	to	frame	citizenship	as	a	
way	 of	 constituting	 oneself	 as	 a	 political	 being	 through	 acts	 that	 are	 purposive	 but	 not	
necessarily	 intentional,	 and	 by	 engaging	 in	 agonistic	 as	 well	 as	 solidaristic	 and	 alienating	
orientations	 (2002,	 p.276).	 Citizenship	 is	 then	 a	 dialogical	 enactment	 of	 different	 subject	
positions	that	implicates	subjects	and,	in	doing	so,	necessarily	also	marks	their	differentiation	
from	 others	 (Isin,	 2008,	 p.18-19).	 The	 notion	 of	 visibility,	 discussed	 earlier,	 is	 a	 useful	
complement	 to	 this	 perspective	 on	 citizenship	 in	 the	 context	 of	 online	 social	 networking.	
There	are	two	important	aspects	to	the	question	of	visibility	that	arise	with	respect	to	being	
political	on	social	media.	The	enactment	of	different	subject	positions	that	 Isin	refers	to,	by	
virtue	of	 its	digital	 inscription	 in	more	publicly	visible	ways	on	social	media	users’	accounts,	
archives	and	fixes	these	positions	and	differentiations	from	others	in	new	ways	not	available	
in	an	offline	context.	By	being	more	visible	across	networks	of	 like-minded	(or	not)	citizens,	
the	sedimented	‘social’	that	Mouffe	refers	to	becomes	more	difficult	to	ignore,	and	easier	to	
challenge	on	an	individual	and	collective	basis,	meaning	that	spaces	for	the	political	to	arise	
are	potentially	significantly	extended.	Similarly,	subjects	can	also	become	more	accountable	
for	 this	 enactment	 and	 less	 flexible	 in	 navigating	 across	 different	 positions.	 Secondly,	 the	
enactment	of	 subject	 positions	by	 citizens	 and	 the	unavoidable	differentiations	 they	 imply,	
can	be	produced,	distributed	and	seen	by	other	citizens	on	a	much	larger	scale.	To	be	visible	
is	 not	 simply	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 public	 (Voirol,	 2005),	 but	 requires	 attention	 to	 a	 subject	 to	 be	
acknowledged.	Media’s	 power	 resides	 in	 conferring	 regimes	 of	 visibility	 to	 subjects	 in	 the	
social	arena	(Brighenti,	2010).	Where	such	power	becomes	more	widely	distributed	through	
social	media,	 it	 in	 part	 resides	 in	 how	 platform-specific	 network	 architecture	 frames	 these	
regimes.	However,	this	power	also	extends	to	citizens	as	they	ignore,	recognise	or	reject	each	
other’s	 subject	 positions	 in	ways	which	 are	more	 public	 than	 ever	 before.	 Participation	 on	
social	 media	 then	 also	 opens	 the	 arena	 to	 the	 collective	 negotiation	 of	 these	 regimes	 of	
visibility.	 To	 be	 political	 then	 also	 involves	 the	 dialogical	 enactment	 of	 subject	 positions	 in	
relation	to	this	negotiation.	
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4.1. Being	public	on	social	media	
	
The	 public-private	 nature	 of	 networked	 communication	 on	 social	 networking	 platform	
Facebook	 is	 ambiguous.	 It	 is	 both	 a	 space	 for	 the	 expression	 of	 an	 individual	 identity	 and	
personal	perspectives,	as	well	as	a	space	 for	networked	 interactions,	connection	to	a	wider	
public,	and	identity	performance	visible	to	others	in	users’	personal	networks.	In	this	regard,	
respondents’	 perspectives	 on	 and	 relation	 to	 the	 ambiguous	 public-private	 nature	 of	
communication	on	the	platform	was	interesting.	These	suggest	that	their	use	of	the	platform	
was	 oriented	 –	 during	 this	 initial	 research	 period	 –	 towards	 communication	 about	 more	
public	 than	 private	 matters,	 and	 served	 to	 extend	 everyday	 offline	 political	 talk	 and	
interactions	in	new	ways.		
	
Most	 participants	 had	 one	 social	media	 account	 on	 Facebook,	 and	 all	 of	 them	based	 it	 on	
their	offline	identities.	Typically,	this	was	achieved	through	the	inclusion	of	their	real	names	
rather	 than	pseudonyms,	photos	or	 information	about	 their	personal	 lives	and	activities,	or	
by	drawing	on	their	offline	family	and	friendship	networks	for	their	online	connections.	In	this	
sense,	 participants	 were	 not	 using	 the	 platform	 under	 anonymous	 profiles	 and	 their	
communication	 and	 interactions	 about	 public	 and	 political	 matters	 were	 linked	 to	 their	
personal	 identities.	 Furthermore,	 similar	 to	 other	 national	 contexts	 (Mor	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 p.2),	
research	 participants	 tended	 to	 have	 limited	 awareness	 and	 rarely	make	 us	 of	 the	 privacy	
parameters	available	to	them	on	the	platform	to	adjust	the	visibility	of	their	communication	
(mainly	on	 their	personal	walls)	 to	different	groups	 in	 their	 social	media	networks.	 Instead,	
most	of	it	tended	to	be	visible	to	all	contacts	in	their	networks	and	beyond.	Two	participants	
(Raouf,	 Asma)	 made	 their	 profiles	 completely	 public	 and	 enabled	 anyone	 to	 follow	 its	
content,	and	nearly	two	thirds	of	the	sample	did	not	use	privacy	parameters	and	relied	on	the	
standard	 profile	 settings	 through	 which	 their	 content	 was	 visible	 to	 all	 contacts	 in	 their	
network	 in	 the	 same	 way,	 and	 at	 times	 it	 was	 also	 visible	 to	 friends	 of	 friends	 in	 their	
networks	if	they	interacted	with	the	same	content	(liked,	shared	or	commented	on	the	same	
Facebook	 post	 for	 example).	 Mostly,	 respondents	 expressed	 little	 concern	 or	 a	 lack	 of	
knowledge	 in	 terms	 of	 adjusting	 these	 visibility	 parameters.	 The	 remaining	 interviewees	
occasionally	 made	 some	 use	 of	 these	 parameters,	 but	 only	 three	 of	 them	 (Nabil,	 Rim,	
Meriem)	 said	 they	made	quite	advanced	and	more	 systematic	use	of	 these	adjustments	 to	
customise	content	to	different	groups	in	their	network	of	social	media	contacts.	Equally,	what	
participants	 shared	 on	 their	 personal	 social	 media	 profiles	 in	 2011	 and	 2012	 included	
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relatively	 little	 personal	 information.	 Based	on	online	data	 available,	 this	 included	a	mix	of	
audio-visual	and	written	content	 ranging	 from	religious	quotes,	 cultural	 content	and	music,	
jokes,	 proverbs	 and	 anecdotes,	 to	 news	 and	 political	 commentary.	 Furthermore,	 in	
articulating	 their	 use	 of	 the	 platform,	 only	 six	 participants	 indicated	 that	 they	 regularly	
disclosed	 more	 private	 details	 and	 photos	 relating	 to	 their	 social	 activities,	 families	 and	
friends,	whereas	 the	majority	of	 them	 limited	 their	expression	on	 their	personal	profiles	 to	
communication	that	seemed	to	be	aimed	at	an	exchange	of	a	wider	and	more	public	nature.		
	
Respondents’	reflections	on	why	they	didn’t	use	the	platform	to	interact	with	others	in	their	
networks	 about	more	 private	 issues	were	 quite	 undeveloped:	 “I	 just	 don’t	 like	 it”,	 “I	 don’t	
know	why”,	“others	do	but	I	don’t	feel	like	it”	and	similar	comments	were	a	recurring	theme.	
Whereas	 there	was	only	 limited	evidence	of	 instrumental	 use	of	 privacy	parameters,	 there	
were	 other	 ways	 in	 which	 research	 participants	 more	 spontaneously	 shaped	 their	
communication	 on	 the	 platform	 to	 a	 more	 publicly-oriented	 form	 of	 interaction	 and	
exchange,	in	which	politically-related	communication	between	citizens	featured	prominently.	
This	was	achieved,	as	previously	 indicated,	by	adhering	 to	a	collective	 interpretation	of	 the	
platform	 as	 a	 space	 primarily	 suitable	 for	 public	 and	 politically-oriented	 interaction	 in	 the	
initial	 post-revolutionary	 period.	 Whilst	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 respondents	 mixed	 more	
personal	 and	 public	 content	 in	 what	 they	 disclosed,	 none	 used	 their	 personal	 profiles	
exclusively	to	communicate	about	personal	matters.	As	a	result,	for	respondents	who	did	not	
wish	to	participate	 in	this	public	exchange,	their	use	of	the	platform	was	entirely	 limited	to	
the	reception	of	mediated	content.	Habib,	for	instance,	who	is	one	of	the	oldest	participants	
in	the	sample,	only	used	Facebook	to	access	news	and	did	not	see	any	point	in	any	other	form	
of	interaction	on	the	platform.	Youssef,	a	much	younger	respondent,	used	it	in	a	similar	way	
but	made	a	conscious	effort	not	to	participate	 in	any	form	of	communicative	expression	on	
Facebook	 because	 he	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 disclose	 anything	 about	 his	 opinions	 at	 all.	 He	
associated	the	disclosure	of	his	political	opinions	and	positions	on	the	platform	with	a	level	of	
risk.	Whereas	 he	 talked	 about	 politics	 extensively	with	 his	 friends	 in	 everyday	 face-to-face	
encounters,	 he	 considered	 that	 any	 form	 of	 communicative	 interaction	 or	 expression	 on	
Facebook	was	problematic	because	of	its	traceability	and	visibility	by	a	wider	audience.	These	
examples	 are	 exceptions	 rather	 than	 the	 norm,	 but	 they	 nevertheless	 confirm	 the	 broader	
trend	that	the	ambiguous	public-private	nature	of	the	platform	was	primarily	interpreted	by	
participants	 in	 this	 sample	 as	 a	 public	 space	 or	 a	 space	 oriented	 to	 communication	 about	
public	matters.	
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4.2. Communicating	in	the	public	interest	
	
The	 new	 forms	 of	 communication	 accessible	 to	 users	 of	 the	 platform	 were	 also	 relatively	
ambiguous.	What	 the	 act	of	 sharing	 content,	 for	 example,	means	 can	be	extremely	 varied,	
depending	on	perspective.	However,	 in	this	context,	paralleling	the	publicly-oriented	nature	
of	political	conversation	offline	(as	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter),	the	meanings	that	study	
participants	 associated	 with	 sharing	 content	 on	 social	 media	 also	 tended	 to	 frame	 it	 as	 a	
publicly-oriented	and	politically-inspired	use.	 Indeed,	 it	was	 striking	 that	when	 respondents	
reflected	on	their	own	sharing	habits,	most	of	them	associated	a	sense	of	public	purpose	with	
such	acts.	Some	intervieweess	recalled	the	first	time	they	shared	content	that	was	related	to	
the	 socio-political	 situation	 during	 the	 revolution	 period.	 The	 decision	 to	 join	 in	 the	
dissemination	of	videos	about	the	protests	and	their	repression	was,	at	the	time,	associated	
with	 great	 risk	whilst	Ben	Ali	was	 still	 in	power,	but	 interview	accounts	 indicate	 that	many	
respondents	considered	it	as	a	necessary	act	out	of	a	sense	of	collective	duty.	Such	was	the	
case	 for	Sarra	who	was	 too	 scared	 to	 join	 in	 the	protests	herself,	but	 felt	 that	 transmitting	
information	 and	 dissenting	messages	 online	was	 a	way	 to	make	 a	 contribution	 in	 her	 own	
limited	way.	Similarly,	Sihem	vividly	recalled	joining	in	these	online	practices	at	the	height	of	
protests	in	her	region	and	feeling	torn	between	the	urge	to	join	in	denouncing	the	regime’s	
repression	and	the	disapproval	of	her	mother	who	worried	about	the	consequences	of	such	
overt	 dissent	 on	 her	 daughter’s	 safety.	 Overcoming	 these	 fears	 and	 breaking	 her	 silence	
online	by	disseminating	footage	of	the	repression	and	victims	marked	a	sort	of	boundary	that	
Sihem	and	others	 crossed	 through	participation	 in	 these	 sharing	 practices	 on	 social	media.	
Doing	 so	 after	 the	 revolution	 continued	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	means	 of	 benefiting	 others,	
informing,	raising	awareness,	and	positively	contributing	to	public	debate.	For	instance,	Sarra	
and	 Raouf	 considered	 that	 sharing	 news	 and	 content	 providing	 a	 political	 commentary	 or	
analysis	was	aimed	at	helping	as	many	people	as	possible	to	access	content	they	deemed	as	
important	 for	 others	 to	 see	 or	 read.	 Similarly,	 Sonia	 wanted	 people	 to	 “find	 out”	 about	
specific	points	of	view	or	information	through	the	content	she	helped	to	transmit.		
	
The	 act	 of	 informing	 others	was	 often	 framed	 as	 being	 politically	motivated	 and	 aimed	 at	
swaying	 the	 opinion	 of	 people	 in	 their	 network	 and	 influencing	 their	 understanding	 or	
interpretation	of	the	situation	in	the	country.	For	example,	Kamal	only	chose	to	share	content	
when	he	considered	that	 it	brought	a	“benefit”	 (“bech	nfid	bih”)	and	Neila	when	 it	was	“in	
the	interest	of	[her]	country”.	 	This	sense	of	duty	or	responsibility	was	associated	with	such	
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practices	 in	 the	 accounts	 of	 several	 respondents.	 In	 this	 context,	Meriem	 recalled	 the	 first	
time	she	shared	politically-related	content	after	the	revolution:	
	
Before,	 I	was	using	Facebook	 just	 for	me	 to	 take	 information	without	 sharing	anything,	you	
could	see	that	on	my	wall.	This	was	until	the	period	of	all	the	nominations94.	I	was	talking	with	
my	friends	about	politics	on	Facebook,	but	for	me	to	share,	I	didn’t	want	to,	I	don’t	know	why.	
But	afterwards	when	they	started	to…	When	there	were	a	lot	of	things	starting	to	go	wrong	in	
Tunisia,	 I	 started	to	 feel	 responsible	myself	 in	some	way,	so	 I	 felt	 I	had	to	 try…	not	 to	bring	
awareness…	 but	 to	 play	 a	 little	 part	 in	 the	 things	 I	 could	 do,	 even	 if	 it’s	 a	 very	 small	 thing	
among	the	things	I	could	do	but	at	least	I	can	share	information	to	make	people	aware,	to	try	
to	do	the	maximum.	
	
In	this	context	the	act	of	sharing	content,	or	the	decision	not	to	transmit	it,	was	perceived	by	
a	 number	 of	 participants	 as	 requiring	 careful	 consideration.	 Only	 one	 fifth	 of	 participants	
articulated	 their	 sharing	practices	as	more	 spontaneous	communicative	acts.	 In	 the	case	of	
Meriem,	who	felt	that	such	opinion	expression	might	not	be	unanimously	met	with	approval	
in	 her	 network	 of	 online	 contacts,	 much	 reflection	 went	 into	 taking	 this	 step.	 Meriem	
considered	 that	 she	 had	 to	 overcome	 these	 personal	 reservations	 and	 her	 worries	 about	
being	negatively	perceived	by	others,	out	of	a	sense	of	wider	public	good.	She	continues:	
	
I	 thought	a	 lot	before	 I	 shared	my	 first	video,	whether	what	 I	was	about	 to	do	was	 right	or	
wrong,	because	this	wasn’t	about	a	nice	dress	you	like	or	don’t,	I	mean	this	was	to	do	with	the	
country	and	its	future,	a	small	thing	can	have	an	impact,	so	I	thought	a	lot	whether	I	should	be	
sharing	things	or	not,	but	then	like	I	said,	I	have	friends	who	are	Ennahdha	and	it	seemed	that	
the	information	that	reached	us	was	different	so	I	thought	let	me	share	what	I	am	receiving	so	
they	can	see	 it,	and	 if	someone	wants	to	comment	on	 it	 I	am	prepared	to	 listen,	even	 if	his	
opinion	is	very	different	or	provocative.	And	I	think	that	when	someone	shares	he	has	to	be	
prepared	for	everything,	that	there	will	be	people	telling	him	‘lol95’	and	laughing	with	him	and	
other	 people	 who’ll	 tell	 him	 what	 you’re	 doing	 is	 wrong	 and	 disagree.	 So	 when	 I	 stared	
sharing	I	directly	had	images	of	some	people	in	mind	and	how	their	reaction	will	be	[…].	I	was	
thinking	about	them	and	I	asked	myself	whether	I	was	ready	to	face	these	people	or	not.	And	I	
felt	yes	I	was	ready.	
	
																																																						
94	During	its	first	months	in	government,	the	coalition	government	nominated	large	numbers	of	its	parties’	supporters	and	
members	-	Ennahdha	members	in	particular	–	to	key	positions	in	regional	governorate	administrations	and	at	the	head	of	
national	companies,	as	well	as	in	a	number	of	other	leading	public	administration	roles.	Opposition	leaders	and	the	Tunisian	
Public	Service	Union	denounced	these	nominations	as	overly	partisan	and	estimated	that	in	total	approximately	2,000	of	them	
were	implemented	in	the	first	eighteen	months	of	the	government	(Mosaique	FM,	2013).	
95	‘LOL’	(acronym	for	Lough	Out	Loud)	was,	here,	said	in	English	by	the	interviewee.	
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Although	 sharing	 other	 type	 of	 content	 was	 referred	 to,	 across	 all	 sides	 of	 the	 political	
spectrum,	as	a	more	 spontaneous	action	 that	was	done	 “without	even	 thinking”,	 that	 they	
“felt	like”,	that	depended	on	“the	mood	of	the	day”,	politically-related	content	required	more	
consideration.	Beyond	the	purpose	of	spreading	information	and	opinions,	the	act	of	sharing	
such	 content	 was	 also	 aimed	 at	 engaging	 others	 in	 debate	 and	 related	 to	 the	 hope	 of	
influencing	their	opinions.	In	this	regard,	Zied	differentiated	between	what	it	means	to	‘like’	
and	to	‘share’	content	in	the	following	way:	
	
It’s	as	if	there	was	a	scale,	if	you	put	like	it’s	I	think	you’re	saying	okay	I	enjoyed	it	but	I	don’t	
fully	agree	-	at	least	for	me;	but	if	I	share,	it’s	that	I	adhere	to	that	idea	and	I	encourage	other	
people	to	do	the	same	and	look	at	it.	
	
Two	 respondents	 (Ahmed,	 Rim)	 also	 made	 a	 correlation	 between	 participation	 in	 such	
communicative	acts	on	social	media	and	 their	 religious	beliefs.	 For	Ahmed,	 it	was	a	way	of	
inspiring	others	religiously	and	to	fulfil	a	duty	of	spreading	religious	messages.	Rim,	 in	turn,	
considered	that	involvement	in	public	matters	was	a	form	of	positive	contribution	in	line	with	
her	 beliefs.	 But	 even	 when	 sharing	 political	 content	 was	 less	 targeted	 and	 a	 more	
spontaneous	 activity,	 it	 required	 a	 level	 of	 consideration.	 Farah	 expressed	 her	 sense	 of	
freedom	and	enjoyment	of	sharing	all	sorts	of	content	that	she	“liked”,	yet	at	the	same	time	
she	was	also	careful	not	to	offend	anyone	by	doing	so:		
	
The	 things	 I	 see	 on	 Facebook	 are	 of	 all	 sorts	 and	 if	 you	 look	 at	 my	 profile	 you	 won’t	
understand	what’s	my	political	 view.	 I	 share	all	 sorts	of	 things	 from	all	directions,	 if	 there’s	
something	I	like	I	share	it,	it	can	be	religious,	or	it	can	be	to	do	with	Bourguiba…	I	don’t	want	
to	 show	 through	 Facebook	 one	 and	 only	 one	 direction	 that	 I’m	 taking	 or	 propagating	 that	
political	view.	I	do	think	about	the	kind	of	things	I	share,	but	I	share	things	that	don’t	do	any	
harm,	I	don’t	want	to	make	any	enemies.	
	
Upon	a	more	detailed	examination	of	the	content	that	participants	shared	on	their	personal	
social	media	profiles	from	different	sources,	it	was	striking	that	while	many	tended	to	share	
numerous	items	on	a	daily	basis,	interaction	with	this	content	by	fellow	users	in	their	network	
was	 quite	 limited.	 Although	 some	 entries	 generated	 comments,	 ‘shares’	 or	 ‘likes’,	 these	
broadly	 remained	 low	 in	 number,	 and	 yet	 participants	 continued	 to	 extensively	 share	
material	 on	 their	 profile	 pages.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 -	 as	 expressed	 by	Nabil	 and	 Zied	 -	
rather	than	debating	political	issues	as	such,	many	users	instead	chose	to	“answer	each	other	
via	 their	 (own)	 shares”	 (comment	 by	 Zied,	 Nabil	 articulated	 the	 same	 idea	 in	 very	 similar	
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terms).	In	this	sense,	respondents	seemed	to	participate	through	the	content	they	helped	to	
disseminate	through	sharing	practices	in	delimitating	collective	representations	of	the	socio-
political	reality	they	identified	with.	In	other	words,	rather	than	more	in-depth	discussion	and	
opinion	 exchange,	 much	 of	 the	 politicised	 communication	 that	 could	 be	 observed	 on	 the	
research	participants’	social	media	accounts	consisted	more	of	putting	forward	content	that	
represented	or	signalled	social	and	political	opinions	and	positions	they	identified	with.	
	
4.3. Visible	expressions	of	consent	and	dissent	
	
The	 previous	 analysis	 highlighted	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 respondents	 engaged	 in	
communicating	 about	 news	 and	 current	 affairs	 on	 social	 media,	 and	 in	 which	 forms	 of	
political	 talk	 between	 citizens	 are	 extended	 on	 the	 Facebook	 platform.	 These	 forms	 were	
quite	 different	 from	 verbal	 deliberation,	 exchange	 and	 debate	 in	 an	 offline	 face-to-face	
context,	and	they	were	shaped	by	the	communicative	architecture	and	affordances	provided	
by	 the	 platform,	 but	 equally,	 these	 possibilities	 and	 the	 communicative	 framework	 were	
embraced	 in	different	ways	by	 the	users	 to	bring	across	 their	messages.	 These	 forms	were	
not	 deliberative	 on	 the	 whole.	 Primarily,	 respondents	 participated	 in	 forms	 of	 public	
communication	through	collective	expressions	of	consent	or	support	of	particular	issues,	and	
on	the	other	hand	of	their	dissent	or	disagreement.	
	
There	were	a	number	of	options	for	users	to	express	their	consent	and	support	of	particular	
issues	or	opinions.	By	 clicking	 the	 ‘like’	button,	 research	participants	expressed	agreement,	
enjoyment,	 consent	or	 support.	Respondents	were	unanimous	 in	defining	 the	meaning	and	
their	 use	 of	 this	 option	 closely	 to	 the	 literal	meanings	 –	 ‘like’	 in	 English,	 ‘I	 love’	 in	 French	
(j’aime),	or	‘I	enjoyed/liked	this’	in	Arabic	(a’jabani),	depending	on	the	linguistic	choices	they	
adopted	on	Facebook.	No	equivalent	option	was	available	on	the	platform	to	express	dislike	
or	other	nuances	of	‘liking’	at	the	time	the	research	was	conducted.	As	I	have	also	indicated	
in	 the	previous	analysis,	 the	act	of	 ‘sharing’	content	was	generally	associated	with	a	strong	
message	of	support,	or	a	message	that	respondents	wished	to	draw	attention	to	and	put	on	
the	 public	 news	 or	 political	 agenda.	 Occasionally,	 content	 that	 participants	 sought	 to	
denounce	 as	 problematic	 or	 offensive	 for	 example,	 was	 shared	 by	 them.	 However,	 such	
instances	were	rather	rare.	Overall,	sharing	indicated	a	strong	identification	or	agreement	of	
research	participants	with	the	content	they	transmitted.	
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A	 brief	 exploration	 of	 large-scale	 patterns	 of	 interactions	 from	 the	 sample	 of	 publicly	
accessible	 Facebook	 pages	 (see	 chapter	 2	 for	 details),	 illustrates	 how	 political	 views	 are	
exchanged	through	interactions	such	as	‘liking’	and	‘sharing’	that	support	the	construction	of	
contrasting	 notions	 of	 citizenship	 and	 of	 political	 legitimacy	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 political	
unrest	in	July	2013.			For	instance,	among	content	most	interacted	with	at	the	end	of	July	on	
pages	 that	opposed	 the	 transitional	 government96,	were	 images	of	 the	 ‘Rahil’	 protests	 that	
offered	 a	 specific	 interpretation	 of	 political	 events.	 The	 protests	 were	 represented	 as	 an	
important	 turning	 point	 and	 an	 indicator	 of	 citizens’	 unity	 against	 the	 transitional	
government.	 Such	 was	 the	 case	 for	 example	 for	 a	 page	 called	 “Wezir	 dhaght	 eddem	
w’essouker”97	that	had	over	three	hundred	thousand	followers	at	the	time.	On	this	page,	the	
most	 shared	and	 liked	entry	 at	 the	end	of	 July	 2013	by	 far	 exceeded	 interactions	with	 any	
other	content,	and	generated	over	four	thousand	shares	by	social	media	users.	The	content	
consisted	of	a	video	of	the	protests	in	front	of	the	National	Assembly	the	previous	night,	with	
a	 caption	 that	 emphasised	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 event	 in	 historic	 terms,	 and	 implied	 a	
positive	framing	of	the	protestors’	representativeness	of	the	civic	body.	
	
By	 contrast,	 on	 pages	 supportive	 of	 the	 government,	 similar	 videos	 of	 large	 crowds	 of	
protestors	were	widely	 interacted	with,	but	these	provided	very	different	 interpretations	of	
the	 events.	 For	 example,	 on	 a	page	 called	 “I	 love	 you	Tunisia”98,	 over	 four	 thousand	 social	
media	users	shared	a	video	of	the	protests	on	the	night	of	the	30th	that	in	fact	defended	the	
government.	 Its	caption	explained	that	the	video	confirmed	that	more	than	three	thousand	
protestors	 gathered	 “in	 support	 of	 legitimacy”	 (here	meaning	 democratic	 legitimacy	 of	 the	
elected	government),	a	video	that	is	said	would	come	as	a	shock	to	“traitors	of	Tunisia”	and	
those	 attempting	 a	 coup.	 There	 were	 indeed	 a	 number	 of	 counter-demonstrations	 by	
government	supporters	during	this	period,	many	of	whom	assimilated	the	turn	of	events	 in	
Tunisia	 to	 the	 ones	 in	 Egypt	 that	 brought	 the	 military	 back	 to	 power	 earlier	 in	 the	 same	
month.	However,	there	were	significant	divergences	about	the	number	of	protestors	in	each	
camp	 and	 much	 of	 the	 battle	 over	 the	 representativeness	 of	 these	 numbers	 and	 the	
representation	of	the	will	of	the	majority	of	citizens	took	place	on	social	media.	
	
Through	 such	 large-scale	 interactions,	 Tunisian	 social	 media	 users,	 who	 were	 divided	 into	
these	 two	groups,	were	gathering	around	opposing	representations	and,	 in	a	sense,	 setting	
																																																						
96	Opposition	here	in	the	broad	sense	as	opposition	to	the	government,	rather	than	in	the	sense	of	opposition	parties.	
97	This	translates	as	“the	minister	of	high	blood	pressure	and	diabetes”,	denoting	a	sarcastic	comment	on	the	impact	of	
institutional	politics	on	people’s	lives	and	health.	
98	My	English	translation,	the	original	name	is	a	mix	of	Tunisian	dialect,	English	and	French.	Similarly	to	the	opposition	page	
previously	quoted,	this	page	also	had	over	three	hundred	thousand	followers	in	2013.		
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them	apart	from	other	content	as	collectively	significant.	Other	content	that	generated	large-
scale	 interactions	 further	 supported	 this	 reading.	 For	 instance,	 this	 included	 content	 that	
related	 to	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 protests,	 and	 the	 representativeness	 of	 the	 protestors.	 On	
opposition	 pages,	 some	 of	 this	 content	 consisted	 of	 satellite	 imagery	 to	 approximate	 the	
number	of	protestors	based	on	the	space	they	spatially	occupied.	Such	content	was	aimed	at	
demonstrating	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 anti-government	 crowd.	 By	 contrast,	 alternative	
interpretations	 were	 provided	 on	 pro-government	 pages	 through	 content	 that	 sought	 to	
portray	 the	 number	 of	 opposition	 protestors	 in	 relative	 terms,	 for	 example	 by	 comparing	
them	to	the	number	of	supporters	in	a	football	stadium,	thereby	implying	that	they	were	not	
significant.	 Again,	 in	 these	 cases,	 contending	 representations	 over	 the	 protests’	 meaning	
were	‘liked’	and/or	‘shared	on	a	similarly-large	scale	at	both	end	of	this	polarised	networked	
sphere.		
	
To	express	dissent,	disagreement	or	difference	of	opinion,	users	mostly	drew	on	the	options	
available	to	them	on	the	platform	to	either	express	in	writing,	or	to	ignore	an	issue.	Because	
the	 content	 that	 respondents	 posted	 on	 their	 social	media	 accounts	was	 to	 a	 large	 extent	
drawn	 and	 transmitted	 from	other	 sources	 rather	 than	produced	by	 themselves,	 sharing	 it	
was	a	form	of	endorsement,	an	act	of	association	between	a	personal	communicative	space	
and	a	more	publicly-oriented	message.	It	was	therefore	less	likely	for	users	wishing	to	express	
disagreement	 about	 an	 issue	 to	 resort	 to	 sharing	 content	 they	 were	 opposed	 to	 on	 their	
profile.	Furthermore,	the	visual	structure	of	the	platform	draws	more	attention,	 in	terms	of	
size	and	central	position	in	a	newsfeed,	to	visual	rather	than	written	content.	If	users	in	this	
context	were	to	share	content	they	wished	to	denounce	for	example,	their	only	option	was	to	
add	 their	 own	 written	 comment	 to	 accompany	 such	 content.	 Such	 comment	 would	 have	
been	less	significant	visually	than	the	content	they	expressed	dissent	to,	and	in	doing	so	they	
would	 nevertheless	 provide	 more	 exposure	 to	 issues	 or	 voices	 they	 opposed.	 This	
fundamental	 contradiction	meant	 that,	 rather	 than	 sharing	 content	 they	disagreed	with	on	
their	personal	profiles,	respondents	were	more	likely	to	remain	silent	about	them,	or	in	turn	
to	draw	on	other	content	and	counter-discourses	whose	messages	they	endorsed.	
	
As	 a	 result,	 dissent	 and	 opposition	were	mostly	 expressed	 in	written	 form.	 Only	 a	 fifth	 of	
content	 on	 respondents’	 personal	 profile	 walls	 consisted	 of	 content	 they	 had	 produced	
themselves	as	I	have	previously	established.	Of	such	content,	more	than	half	of	it	consisted	of	
photographs	uploaded	by	participants,	and	very	occasionally	of	videos.	Thus	written	 ‘status	
updates’	and	‘notes’	created	and	posted	by	participants	on	their	personal	walls	to	express	a	
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view	or	share	a	message	of	any	type	made	up	an	extremely	 low	proportion	of	this	content.	
The	majority	 of	 expressions	 of	 dissent	 or	 disagreement	 consisted	 of	 comments	written	 by	
users	below	a	Facebook	‘post’	or	piece	of	content	shared	by	someone	else,	and	in	reaction	to	
it.	Such	interactions	thus	mainly	occurred	on	the	user	profiles	or	pages	of	the	authors	of	such	
content	rather	than	that	of	the	author	of	the	dissenting	comment.	The	communicative	space	
in	 which	 such	 dissent,	 disagreement	 or	 expression	 of	 difference	 of	 opinion	 was	 visible	
mattered	because	this	communicative	architecture	put	more	of	an	onus	on	those	authoring	
an	 opinion	 or	 distributing	 content	 from	 other	 sources	 to	 defend	 their	 views	 and	
endorsements	 in	 front	 of	 others	 in	 their	 network	 of	 contacts,	 than	 on	 those	 issuing	 the	
opposing	 view	 (whose	 comment	 does	 not	 necessarily	 become	 visible	 to	 others	 in	 their	
network	 as	 content	 authored	 or	 shared	 was	 given	 priority	 over	 comments	 in	 Facebook’s	
newsfeed	algorithm	at	the	time).		
	
The	architecture	of	the	platform	thus	shaped	politically-related	communication	and	exchange	
along	quite	specific	lines	in	this	context,	and	in	ways	that	encouraged	endorsement	of	others’	
voices	on	the	one	hand,	and	reactive	dissent	or	silence	on	the	other,	 rather	than	any	more	
nuanced	 form	 of	 debate,	 personal	 voice	 and	 deliberation.	 However,	 there	 are	 also	 some	
exceptions	to	this	trend	and	some	interesting	ways	in	which	this	architecture	is	appropriated	
in	turn	by	users	to	express	collective	support	and	voice	in	written	and	quasi-ritualised	forms.		
	
Whereas	 the	 closest	 form	 to	 offline	 political	 talk	 can	 be	 found	 in	 written	 exchanges	 and	
comments	 through	which	 users	 articulate	 their	 personal	 opinions,	written	 comments	were	
also	used	at	times	to	express	solidarity	with	other	users.	This	can	be	observed	for	example	in	
the	 case	 of	 trolling	 campaigns	where	 hundreds	 of	 users	 copied	 the	 same	wording	 in	 large	
numbers	on	a	social	media	account	or	page	as	a	way	of	silencing	it	by	occupying	its	space	and	
crashing	 the	 site.	 This	 occurred	 a	 number	 of	 times	 during	 the	 research	 period	where	 such	
campaigns	 targeted	 the	 pages	 of	 public	 figures	 and	 politicians.	 But	 such	 repetitive	written	
communication	can	also	be	observed	in	contexts	where	they	serve	to	support	specific	media	
content	on	the	platform	and	set	it	apart.		
	
As	a	means	of	 analogy,	 such	patterns	 could	be	observed	 in	 interactions	with	 religious	 text,	
such	 as	 excerpts	 of	 the	 Qur’an,	 where	 its	 sacred	 character	 was	 upheld	 through	 repetitive	
comments,	as	in	the	example	provided	in	the	screenshot	on	the	next	page99.	
	
																																																						
99	Screenshot	drawn	from	content	transmitted	by	one	of	the	research	participants	from	a	Facebook	page.	
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FIG.2:	Communicative	patterns	in	comments	to	religious	text	shared	on	Facebook	(Jul.2013)	
	
The	sacred	status	of	the	Qur’an	text	was	reinforced	in	this	 instance	through	collective	ritual	
invocation	of	a	phrase	uttered	in	Muslim	practice	at	the	end	of	Qur’an	reading	or	recitation.	
As	 illustrated	 in	 the	 example,	 the	 phrase	 (it	 translates	more	 or	 less	 as	 ‘Allah	 almighty	 has	
spoken	 the	 truth’)	 is	 repeatedly	 typed	 in	 the	comments	section	adjacent	 to	 the	sacred	 text	
content.	In	this	sense,	although	interactions	between	citizens	were	framed	by	the	platform’s	
communicative	 architecture	 along	 specific	 lines	 that	 shaped	 the	 expression	 of	 support	 and	
disagreement	 with	 representations	 of	 their	 shared	 socio-political	 reality,	 there	 are	 also	
instances,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 religious	 content	 seen	 above,	 where	 formalised	 and	 socially-
embedded	 patterns	 of	 communication	 were	 re-established	 on	 the	 platform	 to	 express	
solidarity	with	others	 through	participation	 in	 ritualised	norms	of	 interaction	 that	 set	apart	
this	type	of	social	media	content.	
	
The	special	character	of	interactions	with	such	content	on	social	media	was	also	confirmed	by	
interview	 accounts.	 Whereas	 numerous	 research	 participants	 engaged	 in	 contesting	 what	
others	 in	 their	 networks	 shared,	 religious	 content	 “[could]	 not	 be	 touched”	 as	 one	 of	 the	
respondents	(Sihem)	said.	In	the	early	phase	of	the	post-revolution	period	and	following	the	
rise	to	power	of	the	Islamist	party,	religious	content	was	transmitted	on	a	larger	scale	across	
the	Tunisian	Facebook	sphere	than	was	te	case	before	the	revolution,	and	this	was	partly	the	
result	of	the	freeing	of	religious	expression	in	public	after	its	control	under	previous	regimes.	
However,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 such	 content,	 particularly	 on	 the	 social	 media	 accounts	 of	
Islamist	 party	 supporters,	 also	 gave	 it	 a	 political	 dimension	 that	 some	 interviewees	 found	
problematic.	 These	 considered	 themselves	 as	 Muslims	 yet	 had	 more	 secular	 views,	 and	
clarified	 that	 they	 viewed	 religion	 as	 a	 private	matter	 that	 should	 not	 to	 be	 aired	 on	 such	
196	
	
platforms.	These	participants	found	it	problematic	to	publicly	react	to	the	circulation	of	such	
content	 on	 social	 media	 and	 only	 discussed	 these	 difficulties	 within	 the	 interview	 setting.	
Although	they	would	have	liked	to	express	their	disapproval	more	openly	and	react	to	those	
sharing	a	 lot	of	 religious	 content,	 the	 risk	of	 their	 reaction	being	 interpreted	as	being	anti-
religious	 was	 deemed	 too	 high.	 Participants	 in	 that	 case	 preferred	 to	 remain	 silent.	 The	
following	quotes	reflect	the	difficulty	some	of	these	respondents	encountered	in	expressing	
their	disapproval:	
	
Habib:	“When	someone	shares	something	 like	that,	you	can’t	say	anything,	at	most	you	can	
press	 like	 that’s	all.	 Impossible.	Nobody	would	dare.	Either	you	don’t	 like	 it	and	 ignore	 it	or	
you	press	like.”	
	
Slim:	“I	don’t	like	it	when	people	put	religion	on	Facebook.	It’s	just	to	show	off	as	religious,	to	
stand	out.”	
	
Nabil:	“With	the	religious	stuff,	you	stop	there,	you	can’t	talk	or	comment…	Otherwise	you’re	
a	keffer	[unbeliever]	and	all	that,	you	get	into	trouble.	And	even	in	the	comments,	you	never	
see	a	 video	with	 that	 kind	of	 content	 that	 someone	 comments	on.	Nobody	discusses	 these	
things.	You	can’t,	you	can’t.”	
	
The	 quotes	 point	 to	 a	 clear	 social	 boundary	 that	 cannot	 be	 crossed.	 This	 suggests	 that	
religious	norms	are	not	only	 reproduced	 in	 such	 instances,	 but	 also	 that	 the	 association	of	
those	 interacting	with	 sacred	 content	 provides	 them	 in	 turn	with	 a	 certain	 communicative	
authority	that	demarcates	them	from	other	platform	users	not	participating	in	the	process.		
This	 pattern	 was	 almost	 exclusively	 observed	 in	 relation	 to	 religious	 content	 during	 the	
research	 period.	However,	 it	was	 also	 replicated,	 in	 the	 content	 sample	 from	 July	 2013,	 in	
interactions	 with	 representations	 of	 the	 protests.	 For	 example,	 the	 comments	 that	
accompanied	 one	 of	 the	 most	 shared	 videos	 of	 the	 protests	 on	 pages	 opposed	 to	 the	
government,	 illustrate	 a	 dynamic	 not	 too	 dissimilar	 from	 interactions	 with	 sacred	 text,	
whereby	here	 comments	 repetitively	and	collectively	echoed	and	upheld	 the	 sacredness	of	
the	 nation.	 Hundreds	 of	 such	 comments	 repetitively	 invoked	 Tunisia	 in	 this	 manner.	 A	
translation	of	a	short	excerpt	from	these	comments	is	provided	in	the	table	on	the	next	page.	
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Glory	to	Tunisia♥	
	 	
Oh	deeeeear	people	of	Tunisia	♥	
Ssomething	that	lifts	the	spirits	
Long	live	Tunisia!!	
Long	live	my	Tunisia	♥	
Long	live	Tunisia	
Long	live	Tunisia	
aaaahh	Tunisia	what’s	happening	to	you	
Long	live	Tunisia………………………..	
FIG.3:	Communicative	patterns	in	comments	to	video	of	protests	shared	on	Facebook	(Jul.2013)	
	
Here,	 the	 relationship	 between	 these	 video	 images	 and	 the	 citizens	 that	 saw	 in	 them	 a	
representation	of	 the	nation	was	opened	 to	new	communicative	 forms	of	 interactions.	The	
video	of	 the	protesters	waving	their	 flags	can	be	seen	to	take	 in	 turn	a	symbolic	value	that	
individuals	upheld	as	socially	sacred.	All	sorts	of	slogans	other	than	“long	 live	Tunisia”	were	
raised	at	the	protests.	However,	the	interactions	with	the	images	of	the	protest	occupied	the	
visual	space	adjacent	to	the	content	and	enabled	users	to	support	a	particular	representation	
of	 what	 the	 Tunisian	 nation	 politically	 stood	 for	 in	 their	 views	 (i.e.	 supporting	 the	 ‘Rahil’	
protests	calling	for	the	government	resignation).		
The	 new	 possibilities	 opened	 by	 the	 social	 media	 platform	 could	 be	 seen	 to	 provide	 an	
opportunity	 for	 such	 images	 of	 the	 group	 to	 be	 transmitted	 to	 a	 large	 network	 of	
individualised	 audiences,	 and	 to	 extend	 abilities	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 group	 online.	 But	
crucially,	the	new	text	formed	through	the	association	of	this	content	and	its	commentators	
was	 also	 a	 collective	 reinforcement	 of	 the	 sacredness	 of	 such	 images	 or	 videos	 as	
representations	of	the	nation.	In	that	sense,	it	was	quite	difficult	for	anyone	wishing	to	offer	
an	alternate	reading	of	 the	protests	to	 interact	differently.	As	the	platform’s	design	did	not	
allow	dis-liking,	nor	making	the	 lack	of	sharing	visible,	the	sole	space	for	contention	was,	 in	
this	 instance,	 away	 from	 such	 content	 as	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 group	 left	 little	 space	 for	
contention	through	written	comments.		
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4.4. 	Issues	with	‘seeing’	political	opinions	on	social	media	
	
The	new	political	freedoms	after	the	revolution,	whilst	not	necessarily	translating	into	forms	
of	participation	in	the	sphere	of	institutional	politics,	were	enacted	by	citizens	eager	to	make	
their	voices	heard	and	express	their	opinions	 in	public.	 In	this	context,	 the	use	of	Facebook	
was	 oriented	 towards	 public	 and	 politically-related	 communication	 between	 citizens,	 and	
supported	 the	 performance	 of	 political	 identities.	 These	 two	 aspects	 need	 to	 be	
distinguished.	 Communication	 on	 the	 platform	 is	 both	 about	 the	 information	 or	 content	
communicated	as	well	as	about	an	 identity	performance.	The	association	of	 the	 two	 in	 this	
networked	 environment	 supported	 the	 large-scale	 transmission	 of	 information	 and	
mobilisation	messages	 across	 networks	 based	 on	 trusted	 offline	 connections	 and	 identities	
during	 the	 revolution.	 It	 further	 sustained	 the	 expression	 of	 solidarity	 and	 support	 for	
different	causes	afterwards.	However,	 it	also	undermines	the	levels	of	autonomy	in	political	
and	public	expression	when	 it	came	to	divergences	of	opinions,	and	reinforces	divisions.	At	
times,	this	networked	paradox	resulted	in	difficult	situations	for	study	participants	to	handle	
as	 their	 social	media	 accounts	 served	 as	 a	 source	 for	 a	more	 public	 interaction	 and	media	
dissemination	on	the	one	hand,	and	as	a	site	of	personal	identity	expression	and	reputation	
management	on	the	other.	
	
As	 Tunisians	 broke	 their	 silence	 about	 socio-political	 issues	 after	 the	 revolution,	 many	
discovered	 for	 the	 first	 time	 their	 mutual	 opinions	 and	 political	 orientations.	 The	 lack	 of	
freedom	 to	 express	 them	 before	 the	 revolution	 meant	 for	 several	 respondents	 that	 they	
were	not	aware	of	 the	views	of	 friends	and	acquaintances	 in	 their	networks,	 and	 for	 some	
this	 came	 as	 a	 surprise.	 Nabil,	 for	 instance,	 referred	 to	 one	 of	 his	 close	 friends.	Whilst	 he	
shared	with	this	friend	a	hatred	of	the	Ben	Ali	regime	before	the	revolution,	he	had	no	idea	
that	this	friend	supported	Ennahdha	and	that	his	father	was	an	Islamist	activist.	This	led	to	a	
number	 of	 problems	 after	 the	 revolution	 as	 Nabil	 was	 a	 fervent	 opposition	 supporter.	
Similarly,	Rim	who	supported	Ennahdha	said	that	expressing	her	support	of	the	party	on	her	
social	media	profile	must	have	come	as	a	surprise	 to	many	people	 in	her	network	and	that	
she	noticed	that	a	number	of	contacts	had	‘un-friended’	her.	
	
While	research	participants	provided	a	relatively	consensual	framing	of	the	publicly-oriented	
use	of	 the	platform	to	express	and	 influence	opinions,	more	ambiguity	was	associated	with	
the	communicative	norms	surrounding	their	reception.	Overall,	respondents	considered	that	
political	talk	offline	was	more	likely	to	support	dialogue	and	listening	to	different	voices	than	
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a	social	media	context	 in	which	attention	was	sparse,	and	misunderstanding	more	rife.	The	
lack	 of	 contextualising	 information	 typically	 available	 to	 interlocutors	 in	 face-to-face	
communication	was	an	 issue.	For	example,	Meriem	considered	 that	 the	 lack	of	clues	based	
on	 body	 language	 and	 tone	 could	 result	 in	misunderstandings	 and	misinterpretations.	 She	
considered	 that	debating	opinions	offline	allowed	 to	bring	across	one’s	 conviction,	positive	
intent,	and	authenticity	of	message	in	more	constructive	ways.	Similarly,	several	respondents	
pointed	 to	occasional	 issues	of	potential	misinterpretation	of	 the	 intended	message	or	aim	
that	 social	media	 users	 had	when	 they	 expressed	 a	 political	 opinion	 on	 their	 social	media	
accounts.	 In	 the	 same	 sense,	 Raouf,	who	was	 relatively	 positive	 about	 debating	 politics	 on	
social	media,	nevertheless	highlighted	that,	because	of	the	potential	for	misinterpretation,	it	
was	necessary	 to	 invest	more	care,	effort	and	subtlety	 into	communicating	opinions	on	the	
platform	than	in	everyday	face-to-face	encounters.	Furthermore,	this	type	of	communication	
on	 social	 media	 was	 often	 considered	 as	 problematic	 because	 the	 intended	 recipient	 of	 a	
message	wasn’t	as	clear	as	in	an	offline	context.	When	people	posted	content	or	comments	
on	their	personal	social	media	accounts,	it	was	not	always	clear	if	it	was	aimed	at	one	of	their	
contacts	 in	 particular,	 or	 at	 a	 wider	 public,	 as	 it	 was	 typically	 visible	 to	 all	 contacts	
irrespectively.	Generally	speaking,	and	as	previously	discussed,	the	difference	of	opinions	 in	
respondents’	social	media	networks	meant	that	reactions	to	what	they	shared	wasn’t	always	
supportive.	 Interviewees	were	not	necessarily	aware	of	who	was	co-present	or	part	of	their	
network	 and	 likely	 to	 be	 offended	 by	 what	 they	 said.	 As	 Baym	 and	 boyd	 (2012)	 contend,	
social	media	 are	 particularly	 challenging	 in	 terms	 of	 understanding	 ‘‘who	 is	 out	 there	 and	
when’’,	thus	they	raise	“the	potential	for	greater	misalignment	between	imagined	and	actual	
audiences”	 (p.323).	 Equally,	 this	meant	 that	many	perceived	 the	 social	media	 space	as	 less	
inhibited	 and	 controlled	 than	 an	 offline	 communicative	 environment	 where	 the	 potential	
consequences	 of	 such	 expression	 was	 not	 spatially	 and	 temporally	 separate.	 Other	
respondents	also	referred	to	the	difficulty	of	avoiding	contentious	subjects	online	compared	
to	when	 they	communicated	with	 their	 close	 friends	 face-to-face.	 In	 this	 respect,	Neila,	 for	
example,	mentioned	friends	she	studied	with	who	involuntarily	offended	her	because	of	what	
they	shared	on	their	Facebook	accounts	about	the	importance	for	women	of	wearing	a	veil	in	
public.	 Neila	 said	 that	 this	 subject	 was	 exhausted	 during	 conversations	 with	 these	 friends	
offline	and	they	had	come	to	avoid	it	so	as	to	no	longer	argue	about	it,	but	that	it	was	more	
difficult	for	her	to	ignore	what	she	was	exposed	to	of	her	friends’	opinions	communicated	on	
Facebook.	
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The	 reception	 of	 political	 expressions	 to	 extended	 networks	 on	 social	 media	 users	 that	
included	citizens	of	radically	opposing	perspectives	was	particularly	problematic.	Regularly,	it	
led	to	the	use	of	aggressive	terms	and	insulting	language	during	arguments	on	the	platform.	
The	use	of	verbal	abuse	can	be	seen	in	this	context	as	an	exercise	of	power	aimed	at	silencing	
specific	 opinions,	 contesting	 their	 visibility	 and	 limiting	 their	 recognition	 in	 this	 networked	
sphere.	To	some	extent,	it	reflects	the	rising	socio-political	polarisation	in	the	country,	as	well	
as	a	fledgling	democratic	culture	in	which	tolerance	of	differences	and	norms	of	deliberation	
are	still	in	the	process	of	becoming	established.	For	instance,	it	can	be	seen	to	parallel	some	
of	 the	 interactions	 between	 politicians	 during	 televised	 debates,	 who	 often	 resorted	 to	
shouting	 and	 where	 moderators	 struggled	 to	 contain	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 debate.	 On	 social	
media,	 the	written	 form	 this	 type	of	exchange	 took	between	citizens,	 translated	 into	other	
forms	of	aggressive	communication.	The	contrast	between	more	publicly-oriented	terms	for	
communicative	 expression	 and	 more	 privately	 framed	 terms	 of	 reception	 made	 such	
interactions	 problematic.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Zied	 considered	 that	 the	 opportunity	 that	 social	
media	offered	to	communicate	about	public	or	political	 issues	with	complete	strangers	(e.g.	
on	public	pages,	or	 friends	of	 friends	on	 their	 social	media	page),	 led	among	others	 to	 less	
inhibitions	and	more	pronounced	disrespect	in	confronting	divergences,	that	he	perceived	as	
particularly	hurtful:	
	
Sometimes	when	 I	comment	on	something	 I	 find	other	people	 insulting	me	or	attacking	me	
and	it	really	brings	up	an	emotional	reaction,	 it	really	affects	you	[…].	Even	the	word	war	or	
battle	can	seem	sometimes	quite	 light	compared	to	what	happens.	Because	war…	at	 least	 it	
doesn’t	affect	you	in	your	own	house	in	this	way,	whereas	this	it	touches	you	in	your	house,	
on	your	table,	as	you’re	sitting	in	your	chair.	You	feel	like	people	have	crashed	into	you.	It	may	
be	people	who	know	nothing	about	you	and	all	you	did	was	to	share	something	on	Facebook	
or	you	commented	[about	some	content]	for	example.	
	
4.5. Managing	the	visibility	of	politicised	communication	
	
Over	 time,	 study	 participants	 deployed	 different	 strategies	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 and	
manage	 the	 use	 of	 their	 social	 media	 accounts,	 for	 both	 political	 expression,	 and	 more	
sociable	 interactions.	 Approximately	 one	 third	 of	 participants	 felt	 it	 was	 important	 not	 to	
limit	the	expression	of	their	opinions	and	they	continued	to	share	such	content	regardless	of	
the	 consequences.	 For	 Hanen,	 who	 was	 quite	 vocal	 about	 her	 opinions	 and	 critiques	 of	
politics	 and	 Tunisian	 society	 more	 generally	 –	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 women’s	 rights	 –	
expressing	her	opinions	freely	on	social	media	was	important	but	came	at	a	cost:	
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I	do	take	into	consideration	how	people	react	to	what	I	post,	but	that	doesn’t	stop	me	from	
posting	it.	I	mean	I	think	in	advance	how	they’re	going	to	react,	and	I	do	it.	It’s	like	a	battle.	I	
prepare	in	advance	how	I	can	respond	to	each	type	of	criticism.	It’s	true	sometimes	it’s	like	a	
war,	but	 it’s	no	 longer	 like	 it	used	 to	be,	people	know	me	better	now	and	 they	understand	
where	 I’m	 coming	 from,	 so	 I	 don’t	 receive	 so	many	 comments	 any	 longer.	 I	 never	 had	 this	
problem	before	the	revolution,	it	all	happened	after.	
	
Zied,	 referred	 to	earlier,	did	not	wish	 to	 restrict	his	political	expression	on	his	 social	media	
account	either,	but	he	 learned	over	 time	 to	 ignore	critical	 comments	about	 the	content	he	
distributed	as	this	always	led	to	a	negative	escalation.	In	both	cases,	these	issues	come	at	a	
cost,	leading	to	either	more	difficult	or	more	limited	exchanges.	
	
However,	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 participants	 (two	 thirds),	 these	 issues	 progressively	 led	 to	
adjustments	 in	 the	 visibility	 of	 politically-related	 content	 and	 restrictions	 of	 the	 publicly-
oriented	 nature	 of	 these	 interactions.	 This	 was	 achieved	 through	 a	 number	 of	 strategies.	
Some	respondents	retrospectively	acted	to	divert	attention	away	from	content	that	attracted	
negative	 reactions	 in	 their	 network.	 For	 instance,	 Slim’s	 strategy	was	 to	 “drown”	 opinions	
that	 provoked	 such	 reactions	 by	 increasing	 his	 activity	 on	 the	 platform	 and	 producing	 or	
distributing	 numerous	 other	 pieces	 of	 content	 in	 rapid	 succession	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 a	
potentially	 unpleasant	 escalation	of	 debate.	Narjes	 had	on	 a	 few	occasions	 erased	 content	
she	 had	 previously	 shared	 due	 to	 reactions	 to	 the	 opinions	 she	 expressed	 or	 suggested	
through	her	social	media	activity.	She	recalled	one	case,	in	particular,	where	she	transmitted	
an	 article	 commemorating	 the	 anniversary	 of	 the	 death	 of	 former	 Tunisian	 president	
Bourguiba.	When	she	shared	it	on	her	social	media	account	and	commented	on	his	battle	to	
lead	 the	country	 to	 independence,	one	of	her	contacts	wrote	a	critical	comment	 listing	 the	
negative	 impact	of	his	 rule	and	his	 secularising	agenda,	which	 led	Narjes	 in	 turn	 to	provide	
counter-arguments.	However,	 the	 debate	 became	 increasingly	 heated	 and	 lengthy	 and	 she	
decided	 to	 delete	 the	 entire	 thread	 of	 the	 exchange	 and	 the	 content	 it	 related	 to,	 whilst	
keeping	 the	 person	 in	 her	 social	 media	 contacts.	 Other	 respondents	 considered	 that	 it	
became	 necessary,	 after	 a	 number	 of	 arguments	 on	 social	 media,	 to	 adjust	 their	
communication	 on	 the	 platform	 to	 more	 private	 and	 easily	 manageable	 exposure	 levels.	
Sarra,	for	example,	mentioned	that	her	use	of	privacy	parameters	on	Facebook	was	relatively	
basic.	When	 it	 came	 to	 personal	 photos	 of	 her	 and	 her	 family,	 she	 ensured	 that	 she	 only	
shared	such	content	with	a	close	network	of	friends.	With	other	forms	of	content,	she	made	
no	 restrictions	 to	who	 could	 see	what	 she	wrote	 and	 shared.	 However,	 this	 changed	 over	
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time	as	a	few	contacts	in	her	network,	whose	political	opinions	were	opposed	to	hers,	made	
comments	she	perceived	as	unpleasant.	As	a	result,	she	changed	her	privacy	parameters	to	
ensure	that	they	could	no	longer	see	content	she	produced	on	her	profile.	Nevertheless,	she	
kept	them	in	her	network	of	friends	because	she	wanted	to	continue	seeing	what	they	in	turn	
shared.	Similarly,	Anis	made	the	point	that,	over	time,	he	had	resorted	to	only	discussing	his	
political	 views	 in	 closed	 social	 media	 groups	 with	 like-minded	 individuals.	 His	 previous	
experiences	 meant	 that	 “otherwise	 [he]	 would	 be	 spending	 all	 [his]	 time	 replying	 to	
comments	from	people.”	
	
Whilst	some	study	participants	restricted	the	visibility	of	 their	and	other’s	political	opinions	
and	positions,	 in	a	 few	 instances,	 the	ability	 to	 freely	express	necessitated	 the	use	of	more	
than	one	social	media	profile.	In	the	case	of	Neila,	it	led	to	the	drastic	decision	to	shut	down	
her	 profile	 and	 start	 a	 new	 one.	 Neila	was	 particularly	 active	 in	 disseminating	 information	
through	 her	 Facebook	 account	 during	 the	 revolution	 period.	 To	 do	 so,	 she	 connected	 to	 a	
large	 number	 of	 users	 and	 significantly	 expanded	 her	 network	 to	 contacts	 she	 was	 not	
personally	 familiar	 with.	 As	 she	 continued	 to	 share	 information	 and	 express	 her	 political	
stances	after	the	revolution,	the	size	of	this	network	made	the	wide-scale	communication	on	
her	profile	difficult	to	manage	in	the	context	of	an	increasingly	polarised	political	space.	After	
receiving	death	threats	because	of	the	opinions	she	published,	she	considered	that	she	had	
to	start	a	new	profile.	In	a	less	extreme	context,	Rim	considered	that	the	public	nature	of	the	
platform	and	the	visibility	of	her	communicative	expressions	to	her	contacts	 in	her	network	
were	limiting	in	terms	of	the	diversity	of	opinions	she	wished	to	interact	with.	As	a	result,	she	
created	a	separate	account	under	a	pseudonym	to	do	so.	She	explains:	
	
At	a	certain	point	 I	 set	up	two	additional	accounts	 in	addition	to	my	Facebook	account.	But	
these	 two	were	 not	 in	my	 name.	 They	 were	 in	 the	 name	 of	 people	 I	 had	 imagined,	 and	 I	
created	 them	as	 two	different	 types	of	 people.	One	of	 them	was	pro	 government,	 and	 the	
other	one	was	against	the	government.	It	was	just	to	find	out	how	people	were	talking	[…]	I	
used	different	accounts	from	my	own	because	if	you	wanted	to	follow	the	pages	you	had	to	
go	on	them	and	mark	that	you	like	them.	And	it	could	be	the	case	that	these	pages	would	not	
be	in	my	interest.	Because	people	would	see	that	I	like	the	pages	when	they’re	different	from	
my	personal	convictions.	
	
In	 this	 sense,	 the	 assimilation	 in	 one	 and	 the	 same	 communicative	 space	 of	 a	 personal	
identity	 and	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 political	 identity	 was	 limiting.	 The	 public	 visibility	 of	 this	
political	identity	signified,	in	her	perspective,	an	accountability	towards	others	and	fixed	it	in	
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such	 a	 way	 that	 made	 a	 more	 flexible	 exploration	 and	 experimentation	 with	 different	
opinions	impossible.	
	
The	 visibility	 of	 political	 identifications	 and	 positions	 on	 social	 media	 also	 impacted,	 for	 a	
number	of	respondents,	on	their	social	relations	offline.	Such	was	the	case	for	Ahmed,	who	
supported	 the	 Salafi	 movement	 and	 had	 many	 issues	 in	 terms	 of	 managing	 exposure	 to	
opinions,	 in	 his	 social	 media	 network,	 that	 he	 found	 politically	 or	 religiously	 offensive.	 He	
recalled	the	example	of	a	close	relative	he	decided	to	remove	from	his	contacts	as	a	result.	
However,	 the	decision	 led	to	further	difficulties	as	his	relative	was	offended	by	this	act	and	
confronted	him	when	they	met	face-to-face.	Ahmed	had	to	reverse	his	decision	and	reinstate	
his	relative	in	his	network	of	contacts	on	Facebook	as	a	result.	Equally,	Ahmed	said	that	many	
of	 his	 online	 acquaintances	 had	 blocked	 him	 out	 of	 their	 social	media	 network	 due	 to	 the	
religious	 and	 political	 views	 he	 expressed,	 and	 this	 made	 their	 real-life	 interactions	 very	
awkward	 and	 difficult	 to	 manage.	 Mehdi,	 in	 turn,	 mentioned	 that	 he	 had	 many	 concerns	
about	the	political	opinions	that	one	of	his	childhood	friends	was	sharing	on	Facebook	and,	as	
a	result,	waited	until	they	met	in	person	to	clarify	that	these	were	not	aimed	at	offending	him	
personally.	Similarly,	Sarra	who,	as	previously	mentioned,	 felt	 the	need	to	block	one	of	her	
friends	 from	 seeing	 what	 she	 posted	 on	 social	 media	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 her	 aggressive	
comments,	said	that,	although	she	occasionally	still	met	this	person	during	social	gatherings,	
she	hardly	spoke	to	her	any	longer	because	of	the	opinions	she	had	posted	online.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
A	 closer	assessment	of	political	 communication	between	citizens	on	social	media	highlights	
the	importance	of	understanding	the	specific	context,	meanings	and	consequences	of	the	use	
of	the	platform	as	a	space	for	public	expression.	The	networked	architecture	of	social	media	
and	 its	 link	 to	 offline	 identities	 and	 networks,	 are	 empowering	 of	 civic	 expression	 and	
interactions	 but	 equally	 undermine	 personal	 opinion	 autonomy	 and	 can	 reinforce	
divergences	 in	 this	 context.	Over	 time,	users	 adapted	 their	 communicative	practices	 in	 this	
regard	 to	 adjust	 the	 visibility	 of	 their	 and	 others’	 political	 opinions,	 identifications	 and	
identity	expressions	to	a	more	privately	customised	exposure.	As	highlighted	in	this	chapter,	
the	type	of	political	communication	that	citizens	took	part	in	on	Facebook	was	less	conducive	
to	 debate	 and	 deliberative	 exchange	 than	 political	 talk	 in	 an	 offline	 context.	 Instead,	
interactions	 on	 the	 platform	 were	 aimed	 at	 supporting	 or	 undermining	 the	 visibility	 of	
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opinions,	representations,	and	political	positions.	The	logic	of	these	social	media	interactions	
in	 this	post-revolution	context	were	predicated	on	 the	association	of	a	private	 identity	and	
image	with	 specific	 interpretations	of	 public	 and	political	 issues.	 The	 visibility	 of	 politically-
related	interactions	on	social	media	thus	mattered	on	two	opposing	levels.	On	the	one	hand,	
it	mattered	to	respondents	how	their	own	identity	came	across	and	as	a	result	they	sought	to	
manage	 their	 personal	 image	 on	 the	 platform.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 by	
extending	 opportunities	 for	 political	 communication	 from	 the	 political	 sphere	 to	 ‘ordinary’	
citizens,	 networked	 communication	 between	 citizens	 exposed	 them	 to	 public	 scrutiny,	
paralleling	 some	of	 the	 problems	 that	 Thompson	 (2005)	 refers	 to	 in	 his	 assessment	 of	 the	
consequences	of	the	rise	of	visibility	for	politicians	 in	the	television	era.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	new	communicative	opportunities	on	social	media,	shape	public	debate	along	the	lines	of	
a	negotiation	over	the	terms	of	visibility	of	different	issues	and	opinions	in	the	public	realm.	
The	 forms	 of	 communication	 on	 the	 Facebook	 platform	 in	 this	 context	 (e.g.	 like,	 share),	
support	 communicative	 construction	 of	 a	 different	 type	 and	 articulations	 of	 terms	 of	
inclusion	and	exclusion	in	what	is	considered	as	collectively	permissible	and	legitimate	in	the	
broader	 socio-political	 space.	 Whereas	 only	 a	 few	 respondents	 chose	 to	 act	 on	 their	
engagement	with	public	and	political	matters	 through	the	structures	and	 institutions	of	 the	
formal	 political	 sphere,	 their	 involvement	 in	 politicised	 forms	 of	 communication	 on	 social	
media	can	be	regarded	as	participative	in	as	far	as	it	is	tied	to	the	desire	to	influence	not	just	
other	citizens’	opinions,	but	also	to	shape	the	representation	of	their	shared	public	world	and	
its	boundaries.	In	this	sense,	the	use	of	social	media	in	this	context	can	be	considered,	rather	
than	a	revival	of	a	deliberative	public	sphere,	as	more	of	a	relative	extension	to	citizens	of	the	
power	of	naming	 (Melucci,	 1996),	 formerly	associated	with	mass	media	 institutions.	But	as	
becomes	 more	 evident	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 this	 communicative	
participation	and	political	outcomes	only	serves	to	increase	perceived	disillusion,	nurture	de-
politicisation	and	undermine	a	sense	of	civic	and	political	efficacy.	
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CHAPTER	6	
	
SOCIAL	MEDIA’S	CHANGING	ROLE	
	
	
Introduction	
	
This	chapter	follows	research	participants	 in	the	rapidly	changing	post-revolution	context	of	
Tunisia	a	year	after	the	first	round	of	interviews	were	conducted.	Similar	themes	are	explored	
to	 the	 previous	 two	 empirical	 chapters,	with	 a	 focus	 on	 better	 understanding	 longer	 term	
processes	 that	 underpin	 the	 use	 of	 social	 media	 by	 users.	 In	 particular,	 an	 assessment	 is	
undertaken	 of	 the	 changes,	 one	 year	 later,	 in	 respondents’	 media	 practices	 aimed	 at	
informing	 themselves,	 connecting	 to	 a	 wider	 public	 realm,	 and	 influencing	 it	 through	
different	 participative	 forms.	 The	 findings	 of	 research	 conducted	 in	 2012	 indicated	 rapid	
changes	not	only	 in	socio-political	context,	but	also	 in	media	use	by	respondents	and	in	the	
role	played	by	social	media	over	 time.	By	 revisiting	some	of	 these	 findings	a	year	 later,	my	
aim	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 better	 capture	 these	 changes	 and	 explore	 participants’	 evolving	
perspectives	 about	 their	 perceived	 relation	 to	 a	wider	 public	 realm	 and	 the	 different	ways	
their	 media	 practices	 co-evolve	 with	 these	 views.	 The	 chapter	 starts	 with	 an	 overview	 of	
developments	 in	 the	 Tunisian	 socio-political	 and	 media	 contexts	 between	 the	 autumn	 of	
2012	 and	 the	 end	 of	 2013,	 then	 assesses	 participants’	 media	 and	 news	 practices	 in	 this	
rapidly	 changing	 and	 polarised	 landscape,	 and	 finally	 explores	 their	 participatory	 activities	
online	and	offline	one	year	after	 the	 first	 round	of	 interviews.	Fundamentally,	 I	 argue	 that,	
social	media	contributed	to	further	reinforcing	this	polarised	socio-political	context	and,	as	a	
result,	there	was	a	relative	shift	back	in	the	role	adopted	by	respondents	from	participating	
and	 interacting	public	 to	social	media	audience.	Empirical	evidence	 in	 this	chapter	suggests	
that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 communication	 between	 citizens	 about	 public	 and	 political	 issues,	
concerns	about	the	ability	to	socialise	with	others	ultimately	dictate	the	terms	and	limits	of	
involvement	 in	 the	 networked	 communicative	 space.	 Paralleling	 this	 shift	 is	 a	 reframing	 of	
participants’	 perceptions	 about	 their	 role	 and	 influence	 as	 citizens,	 an	 understanding	 that	
decreasingly	associates	the	social	media	space	to	the	opportunity	to	advance	their	own	views	
and	representations	of	the	public	world	or	to	make	their	voices	heard.		
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1. One	year	later:	a	changed	context	
	
1.1. Growing	political	polarisation	and	rise	in	violence	
	
The	tense	and	increasingly	violent	socio-political	context	referred	to	in	the	previous	chapter	
continued	to	escalate	in	2013.	The	country	was	beset	by	a	number	of	difficulties.	Two	years	
after	 the	 start	 of	 the	 revolution,	 the	 socio-economic	 demands	 that	 originally	 fuelled	 it,	
unsurprisingly	 failed	 to	 translate	 into	 rapid	 improvements	 and	 better	 youth	 and	 regional	
employment	 opportunities.	 Instead,	 the	 economic	 recovery	 after	 the	 revolution	 was	
somewhat	 stagnating	 and	 rising	 inflation	 levels	 were	 making	 living	 conditions	 increasingly	
difficult,	 whilst	 the	 informal	 economy	 was	 expanding	 (Ayadi	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Trabelssi,	 2014).	
Equally,	 more	 fundamental	 structural	 and	 institutional	 reforms	 failed	 to	 make	 meaningful	
progress	over	time	(Hachemaoui,	2013)	and	the	drafting	of	the	new	constitution	was	stalling.	
Meanwhile,	 different	 strands	 of	 radical	 Islamic	 and	 Jihadi	movements	were	 gaining	 ground	
among	 socially	 and	 economically	 disenfranchised	 youth,	 and	 within	 a	 context	 of	 rising	
political	 tension	 and	 ideological	 polarisation	 (Merone,	 2015).	 As	 previously	mentioned,	 the	
government’s	initially	muted	stance	on	the	rise	of	such	movements,	as	well	as	questions	as	to	
its	competence	 in	handling	a	difficult	economic	 recovery	and	complex	 regional	 inequalities,	
were	 feeding	 progressively	 sharper	 criticism	 by	 the	 opposition.	 Furthermore,	 the	 use	 of	
excessive	and	unjustified	force	by	police	to	quell	dissent	at	times	provided	a	painful	reminder	
that	little	had	changed	since	the	Ben	Ali	days,	as	was	the	case	for	example	in	the	socially	and	
economically	marginalised	region	of	Siliana	in	November	2012,	where	bird	shot	pellets	were	
fired	indiscriminately	at	protestors	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2012).	
	
However,	 the	major	 turning	point	 for	 the	 first	democratically	elected	government	after	 the	
revolution,	 came	 with	 the	 assassination	 of	 a	 leading	 opposition	 figure	 of	 the	 left,	 Chokri	
Belaid,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 February	 2013.	 The	 death	 of	 other	 public	 figures	 during	 this	
transitional	 period	 had	 aroused	 a	 level	 of	 disquiet,	 notably	 the	 lynching	 of	 a	 regional	
coordinator	 of	 the	 opposition	 party,	 Nidaa	 Tounes,	 in	 October	 2012	 (Chouikha	 and	 Gobe,	
2013).	However,	the	shooting	of	a	leading	political	figure	such	as	Belaid	in	front	of	his	home	
and	 in	 broad	 daylight,	 marked	 a	 profound	 shift	 in	 popular	 opinion	 about	 the	 troika	
government.	Indeed,	Belaid	was	one	of	the	fiercest	critics	of	Ennahdha,	who	denounced	what	
he	 considered	 the	 instrumentalisation	 of	 religion	 to	 political	 ends	 and,	 shortly	 before	 his	
death,	he	directly	accused	the	party	of	increasingly	resorting	to	violence	to	impose	their	rule.	
Belaid	had	also	been	accused	by	Ali	 Laarayedh,	a	 leading	 figure	 in	 the	Ennahdha	party	and	
207	
	
head	of	the	Interior	Ministry,	of	being	the	instigator	of	the	violence	during	the	Siliana	protest.	
His	 death	 translated	 into	 growing	 distrust	 of	 Ennahdha	 and	 fuelled	 suspicion	 about	 the	
party’s	 implication	 in	 his	 murder	 (Hachemaoui,	 2013).	 The	 ensuing	 political	 crisis	 saw	 the	
resignation	 of	 Prime	 Minister	 Hamadi	 Jebali	 (of	 the	 Ennahdha	 party),	 followed	 by	 the	
formation	 –	 to	 the	 dismay	 of	 many	 in	 the	 opposition	 ranks	 (Amara,	 2013)	 -	 of	 a	 new	
government	 led	 by	 Laarayedh.	 These	 developments	 did	 little	 to	 appease	 socio-political	
polarisation	 and	 a	 number	 of	 conflictual	 readings	 of	 the	 events	 were	 influential	 on	 public	
opinion	(Scheuerman,	2013).	Whereas	the	government	accused	a	group	of	Salafi	extremists	
as	 perpetrators	 and	 vowed	 to	 crack	 down	 on	 jihadi	 movements	 in	 the	 country,	 some	 of	
Belaid’s	 immediate	entourage	pointed	 fingers	at	Ennahdha	 for	 complicity	 in	masterminding	
the	 murder	 and	 covering	 up	 details	 of	 the	 subsequent	 investigation	 (Scheuermann,	 2013;	
Auffray,	 2013).	 Part	 of	 the	 political	 opposition,	 in	 turn,	 pointed	 to	 the	 government	 and	
Ennahdha’s	 indirect	 complicity	 in	 the	 attack,	 considering	 it	 a	 predictable	 consequence	 of	 a	
previously	 passive	 handling	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 religious	 extremism	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	
condemnation	 of	 religiously-divisive	 discourses.	 The	 distrust	 between	 Islamists	 and	 their	
opponents	fed	this	climate	of	suspicion	and	polarisation	(Merone,	2013).	
	
During	 the	 month	 of	 Ramadan	 in	 July	 2013,	 the	 country	 was	 further	 immersed	 in	 deep	
political	 crisis	 by	 a	 second	 assassination	 -	 of	 left	 opposition	 figure	 and	 member	 of	 the	
Constitutional	 Assembly	 (ANC)	 Mohammed	 Brahmi	 –	 and	 the	 killing,	 a	 week	 later,	 of	 six	
soldiers	 on	 a	 patrol	 in	 the	 Chaambi	Mountain	 in	 the	West	 of	 the	 country	 (Carboni,	 2015).	
These	 developments	 resulted	 in	 a	 political	 lockdown	 by	 the	 opposition,	 with	 a	 group	 of	
opposition	deputies	boycotting	the	ANC’s	activities	and	occupying	the	square	in	front	of	it,	a	
movement	 that	 became	 known	 as	 the	 “Rahil”	 (departure)	 sit-in	 (Boubekeur,	 2015).	 At	 the	
end	of	July	2013,	this	space	saw	the	largest	scale	protests	in	the	capital	since	the	beginning	of	
the	 revolution,	 leading	 to	 the	 resignation	 of	 the	 troika	 government	 and	 a	 renewed	
commitment	by	the	political	parties	to	reach	a	compromise	(ibid).	When	I	returned	to	Tunisia	
at	 the	 end	 of	 October	 2013	 to	 conduct	 the	 second	 round	 of	 interviews	 with	 the	 same	
respondents,	 a	 ‘national	dialogue’	process	was	 starting,	with	 the	aim	of	 resolving	 the	 crisis	
and	 negotiating	 the	 composition	 of	 a	 caretaker	 technocratic-political	 government	 in	which	
key	posts	were	to	be	allocated	to	relatively	independent	or	non-partisan	ministers	(Thornton,	
2014).	Crucial	to	these	negotiations	was	a	group	of	four	organisations	comprising	two	unions	
(the	workers’	Union	UGTT,	and	the	employers’	Union	UTICA)	as	well	as	the	Tunisian	Human	
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Rights	League	(LTDH)	and	the	Lawyers’	Association	(Ordre	des	Avocats)100.	The	drafting	of	the	
new	constitution	was	rapidly	finalised	and	it	was	adopted	in	January	2014.	During	the	same	
period,	 the	new	government	was	 formed	and	came	to	power	with	a	mandate	 to	oversee	a	
crackdown	 on	 terrorist	 networks	 and	 to	 organise	 new	 parliamentary	 and	 presidential	
elections	within	a	year.	
	
1.2. A	highly	politicised	media	landscape	
	
As	briefly	contextualised	in	the	first	chapter,	the	Tunisian	media	landscape	underwent	radical	
changes	 after	 the	 revolution.	 The	 freeing	 of	 public	 expression	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	
establishment	of	new	media	outlets,	 by	 changes	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 state	and	
media	 sector,	 and	 by	 a	 radical	 shift	 in	 journalistic	 practices.	 Equally,	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	
revolution	saw	the	emergence	and	proliferation	of	media	content	relating	to	political	issues	-	
previously	a	taboo	subject	(see	Chapters	1	and	3).	
	
Whereas	the	initial	period	after	the	2011	revolution	prompted	a	number	of	hopes	about	the	
transformation	 of	 the	 media	 sector,	 the	 subsequent	 years	 were	 marked	 by	 delays	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 more	 profound	 structural	 reforms,	 by	 the	 persistence	 of	 close	 links	
between	 the	media	and	political	 spheres,	and	by	 the	emergence	of	new	struggles	over	 the	
boundaries	of	free	and	permissible	forms	of	expression	and	communication.	This	context	was	
fed	 by,	 and	 in	 turn	 contributed	 to,	 the	 socio-political	 polarisation	 in	 the	 country	 (El-Issawi,	
2015).	Delays	in	the	establishment	of	the	audio-visual	regulatory	body	HAICA	(see	Chapter	1)	
partly	contributed	to	some	of	these	issues,	but	these	delays	were	also	the	result	of	a	complex	
context	 and	 legacy	 that	 resisted	 reform	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 political	 will	 to	 support	 it	 (Ben	
Chaabane,	2015;	Farmanfarmaian,	2014,	Laabidi,	2014).	Indicative	of	these	difficulties	are,	for	
example,	 the	 lengthy	 negotiations	 over	 the	 composition	 of	 HAICA’s	 committee	 and	 its	
legitimacy	(El-Issawi,	2015),	as	well	as	the	difficult	negotiations	it	faced	with	the	government	
in	 asserting	 the	 terms	 of	 appointment	 of	 public	 broadcasting	 directors	 (Farmanfarmaian,	
2014),	 and	 the	 challenges	 (including	 a	 legal	 challenge)	 the	 regulatory	body	was	 confronted	
with	in	trying	to	establish	an	apolitical	framework	for	private	media	ownership.	These	latter	
changes	were	 resisted	 by	media	 owners	 as	well	 as	 part	 of	 the	 journalistic	 profession	 (Ben	
Chaabane,	 2015).	 In	 this	 context,	 more	 drastic	 attempts	 to	 enforce	 change	 were	 often	
represented	to	public	opinion	as	attacks	on	freedom	of	expression	and	media	pluralism.	
																																																						
100	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	these	four	organisations	were	awarded	with	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize	in	2015,	for	their	role	in	
heading	the	national	dialogue	process	at	the	end	of	2013.	
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The	 deeper-level	 reform	 of	 the	 media	 landscape	 was	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 in	 a	 transitional	
context	 where	 part	 of	 the	 political	 culture	 continued	 to	 be	 entrenched	 in	 the	
instrumentalisation	 of	 media	 outlets	 for	 political	 purposes,	 and	 where	 relations	 between	
different	sides	were	marked	by	a	level	of	distrust.	Similar	difficulties	arose	in	relation	to	other	
sectors	(e.g.	the	judiciary)	that	equally	struggled	to	undergo	a	more	profound	overhaul.	Much	
of	 the	 private	 media	 landscape	 was	 in	 fact	 more	 or	 less	 directly	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 political	
actors.	 Additionally,	 the	 transitional	 period	 saw	 the	 launch	 of	 some	media	 figures	 into	 the	
political	 arena,	 who	 thereby	made	 use	 of	 their	 influence	 in	 the	media	 sphere	 for	 political	
gains.	 Furthermore,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	media	 sector	 and	 the	 former	 dictatorial	
regime,	was	perhaps	not	sufficiently	addressed	to	support	a	solid	basis	for	trust	and	reform.	
Although	 Ben	 Ali’s	 family	 and	 direct	 entourage	 no	 longer	 owned	 leading	 private	 media	
outlets,	 the	 politicisation	 of	 media	 and	 limited	 transparency	 over	 its	 financing	 further	
contributed	 to	 the	 socio-political	 polarisation	 in	 the	 country	 as	 government	 supporters	
distrusted	the	motives	behind	negative	coverage	by	private	media	formerly	linked	to	the	old	
regime,	and	by	the	same	token,	government	opponents	distrusted	more	positive	appraisals	
of	government	activities	by	new	media	outlets,	considering	them	as	 indicative	of	the	return	
of	 regime	 propaganda.	 This	 was	 the	 case,	 for	 example,	 for	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 Tunisian	
television	 channels	Nessma	TV,	 distrusted	by	 Ennahdha	 supporters	 for	 its	 links	 to	Ben	Ali’s	
regime	 as	 well	 as	 to	 new	 opposition	 party	 Nidaa	 Tounes,	 considered	 by	 many	 of	 these	
supporters	as	the	voice	of	former	networks	of	influence	and	corruption101.		
	
For	government	supporters,	it	was	equally	difficult	to	create	an	alternative	media	space	more	
suited	to	their	viewpoints	in	this	polarised	context	where	any	such	attempt	was	considered,	
rightly	or	wrongly,	as	a	new	form	of	propaganda.	A	number	of	media	outlets	more	aligned	to	
pro-government	 or	 pro-Ennahdha	 perspectives	 emerged	 during	 the	 research	 period,	 but	
these	also	tended	to	be	directly	tied	to	the	political	sphere.	For	instance,	Zeitouna	television	
channel,	 launched	 in	May	 2012,	was	 owned	 by	 the	 son	 of	 a	 leading	 Ennahdha	 figure	who	
served	 as	minister	 in	 the	 troika	 government	 (Farmanfarmaian,	 2014).	 The	 level	 of	 distrust	
between	 different	 sides	 of	 the	 media	 and	 political	 sphere	 was	 also	 evidenced	 by	 the	
controversial	move	by	the	presidency	of	the	Republic	to	publish,	in	December	2013,	a	‘black	
book’	 exposing	 media	 outlets	 and	 journalists	 implicated	 in	 Ben	 Ali	 regime’s	 propaganda	
structures.	The	publication	was	hailed	by	some	as	a	brave	move	for	 its	revelations,	but	also	
rightly	criticised	by	others	because	the	research	into	the	presidential	archives	was	instigated	
																																																						
101	Many	members	of	Nidaa	Tounes	are	former	RCD	members	(the	party	of	Ben	Ali)	and	its	octogenarian	leader	Beji	Caid	Essebsi	
was	formerly	a	minister	under	Bourguiba.	Due	to	the	relative	failure	of	the	transitional	justice	process,	distinction	between	
different	levels	of	responsibility	for	perceived	crimes	of	the	former	regime	has	been	difficult.	
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by	 the	 president	 Mohamed	 Moncef	 Marzouki	 outside	 of	 any	 legal	 mandate,	 formal	
independent	 process,	 or	 consultation	 with	 other	 bodies	 dealing	 with	 transitional	 justice	
issues	(Joyce,	2013;	Tolbert,	2013).			
	
The	case	of	private	television	channel	Ettounsiya	TV	(The	Tunisian	channel),	one	of	the	most	
popular	 channels	 in	2011	and	2012,	 is	 just	one	example	 to	 illustrate	 this	polarised	context,	
but	 it	 perhaps	 encapsulates	 most	 strikingly	 how	 the	 media	 sphere	 was	 serving	 as	 an	
important	 political	 battleground	 in	 2013.	 The	 channel	was	 launched	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 2011,	
shortly	after	 the	 revolution,	by	 television	presenter	and	producer	Sami	Fehri,	who	 formerly	
controlled	one	of	Tunisia’s	major	production	companies	 (Cactus	Productions)	 together	with	
Ben	Ali’s	brother-in-law,	Belhassen	Trabelsi.	Whereas	an	enquiry	was	launched	in	June	2011	
into	the	unfair	financial	advantages	offered	by	these	ties	to	the	old	regime,	the	imprisonment	
of	Fehri	in	August	2012	arose	suspicion	-	due	to	its	timing	and	irregular	judicial	procedures	-	
about	the	underlying	political	motives	and	pressures	that	may	have	motivated	it	(IFEX,	2012;	
RSF,	 2012).	 Indeed,	 Fehri	 claimed	 that	 the	 arrest	was	 due	 to	 the	 airing	 on	Ettounsiya	 of	 a	
political	 satire	 programme	 “Ellogique	 Essiyassi”	 (The	 Political	 Logic)	 that	was	 critical	 of	 the	
transitional	‘troika’	government.	The	programme	was	suspended	by	the	channel,	a	move	that	
Fehri	 as	 well	 as	 the	 National	 Union	 of	 Tunisian	 Journalists	 (SNJT)	 justified	 as	 a	 result	 of	
pressure	 from	the	authorities	 (RSF,	2012)102.	By	December	2012,	 the	case	was	not	only	 the	
centre	of	a	battle	between	a	section	of	the	political	and	media	spheres,	but	had	shifted	to	an	
unprecedented	conflict	within	the	judiciary	that	raised	doubts	over	its	political	independence.	
Indeed,	 two	 judicial	 bodies,	 the	 Court	 of	 Cassation	 and	 the	 Accusation	 Chamber	 disagreed	
over	the	outcome	of	the	case;	the	former	issuing	a	warrant	for	Fehri’s	release	and	the	latter	
demanding	 for	 him	 to	 be	 kept	 in	 prison	 (IFEX,	 2012).	 Eventually,	 after	 a	 third	warrant,	 the	
channel’s	owner	was	released	from	prison	in	September	2013,	having	spent	a	year	in	custody	
despite	 –	 according	 to	 Fehri	 -	 never	being	 formally	 sentenced	 (Le	Monde,	 2013),	 and	even	
though	he	still	faced	charges	in	relation	to	other	embezzlement	affairs.		
	
Equally	 illustrative	 of	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 media	 sphere	 to	 this	 polarised	 context	 are	
developments	 regarding	 the	 ownership	 of	 Ettounsiya	 during	 Fehri’s	 detention.	 In	 March	
2013,	 the	 channel’s	 frequency	was	 acquired	 by	 another	 businessman,	 Slim	Riahi,	 leader	 of	
the	political	party	UPL	(and	later	candidate	in	the	presidential	elections	of	2014).	In	July	2013,	
the	broadcasting	of	Ettounsiya	 came	 to	a	 sudden	end	and	Riahi	 announced	 that	he	was	 to	
																																																						
102	Fehri	announced	that	he	received	a	phone	call	from	a	minister	of	the	Ennahdha	party	directly	requesting	the	suspension	of	
the	programme,	a	claim	denied	by	the	minister.	The	SNJT	in	turn	said	it	was	the	result	of	“indirect”	pressure	from	the	regime.	
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create	 three	 new	 channels	 under	 the	 Ettounsiya	 brand.	 However,	 lawyers	 acting	 for	 the	
channel	 challenged	 his	 ownership	 of	 the	 brand	 and	 denounced	 the	 move	 as	 a	 renewed	
attempt	 to	 silence	 the	 channel’s	 editorial	 line.	 Another	 channel,	 El	 Hiwar	 (The	 Dialogue),	
offered	to	host	Ettounsiya’s	popular	programmes	on	 its	airwaves	 instead,	alongside	 its	own	
schedule.	 This	 channel	was	 in	 turn	owned	by	political	opposition	 figure	Tahar	Ben	Hassine,	
persecuted	under	Ben	Ali’s	regime,	and	an	active	member	of	opposition	party	Nidaa	Tounes	
after	 the	 revolution.	 Ben	 Hassine	 claimed	 that	 Ennahdha	 was	 pressuring	 advertisers	 into	
discontinuing	 their	 business	 with	 his	 channel,	 leading	 to	 financial	 difficulties	 (Grira	 and	
Rezgui,	2013).	In	September	2014,	a	year	after	Fehri’s	release,	El	Hiwar	and	Ettounsiya	were	
to	merge	into	a	new	company	whose	majority	shareholder	was	Fehri’s	wife	(Haddaoui,	2014).		
	
The	 scope	 of	 this	 project	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 a	 more	 detailed	 assessment	 of	 the	
transformations	 of	 the	 media	 sphere	 in	 Tunisia.	 However,	 the	 overview	 provided	 above	
aimed	to	highlight	the	complexity	and	range	of	conflicts	related	to	its	reform	in	this	unstable	
and	highly	 polarised	 transitional	 context.	 I	will	 now	 turn	 to	 an	 assessment	 of	 respondents’	
perspectives	 and	 orientations	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 media	 landscape	 and	 socio-political	
developments,	 particularly	 during	 the	 heightened	 period	 of	 crisis	 between	 the	 first	 and	
second	rounds	of	interviews	(October/November	2012	to	October/November	2013).	
	
	
2. Changes	in	media	and	news	practices	
	
2.1. Ambiguous	perspectives	on	news	viewing	practices	
	
Participants’	media	habits	changed	–	and	 in	some	cases	quite	drastically	 -	 compared	 to	 the	
first	 round	 of	 interviews	 conducted	 a	 year	 earlier.	 Discussions	 of	 the	 time	 they	 spent	with	
different	 media	 indicated	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 underpinning	 these	 differences.	 For	 some	
participants,	changes	in	their	personal	circumstances	had	a	significant	impact	on	their	use	of	
different	media	forms.	This	was	the	case,	for	example,	for	Sonia	who	temporarily	moved	back	
to	her	parents’	and	had	to	adapt	her	media	use	(television	and	radio	in	particular)	to	theirs	as	
a	 result.	Other	participants	saw	a	change	 in	 their	professional	situation	 (Nabil,	Hamza,	Rim,	
Sarra	 and	 Zied)	 which	 affected	 the	 time	 they	 were	 spending	 with	media.	 One	 respondent	
(Slim)	 had	migrated	 to	 the	Middle	 East	 in	 the	meantime	 in	 pursuit	 of	 better	 employment	
opportunities,	and	was	no	longer	able	to	participate	in	the	study	as	a	result.	However,	overall,	
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it	 was	 striking	 that	 much	 of	 the	 change	 in	 participants’	 media	 habits	 was	 related	 to	 the	
heightened	political	polarisation	and	politicisation	of	media	referred	to	earlier	in	this	chapter.	
	
Perspectives	on	the	importance	of	following	the	news	were	relatively	unchanged.	It	still	really	
mattered	to	most	respondents	to	be	up	to	date	with	rapid	developments	in	the	country	and	
to	understand	them.	However,	they	also	expressed	far	more	ambivalent	feelings	about	their	
relationship	to	news	in	general	than	they	had	in	2012.	Whilst	this	knowledge	was	important	
and	 considered	 as	 necessary,	 it	 was	 also	 painful,	 stressful,	 and	 increasingly	 challenging	 in	
psychological	terms.	Narjes’	comments	on	this	issue	illustrate	this	point	effectively:	
	
Before	 one	 was	 very	 attentive	 and	 wanted	 to	 follow	 the	 news,	 but	 now	 there	 has	 been	 an	
overdose,	you	don’t	want	to	hear	anything	any	longer.	
	
[Since	when?]	
Since	events	have	been	succeeding	each	other	without	there	being	any	visible	solution…	
	
[So	 if	 I	 understand	 this	 correctly,	 because	of	 the	events,	 you	prefer	not	 to	 follow	 the	news	any	
longer?]	
Yes	but	it’s	only	for	a	short	time,	because	you	tell	yourself	you	must,	you	have	to	know.	After	all	
we	 live	 in	this	country	so	we	better	 follow.	We’re	 forced	to.	You	can’t	avoid	 it.	We	have	to	 face	
this,	at	least	to	know	what’s	going	on.	
	
In	my	translation	of	her	words,	I	have	tried	to	reflect	her	avoidance	of	using	the	first	person	
(I).	Her	 frequent	shift	between	using	the	third	person	(one,	you)	 to	talk	about	her	personal	
perspective	 and	 the	 collective	 “we”	 highlights	 some	 of	 the	 difficulty	 Narjes	 encounters	 in	
trying	to	negotiate	her	relationship,	as	individual	and	citizen,	to	a	wider	public	world	she	feels	
the	need	to	both	connect	to	and	seek	shelter	 from.	Connection	to	this	realm	through	news	
comes	 across,	 in	 her	 framing,	 as	 an	 imposed	duty,	 one	 that	Narjes	 appears	 to	be	 trying	 to	
convince	herself	is	still	important.	
	
Although	most	interviewees	continued	to	consider	that	following	events	in	this	socio-political	
context	was	still	of	value,	many	had	reduced	their	exposure	to	news	or	sought	more	variety	in	
media	content	in	order	to	alleviate	some	of	the	distress	it	was	causing	them.	Anis	referred	to	
the	return	of	football	as	national	preoccupation	that	was	symptomatic	of	this	news	fatigue.	
Others,	 such	 as	 Rim	 and	 Zied,	 limited	 their	 exposure	 to	 news	 and	 sought	 more	
entertainment-led	 television	 content	 to	 avoid	 “feeling	 depressed”	 and	 “think	 about	 other	
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things”.	Neila	and	Hanen,	in	turn,	listened	to	more	music	online	and	on	the	radio	than	before	
for	similar	reasons.	
	
The	level	of	anxiety	linked	to	following	the	news	was	often	explained	by	the	development	of	
events	 in	 the	 country,	 the	 worrying	 escalation	 in	 violence,	 and	 the	 generalised	 context	 of	
antagonism	 and	 division.	 Additionally,	 approximately	 one	 third	 of	 respondents	 directly	
associated	 this	 stressful	 experience	with	 the	media’s	 reporting	 and	 representation	of	 news	
and	current	affairs.	Misinformation	continued	to	play	a	part	 in	this	negative	perception,	but	
the	 majority	 of	 the	 interviewees	 identified	 the	 excessive	 politicisation	 and	 overt	 lack	 of	
objectivity	 of	 journalists	 as	 a	 crucial	 problem.	Anis,	 for	 example,	 kept	 repeating	 that	 all	 he	
wanted	 was	 “just	 the	 information”	 and	 “the	 facts”	 rather	 than	 opinions.	 For	 some,	 the	
mediation	 of	 terrorist	 attacks	 by	 the	media	was	 also	 particularly	 shocking	 and	 inadequate.	
Images	 of	 the	 beheaded	 soldiers	 after	 the	 attack	 at	 Chaambi	mountain	 at	 the	 end	 of	 July	
2013	were	 broadcast	 uncensored	 on	 public	 television,	 leading	 to	 a	 public	 outcry.	 Similarly,	
disturbing	images	of	an	attack	in	a	beach	resort	in	Sousse	in	October	2013	were	transmitted	
on	a	large	scale	and	quoted	by	two	interviewees	as	partly	motivating	a	reduction	in	exposure	
to	news	content.	
	
2.2. Overview	of	changes	in	media	habits	in	2013	
The	time	that	research	participants	spent	using	different	media	reflected	the	changes	in	their	
relation	to	news	and	public	matters,	but	equally	the	media	form	they	turned	to	mattered	in	
this	respect.	This	was	markedly	apparent	in	the	case	of	Rim,	as	illustrated	in	the	graph	below.	
	
	
GRAPH	7:	P3:	Changes	in	average	daily	media	time	between	Oct/Nov.2012	and	Oct/Nov.2013	
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The	 proportion	 of	 time	 she	 spent	 using	 different	 media	 forms	 dramatically	 changed.	
Whereas,	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 2012,	 she	 described	 the	 time	 she	 spent	 on	 Facebook	 as	
dominating	her	media	usage,	most	of	her	media	time	was	dedicated,	a	year	later,	to	watching	
television,	in	particular	films	broadcast	on	satellite	television	channels.	
	
A	 similarly	drastic	 change	was	evidenced	 in	Meriem’s	media	habits	 in	 the	autumn	of	2013,	
who	 deactivated	 her	 social	 media	 account	 altogether,	 but	 equally	 avoided	 exposure	 to	
television	 content.	 As	 a	 result,	 her	 media	 time	 was	 exclusively	 shared	 between	 radio	 and	
online	media	spaces	other	than	social	networking	sites,	as	illustrated	in	this	representation:	
	
	
GRAPH	7:	P19:	Changes	in	average	daily	media	time	between	Oct/Nov.2012	and	Oct/Nov.2013	
	
	
There	were	many	differences	in	the	way	that	participants’	media	habits	changed	in	2013,	and	
not	all	of	these	were	as	drastic	as	in	the	two	cases	mentioned	above,	but	certain	tendencies	
can	be	discerned.	The	time	spent	using	Facebook	decreased	by	a	third	overall,	and	the	time	
spent	with	radio,	television	and	other	online	sites	significantly	increased	(cumulatively	by	an	
average	of	eighty	per	cent).		
	
Half	of	the	participants	in	the	sample	said	that	there	was	no	difference	in	their	radio	habits,	
whereas	the	other	half	spent	more	time	listening	to	it.	For	several	of	them,	this	was	related	
to	changes	 in	their	circumstances	that	translated	 into	more	time	spent	at	home	or	 in	a	car.	
Seven	respondents	also	expressed	their	preference	for	radio	compared	to	watching	Tunisian	
television	that	they	considered	a	more	stressful	experience.	For	instance,	Anis	explained	that	
his	 positive	 view	of	 listening	 to	political	 programmes	on	 the	 radio,	 compared	 to	 television,	
was	related	to	a	difference	in	formats.	He	enjoyed	the	fact	that,	on	the	radio,	politicians	were	
being	 interviewed	and	expressed	their	opinions	one	by	one,	whereas	on	television,	 formats	
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tended	 to	 focus	 on	 debates	 between	 politicians	 that	 were	 difficult	 for	 the	 presenter	 to	
control	and	often	degenerated	 into	heated	arguments.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	 lack	of	visual	cues	
and	the	necessity	to	make	each	speaker’s	voice	audible	on	radio	programmes	favoured	more	
controlled	political	exchange.	
	
Although	 it	 was	 already	 relatively	 low	 in	 2012,	 the	 time	 that	 interviewees	 said	 they	 spent	
reading	 print	 newspapers	 or	 magazines,	 had	 further	 declined	 by	 2013.	 This	 trend	 can	 be	
considered	 to	 tie	 in	 with	 a	 continued	 migration	 of	 print	 readership	 to	 digital	 platforms,	
particularly	 observed	 among	 younger	 respondents.	 Many	 of	 these	 younger	 respondents	
expressed	 no	 interest	 in	 buying	 newspapers	 and	 several	 of	 those	who	 previously	 did,	 said	
they	 no	 longer	 had	 the	 time	 to	 read	 them,	 as	 they	 spent	much	 time	 already	 following	 the	
news	 on	 television	 or	 online.	 The	 only	 participant	 (Marwa)	who	 still	 continued	 to	 buy	 and	
read	a	print	newspaper	on	a	more-or-less	daily	basis	said	she	did	so	“out	of	solidarity”	with	
the	 media	 owner	 because	 the	 paper	 belonged	 to	 an	 opposition	 figure.	 This	 alignment	 of	
media	consumption	to	political	opinion,	and	indeed	the	boycotting	of	specific	media	outlets	
in	 favour	 of	 others	 out	 of	 political	 motives,	 was	 most	 apparent	 in	 participants’	 television	
viewing	practices.	
	
2.3. Extreme	contrast	in	television	viewing	habits	
	
Opinions	about	Tunisian	television	channels	in	general	were	quite	divided	when	I	conducted	
interviews	 in	2013.	One	point	of	consensus	among	respondents	was	that	news	and	political	
programming	(televised	debates	in	particular)	were	stressful	to	watch	and	that	they	reduced	
their	exposure	to	this	type	of	content	accordingly,	preferring	to	turn	their	attention	to	lighter	
and	more	 entertaining	 content	 or	 subject	 matters	 instead.	 However,	 beyond	 this	 point	 of	
agreement,	 two	quite	clearly	delineated	groups	could	be	distinguished	 in	 terms	of	opinions	
about	Tunisian	channels	and	viewing	habits.		
	
The	 first	 group	mainly	 comprised	 supporters	 of	 the	 transitional	 government	 and/or	 one	 of	
the	 Troika	 parties.	 Participants	 in	 this	 group	 had	 pronounced	 negative	 opinions	 about	
Tunisian	 television	 and	 leading	 private	 broadcasters	 Nessma	 and	 El	 Hiwar	 in	 particular	
(including	 its	 broadcasting	 of	 Ettounsiya	 programmes).	 As	 a	 result,	 they	 either	 completely	
boycotted	these	channels	or	Tunisian	television	 in	general.	Such	was	the	case,	 for	example,	
for	 Asma	 and	 Anis	who	 said,	 respectively,	 they	 “no	 longer”	 and	 “never”	watched	 Tunisian	
channels,	 accusing	 them	 of	manipulating	 opinions	 with	 false	 information	 and	 propaganda.	
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Anis,	however,	later	indicated	that	he	had	made	an	exception	to	this	rule	since	the	launch	of	
a	new	channel,	El	Moutawasset,	which	he	regarded	more	positively.	Other	participants	in	this	
group,	such	as	Mehdi,	Rim	and	Raouf,	boycotted	leading	channels	Nessma	and	El	Hiwar,	but	
watched	 other	 Tunisian	 channels	 including	 public	 broadcaster	 Watanyia	 as	 well	 as	 El	
Moutawasset,	considering	both	to	be	more	aligned	to	their	viewpoints.	Similar	to	 interview	
outcomes	 in	2012,	public	broadcaster	Watanyia	was	 still	 the	most	widely	watched	channel	
across	different	opinion	groups,	although	negative	views	about	it	were	perhaps	a	little	more	
pronounced	 than	 the	previous	 year.	 The	 large	majority	of	 respondents	 also	 concurred	 that	
they	 only	 turned	 to	 the	 broadcaster	 for	 its	 news	 rather	 any	 other	 type	 of	 content.	 Other	
respondents	 in	 this	 group,	 such	 as	 Rim,	 who	 rarely	 followed	 the	 news	 in	 2013,	 said	 that	
Watanyia	 was	 the	 only	 Tunisian	 channel	 she	 still	 watched	 occasionally	 for	 its	 news.	 She	
boycotted	private	Tunisian	television	channels	explaining	that	she	did	not	wish	to	be	exposed	
to	the	viewpoints	of	the	opposition	that	she	considered	unfair	in	its	constant	attacks	on	the	
government.	For	her,	most	Tunisian	television	was	equated	to	opposition	media.	Participants	
in	this	group	also	referred	to	watching	Al	Jazeera,	either	via	satellite	television,	for	those	who	
had	 access	 to	 it,	 or	 online.	 Meriem	 and	 Ahmed	 were	 two	 exceptions	 in	 that	 they	 also	
boycotted	all	Tunisian	 television,	despite	 their	opposition	 to	 the	government,	because	 they	
considered	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 most	 Tunisian	 media	 in	 general	 to	 be	 too	 subjective	 and	
polarising.	
	
All	 other	 participants	were	 in	 the	 second	 group,	 including	 supporters	 of	 the	 opposition	 as	
well	as	those	who	opposed	the	government	but	did	not	have	a	specific	political	orientation,	
and	those	who	did	not	express	any	particular	interest	in	political	matters	and	current	affairs	
overall.	Opinions	in	this	group	were	quite	varied.	A	number	of	participants	did	not	have	any	
particular	issues	with	Tunisian	television	channels	or	programming	and	did	not	further	reflect	
on	their	viewing	habits	(e.g.	Farah,	Salma,	Anouar).	Others	(e.g.	Youssef,	Marwa,	Zied)	had	a	
positive	opinion	about	the	channels	because	they	considered	that	they	played	an	important	
role	 in	 raising	awareness	about	alleged	power	abuses	and	 turned	people’s	opinions	against	
the	government,	a	change	they	considered	positive.	Zied,	for	instance,	was	a	fan	of	the	Hiwar	
channel	and	its	owner	who,	for	him,	stood	for	the	opposition	under	Ben	Ali	and	continued	to	
do	 so	 after	 the	 revolution.	 He	 considered	 that,	 following	 the	 temporary	 detention	 of	 the	
channel’s	owner	by	authorities	in	August	2013103,	he	was	even	more	inclined	to	switch	on	the	
channel	“not	even	to	really	watch	it”,	but	“mostly	as	an	encouragement”.	At	the	extreme	end	
																																																						
103	The	channel’s	owner	Tahar	Ben	Hassine	was	temporarily	detained	for	incitement	to	civil	disobedience	during	a	broadcast	on	
his	channel	El	Hiwar	in	August	2013	(Smathi,	2013).		
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of	this	trend	was	Youssef,	who	felt	particularly	bitter	about	voting	for	Ennahdha	in	2011,	and	
thought	 that	 Tunisian	 television	 channels	 were	 in	 fact	 not	 sufficiently	 aligned	 with	 the	
opposition.	He	expressed	 the	wish	 for	 them	to	be	more	“like	 in	Egypt”	 to	“mobilise	people	
and	 fill	 the	 streets”.	However,	 in	 this	group,	 there	were	also	many	 respondents	who	had	a	
negative	opinion	about	the	role	of	Tunisian	television,	highlighting	that	it	was	too	politicised	
and	 biased	 towards	 the	 opposition,	 but	 they	watched	 it	 nevertheless,	 as	 they	 did	 not	 feel	
particularly	 positive	 about	 the	 government	 or	 leading	 parties	 (e.g.	 Sonia,	 Hanen,	 Narjes,	
Kamel).	 Paralleling	 the	boycott	of	what	participants	 in	 the	 first	 group	viewed	as	opposition	
media,	 a	 number	of	 respondents	 in	 this	 second	group	also	mentioned	 that	 they	 “disliked”,	
“refused	 to	 watch”	 or	 even	 “hated”	 televised	media	 outlets	 they	 considered	 to	 be	 biased	
towards	the	Ennahdha	party	and	the	government,	with	repeated	references	by	interviewees	
in	 this	 regard	 to	 the	 new	 Al	 Moutawasset	 channel	 and	 to	 Qatari	 broadcaster	 Al	 Jazeera.	
Opinions	about	Al	Moutawasset	were	particularly	negative	following	the	presentation	by	the	
channel,	 in	a	documentary	transmitted	shortly	before	I	conducted	the	interviews,	of	alleged	
extremists	 that	 were	 captured	 by	 security	 forces	 after	 a	 prolonged	 armed	 exchange,	 as	
innocent	people	on	a	treasure	hunt	and	erroneously	mistaken	for	terrorists104.	The	absurdity	
of	 this	 representation	 of	 events	 was	 referred	 to	 by	 several	 respondents	 in	 the	 group	 as	
evidence	of	the	channel’s	intended	manipulation	of	information	and	its	political	bias105.		
	
2.4. More	controlled	exposure	to	social	media	content	
	
The	use	of	social	media	and	exposure	to	 its	content	had	equally	changed	 in	2013.	As	noted	
earlier	in	this	chapter,	the	time	that	study	participants	spent	with	social	media	compared	to	
other	 media,	 decreased	 whereas	 time	 occupied	 by	 mass	 media	 use	 was	 higher	 in	 2013	
overall.	 This	 applied	 to	 Facebook	 as	 well	 as	 to	 Twitter.	 Participants,	 such	 as	 Anis,	 who	
preferred	Twitter	in	2012	because	he	regarded	it	as	a	more	exclusive	communicative	space,	
explained	that	this	was	no	longer	the	case	a	year	later	and	that	he	was	starting	to	encounter	
similar	issues	as	on	Facebook,	relating	to	the	spread	of	misinformation	and	the	polarisation	of	
opinions,	resulting	in	a	reduction	of	social	media	use	overall.		
	
Generally,	 social	 media’s	 role	 was	 framed	 as	 serving	 to	 access	 news,	 information	 and	
entertainment	content.	Despite	the	reduction	in	time,	 it	was	still	 important	for	the	majority	
																																																						
104	It	remains	unclear	whether	this	was	due	to	the	inexperience	of	the	channel’s	journalists	or	a	deliberate	attempt	to	misinform	
or	minimise	the	incident.	
105	Here	considered	by	respondents	as	biased	towards	Ennahdha	because	it	was	interpreted	as	an	attempt	to	minimise	the	
terrorist	threat	in	the	country.	
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of	respondents	to	use	social	media,	and	this	was	tied	to	the	need	to	access	news	through	the	
platforms.	 Although	 following	 events	 in	 the	 country	 was	 stressful,	 and	 despite	 increased	
awareness	 of	 the	 unreliability	 of	 some	 of	 the	 information	 they	 came	 across	 online,	 the	
majority	 of	 respondents	 continued	 to	 turn	 to	 social	 media	 to	 find	 out	 about	 the	 latest	
developments.	When	 I	 asked	 interviewees	 about	 their	 main	 reason	 for	 using	 Facebook	 or	
Twitter	 in	 2013,	most	 unequivocally	 associated	 this	 use	 to	 knowledge	of	 news	 and	 current	
affairs.	Much	of	 this	was	still	due	to	 the	rapidity	of	changes	 in	 the	socio-political	context	 in	
the	 country.	 By	 following	 numerous	 sources	 of	 information	 through	 their	 accounts,	 social	
media	users	were	able	 to	have	 instant	 access	 to	updates	where	and	when	 they	wished	 to,	
and	this	offered	a	sense	of	control	over	a	volatile	context	they	had	little	 influence	over,	but	
needed	to	form	an	understanding	of.	
	
However,	social	media	was	less	central	to	participants’	news	practices	in	the	autumn	of	2013	
than	 the	previous	 year	 and	 this	 tendency	 can	be	 tied	 to	 a	wish	 to	have	more	 control	 over	
content	 exposure.	 Participants	 were	 less	 reliant	 on	 social	 media	 as	 their	 main	 source	 of	
information.	 Instead,	 references	 to	 mass	 media	 as	 well	 as	 other	 online	 news	 websites	
featured	more	extensively	 in	 their	accounts.	Beyond	 issues	of	 reliability	of	 information	 that	
numerous	respondents	continued	to	complain	about,	 it	could	be	argued	that	the	decreased	
centrality	 of	 social	media	within	 their	 news	mix,	was	 related	 to	 the	more	widely	 observed	
tendency	to	manage	stress	levels	and	the	associated	wish	to	maintain	a	level	of	control	over	
their	 exposure	 to	 news	 and	 other	 types	 of	 content.	Unlike	 their	 use	 of	mass	media	where	
respondents	 were	 able	 to	 choose	 to	 switch	 away	 from	 specific	 channels,	 watch	 movie	
channels,	or	listen	to	a	radio	station	whose	balance	between	news	and	music	they	enjoyed,	
scrolling	through	their	social	media	newsfeeds	meant	more	exposure	to	unsolicited	content,	
including	news	and	socio-political	opinions,	at	times	when	they	did	not	necessarily	aim	to	do	
so.	As	a	result,	Imen	for	example,	not	only	reduced	her	use	of	social	media,	but	also	adapted	
it	 towards	more	 targeted	 news	 practices.	 Increasingly,	 she	 chose	 to	 visit	 specific	 Facebook	
pages	that	she	wished	to	consult,	instead	of	scrolling	through	her	newsfeed	as	she	previously	
did.	 Equally,	 Hanen,	 although	 still	 consulting	 her	 newsfeed,	 chose	 to	 ‘unlike’	 a	 number	 of	
Facebook	pages	she	was	following	in	order	to	regain	a	level	of	control	over	the	content	she	
was	exposed	to,	as	she	found	the	politicised	content	of	some	of	these	pages	was	causing	her	
more	anxiety.	The	fact	that	participants	also	spent	more	time,	overall,	accessing	online	sites	
other	 than	 social	media	 in	2013,	was	 also	 suggestive	of	 their	 increased	 inclination	 towards	
more	 targeted	 and	 manageable	 media	 content	 exposure.	 Indeed,	 whereas	 a	 number	 of	
respondents	had	equated	the	Internet	to	Facebook	in	2012,	or	referred	to	no	content	online	
219	
	
other	than	what	they	encountered	on	social	media,	their	descriptions	of	their	media	habits	in	
2013	indicate	that	they	spent	nearly	fifty	per	cent	more	time	on	other	websites	than	in	2012,	
and	they	listed	a	variety	of	online	news	sites	that	they	consulted	directly	rather	than	through	
their	social	media	accounts.	
	
Equally	 noteworthy	 is	 that	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 difference	 between	 supporters	 and	
opponents	 of	 governing	 parties	 in	 their	 change	 of	 social	 media	 habits	 between	 2012	 and	
2013.	It	could	have	been	hypothesised	that	respondents	who	felt	particularly	antagonised	by	
Tunisian	mass	media’s	 critique	 of	 government	 achievements,	 might	 have	 compensated	 by	
turning	more	often	to	social	media	platforms	in	order	to	connect	to	like-minded	perspectives,	
but	 this	 trend	 was	 not	 observed.	 Instead,	 interviewees	 on	 both	 sides	 indicated	 an	 overall	
reduction	in	the	time	dedicated	to	social	media	in	their	everyday	lives,	induced	by	fatigue	in	
processing	news	about	the	deterioration	of	the	situation	in	the	country	and	by	higher	levels	
of	 anxiety	 caused	 by	 this.	 There	 were	 three	 exceptions	 to	 this	 tendency	 (Raouf,	 Farah,	
Youssef),	 and	 of	 these,	 two	 were	 over	 the	 age	 of	 35	 and	 came	 relatively	 late	 to	 using	
Facebook,	which	may	 suggest	 that	 this	 increase	may	have	been	 related	 to	 a	 lower	 level	 of	
familiarity	with	the	platform	than	other	respondents,	and	a	less	pronounced	negativity	about	
their	experiences	of	using	social	media.	
		
2.5. A	polarising	social	media	sphere	
	
Social	media	use	was	perceived	as	particularly	stressful	for	two	other	reasons.	Related	to	the	
exposure	 to	unsolicited	 content	 discussed	 above	was	 the	 lack	of	 content	 filtering	on	 social	
media.	Six	respondents	complained	in	this	regard	about	the	circulation	of	distressing	imagery	
or,	at	times,	of	aggressive	discourse,	by	other	users	in	their	social	media	networks,	and	on	a	
larger	scale	than	what	they	had	encountered	on	other	media.	Sonia,	for	 instance,	explained	
that	 she	 reduced	her	use	of	 Facebook	because	of	 the	photographs	of	 terrorist	 attacks	 that	
she	came	across,	comparing	them	to	the	similar	images	she	had	seen	on	television	that	were	
pixelated.	
	
Furthermore,	 the	 polarisation	 of	 opinions	was	more	 apparent	 and	 less	 escapable	 on	 social	
media.	 Different	 opinions	 but	 also	 different	 representations	 of	 news	 and	 events	 were	
distributed	 in	 this	 space,	 and	when	 such	 content	 was	 shared	 by	 users	 in	 their	 network	 of	
contacts,	 it	 transmitted	a	message	not	only	about	 the	media	content	per	se,	but	about	 the	
perspective	and	alignment	of	the	transmitter	of	this	polarised	information.	This	also	signalled	
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to	a	social	media	user	to	what	extent	his/her	interpretations	were	reflective	of	a	more	widely	
held	perspective.	
	
Whilst	research	participants	were	less	inclined,	in	2013,	to	engage	in	political	interactions	on	
social	 media,	 when	 they	 did,	 exchanges	 tended	 to	 be	 more	 confrontational.	 Due	 to	 their	
previously	negative	experiences	and	arguments	with	others	in	their	social	media	networks,	a	
number	 of	 participants	 explained	 that	 they	were	more	 selective	with	what	 they	 publicised	
and	were	more	 likely	 to	express	 their	views	when	 they	considered	 that	an	 important	point	
needed	 to	 be	 made	 and	 defended.	 In	 this	 sense,	 respondents	 were	 exposed	 to	 more	
pronounced	or	strongly-held	opinions	and	there	was	less	possibility	for	exchange	in	a	middle-
ground	debate	than	the	previous	year.	As	Sonia	formulated	 it,	on	social	media	“there	[was]	
no	objectivity	at	all	any	more,	all	I	see	is	that	each	one	is	on	his	own	side”.	
	
Additionally,	 this	 space	 was	 more	 polarised	 in	 2013	 because	 participants	 were	 either	 less	
prepared	 to	 be	 exposed	 to	 antagonising	 perspectives,	 or	 less	 prepared	 to	 discuss	 their	
differences.	The	first	motivation	led	to	greater	selectivity	in	their	network	of	online	contacts	
in	 order	 to	 filter	 out	 or	 block	 drastically	 opposing	 perspectives.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Marwa,	 she	
explained	 that,	 on	 one	 hand,	 she	 did	 not	 witness	 too	 many	 arguments	 in	 her	 Facebook	
network	 any	 longer,	 and	 she	 interpreted	 this	 as	 a	 positive	 sign	 that	 pointed	 to	 a	 more	
consensual	 view	between	people	 in	 opposing	 the	 government	 and	 Ennahdha’s	 agenda.	On	
the	other	hand,	when	 I	enquired	about	 the	selection	of	her	 social	media	contacts,	 she	was	
keen	to	emphasise	that	she	made	more	radical	choices	than	before:	
	
For	 me,	 in	 my	 list	 of	 friends,	 I	 don’t	 approve	 people	 I	 don’t	 know,	 I	 don’t	 accept	 simple	
acquaintances,	but	people	I	know	and	whom	I	know	will	accept	me	as	I	am,	really,	yes.	I	mean	
it	happened	to	me	to	not	accept	people	that	I	knew	were	very	different	politically,	who	have	
different	 perceptions	 of	 politics	 and	 all	 that,	 especially	 after	 the	 murder	 of	 Chokri	 Belaid.	
Hmmm…	my	choice	of	friends	on	Facebook	has	become	very	categorical.	
	
Similarly,	Zied	suggested	that	he	no	longer	came	across	opinions	opposed	to	his	on	Facebook	
because	his	friends	who	supported	Ennahdha	were	“either	no	longer	friends	or	no	longer	for	
Ennahdha”.		
	
In	 the	 second	–	and	more	prevalent	–	 case,	 study	participants	opted	 to	maintain	a	 level	of	
variety	and	preserve	their	social	relations,	but	the	silence	this	necessitated	meant	that	more	
polarising	 political	 expressions	 tended	 to	 become	more	 visible,	 further	 contributing	 to	 this	
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reinforcement.	 Farah,	 for	 instance,	 who	 was	 particularly	 careful	 about	 making	 potentially	
alienating	 comments	 online,	 explained	 that	 she	 was	 encountering	 more	 “opinions	 [she]	
disagree[d]	with	or	 [got]	annoyed	by	 than	before”,	a	 change	she	 found	at	 times	difficult	 to	
avoid	reacting	to.	Youssef,	whose	network	of	online	contacts	included	very	different	political	
identifications	 was,	 as	 a	 result,	 exposed	 to	 opinions	 and	 news	 representations	 that	 were	
much	 contrasted.	 His	 reading	 of	 these	 differences	 was,	 however,	 very	 uncompromising:	
“Nidaa	people”	were,	in	his	opinion	“more	sincere”	whereas	“the	other	people	are	all	liars”,	
further	clarifying	that	“even	their	news	are	lies”.	By	contrast,	Rim,	who	supported	Ennahdha,	
also	 chose	 to	 maintain	 her	 social	 relations	 and	 not	 exclude	 friends	 whose	 opinions	 she	
disagreed	with.	However,	she	felt	extremely	antagonised	by	the	level	of	abusive	language	as	
well	 as	 by	 the	 perspectives	 she	 came	 across	 in	 her	 social	 media	 network,	 and	 she	 kept	
repeating	how	little	understanding	she	had	of	their	perspectives.	Whereas	in	2012,	she	held	a	
relatively	positive	opinion	about	 the	opportunities	provided	by	social	media	and	a	negative	
view	of	 journalists	who	 provided	 one-sided	 and	manipulative	 accounts	 of	 events,	 by	 2013,	
she	viewed	social	media	users	 in	her	network	as	similarly	biased.	The	opening	of	the	media	
field	 to	 the	 expression	 of	 opinion	 by	 ordinary	 citizens	 was,	 in	 this	 sense,	 becoming	 more	
problematic	 in	 that	 opinions	 of	 non-professional	 political	 commentators	 was	 even	 more	
subjective	and	alienating.	Similarly,	Yassine	considered	that:		
	
In	our	current	situation,	in	terms	of	Facebook	and	twitter	mmm…	I	feel	they	got	out	of…	for	
example	in	the	revolution,	they	were	the	cause,	they	helped	the	revolution	a	lot,	because	we	
didn’t	have	media	that,	I	mean,	were	with	the	youth	and	with	the	people	I	mean.	Now,	it’s	no	
longer	 the	 case,	 quite	 the	 opposite,	 you	 see	 that	 Facebook	 and	 Twitter	 are	 making	 the	
situation	more	tense	because	everyone	is	talking,	everyone	is	issuing	news	[…].	Now	Facebook	
and	Twitter	is	what	is	stressing	people	out.	
	
To	 summarise,	 the	 socio-political	 polarisation	 and	 the	 highly	 politicised	 media	 landscape	
translated	into	–	at	times	drastic–			changes	in	participants’	news	and	media	habits	in	2013.	
Exposure	 to	media	 content	 was	more	 targeted	 and	 geared	 towards	 relieving	 some	 of	 the	
anxieties	 caused	 by	 this	 unstable	 context.	 Respondents’	 need	 to	 stay	 informed	 about	 a	
rapidly	evolving	situation	was	 in	contrast	with	their	wish	to	avoid	exposure	to	news	and	an	
antagonistic	 political	 setting,	 leading	 to	 a	 level	 of	 ambiguity	 in	 respondents’	 relation	 to	
knowledge	about	 their	 shared	public	world.	Overall,	 respondents	 sought	more	exposure	 to	
entertainment-led	content	and	 they	 turned	to	media	 forms	 that	more	 readily	provided	 this	
access.	Whereas	average	time	spent	with	broadcast	media	in	their	everyday	lives	increased,	
time	 spent	 using	 social	media	 decreased.	 This	was	 partly	 explained	 by	 the	 level	 of	 control	
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over	 content	 exposure	 that	 mass	 media	 provided.	 Findings	 also	 indicated	 that	 changes	 in	
media	habits	were	 influenced	by	 the	polarisation	of	 the	 socio-political	 and	media	 contexts,	
but	that	these	further	reinforced	them.	Research	participants’	orientation	towards	different	
mass	media	outlets	were	closely	 tied	 to	political	orientations,	and	equally,	on	social	media,	
exposure	 to	 opposing	 viewpoints	 was	 more	 limited	 than	 in	 2012,	 and	 where	 it	 occurred,	
difference	 in	 interpretations	 and	 representations	were	 less	 tolerated.	 I	will	 now	 explore	 in	
more	detail	forms	of	political	communication,	interactions	and	participation	that	participants	
engaged	with	in	2013.	I	start	this	exploration	by	revisiting	the	case	of	some	participants	who	
were	active	in	formal	political	and	civil	society	organisations	in	the	autumn	of	2012.	
	
	
3. Political	and	mediated	participation	over	time	
	
Social	 media’	 participative	 dimension	 is	 often	 explored	 in	 relation	 to	 –	 or	 positioned	 as	
potential	 solution	 to	 -	a	 crisis	of	disengagement	and	alienation	 from	 institutional	politics	 in	
established	 western	 democracies.	 Equally,	 in	 less	 democratic	 contexts,	 social	 media’s	
participative	 opportunities	 raise	 hopes	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 possibilities	 they	 provide	 for	
alternative	 political	 movements	 to	 emerge,	 and	 for	 citizens’	 voice	 to	 become	 more	
pronounced.	As	discussed	in	chapter	5,	the	hypothesis	is	often	advanced	about	the	possibility	
of	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 form	 of	 politics	 online	 (Gibson	 and	 Cantijoch,	 2013)	 that	may	
provide	 an	 easier	 and	 more	 flexible	 frame	 for	 citizens’	 political	 expression,	 self-
representation,	and	the	organisation	of	new	forms	of	collective	action.		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 juxtaposition	of	 these	new	opportunities	with	 the	 realities	of	 formal	
political	 processes	 raises	 new	 questions	 about	 the	 relation	 between	 forms	 of	 political	
involvement	 online	 and	 offline	 (Vitak	 et	 al.	 2011),	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 citizens’	 sense	 of	
political	 efficacy	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 online	 activities	 over	 time.	 The	 notion	 of	 efficacy	
highlights	the	underlying	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	communicative	tie	between	citizens	and	
their	 governing	 institutions	 (Coleman	 et	 al.,	 2008),	 one	 that	 underpins	 their	 hope	 of	
producing	a	change	and	motivates	their	political	involvement	(Campbell	et	al.,	1954).	On	the	
one	hand,	it	may	be	argued	that	the	sense	of	empowerment	that	social	media	provides	users	
with,	or	the	facilitation	of	political	interactions	and	exchange,	may	support	their	politicisation	
and	progressively	mobilise	them	into	further	participation	and	involvement	in	formal	politics	
(e.g.	Valenzuela	et	 al.,	 2012).	On	 the	other	hand,	politicised	 social	media	use	 could	 further	
alienate	 from	party	 politics	 and	widen	 the	 gap	 between	 citizens	 and	 their	 representatives.	
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Vice	versa,	it	could	be	argued	that	political	contexts	affect	the	extent	to	which	people	tap	into	
new	media	opportunities	for	political	expression	and	action,	or	that	social	media	are	simply	
reflective	of	offline	political	contexts	and	levels	of	civic	and	political	engagement	offline.	Far	
from	a	simple	and	 linear	causal	 relationship,	 in	practice,	 these	questions	are	more	complex	
and	contingent	on	individual	settings.	
	
Overall,	research	is	currently	relatively	limited	about	what	it	means,	in	practice,	for	citizens	to	
be	 involved	 politically	 through	 these	 new	 communicative	 opportunities	 when	 decision-
making	 continues	 to	 be	 predominantly	 conducted	 through	 more	 traditional	 political	
processes	 and	 structures.	 In	 the	 British	 political	 context,	 Coleman	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 draw	 an	
ambiguous	 picture	 of	 citizens'	 Internet	 use	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 political	 efficacy.	 Their	 study	
highlights	the	continued	importance	of	local	settings	as	primary	sites	that	the	construction	of	
a	 sense	of	 efficacy	 relates	 to,	 and	 the	 continued	 relative	 centrality	of	 television	 to	political	
knowledge,	despite	the	availability	of	alternative	informational	resources	online.	At	the	same	
time,	 they	 also	 highlight	 a	 number	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 citizens'	 experience	 of	 democracy	 is	
benefited	by	political	 involvement	online.	In	particular,	they	highlight	the	importance	of	the	
symbolic	 repertoire	 and,	 at	 times,	 of	 'mundane'	 cues	 in	 undermining	 levels	 of	 public	
confidence	in	politics.	For	instance,	increased	exposure	to	images	of	politicians	can	widen	the	
gap	with	the	political	class	when	citizens	perceive	that	they	can’t	relate	to	them.	By	the	same	
token,	online	 interactions	can	support	connection	between	 like-minded	citizens	within,	and	
beyond,	their	local	context,	as	opportunities	to	tap	into	a	symbolic	repertoire	to	self-express	
and	to	communicate	solidarity	with	others,	are	facilitated.	
	
In	chapter	5,	I	highlighted	how,	within	a	Tunisian	context	that	was	already	highly	politicised,	
social	media	 further	extended	opportunities	 for	 communication	and	exchange	about	public	
and	political	matters,	and	how	it	equally	provided	a	sense	of	proximity	(albeit	with	low	levels	
of	 interactions)	 between	 social	 media	 users	 in	 this	 sample	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	
institutional	 political	 sphere.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 explore	 how	 the	 change	 in	 political	
context	 in	 2013	 relates	 to	 these	 respondents’	 sense	 of	 political	 efficacy	 and	 their	 levels	 of	
involvement	with	political	matters	on-	and	offline.	
	
3.1. Changes	in	participation	in	formal	politics	
	
It	 comes	 as	 no	 surprise	 that,	 in	 the	 uncertain	 context	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2013,	 research	
participants’	 disillusion	 with	 the	 revolution’s	 outcomes	 and	 with	 political	 pluralism	 were	
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more	 pronounced	 than	 a	 year	 earlier	 when	 I	 first	 met	 them.	 But	 the	 deterioration	 of	 the	
social,	economic	and	political	climate	more	generally	had	also	taken	its	toll	on	their	hope	for	
change	and	belief	in	their	ability	to	influence	it.	
	
The	reality	of	 involvement	with	organised	politics	was	not	a	particularly	easy	experience	for	
several	of	the	young	respondents	who	ventured	 into	participation	 in	formal	political	parties	
and	 civil	 society	 organisations.	 Out	 of	 the	 eight	 young	 interviewees	 new	 to	 this	 form	 of	
participation	 in	 2012,	 five	had	discontinued	 their	 activities	within	 these	 structures	 in	 2013.	
For	 some,	 this	was	 due	 to	 time	 constraints	 related	 to	 new	work	 and	 family	 commitments.	
This	was	the	case	for	Sarra,	for	instance,	who	had	campaigned	for	an	opposition	party	during	
the	elections	in	2011	and	found	no	time,	after	having	a	baby	in	2012,	to	further	contribute	in	
this	way.	Since	interviewing	her	in	2012,	Sarra	had	found	full-time	employment	and	was	even	
less	capable	of	committing	 to	any	other	 responsibilities.	However,	 for	most	Respondents	 in	
this	 group,	disengagement	was	primarily	 tied	 to	a	profound	 change	 in	 their	perspective	on	
the	sphere	of	politics	and	their	involvement	with	it.	Sihem,	for	example,	previously	a	staunch	
supporter	of	the	left	party	grouping	Jebha	Cha’bia	and	a	regular	attendee	of	its	meetings,	had	
become	disillusioned	by	the	political	decisions	and	discourse	adopted	by	 its	 leadership	over	
time,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 assassination	 of	 Belaid,	 whose	 criticism	 of	
Ennahdha	 she	 regarded	 as	 being	 among	 the	 sharpest	 and	most	 articulate	 of	 that	 from	 the	
opposition	 ranks.	 Nearly	 a	 year	 after	 his	 death,	 she	 was	 still	 feeling	 “traumatised”	 by	 the	
death	of	“Chokri”.	In	this	sense,	his	killing	also	silenced	a	unique	voice	in	the	political	sphere	
that	Sihem	identified	with	and	felt	she	was	on	first	name	terms	with.	Whilst	she	still	identified	
with	the	political	left	as	a	whole,	she	was	less	inspired	to	continue	her	political	involvement	
within	 the	 party	 after	 his	 passing.	 Sihem	 expressed	 her	 disappointment	 with	 the	 party	 as	
motivating	her	disengagement,	but	found	it	difficult	to	provide	more	details	and	preferred	to	
change	 subject.	 She	 continued	 to	participate	 in	occasional	 student	union	activities	 in	2013,	
but	was	 very	 critical	 of	 the	 infighting	 she	witnessed,	 and	 expressed	 a	 sense	 of	 exhaustion	
with	 the	 lack	 of	 consensus	 between	 different	 political	 factions	 in	 the	 union,	 that	 similarly	
undermined	 her	 involvement	 in	 this	 structure.	 Beyond	 her	 experience	 of	 politics	 through	
these	activities,	when	I	asked	her	what	had	changed	since	our	discussion	the	previous	year,	
she	expressed	a	more	profound	sense	of	hopelessness	with	the	political	sphere	in	general	as	
motivating	her	political	disaffection:	
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There	is	something	that	changed.	The	only	thing	that	really	changed	is	that...	I	am	not	at	all…	
with	 the	 same…	 I	mean,	 since	 last	 year	 I’m	no	 longer…	 the	energy	of	 last	 year	 is	no	 longer	
there.	Because	with	so	many	things	before,	with	the	revolution,	with	politics…	I	used	to	have	
hope.	Now	it’s	not…	I	distanced	myself	from	many	things.	
	
It	was	striking	that	respondents’	disillusion	with	political	participation	was	paralleled	at	both	
ends	of	 the	political	continuum.	Anis	and	Rim,	both	 formerly	active	members	of	Ennahdha,	
also	indicated	that	they	were	no	longer	participating	in	the	party.	Rim,	who	had	overcome	a	
number	of	obstacles	 to	act	on	her	wish	 to	 support	 Ennahdha	 (as	discussed	 in	 the	previous	
chapter)	 explained	 that	 her	 withdrawal	 was	 due	 to	 personal	 reasons	 as	 well	 as	 to	 time	
constraints.	Indeed,	after	failing	to	secure	the	renewal	of	a	temporary	position	she	had	found	
in	 2012,	 she	 felt	 under	 tremendous	 pressure	 to	 dedicate	 her	 time	 to	 finding	 new	
employment.	Her	situation	had	caused	her	much	distress,	but	she	also	reflected	on	her	non-
involvement	 as	 being	 related	 to	 a	 feeling	 of	 disillusionment	 with	 what	 she	 felt	 she	 was	
capable	of	achieving	politically:	
	
I'm	 still	 interested	 and	 I'm	 very	 scared	 about	 the	 future	 and	 I	 wish	 I	 was	 active	 and	 did	
something	about	it,	but	I	feel	like	my	hands	are	tied...	that	even	if	I	made	the	time	I	wouldn't	
manage	to	change	these	people's	minds??	
	
[What	people	are	you	referring	to?]	
Mmm...	the	people	who	don't	have	principles	[…].	I	get	the	impression,	and	maybe	I’m	wrong,	
but	I	have	the	impression	that	people	like	that	you	can’t	convince	them.	
	
The	 excerpt	 denotes	 how	 closely	 Rim	 connected	 her	 participation	 to	 a	 wish	 to	 influence	
others,	 and	 how	 her	 political	 ideals	 were	 tied	 to	 moral	 norms	 according	 to	 which	 she	
perceived	 the	 political	 game	 ought	 to	 be	 conducted.	 Even	 respondents	 such	 as	 Narjes,	 a	
teacher	who	did	not	identify	with	any	political	party,	but	experimented	with	participation	in	a	
union,	also	expressed	a	 similar	 sense	of	disillusionment	with	 the	 realities	of	action	 through	
such	structures:	
	
I	have	been	disappointed	by	my	experience	of	anything	to	do	with	collectiveness.	I	wanted	to	
have	 that	 experience,	 and…	 [ironic	 tone]	 I	 certainly	 got	 a	 real	 insight	 into	 it	 and	 saw	 how	
things	work	hah!	
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She	 described	 her	 initial	 motivation	 to	 participate	 as	 being	 bound	 up	 with	 a	 sense	 of	
patriotism	and	wanting	 to	 contribute	 to	 serving	 the	 country	 during	 the	 transitional	 period.	
However,	the	realities	of	political	involvement	eroded	this	initially	optimistic	position,	and	her	
experience	of	internal	dissension	during	the	election	of	new	union	representatives	eventually	
led	her	to	leave.	She	drew	the	following	conclusion	about	this	experience:	
	
From	that	point	onwards,	I	decided	that	if	there	was	anything,	if	there	is	the	slightest	hint	of	
power	games,	 then	no,	 I'm	not	getting	 involved,	and	 I	will	pursue	my	other	 [teaching]	work	
with	the	kids,	for	the	kids	from	now	on,	and	that's	all...	It	was	a	complete	mess.	
	
The	juxtaposition	of	her	political	experiences	with	her	teaching	is	perhaps	illustrative	of	how	
the	 sense	 of	 idealism,	 which	 originally	 underpinned	 her	 involvement,	 was	 subsequently	
shattered,	which	led	her	to	retreat	to	the	more	familiar	world	of	her	work	with	children.	
	
3.2. Distancing	from	the	political	sphere	
	
Disillusion	 with	 the	 political	 sphere	 was	 more	 generalised	 and	 not	 limited	 to	 respondents	
with	 experience	 of	 active	 participation	 in	 organisations	 and	 political	 structures.	 Overall,	
opinions	about	the	political	sphere	were	more	negative	than	in	2012,	and	at	times	a	hatred	or	
repulsion	 for	 political	 representatives	 and	 structures	 transpired	 through	 interviews.	 Being	
“fed	up	with	politics”	was	a	 recurrent	 comment	 in	over	half	of	 the	 interviewees’	 accounts.	
Many	even	referred	to	the	painful	physicality	of	witnessing	and	experiencing	politics	the	way	
they	had	over	the	previous	year.	Violence,	in	the	form	of	assassinations	of	politicians,	as	well	
as	in	the	level	of	aggression	and	verbal	abuse	in	political	discourse,	was	taking	its	toll	on	their	
bodies,	 triggering	depression	or	heightened	states	of	anxiety,	making	them	lose	appetite	or	
gain	weight	and	inducing	headaches	(P1,	P3,	P9,	P10,	P12,	P13,	P14,	P19,	P20,	P30).	Whilst	for	
some,	 like	 Kamal,	 disillusion	with	politics	was	 the	 result	 of	 a	more	 gradual	 disappointment	
with	particular	politicians	whose	points	of	view	he	could	no	longer	assimilate	to	his	personal	
perspective,	 for	 respondents	 such	 as	 Neila	 and	 Anis,	 politics	 more	 generally	 had	 become	
equated	with	 endless	 noisy	 arguments	 between	 politicians	 during	 televised	 debates.	Neila,	
for	 instance,	 expressed	 how	 this	 spectacle	 of	 politics	 had	 become	 indicative	 of	 a	 wider	
breakdown	of	communication	in	society,	concluding	that	“[politics]	has	split	us”.	Anis,	whilst	
equally	 associating	 a	 general	 political	 fatigue	 experienced	 by	 him	 and	 his	 friends	 with	 the	
failure	 of	 the	 political	 class	 to	 engage	 in	 more	 constructive	 dialogue,	 observed	 that	 many	
people	 in	 his	 entourage	 now	 resorted	 to	 avoiding	 involvement	 in	 political	 issues,	 instead	
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turning	 more	 of	 their	 attention	 back	 to	 football	 talk	 as	 in	 the	 pre-revolution	 days.	 More	
pronouncedly	critical,	Youssef,	who	expressed	a	distrust	of	the	political	class	after	regretting	
his	vote	for	Ennahdha	in	2011,	now	considered	that	parties,	irrespective	of	orientation,	were	
“all	 liars,	 they’re	 all	 thieves”,	 later	 explaining	 that,	 as	 a	 Tunisian	 citizen,	 he	 felt	 he’d	 “been	
robbed”	 and	his	mood	had	 “fallen	 flat”.	 Youssef’s	 analogy	 could	be	 seen	 to	mean	 that	 the	
political	sphere,	in	his	opinion,	had	denied	citizens	the	result	of	the	democratic	opportunities	
they	had	struggled	to	gain	during	the	revolution,	and	with	this,	they	had	also	been	deprived	
of	the	hope	they	invested	in	the	possibility	of	change	in	political	culture	and	future	prospects.	
Perhaps	most	bleakly	expressing	the	utter	failure	of	democratic	pluralism	was	Meriem	who,	
as	seen	in	the	previous	chapter,	had	invested	much	energy	and	meaning	in	participating,	on	
social	 media,	 in	 the	 expression	 of	 her	 position	 and	 identity	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 political	
landscape	in	the	country.	For	her,	dialogue	and	consensus	had	become	a	waste	of	time	and	
pragmatism	now	needed	to	prevail:	
	
The	thing	that	you	always	find	in	politics	is	that	the	multitude	of	ideas	is	always	blocking	the	
advancement	of	the	country.	Each	one	sees	that	his	idea	is	the	right	one.	But	then	you	don’t	
know	who’s	 right,	 it	 could	 be	 that	 I,	 you	 or	 someone	 else,	 we’re	 all	 right.	 But	 in	 the	 end,	
whose	way	is	the	fastest	one?	We	can’t	all	be	there	at	the	same	time,	only	one	of	us	has	to	
stay.	
	
For	the	majority	of	these	respondents	then,	the	vibrant	political	culture	that	emerged	in	the	
aftermath	 of	 the	 revolution	 was	 progressively	 dissipating	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 more	 distant	 and	
disengaged	relation	to	the	political	sphere	and,	at	times,	a	cynical	perspective	on	the	value	of	
pluralism.	Paralleling	this,	communication	and	exchange	about	political	issues	on	social	media	
equally	changed.	
	
3.3. Profile	images	over	time	
	
As	 illustrated	 in	 chapter	 5,	 the	 use	 of	 profile	 images	 was	 one	 way	 in	 which	 interviewees	
expressed	their	identification	with	particular	representations,	and	their	solidarity	as	Tunisian	
citizens	during	the	period	of	the	revolution	in	January	2011.	As	the	socio-political	 landscape	
in	Tunisia	became	 increasingly	polarised,	 so	did	 the	use	of	profile	avatars.	 Imagery	drawing	
on	the	Tunisian	flag	and	symbols	of	unity	changed	over	time,	either	to	personal	photos	or	to	
other	profile	images	that	reflected	divergent	socio-political	identifications.	To	illustrate	this,	I	
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have	included	a	chronology	of	profile	pictures	used	by	three	participants	at	different	points	of	
the	research	period106.	
	
	 	 	“Participant	1”																				“Participant	2”	 					“Participant	3”	
	
	 	 	 	
									
	
FIG.4:	Changes	in	participants’	use	of	profile	images	between	2011	and	2013	
	
	
As	illustrated	by	the	screenshots	of	profile	imagery	below,	all	three	participants	used	exactly	
the	same	image	of	the	‘solidarity	flag’	(discussed	in	chapter	5)	during	the	revolution	period	in	
January	2011.	By	February	2013,	Participant	3107	(right	hand	column),	switched	profile	picture	
to	a	photo	of	Chokri	Belaid,	when	the	politician	was	assassinated.	The	second	assassination	in	
July	2013	prompted	the	adoption	by	this	participant	of	a	black	screen	as	profile	image.	During	
the	ensuing	sit-in	and	protests	at	the	end	of	July,	a	third	image	was	used,	depicting	two	hands	
																																																						
106	I	have	only	used	a	selection	of	profile	images	here,	and	not	included	any	personal	photos	used	at	times	by	participants	for	
their	account	profiles.	
107	I	refer	to	participants	by	numbers	here	to	avoid	making	them	identifiable	and	linking	their	quotes	to	their	profile	images.	
2011	
	
2013	
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holding	a	black	sign	that	 read:	“the	people	want	 the	 fall	of	 the	regime”	 (bottom	right	hand	
corner).	 In	 this	 sense,	 through	 these	 evolving	 self-representations,	 this	 participant	
progressively	expressed	an	alignment	that	shifted	from	unity	with	other	citizens	against	the	
dictatorship	at	the	beginning	of	2011,	to	an	opposition	by	the	end	of	July	2013	-	articulated	as	
collective	opposition	in	the	name	of	the	Tunisian	people	-	to	the	transitional	government.	
	
Participant	1	(left	hand	column)	also	used	the	‘solidarity	flag’	image	in	early	2011.	However,	
over	time,	the	use	of	imagery	to	represent	the	user’s	profile	became	increasingly	articulated	
along	 religious	 lines,	 with	 a	 change	 –	 as	 illustrated	 above	 –	 to	 the	 photo	 of	 an	 Islamic	
preacher,	then	a	picture	related	to	an	online	campaign	in	support	of	Palestinian	prisoners	but	
later	a	return	to	the	religious	theme	with	the	adoption	of	an	image	of	Qur’anic	text	as	avatar	
(bottom	left	hand	corner).		
	
Participant	2,	in	the	middle,	continued	with	the	flag	theme	for	some	time,	using	an	image	of	
the	Tunisian	 flag	as	 the	background	 to	 the	photo	of	a	newborn	baby	and	 text	 reading	 “my	
name	is	freedom”.	Later,	this	participant	switched	image	to	a	mixed	Tunisian	and	Syrian	flag	
with	 the	 text	 “one	people	 against	 tyrants”.	 Finally,	 a	 photo	of	Ali	 Laaraydeth	 -	 the	 Islamist	
prime	minister	who	assumed	his	role	after	the	death	of	Belaid	-	was	uploaded,	an	image	that	
was	 part	 of	 a	 campaign	 in	 his	 support	 in	March	 2013	 following	 the	 resignation	 of	 former	
prime	 minister	 Hamadi	 Jebali.	 Thus,	 through	 this	 use	 of	 profile	 imagery	 participant	 2	
portrayed	an	alignment	in	support	of	the	Islamist	party	leadership	at	a	time	when	its	future	
was	in	question.	It	is	also	worth	noting,	that	the	political	assassinations	in	February	and	July	
2013	did	not	trigger	a	change	in	the	use	of	images	to	represent	their	profiles	on	Facebook	for	
participants	1	and	2,	unlike	the	case	for	participant	3.		
	
Similarly,	 an	 assessment	 of	 participants’	 social	 media	 accounts	 during	 these	 important	
turning	points,	 indicates	that	the	type	of	content	shared	by	participants	who	supported	the	
transitional	 government	 and	 those	 who	 opposed	 it,	 was	 notably	 contrasted.	 For	 example,	
following	the	political	assassination	in	February	2013,	a	number	of	opponents	shared	images,	
drawings,	photographs	and	video	footage	of	Belaid,	as	well	as	images	of	the	wife	and	children	
he	 left	behind.	A	 similar	pattern,	 though	on	a	 smaller	 scale	 could	be	observed	 in	 July	2013	
with	 the	death	of	politician	Mohammed	Brahmi.	By	 contrast,	 on	profiles	of	 government	or	
Ennahdha	supporters,	references	to	these	events	were	 less	prevalent.	Occasionally,	content	
that	more	 generally	 condemned	violence	was	 shared,	 but	no	 similar	 sharing	patterns	were	
observed	in	relation	to	images	or	representations	of	the	victims	or	their	families.	It	could	be	
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argued	that	this	trend	was	indicative	of	their	choice	not	to	opt	in	to	the	collective	gathering	
by	 other	 citizens	 around	 these	 representations.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 some	 participants	 who	
supported	 the	 government,	 similar	 image	 sharing	 patterns	 could	 be	 observed	 but	 these	
related	 instead	 to	 alternative	 images	 and	 representations	 of	 what	 they	 considered	 as	
important.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	two	participants,	imagery	was	shared	in	February	2013	
that	 related	 to	 the	 death	 of	 a	 policemen	 in	 the	 violent	 clashes	 that	 erupted	 after	 the	
assassination	of	Belaid.	By	choosing	to	transmit	photos	of	this	policeman	or	of	his	orphaned	
son	instead	of	the	wider	pattern	of	association	with	Belaid’s	death,	these	participants	could	
be	seen	to	advance	a	different	narrative	of	whom	sacrifice	in	the	name	of	the	wider	collective	
was	assimilated	to.		
	
3.4. Nodes	of	silence	
	
Whilst	 some	 respondents	 discontinued	 their	 participation	 in	 formal	 political	 structures	 and	
organisations,	others,	who	were	not	active	in	such	structures	(but	the	majority	of	whom	were	
involved	 in	 talking	 about	 public	 and	 political	 matters	 on	 social	 media)	 expressed	 a	 similar	
disaffection	with	 politics	 and,	 paralleling	 this,	 a	 relative	 reduction	 in	 communication	 about	
political	issues.	In	this	context	of	rising	tensions,	whilst	some	felt	no	longer	able	or	willing	to	
listen	 to	 diverging	 political	 opinions,	 many	 also	 chose	 to	 no	 longer	 participate	 in	 their	
expression	on	social	media.		
	
Noelle-Neuman’s	theory	of	the	spiral	of	silence	(1974)	asserts	that	individuals	are	inclined	to	
abstain	 from	 expressing	 their	 opinions	 if	 they	 perceive	 them	 to	 be	 at	 odds	with	 dominant	
public	opinion,	because	they	fear	being	socially	isolated	or	sanctioned.	Studies	exploring	the	
translation	 of	 this	 theory	 to	 online	 environments	 have	 led	 to	 different	 and,	 at	 times,	
contradictory	findings.	Opportunities	to	communicate	anonymously,	and	to	find	like-minded	
individuals	 in	 online	 settings,	 may	 partially	 counter-act	 the	 limitations	 to	 political	 opinion	
expression	offline	(e.g.	Hwang	et	al.,	2006;	Ho	and	McLeod,	2008).	However,	recent	research	
into	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 theory	 to	 online	 social	 networking	 sites	 has	 quite	 starkly	
highlighted	that	features	of	this	theory	can	be	observed	in	such	communicative	environments	
(Lee	and	Kim,	2014;	Neubaum	and	Krämer,	2016),	and	that	the	spiral	of	silence	may	even	be	
reinforced	on	social	media	(Hampton	et	al.,	2014).		
	
Indeed,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	mediation	of	opinions	through	social	media’s	networked	
architecture,	may	alter	users’	perspectives	on	what	the	dominant	opinion	is,	and	shape	their	
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understanding	 of	 how	 reflective	 their	 personal	 views	 are	 of	 a	 general	 public	 mood.	 As	 a	
result,	users	may	be	more	 inclined	 to	converge	 towards	concurring	opinions,	and	 they	may	
feel	 more	 supported	 in	 their	 views	 and	 express	 these	 more	 forcefully.	 This	 may	 in	 turn	
undermine	 the	 willingness	 of	 others	 to	 express	 difference,	 and	 it	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	
reinforcement	of	opposing	opinion	networks.	
	
At	 the	same	time,	while	existing	empirical	 research	on	 the	spiral	of	 silence	on	social	media	
(ibid)	 has	 established	 that	 users	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 refrain	 from	 openly	 expressing	 their	
opinions	on	social	media	than	in	a	face-to-face	context,	it	provides	relatively	limited	insights	
into	 the	 underlying	motivations	 and	 dynamics	 underpinning	 these	 choices.	 For	 instance,	 it	
remains	 unclear	 to	 which	 extent	 ‘silence’	 on	 social	 media	 specifically	 relates	 to	 minority	
opinions,	 or	 to	 political	 matters	 more	 generally.	 It	 may	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 opinions	
expressed	on	social	media	are	not	 reflective	of	a	dominant	public	opinion,	but	 rather	of	an	
opinionated	minority.	Furthermore,	from	a	different	perspective,	it	could	also	be	argued	that,	
rather	 than	 fear	 of	 isolation	 -	which	 implies	 a	 level	 of	 involuntary	 submission	 –	 individuals	
may	be	actively	developing	strategies	to	manage	their	online	identities	and	reputations.		
	
Eliasoph	(1997,	1998)	highlights,	in	the	American	context,	that	the	avoidance	of	political	talk	
needs	 to	be	understood	as	part	of	 a	 culture	 that	delineates	 the	 terms	under	which	people	
ought	to	participate	in	opinion	expression.	Under	this	perspective,	the	avoidance	of	politics	is	
not	 a	 spontaneous	 occurrence,	 but	 in	 fact	 it	 requires	 active	work	 and	 the	 investment	 of	 a	
conscious	effort	by	citizens	to	manage	the	conditions	for	political	opinion	exchange.	Crucially,	
Eliasoph	 points	 to	 the	 difference	 between	 political	 talk	 in	 public	 and	 private.	 In	 her	
ethnographic	research,	concerned	with	offline	political	talk	by	political	activists,	she	highlights	
how	people	actively	avoid	talking	about	politics	in	public,	but	increasingly	engage	in	such	talk	
the	more	private	the	context	for	conversation	is.	In	doing	so,	Eliasosph	contends	that	citizens	
actively	reproduce	a	specific	political	culture	and	citizens’	place	within	it.	
	
In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 study,	 the	majority	 of	 participants	who	 previously	 used	 social	media	
platforms	 to	 communicate	 about	 public	 and	 political	matters	 indicated	 that	 their	 activities	
had	significantly	decreased,	and	data	drawn	from	their	online	accounts	confirmed	this	trend.	
This	was	 the	 case	 for	users	of	 Facebook,	 as	well	 as	 for	 respondents	 such	as	Anis,	who	had	
progressively	migrated	 to	Twitter,	because	he	deemed	 its	users	more	 inclined	 to	engage	 in	
constructive	debate.	He	indicated	in	2013	that	similar	issues	were	now	arising	on	both	social	
networking	 sites.	 Approximately	 half	 of	 the	 participants	 whose	 use	 of	 social	 media	 had	
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changed	since	2012	explained	that	they	had	reduced	their	activity	overall	and	their	sharing	of	
content	 on	 their	 social	 media	 profiles.	 The	 others	 indicated	 that,	 although	 they	 had	 not	
reduced	 their	 social	 media	 use,	 the	 type	 of	 content	 they	 exchanged	 was	 less	 related	 to	
political	 matters	 than	 before,	 focusing	 on	 less	 contentious	 content	 instead	 such	 as	 music	
videos,	personal	photographs,	football	results,	celebrity	quotes,	poems,	funny	animal	videos	
or	jokes.		
	
Overall,	political	exchange	on	the	platform	was	more	 limited	than	 in	2012	and	two	reasons	
were	referred	to	as	motivating	this	change.	Notably,	their	sense	of	political	inefficacy	was	one	
important	 factor.	 The	 increased	 distance	 from	 the	 political	 sphere	 that	 respondents	
perceived,	 and	 their	 inability	 to	 influence	 political	 opinions	 and	 outcomes,	 contributed	 to	
dissociating	their	expression	and	sharing	practices	on	the	platform	from	the	goals	some	had	
previously	said	had	propelled	them	into	action	online	(as	seen	in	the	previous	chapter).	Zied,	
for	 instance,	 previously	 enthusiastic	 about	 contributing	 with	 his	 opinions	 and	 mocking	
politicians,	 despite	 some	of	 the	 hurtful	 reactions	 he	 felt	 subjected	 to,	 now	 considered	 this	
type	of	social	media	activity	as	pointless	because	“if	I	participate	or	don’t	participate,	it’s	not	
going	to	change	anything”.	Narjes,	in	turn,	who	had	associated	a	sense	of	patriotism	with	her	
political	 contributions	 and	 the	 need	 to	 raise	 public	 awareness	 about	 specific	 issues,	 now	
emphasized	the	helplessness	she	felt	in	confronting	developments	in	the	country:	“when	you	
see	 things	 happening	 and	 you	 can	 do	 nothing	 about	 it,	 you	 are	 like…	 with	 no	 arms,	
disarmed”,	 concluding	 that	 the	 way	 she	 used	 Facebook	 was	 now	 limited	 to	 maintaining	
contact	with	 people	 in	 her	 network.	 Concisely	 encapsulating	 the	 change	 in	 her	 attitude	 to	
using	 Facebook,	 is	 the	 following	 stark	 contrast	 between	 what	 she	 said	 about	 her	 sharing	
habits	in	2012:	
	
It’s	 mainly	 to	 give	 an	 opinion,	 why	 things	 aren’t	 working,	 why	 things	 are	 blocked	 […].	
Sometimes	you	want	to	motivate	people,	to	try	to	find	a	solution	together,	what	have	we	got	
to	 lose?	 If	 everyone	 sees	 what’s	 wrong	 and	 stays	 silent,	 no.	 At	 some	 point	 you	 think	 it’s	
necessary	that	everyone	moves	on	all	sides	so	that	there’s	a	collective	solution.	
	
…	and	in	2013:	
	
I	 don’t	 expect	 anything	 to	 come	 from	 it.	 This	 story	 of	 a	 Facebook	 revolution,	 it’s	 an	 empty	
story	[h’keya	fergha]108.”	
																																																						
108	“Empty	story”	is	the	literal	translation	of	a	Tunisian	expression	that	means	‘meaningless’	or	‘insignificant’.	
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It	needs	to	be	noted	that,	overall,	the	decrease	in	politically-related	social	media	activity	was	
gradual	 but	 not	 linear	 for	 most	 research	 participants.	 Moments	 of	 heightened	 crisis	
continued	to	trigger	a	surge	 in	activity	 for	many	of	 them,	as	had	already	been	noted	about	
trends	over	the	previous	year.	However,	with	each	renewed	crisis,	the	threshold	of	what	was	
considered	 as	 news-	 and	 discussion-worthy	was	 redefined,	 and	 a	 gradual	 surrender	 to	 the	
language	of	crises	and	violence	as	normal	reframed	this	communicative	space.	Sonia	captures	
this	quite	effectively:	
	
I’m	still	using	Facebook,	now	less…	From	reaching	such	a	level	of	disappointment…	You	know,	
with	there	being	more…	the	political	assassinations,	then	I	was	using	it	a	lot,	a	lot,	a	lot.	And	
after	you	know,	you	have	the	 first	assassination,	 then	the	second,	 then	the	army	and	so	on	
and	 so	 on,	 and	 then	 you’re	 fed	 up	 and	 your	 mood	 gets	 low	 so	 in	 my	 case	 I	 reduced	 it,	 I	
reduced.	
	
A	 second	 factor	 is	 also	 crucial	 to	 understanding	 the	 change	 in	 use	 of	 social	 media	 in	 this	
context.	Communicating	about	public	and	political	matters	had,	as	already	highlighted	in	the	
previous	 chapter,	 undermined	 participants’	 ability	 to	 socialise	 and	 led,	 when	 opinions	
differed,	 to	 numerous	 arguments	 and	 disagreements	 that	 were	 difficult	 to	 manage.	 This	
trend	 was	 further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 heightened	 socio-political	 context	 in	 2013.	
Respondents	 not	 only	 perceived	 no	 positive	 influence	 or	 outcome	 of	 their	 activities,	 but	
encountered	 many	 negative	 consequences	 as	 a	 result,	 and	 this	 gradually	 reinforced	 a	
preference	for	the	avoidance	of	political	talk	and	communication	on	social	media.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 study,	 interviewees	 commented	 on	 the	 reinforcement	 of	 political	
opinions	in	their	entourage,	with	those	whose	views	sided	with	the	governing	parties,	as	well	
as	 their	 opponents,	 becoming	 increasingly	 entrenched	 in	 their	 positions,	 leading	 to	 more	
strident	 confrontations	 and	 arguments	 online.	 Tolerance	 of	 different	 opinions	 was	 now	
lower,	and	there	was	a	stronger	sense	that	social	media	was	reinforcing	divisions	because	it	
opened	debate	to	users	with	all	levels	of	political	knowledge	and	perspectives.		
	
The	 interview	outcomes	 in	2013	 thus	 crucially	 highlight	how	most	of	 the	 respondents	who	
reduced	 communication	 about	 political	 issues	 on	 social	media,	 still	 participated	 in	 political	
opinion	exchange	offline	and	relatively	more	private	contexts.	The	ambiguous	private-public	
nature	 of	 the	 social	 media	 environment,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 control	 over	 the	 mediation	 of	
political	expression	within	it,	translated	into	a	more	strategic	approach	by	these	respondents	
to	political	communication	and	interaction	on	social	media.	Yassine,	for	example,	continued	
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to	engage	in	conversations	about	politics	with	some	of	his	friends	in	cafés,	but	not	on	social	
media.	 He	 thought	 that	 “Facebook	 and	 Twitter	 [were]	making	 the	 situation	more	 stressful	
because	 everyone	 [was]	 talking”	 and	 “there	 [were]	 people	 who	 [didn’t]	 use	 their	 brains”.	
Similarly,	Rim	also	adapted	her	use	of	social	media	after	losing	her	temper	on	a	few	occasions	
on	social	media.	She	opted	to	“avoid	discussions”	with	people	opposing	Ennahdha	as	she	had	
lost	 numerous	 contacts	 from	 her	 Facebook	 network	 already.	 She	 was	 eager,	 however,	 to	
clarify	that	she	still	considered	a	face-to-face	context	suitable	for	such	conversations.	Sihem,	
who	was	previously	very	vocal	in	her	political	expression	and	her	criticism	of	Ennahdha,	had	
also	 paid	 a	 price	 for	 this,	 losing	 contact	 with	 numerous	 friends	 and,	 on	 a	 few	 occasions,	
deeply	regretting	it.	In	a	reversal	of	the	logic	that	accompanied	the	start	of	her	participation	
in	political	 communication	 (see	previous	chapter),	 it	was	now	silence	and	withholding	 from	
this	type	of	expression	online	that	required	careful	consideration	for	Sihem:	
	 	
I	started	to	think	a	lot	about	what	I	share	and	don’t	share,	a	lot	I	mean!	Like	recently,	I	was	close	to	
sharing	a	status	update	that	could	have	led	me	to	ruin!	But	you	see,	I	thought	about	it	a	lot,	and	I	
asked	the	opinion	of	my	friend	who	was	next	to	me	about	whether	to	share	it	or	not	to	share	it,	
and	I	didn’t.	
	
The	negative	outcome	of	interactions	between	social	media	users	of	opposing	socio-political	
opinions	 led	 to	 more	 limited	 communication	 between	 them	 over	 time.	 The	 language	 of	
violence	and	abuse	that	had	marked	the	public	and	political	spheres	over	the	previous	year	
partly	 contributed	 to	Narjes’	 changed	perspective	about	 the	benefits	of	 Facebook	as	a	 tool	
for	the	expression	of	public	opinion	and	convergence	of	a	collective	will.	Changes	in	the	use	
of	Facebook	to	communicate	about	political	and	public	matters	was	even	starker	in	the	case	
of	 Meriem	 who	 preferred	 to	 de-activate	 her	 social	 media	 account	 in	 2013	 rather	 than	
continue	to	be	involved	in	further	arguments	online.	She	explained	that	this	was	because	she	
felt	 too	 angry	 when	 she	 read	 some	 of	 the	 opinions	 of	 her	 network	 contacts	 online	 and	
preferred	to	keep	them	as	friends	offline	where	political	topics	could	be	more	easily	avoided.	
Coincidentally,	 it	 was	 just	 as	 I	 was	 conducting	 the	 interview	with	Meriem	 that	 one	 of	 her	
friends	called	on	her	mobile	phone,	thinking	that	Meriem	had	‘unfriended’	her,	because	she	
could	no	longer	find	her	profile	among	her	contacts	on	Facebook.	As	a	result,	Meriem	had	to	
reassure	her	friend	that	this	was	not	the	case	and	to	explain	her	absence	from	social	media.	
This	was	starkly	illustrative	of	the	politics	of	connectivity	(Van	Dijck,	2012),	and	of	some	of	the	
difficulties	that	these	participants	encountered	in	negotiating	a	coherent	social	and	political	
identity	on-	and	offline.	
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Conclusion	
	
Interviews	 in	 2013	 highlighted	 media’s	 reinforcement	 of	 the	 intensifying	 socio-political	
polarisation	 in	 Tunisia	 in	 2013.	 Exposure	 to	 media	 content	 paralleled	 respondents’	
identification	with	different	sides	of	the	political	sphere	that	were	further	reflected	in	a	highly	
politicised	 media	 landscape.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 chapter	 drew	 on	 the	 distinction	 –	 used	
throughout	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis	 -	 between	 the	 use	 of	 social	 media	 for	 exposure	 to	
news	and	media	content	on	one	hand,	and	for	communicative	participation	in	a	public	sphere	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	 differences	 in	 the	 positions	 adopted	 by	 research	
participants	 in	their	social	media	use	over	time.	 In	doing	so,	 I	have	sought	to	emphasise,	 in	
particular,	 how	 respondents’	 acting	 on	 the	 participative	 opportunities	 provided	 by	 social	
media	is	tied	to	both	their	perception	of	their	political	weight	as	citizens,	as	well	as	to	their	
need	 to	 socialise	 in	a	 context	where	communicating	politically	was	becoming	more	divisive	
and	 arguments	 more	 difficult	 to	 avoid.	 Over	 time,	 these	 factors	 engendered	 a	 significant	
intentional	reduction	 in	respondents’	participation	 in	communication	and	 interaction	 in	this	
politicised	social	media	sphere,	a	change	that	saw	them	increasingly	adopt	the	position	of	a	
social	media	audience	rather	than	that	of	a	networked	public.		
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CONCLUSION	
	
	
This	 thesis	 aimed	 to	 explore	 the	political	 dimensions	of	 everyday	 social	media	practices	by	
ordinary	users.		A	core	focus	was	the	ways	in	which	social	media	may	mediate	a	relationship	
between	users	and	their	wider	public	and	political	world.		This	mediation	was	explored	with	
regard	 to	users’	knowledge	and	conception	of	 these	public	and	political	 spheres,	as	well	as	
their	engagement	with	and	participation	in	them.	To	achieve	this,	the	research	focused	on	a	
context	 in	which	 social	media	was	 claimed	 to	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 supporting	
revolutionary	 movements,	 and	 in	 which	 much	 was	 open	 to	 civic,	 social	 and	 political	
renegotiation	 after	 the	 revolution.	 Thus,	 this	 was	 a	 context	 in	 which	 social	 media	 was	
potentially	to	continue	playing	an	important	public	role.	
	
Social	 media	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 numerous	 social	 movements	 and	 considered	 as	 radically	
transformative	and	disruptive	of	political	processes	over	recent	years	in	a	number	of	national	
and	 transnational	 settings.	 The	 growth	 of	 social	 media	 has	 challenged	 the	 theorisation	 of	
established	 frameworks	 on	 media	 power.	 However,	 academic	 research	 is	 still	 at	 an	 early	
stage,	and	more	empirical	evidence	 is	 required	to	better	understand	how	social	media	may	
shape	existing	power	structures	and	in	turn	be	appropriated	in	different	ways,	and	in	varying	
settings,	by	users	to	challenge	or	reinforce	existing	notions	of	how	power	is	distributed	across	
society	and	the	place	of	citizens	within	a	given	socio-political	order.	
	
More	 in-depth	 and	 contextualised	 exploration	 of	 these	 questions	 particularly	 matters	
because	 traditional	 politics	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 crisis	 in	 established	 democratic	 settings,	
where	 engagement	 levels	 and	 involvement	 in	 political	 processes	 are	 low.	 Against	 this	
backdrop,	 social	media	 seem	 to	 offer	 new	 possibilities	 for	 participation	 that	 are	 politically	
transformative,	 and	 to	 be	 ushering	 in	 a	 new	 era	 of	 politicisation	 and	 activism,	 especially	
among	 younger	 generations	 that	 previously	 appeared	 to	 be	 particularly	 distant	 from	 such	
matters.	 Equally,	 many	 questions	 and	much	 uncertainty	 continue	 to	 revolve	 around	 social	
media’s	role	and	political	potential	in	parts	of	the	Arab	world,	where,	on	the	one	hand,	social	
networking	 sites	appeared	 to	be	prominent	 contributors	 to	 social	movements	 in	2011,	and	
yet,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 new	media’s	 place	 in	 social	 and	 political	 developments	 since	 have	
been	more	difficult	to	grasp.		
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The	 research	 in	 this	 thesis	 provided	 a	 detailed	 empirical	 exploration	 of	 these	 issues	 in	 the	
Tunisian	context	in	which	the	Arab	uprisings	started,	yet	that	has	been	under-explored	since.	
It	 sought	 in	 particular	 to	 contribute	 towards	 addressing	 some	 of	 these	 uncertainties	 by	
assessing	 the	practices,	motivations	and	experiences	of	ordinary	 social	media	users	 in	 their	
everyday	 lives	over	a	 time	period	stretching	 from	pre-	 to	post-revolution,	 in	order	 to	 try	 to	
capture	 politicisation	 and	 de-politicisation	 processes	 in	 detail	 by	 utilising	 people’s	 own	
reflections	on	their	relationship	to	new	and	old	media	within	these	processes.	Furthermore,	
this	study	sought	 to	provide	a	holistic	and	contextualised	exploration	of	 these	questions	by	
assessing	online	actions	in	relation	to	their	offline	setting;	new	media	practices	in	relation	to	
traditional	media;	different	facets	of	activities	on	social	media	in	relation	to	each	other;	and	
by	looking	at	the	development	of	these	relations	over	time.	
	
The	remainder	of	this	concluding	reflection	provides	a	summary	of	empirical	findings,	and	a	
discussion	of	key	emergent	themes	for	further	exploration	and	debate.	
	
	
Summary	of	findings	
	
Chapter	 3	 traced	 the	 change	 in	 media	 habits	 and	 practices	 induced	 by	 the	 revolution.	 In	
particular,	it	focused	on	media’s	role	in	supporting	a	shared	knowledge	and	understanding	of	
socio-political	 reality.	 Findings	 indicated	 that,	 in	 the	 highly	 censored	 informational	 context	
before	the	revolution,	study	participants	shared	a	common	knowledge	of	the	undemocratic	
nature	of	the	political	regime	they	were	living	under,	of	its	pervasive	surveillance,	and	of	the	
norms	 of	 silence	 related	 to	 political	 expression	 and	 engagement	 in	 public	 as	 well	 as,	 to	 a	
lesser	 extent,	 in	 private	 spaces.	 National	 media	 played	 an	 integral	 part	 in	 sustaining	 this	
knowledge	 by	 projecting	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 social	 and	 political	 world	 that	 was	
unchanging	and	removed	from	interviewees’	daily	experiences.	In	doing	so,	it	reiterated	the	
maintenance	 of	 the	 political	 status	 quo	 and	 enforced	 citizens’	 disconnection	 and	
disengagement	from	political	matters.	Similarly	to	other	authoritarian	contexts,	interviewees	
developed	 relatively	 complex	 audience	 positions	 and	 strategies	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 media	
landscape.	 The	 exploration	 of	 their	 perspectives	 on	 their	 media	 practices	 before	 the	
revolution	 highlighted	 that	many	 of	 them	were	 quite	 ambivalent	 towards	 domestic	media	
and	 news	 consumption	 as	 it	 was	 nevertheless	 tied	 to	 important	 social	 dimensions,	 linking	
them	to	shared	habits	and	routines,	as	well	as	informing	them,	in	a	sense,	about	the	lack	of	
change.	 Although	 new	 and	 social	 media	 offered	 opportunities	 to	 bypass	 this	 national	
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informational	 vacuum,	 their	 use	 by	 the	 study	 participants,	 prior	 to	 the	 revolution,	 mainly	
reflected	 these	 norms	 of	 disengagement.	 The	 regime	was	 relatively	 effective	 in	 controlling	
online	content	access	within	the	country	and	limiting	the	proliferation	of	dissenting	content.	
Access	to	alternative	sources	was	relatively	difficult,	and	many	people	lacked	the	motivation	
and	skills	to	overcome	the	level	of	risk	and	effort	involved	in	adopting	a	more	politicised	use	
of	new	media	overall.	
		
This	 situation	 drastically	 changed	 during	 the	 revolution	 period	 as	 social	 media	 became	 an	
important	source	of	alternative	 information	and	user-generated	content	 in	 the	context	of	a	
crisis	in	which	national	mass	media	failed	to	address	citizens’	heightened	informational	needs	
and	 continued	 to	 serve	 instead	 as	 a	 mouthpiece	 for	 the	 regime.	 The	 research	 findings	
underlined	 how	 the	 change	 in	 participants’	 media	 practices	 –and	 in	 particular	 the	 turn	 to	
more	politicised	social	media	use	–	was	tied	to	a	more	gradual	shift	in	their	perspective	about	
the	 possibility	 of	 change,	 and	 to	 an	 understanding	 that	 the	 political	 status	 quo,	 and	 their	
enforced	 disengagement,	 were	 no	 longer	 sustainable.	 This	 change	 in	 perspective	 was	 not	
simply	 the	 result	 of	 mediated	 knowledge	 about	 the	 protests	 and	 their	 repression.	 Direct	
experience	and	witnessing	of	the	changing	environment	in	people’s	daily	lives	often	marked	
important	 turning	 points	 in	 this	 process,	 augmented	 by	 a	 sense	 of	 disconnection	 from	 a	
public	world	 in	 turmoil.	 In	 this	 context,	 social	media	 platform	Facebook	became	 important	
both	as	a	source	of	 information	as	well	as	a	 form	of	re-connection	between	citizens.	 It	was	
closely	associated,	in	interviewees’	accounts,	to	a	narrative	of	civic	empowerment,	to	which	
national	mass	media,	associated	with	the	regime,	were	opposed.	
	
Chapter	4	followed	on	from	the	previous	findings	to	assess	how	participants	navigated	across	
the	changed	informational	landscape	that	emerged	after	the	revolution,	and	examined	social	
media’s	place	within	their	everyday	media	practices	towards	the	end	of	2012.		
	
The	 findings	 highlighted	 how	 much	 importance	 research	 participants	 placed	 on	 being	
knowledgeable	 and	 informed	 about	 the	 new	 socio-political	 context	 they	 lived	 in.	 This	 was	
associated	with	a	new	conception	of	civic	duty	and	to	the	adoption	of	new	civic	identities	that	
marked	a	radical	break	with	the	past.	Equally,	being	 informed	was	motivated	by	a	renewed	
sense	 of	 hope,	 and	 by	 respondents’	 awareness	 of	 their	 own	 political	 weight,	 which	 was	
prompted	by	the	revolution.	Furthermore,	closely	following	the	news	allowed	users	to	keep	
up	 with	 relatively	 complex	 and	 rapidly-evolving	 political	 developments,	 and	 become	
acquainted	with	new	public	and	political	 figures	after	the	revolution.	Most	significantly,	 the	
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findings	highlighted	how	being	political	and	expressing	political	opinions	was	part	of	a	new	
political	culture	that	emerged	after	the	revolution.	Thus,	knowledge	about	public	and	political	
matters	 was	 important	 in	 order	 to	 take	 part	 in	 this	 culture	 and	 served	 as	 an	 important	
resource	for	conversation	and	everyday	socialisation.	
	
The	 research	 established	 that	 participants’	 media	 practices	 were	 consequently	 primarily	
aimed	at	fulfilling	these	heightened	informational	needs.	Social	media	featured	prominently	
within	these	practices	and	occupied	a	central	role	in	participants’	daily	media	habits.	This	was	
in	particular	due	to	the	rapidity	with	which	users	were	able	to	access	information,	which	was	
not	 reflected	 in	 the	 traditional	 mass	 media.	 The	 instantaneity	 of	 information	 access,	 the	
quasi-live	quality	they	associated	with	social	media’s	representation	of	socio-political	reality,	
lent	 it	a	sense	of	proximity	and	connection	to	other	citizens	and	to	 issues	 that	mattered	to	
them	collectively,	and	which	they	could	participate	in	shaping.	
		
At	the	same	time,	the	findings	in	this	chapter	highlighted	that	participants	in	this	study	also	
experienced	a	level	of	difficulty	in	orienting	themselves	among	the	variety	of	information	and	
sources	 available	 to	 them	 after	 the	 revolution	 online	 and	 offline.	 Whilst	 respondents	
expressed	high	expectations	of	media	objectivity	and	journalistic	neutrality,	they	considered	
that	 these	 expectations	 remained	 largely	 unfulfilled.	 However,	 within	 a	 highly	 politicised	
transitional	 context	 that	 was	 gradually	 becoming	 more	 polarised,	 these	 expectations	
contrasted	 with	 their	 own	 orientations	 towards	 (traditional	 and	 new)	 media	 outlets	 and	
sources	that	reflected	their	own	opinions,	and	their	avoidance	–	at	times	even	boycott	of	–	
sources	of	different	views	and	opposing	perspectives.	The	findings	outlined	the	role	played	by	
diverging	 conceptions	 of	 trust	 in	 shaping	 this	 media	 exposure.	 This	 trend	 was	 particularly	
pronounced	online,	in	particular	as	the	social	media	space	became	increasingly	compromised	
by	 the	 proliferation	 of	 rumours,	 misinformation	 and	 highly	 biased	 and	 contrasting	
representations	 of	 events.	 There	was	 a	marked	 lack	 of	 diversity	 of	 opinions	 in	 the	 content	
that	 participants	 seemed	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 through	 their	 social	 media	 accounts.	 Trust,	
personal	judgement	and	political	opinion	were	found	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	level	of	
credibility	 that	 participants	 associated	 with	 mediated	 information	 and	 news	 content	 they	
came	 across	 online	 as	 well	 as	 offline.	 Journalistic	 authority	 was	 regarded	 as	 secondary,	 in	
many	 respondents’	perspectives,	 to	 these	 factors.	The	 resultant	uncertainty	 that	emanated	
from	these	issues,	was	particularly	apparent	in	relation	to	social	media	content,	and	it	led	to	
the	 development	 of	 a	 number	 of	 verification	 strategies	 by	 users,	 in	 which	 the	 source	 of	
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distribution,	 rather	 than	 source	of	 information,	 appeared	 to	be	more	 significant	 in	 shaping	
their	judgement.	
	
Chapter	 5	 explored	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 level	 of	 politicisation	 and	 interest	 in	 public	
matters	 depicted	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 and	 their	 translation	 into	 forms	 of	 participation	 in	
political	and	public	life.	
		
To	 contextualise	 social	media’s	 role	within	 this,	 the	 chapter	 started	with	 an	 assessment	 of	
interviewees’	political	participation	overall,	 including	their	 involvement	with	 formal	political	
organisations	 and	 structures	 offline.	 Findings	 highlighted	 that	 the	 highly	 politicised	
transitional	context	only	partially	translated	into	experimentation	by	some	interviewees	with	
participation	 in	party	politics	and	civil	society	associations,	and	very	occasional	 involvement	
in	 protest	 actions.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 interviewees	 did	 not	 participate	 in	 formal	 political	
structures.	This	was	due	to	a	number	of	obstacles	that	people	perceived	in	accessing	them,	as	
well	 as	 to	 their	 distrust	 of	 the	 political	 class,	 a	 perception	 that	was	 partly	 anchored	 in	 the	
country’s	recent	authoritarian	past	-	a	negative	view	that	continued	to	prevail.	
	
By	 contrast,	 the	 findings	 illustrated	 that	 the	 social	 media	 environment	 extended	
opportunities	 for	 connection	 and	 perceived	 proximity	 to	 the	 political	 sphere.	 Mainly,	 this	
took	the	form	of	relatively	disengaged	political	fandom,	whereby	social	media	users	followed	
(but	 rarely	 interacted	 with)	 political	 figures	 (rather	 than	 parties)	 whose	 views	 they	 could	
identify	with	and	whose	opinions	they	were	interested	in.	Beyond	this	role,	social	media	was	
found	 to	 be	 an	 important	 space	 for	 participation	 in	 political	 talk,	 opinion	 exchange,	
expression	 of	 civic	 and	 political	 identity,	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 communicative	 interactions	
between	citizens	in	relation	to	matters	of	public	concern.		
	
The	 study	 outlined	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 social	 media	 extended	 opportunities	 for	 civic	 and	
political	 communication	 between	 citizens,	 and	 how	 social	 networking	 platform	 Facebook	
became	 a	 highly	 politicised	 and	 vivid	 communicative	 space	 after	 the	 revolution.	 This	
suggested	that	something	close	to	an	online	public	sphere	was	developing.	However,	results	
also	 highlighted	 how	 the	 new	 communicative	 affordances	 of	 the	 platform	 favoured	 the	
expression	 of	 collective	 political	 positions	 and	 identifications,	 and	 were	 less	 supportive	 of	
more	in-depth	political	debate	or	considered	exchange.		
	
241	
	
Indeed,	the	extension	of	public	communication	to	a	broader	citizen	base	caused	some	issues	
due	 to	 the	 range	 in	 levels	 of	 political	 knowledge	 and	 familiarity	 with	 discussing	 political	
issues,	 leading	 at	 times	 to	 difficult	 social	 negotiations	 between	 users	 and	 contacts	 in	 their	
online	networks.	Equally,	unlike	political	exchange	in	an	offline	environment,	the	social	media	
context	led	to	more	frequent	and	less	manageable	exposure	to	unsolicited	politically-related	
content	and	opinions.	The	lack	of	moderation	and	rising	levels	of	aggression	and	abuse	led	to	
relatively	mixed	opinions	among	the	research	respondents	about	social	media	as	a	space	for	
mediated	 participation	 and	 political	 exchange	 (contrary	 to	 their	 views	 about	 its	 role	 as	
informational	space,	which	were	more	positive	overall).	
	
Finally,	 the	 empirical	 findings	 of	 this	 chapter	 highlighted	 how	 the	 publicly-oriented	 use	 of	
Facebook	 in	 this	 specific	 context	 supported	 new	 forms	 of	 collective	 expression,	 and	 partly	
reinforced	divisions.	The	architecture	of	the	platform	shaped	the	ways	in	which	consent	and	
dissent	on	political	issues	were	communicated.	Often,	political	expression	consisted	of	the	act	
of	making	visible	to	others	(for	example	by	‘sharing’	content	or	‘liking’	it)	support	for	political	
positions	 and	 causes	 that	 users	 identified	 with,	 leading	 to	 the	 exchange	 of	 (opposing)	
clickable	stances	but	limited	opportunities	for	more	detailed	dialogue	of	the	issues	at	play	or	
more	in-depth	communication	of	supporting	and	contrasting	arguments.	Equally,	the	results	
pointed	 to	 some	 instances	 where	 the	 intended	 use	 of	 the	 platform’s	 architecture,	 for	
example	 to	 write	 individual	 comments,	 was	 appropriated	 by	 users	 for	 a	 quasi-ritualised	
repetition	of	comments	that	set	specific	content	apart	and	served	to	express	collective	voice	
and	group	solidarity	quite	powerfully,	 leaving	 limited	scope	for	others	to	dissent	or	express	
individual	difference.		
	
Overall,	 respondents	sought	to	participate	 in	this	vibrant	space	of	public	communication	on	
social	media.	 The	 findings	 highlighted	 that	 this	 form	 of	 participation	mattered	 to	 them	 as	
many	perceived	that	their	voice	had	an	impact	and	could	influence	the	opinions	of	others	in	
their	 networks	within	 a	 transitional	 context	 in	which	many	 social	 and	 political	 issues	were	
open	 to	 renegotiation.	 However,	 the	 experience	 of	 this	 ‘publicised’	 communicative	
participation	was	 ambivalent,	 at	 times	 increasing	 socio-political	 polarisation	 and	 leading	 to	
new	 divisions.	 The	 research	 suggests	 that,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2012,	 a	 number	 of	 respondents	
started	 to	 develop	 strategies	 to	manage	 the	 visibility	 of	 their	 opinion	 expression	 and	 their	
public	 identities	 on	 social	 media,	 with	 some	 expressing	 a	 preference	 for	 offline	 and	more	
private	contexts	where	contextualising	information	facilitated	the	adaptation	of	political	talk,	
and	disagreement,	to	everyday	socialisation.	
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Chapter	6	explored	the	evolution	of	the	transitional	context	during	the	subsequent	year,	and	
revisited	 previous	 questions	 through	 an	 assessment	 of	 online	 data	 and	 a	 second	 set	 of	
interviews	with	the	same	study	participants	at	the	end	of	2013.			
	
The	 chapter	 started	 by	 highlighting	 the	 deterioration	 of	 the	 economic,	 social	 and	 political	
situation	 in	 the	 country	 in	 2013.	 Whilst	 economic	 recovery	 stalled	 and	 employment	
opportunities	 demanded	 by	 protestors	 during	 the	 revolution	 failed	 to	 materialise,	 the	
polarisation	 of	 the	 socio-political	 context	 continued	 to	 escalate.	 The	 year	 was	 particularly	
marked	 by	 the	 escalation	 in	 ideologically-motivated	 violence	 that	 included	 two	 political	
assassinations	and	several	attacks	by	jihadi	extremists	against	security	and	military	personnel.	
By	the	end	of	the	summer,	the	country	witnessed	its	deepest	political	crisis	and	largest-scale	
protests	 since	 the	 2011	 revolution.	 The	 media	 landscape	 equally	 witnessed	 delays	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 more	 profound	 structural	 reforms	 to	 empower	 a	 more	 financially	
sustainable	and	politically	independent	media	industry	and	journalistic	profession.	The	media	
context	continued	to	be	marked	by	the	persistence	of	relatively	close	links	with	the	political	
sphere,	which	partly	contributed	to	the	socio-political	polarisation	in	the	country.	
	
Against	 this	 backdrop,	 the	 research	 established	 that	 interviewees’	 media	 habits	 had	
undergone	 relatively	 stark	 changes	 since	 2012	when	 interviews	 were	 first	 conducted.	 This	
was	 partly	 tied	 to	 a	 change	 in	 the	 study	 participants’	 relationship	 with	 news.	 Whilst	
perspectives	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 being	 informed	 remained	 relatively	 unchanged,	
respondents	 had	 more	 ambivalent	 feelings	 about	 the	 experience	 of	 following	 news	 and	
political	 programming.	 The	 negative	 developments	 the	 country	 had	 witnessed	 in	 2013,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 excessive	 politicisation	 of	 journalistic	 reporting	 and	 the	 level	 of	 antagonism	on	
televised	political	debates,	meant	 that	maintaining	a	 level	of	knowledge	and	understanding	
of	public	and	political	issues	was	a	stressful	and,	at	times,	distressing,	experience.	As	a	result,	
respondents	 increasingly	 sought	more	 variety,	 and	more	 entertainment-led	 content,	 in	 the	
type	of	programming	they	were	exposed	to	in	their	everyday	lives.	In	this	assessment,	it	was	
also	noted	that	media	consumption	was	more	polarised	along	political	and	ideological	 lines,	
as	 a	 number	 of	 government	 supporters	 and	 opponents	 in	 the	 research	 sample	 chose	 to	
boycott	specific	mass	media	outlets	based	on	their	political	stance.	
	
Whilst	 mass	 media	 enabled	 this	 desired	 adjustment	 in	 media	 practices	 towards	 less	
politicised	content,	as	well	as	towards	political	and	news	programming	that	was	in	line	with	
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individual	 opinion	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 polarised	 context,	 interviewees’	 accounts	 highlighted	
that	 managing	 this	 exposure	 on	 social	 media	 was	 more	 problematic.	 Consequently,	 the	
proportion	 of	 time	 that	 they	 dedicated	 to	 social	 media,	 in	 comparison	 to	 mass	 media,	
decreased	by	a	third	overall,	compared	to	the	previous	year.	Social	media	continued	to	be	an	
important	source	of	information	for	the	majority	of	respondents.	However,	it	was	less	central	
to	 their	 news	 habits.	 Exposure	 to	 unsolicited	 information,	 antagonising	 opinions,	 and	
distressing	 imagery	 encountered	 on	 social	 media	 made	 the	 experience	 more	 stressful	 to	
manage	than	targeted	news	access	on	other	online	websites	and	professional	programming	
on	mass	media.	Equally,	paralleling	trends	observed	with	mass	media,	exposure	to	opposing	
viewpoints	 was	 more	 limited	 as	 respondents	 became	 more	 selective	 in	 their	 choices	 of	
sources	 they	 followed	 and	 contacts	 they	 stayed	 connected	 to	 through	 their	 social	 media	
accounts.	
	
Furthermore,	the	2013	research	findings	highlighted	that	levels	of	political	participation	had	
significantly	decreased	as	many	of	 the	 respondents	who	had	previously	experimented	with	
involvement	 in	 party	 politics	 and	 civil	 society	 associations	 had	discontinued	 their	 activities,	
either	due	to	time	restrictions	or	out	of	disillusionment.	Opinions	about	the	political	sphere	
overall,	as	well	as	the	democratic	process	and	political	pluralism,	had	become	more	negative	
and,	 at	 times,	 cynical.	 Similarly,	 participation	 in	 civic	 communication	 and	 politically-related	
exchange	on	 social	media	had	decreased.	 The	 study	 findings	 indicated	 two	key	 reasons	 for	
this	 change.	 The	 sense	 of	 civic	 and	 political	 inefficacy	 was	 one	 important	 factor	 as	
respondents	no	longer	associated	their	communicative	involvement	online	with	any	positive	
outcome	or	 influence.	Secondly,	communicating	politically	on	social	media	had	undermined	
participants’	 ability	 to	 socialise	 and	 had	 led	 to	 numerous	 arguments	 with	 friends	 and	
relatives.	The	social	media	environment	reinforced	differences	and	divisions,	 leading	to	 less	
participation	in	this	type	of	communication	online	and	a	more	pronounced	migration,	than	in	
2012,	of	political	talk	and	exchange	to	a	more	manageable	and	private	offline	environment.	
	
	
Emerging	themes	and	implications	
	
A	 number	 of	 important	 points	 arise	 from	 these	 findings,	 which	 contribute	 to	 how	 social	
media	and	their	adoption	in	different	contexts	can	be	understood,	and	which	are	worthy	of	
further	 research	 and	 exploration.	 Although	 this	 study	 focused	 on	 a	 very	 specific	 social,	
political	 and	 civic	 context,	 and	 the	 findings	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	 statistically	
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representative	 of	 a	 wider	 local	 population,	 they	 provide	 important	 insights	 and,	 at	 times,	
counter-arguments	to	overly	linear	discourses	on	social	media	and	change.	For	instance,	the	
research	 has	 provided	 evidence	 of	 the	 continued	 relevance	 of	 traditional	 mass	 media	 to	
public	opinion	and	discourse	(Redden,	2011;	Coleman	et	al.,	2008),	even	within	a	context	in	
which	 social	 media	 occupied	 a	 particularly	 central	 role.	 It	 has	 further	 highlighted	 the	
significance	of	exploring	in	detail	individual	social	settings	in	relation	to	media	practices,	and	
to	 incorporate	 a	 more	 culturalist	 perspective	 on	 politics	 (Buckingham,	 1999)	 in	 different	
contexts.	 This	 is	 particularly	 crucial	 in	 non-Western	 settings	 where	 assumptions	 about	 the	
impact	 of	 new	 communicative	 technologies	 and	 their	 adoption	 can	 easily	 be	 misguided.	
Equally,	 it	has	pointed	 to	 the	benefits	of	not	 just	 taking	 internet	 time	seriously,	but	also	of	
taking	 the	 time	 to	 explore	 fleeting	 communicative	 processes	 in	 their	 complexity.	 The	
following	 discussion	 develops	 in	 more	 detail	 important	 questions	 and	 implications	 that	
emerge	from	this	dissertation.	
	
This	research	has	pointed	out	several	ways	 in	which	social	media	can	be	supportive	of	new	
forms	of	civic	and	political	communication,	as	well	as	facilitate	and	extend	opportunities	for	
engagement	 and	 participation	 for	 ordinary	 social	 media	 users	 in	 everyday	 life.	 It	 has,	 for	
instance,	pointed	to	the	particularly	powerful	(and	disruptive)	role	of	social	networking	sites	
such	as	Facebook	in	facilitating	information	(and	misinformation)	access	and	distribution,	and	
supporting	opinion	 formation.	 Equally	 social	media	have	 facilitated	new	 forms	of	 collective	
participation,	 in	 particular	 through	 individual	 and	 collective	 socio-political	 identity	 and	
solidarity	expressions	 that	 are	 symbolically	powerful.	 Social	media	perhaps	blur,	or	 at	 least	
make	 less	distinct	than	 is	the	case	with	mass	media,	the	media’s	role	 in	supporting	a	socio-
temporal	 and	 a	 socio-political	 connection	 between	 citizens	 (Mihelj	 and	Huxtable,	 2016)	 by	
providing	 a	 seemingly	 unmediated	 access	 to	 an	 unfolding	 socio-political	 reality	 that	
users/citizens	 can	directly	participate	 in	 shaping.	While	 social	media	platforms	appeared	 to	
contribute	 to	 a	 sense	 of	 civic	 connection	 in	 this	 context,	 they	 also	 partly	 extended	
opportunities	 for	 direct	 communication	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	 formal	 political	 and	
institutional	 sphere,	 albeit	 that	 these	 connections	 were	 marked	 by	 a	 relative	 lack	 of	
interaction.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	the	findings	also	highlighted	that	communication	between	citizens	within	
this	specific	social	media	sphere	were	not	supportive	of	deeper	discussion	or	deliberation	on	
issues	 of	 common	 concern.	 The	 architecture	 of	 the	 platform	 shaped	 communicative	 paths	
and	opportunities	for	public	expression	and	the	enactment	of	different	subject	positions	(Isin,	
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2008)	in	very	specific	ways	that	were	not	supportive	of	deeper	engagement	with	the	issues	at	
stake.	The	extension	of	these	communicative	opportunities	to	citizens	with	varying	levels	of	
political	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 was	 also	 problematic.	 Perhaps	 what	 emerges	 most	
strikingly	 from	 the	 research	 is	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 type	 of	 communicative	
involvement	the	citizens	 in	this	sample	were	engaging	with	and	the	political	realities	on	the	
ground.	 As	 the	 findings	 highlight	 (Chapter	 6),	 users’	 participation	 in	 public	 and	 political	
communication	on	social	media	was	undermined,	over	time,	by	the	 lack	of	 improvement	 in	
the	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 situation	 in	 the	 country.	 There	was	 a	marked	 difference	
between	their	politicised	usage	of	social	media	in	2012,	which	was	motivated	by	the	hope	of	
influencing	 their	wider	public	world,	 and	 the	more	disengaged	 social	media	usage	of	2013,	
which	was	partly	tied	to	a	lack	of	belief	 in	the	possibility	of	change.	The	research	illustrated	
that	this	realisation	was	anchored	in	a	distancing	from	the	political	sphere,	whose	legitimacy	
and	representativeness,	in	the	view	of	numerous	participants	in	this	study,	was	undermined	
by	repeated	crises	and	lack	of	effectiveness.	Furthermore,	it	could	be	argued	that,	paralleling	
this	process,	users	distanced	themselves,	to	some	extent,	 from	the	conception	of	the	social	
media	sphere	as	reflective	of	a	wider	public	world	they	have	in	common	with	other	Tunisian	
citizens109	 -	 a	 notion	 they	 had	 contributed	 in	 constructing	 in	 the	 first	 two	 years	 after	 the	
revolution,	but	were	relatively	less	willing	to	engage	with	in	2013.		
	
Nevertheless,	 looking	 specifically	 at	 the	 dynamics	 inherent	 to	 public	 communication	 on	
Facebook	in	this	setting,	the	findings	highlighted	that	communicative	involvement	in	political	
expression,	 and	 information	 and	 opinion	 sharing	 was	 considered	 by	 most	 of	 these	 users,	
during	 the	 initial	post-revolution	context,	 as	a	 civically	and	politically	participative	act,	 thus	
one	 that	needs	 to	be	 taken	 seriously	 regardless	of	 impact,	 representativeness	or	outcome.	
Much	of	this	participation	can	be	understood,	as	Theocharis	 (2015)	contends,	as	relating	to	
shifts	 in	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 public	 realm,	 as	 a	 form	 of	 action	 based	 on	 the	 display	 of	
personal	mobilisation	 and	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 given	 cause.	 It	 challenges,	 and	 at	 times	
undermines,	 the	 power	 of	media	 and	 political	 institutions	 in	 shaping	 a	 public	 agenda,	 and	
equally	 allows	 users	 to	 make	 their	 political	 positions	 visible	 to	 other	 citizens	 and	 political	
actors.	 The	 extension	 of	 mediated	 visibility	 to	 a	 broader	 citizen	 base	 at	 the	 same	 time	
empowers	 them	 and	 subjects	 them	 to	 new	 pressures	 to	 manage	 and	 account	 for	 their	
political	 image	and	identity,	paralleling	issues	that	Thompson	(2005)	identified	in	relation	to	
the	rise	 in	mediated	visibility	and	politics	 in	the	television	age.	As	the	 last	part	of	 the	study	
																																																						
109	 In	fact,	 Internet	and	Facebook	penetration	rates	in	Tunisia	(which	are	quite	similar	 in	the	country)	were	still	under	fifty	per	
cent	of	the	population	by	2015	(Internet	World	Stats,	2015).	
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highlighted,	these	pressures	have	led	to	the	development	of	more	cautious	and	strategic	use	
of	social	media	to	better	manage	social	interactions	and	personal	reputation.	They	have	also	
imposed	limits	on	political	talk	and	communication	in	social	media	settings,	as	well	as,	for	a	
number	of	users,	 led	to	a	more	disengaged	receptive	mode	of	social	media	use,	 in	place	of	
their	 previous	 involvement	 as	 a	 networked	public.	 The	distinction	 and	 juxtaposition,	 in	 the	
research	design,	between	different	types	of	activities	on	social	media,	in	particular	between	
content	 access	 and	 participation	 in	 its	 production	 or	 distribution,	 have	 brought	 these	
dynamics	 to	 the	 fore.	 The	 move	 away	 from	 overtly	 politicised	 communication	 to	 more	
entertainment-led	content	on	social	media	also	signals	user/citizens’	active	role	 in	choosing	
different	 positions	 in	 relation	 to	 media	 content.	 Perspectives	 that	 consider	 mass	 media’s	
entertainment	value	as	an	 important	cause	 for	 the	erosion	of	civic	values	 (Habermas,	1989	
[1962];	 Putnam,	 1995),	 whilst	 perfectly	 valid,	 perhaps	 unnecessarily	 overstress	 audience	
passivity	in	these	processes.	
	
Some	 academics	 have	 called	 for	 the	 increasing	 need	 to	 take	 into	 account	 forms	 of	 non-
participation	 in	 relation	 to	 new	media	 use	 (Casemajor	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 as	 these,	 it	 is	 argued,	
constitute	 politically	 significant	 action,	 particularly	 when	 they	 are	 actively	 intended	 and	
considered.	For	these	authors,	active	non-participation	online	includes,	for	example,	exodus	
from	 specific	 online	 platforms	 or	 their	 “principled	 non-adoption”	 (p.863).	 For	 a	 few	 of	 the	
participants	in	this	research,	such	movement	or	gradual	migration	away	from	Facebook	and	
Twitter	could	be	observed.	However,	its	underlying	motivation	was	not	related	to	a	principled	
rejection	of	a	specific	platform	per	se	but,	rather,	a	choice	to	exit	a	specific	context	of	public	
communication.	Nevertheless,	the	question	arises	of	whether	the	rejection	of	participation	in	
this	sphere	can	be	considered	as	active	non-participation,	because	it	 is	a	considered	choice,	
as	 some	of	 the	 findings	highlighted.	On	a	wider	 scale,	 the	decrease	 in	 expression	of	 public	
opinion	 and	 the	 more	 cautious	 approach	 towards	 opinion	 exchange	 over	 time	 on	 the	
platform	can	equally	be	challenging	in	terms	of	how	we	may	conceive	of	such	purposive	non-
involvement	and	silence.	This	is	reminiscent	of	Eliasoph’s	findings	(1997,	1998)	about	political	
culture	and	avoidance	of	public	political	talk	in	the	American	context	(discussed	in	Chapter	6).	
	
In	 linguistic	 theory,	 and	with	 reference	 to	a	 traditional	offline	 verbal	 communicative	 setup,	
the	 notion	 that	 silence	 can	 be	 equated	 with	 passiveness	 and	 absence	 of	 intent,	 has	 been	
gradually	challenged,	and	 it	has	been	argued	that	 the	concept	of	“eloquent	silence”	can	be	
considered	as	much	of	a	speech	act	as	forms	of	speech	(Saville-Troike,	1985;	Ephratt,	2008).	
However,	 in	 a	 social	 media	 environment,	 silence	 and	 non-participation	 in	 public	
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communication	need	to	be	made	visible	in	order	to	be	meaningful	and	for	their	intent	to	be	
communicated	 clearly	 and	 effectively.	Non-participation	online	 requires	mediation,	 but	 the	
architecture	of	commercial	social	media	platforms	such	as	Facebook,	which	were	predicated	
on	a	principle	of	“automated	connectivity”	(van	Dijck,	2015),	do	not	support	the	translation	of	
choices	such	as	 those	of	silence,	non-participation	or	non-connection.	 In	 the	case	of	one	of	
the	participants	highlighted,	whose	refusal	to	further	participate	in	public	communication	on	
social	media	 translated	 into	 her	 deactivation	 of	 her	 account,	 this	withdrawal	 act	was	 even	
misunderstood	 by	 other	 users	 in	 her	 network	 and	 necessitated	 justification.	 The	 variety	 of	
communicative	forms	that	such	platforms	enable,	in	relation	to	public	and	politically-related	
communication,	 call	 for	 a	deeper	 reflection	on	what	non-participation	as	 a	 form	of	dissent	
may	entail	and	imply.	In	the	context	explored,	for	instance,	when	users	gradually	become	less	
inclined	to	share	content	to	represent	their	opinions	to	others	in	their	network,	exposure	to	
diverging	 opinions	may	 become	more	 restricted,	 and	 the	 power	 to	 produce	 and	 distribute	
content	 and	 information	 across	 this	 communicative	 sphere	may	 become	more	 centralised	
and	hierarchical.	
	
The	 latter	point	 is	particularly	 important	 considering	 that	 content	 that	users	 in	 this	 sample	
shared	was	already	predominantly	non-user	 generated	and	distributed	 from	other	 sources,	
some	of	which	 appeared	 to	 be	part	 of	 orchestrated	media	 campaigns	 by	 different	 political	
factions.	 Furthermore,	 as	 noted	 in	 the	 thesis,	 some	 of	 the	 contextualising	 interviews	
conducted	suggested	 that	 the	sale	and	acquisition	of	Facebook	pages	 that	had	a	significant	
following,	and	the	creation	of	pages	and	payment	of	administrators	to	propagate	content	in	
support	of	the	agendas	of	different	political	groups	(but	with	no	apparent	link	to	them),	was	a	
common	practice	during	the	research	period.	A	detailed	exploration	of	these	issues	was	not	
undertaken	in	this	thesis	as	this	was	not	its	focus,	but	these	trends	starkly	serve	as	a	reminder	
to	take	seriously,	as	Fuchs	(2014a,	2014b)	contends,	the	assessment	of	the	political	economy	
of	emergent	social	networking	sites	and	of	content	production	and	distribution	within	such	
communicative	spaces	in	different	settings.	This	is	particularly	important	as	research	findings	
highlighted	the	relative	lack	of	attention	by	ordinary	users,	in	the	context	of	this	study,	to	the	
sources	 of	 content	 on	 social	 media,	 and	 their	 relative	 reliance	 on	 the	 distributor	 of	 such	
content,	within	their	network	of	contacts,	as	the	basis	for	their	judgement	of	the	credibility	of	
information	 they	 came	 across.	 Source	 transparency	 becomes	 particularly	 problematic	 with	
social	media	 (Sveningsson,	2015).	 Indeed,	as	Sunday	and	Nass	 (2001)	pointed	out,	 the	very	
notion	 of	 ‘source’,	 in	 the	 traditional	 journalistic	 sense,	 is	 challenged	 in	 the	 new	 media	
environment.	The	relative	lack	of	accountability	and	of	monitoring	of	social	media	companies	
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such	 as	 Facebook	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 content	 disseminated	 on	 their	 platform,	 and	 of	 its	
producers,	only	makes	these	questions	more	pressing.	
	
Two	 other	 important	 implications	 emerge	 from	 this	 research.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 relatively	
consistent	 evidence	 in	 this	 study	 indicated	 that	 the	 use	 of	 social	 media	 supported	 the	
reinforcement	of	opinions	and	socio-political	polarisation	in	this	context.	For	instance,	whilst	
participants’	 media	 practices	 evolved	 within	 relatively	 separate	 and	 contrasting	 media	
spheres	 both	 online	 and	 offline,	 privileging	 content	 that	 supported	 their	 opinions	 and	
increasingly	 boycotting	 opposing	 perspectives,	 this	 trend	 was	 more	 pronounced	 on	 social	
media	where	users	were	more	exposed	 to	unsolicited	 content,	 and	 tools	 to	 customise	 and	
adjust	 this	 exposure	were	 available,	 and	 increasingly	 tapped	 into	 as	 a	 result.	 Furthermore,	
findings	highlighted	how	the	polarised	context	in	the	country	was	not	only	reflected	on	social	
media,	but	also	reinforced	as	differences	in	perspectives	were	intentionally	or	unintentionally	
publicised	 to	 a	 wider	 public	 and	made	more	 visible,	 translating	 into	more	 confrontational	
exchanges	than	an	offline	and	face-to-face	context	may	have	triggered.	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 temporal	 dimension	 of	 the	 research	 brought	 to	 light	 that	 any	
conclusions	reached	in	relation	to	social	media’s	role	in	a	given	context	always	needs	to	take	
into	account	the	fact	that	such	trends	are	non-linear	because	media	practices	are	adaptive.	
The	 findings	 outlined	 how	 drastically	 respondents’	 traditional	 and	 new	 media	 practices	
changed	within	 the	 short	 span	 of	 one	 year,	 evolving	 from	 a	 highly	 politicised	 social	media	
usage,	and	vivid	engagement	with	public	matters,	to	a	more	disengaged	media	consumption,	
and	 a	 relative	 avoidance	 of,	 or	 more	 strategic	 approach	 to,	 political	 expression	 on	 social	
media	–	strategies	that	parallel	findings	in	other	contexts	(e.g.	Mor	et	al.,	2015).	
	
These	 are	 not	 only	 context-specific	 changes,	 but	 they	 are	 also	 related	 to	 users’	 learning	
processes	about	the	advantages,	shortcomings	and	implications	of	their	social	media	use	and	
habits,	to	which	they	are	reactive	and	adaptive.	Thus,	where	social	media	use	was	perceived	
as	 reinforcing	 of	 divisions,	 a	 less	 confrontational	 communicative	 space	was	 privileged.	 The	
trends	 observed	 in	 this	 study	 should	 thus	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 permanent	 nor	 as	 linear.	
Rather,	they	elucidate	the	complex	dynamics	and	processes	that	ordinary	users	negotiate	in	
their	everyday	experiences	on	social	media,	which	may	translate	into	increased	participation	
in	public	and	political	communication	at	other	times,	but	will	be,	for	some	users,	increasingly	
skilful	 and	 informed	 by	 previous	 experience	 (Hargittai	 and	 Litt,	 2012;	 Marwick	 and	 boyd,	
2012).	
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APPENDIX	(A):	KEY	POLITICAL	TURNING	POINTS	
	
	
Mar.	1956	 	 	 Tunisian	independence			 	
	
1957	-	1987	 	 	 1st	president	of	the	Tunisian	republic:	Habib	Bourguiba	
	
1987	-	2011	 	 		 2nd	president	of	the	Tunisian	republic:	Zine	El	Abidine	Ben	Ali	
	
Dec.	2010	-	Jan.	2011	 	 Revolution	period,	ends	in	departure	of	Ben	Ali	into	exile	
	
Jan.	-	Feb.	2011	 ‘National	 union	 government’	 led	 by	 Mohamed	 Ghannouchi	
(former	PM	under	Ben	Ali)	
	
Feb.	2011	 ‘El	Kasbah’	sit-ins	lead	to	resignation	of	M.	Ghannouchi	
	
Mar.	-	Oct.	2011	 New	transitional	government	led	by	Beji	Caid	Essebsi	(former	
minister	under	Bourguiba)	
	
23	Oct.	2011	 1st	democratic	elections	after	the	revolution	
Election	of	ANC	deputies	with	1-year	mandate		
	 	 	 	
Dec.	2011	-	Feb.	2013	 1st	‘Troika’	government	(Ennahdha,	CPR,	Ettakatol)	
Prime	Minister:	Mohammed	Jebali	(Ennahdha)	
President:	Mohamed	Moncef	Marzouki	(CPR)		
	
Feb.	2013	 Assassination	of	politician	Chokri	Belaid	(opposition)	
Prime	minister	Jebali	resigns	
	
Feb.	2013	-	Aug.	2013	 	 2nd	‘Troika	government		
Prime	Minister:	Ali	Larayedth	(Ennahdha)	
	
Jul.	2013	 Assassination	of	politician	Mohamed	Brahmi	(opposition)	
Eight	soldiers	killed	in	an	ambush	in	Mount	Chaambi		
	 ‘Rahil’	sit	in	and	mass	protests	in	front	of	the	ANC	
	
Aug.	2013	 ANC	activities	suspended	
Talks	towards	formation	of	‘national	dialogue’	initiative	start	
	
Oct.	-	Nov.	2013	 Escalation	in	violent	attacks	by	jihadi	groups	
	
Dec.	2013	 New	‘technocratic’	government	chosen	(PM:	Mehdi	Jomaa),	
with	aim	to	lead	transition	to	new	elections	
	
Jan.	2014	 	 	 New	Tunisian	constitution	adopted	
	
Oct.	2014	 	 	 2nd	democratic	elections	after	the	revolution.	 	
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APPENDIX	(B):	STUDY	PARTICIPANTS	
Participant	
reference	
Pseudonym	 Gender	 Age	 Political	orientation	
P1	 Sonia	 F	 36	 None	of	existing	parties	
P2	 Sarra	 F	 29	 Other	opposition	party	
P3	 Rim	 F	 25	 Party	in	government	
P4	 Hanen	 F	 21	 None	of	existing	parties	
P5	 Sihem	 F	 22	 Jebha	Cha’bia	(left)	
P6	 Slim	 M	 45	 None	of	existing	parties	
P7	 Habib	 M	 55	 Nidaa	Tounes	
P8	 Imen	 F	 26	 Party	in	government	
P9	 Marwa	 F	 34	 Other	opposition	party	
P10	 Yassine	 M	 23	 Party	in	government	
P11	 Anouar	 M	 21	 None	of	existing	parties	
P12	 Neila	 F	 20	 None	of	existing	parties	
P13	 Farah	 F	 52	 None	of	existing	parties	
P14	 Khouloud	 F	 31	 None	of	existing	parties	
P15	 Ahmed	 M	 27	 None	of	existing	parties	
P16	 Anis	 M	 28	 Party	in	government	
P17	 Mounir	 M	 49	 None	of	existing	parties	
P18	 Salma	 F	 19	 None	of	existing	parties	
P19	 Meriem	 F	 24	 Nidaa	Tounes	
P20	 Narjes	 F	 33	 None	of	existing	parties	
P21	 Zied	 M	 30	 None	of	existing	parties	
P22	 Youssef	 M	 29	 None	of	existing	parties	
P23	 Rafik	 M	 25	 None	of	existing	parties	
P24	 Lobna	 F	 21	 Jebha	Cha’bia	(left)	
P25	 Raouf	 M	 43	 Party	in	government	
P26	 Asma	 F	 46	 Party	in	government	
P27	 Kamal	 M	 23	 None	of	existing	parties	
P28	 Ghada	 F	 57	 Other	opposition	party	
P29	 Mehdi	 M	 37	 Party	in	government	
P30	 Nabil	 M	 27	 Nidaa	Tounes	
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APPENDIX	(C):	INTERVIEW	QUESTIONS	
	
	
INTRODUCTION	
	
Personal	introduction		
Present	the	overall	interview	scope,	aim,	length	and	structure		
Explain	confidentiality	and	anonymity	parameters	
Request	agreement	to	proceed	and	to	record	the	interview	
	
	
PART	1	
	
Background	/	general	
	
- Can	I	start	by	asking	you	to	briefly	introduce	yourself?	
o Occupation	
o Age	
o Background	(family/region/religion	–	if	suitable)	
o What	languages(s)	you	use	in	everyday	life	(e.g.	classical	Arabic,	Tunisian	
dialect,	French)?	
	
	 Media	use	/	general	
	
- Could	you	tell	me	about	the	media	you	tend	to	use?	
o What	do	you	have	access	to?	
o What	do	you	use	the	most?	
o How	often	or	for	how	long?		
o Has	this	changed	over	the	last	two	years?	
	
Account	of	the	revolution	period	
	
- Did	you	witness	the	events	around	the	January	revolution?	If	so,	could	you	
describe	to	me	what	happened	in	the	days	just	before	and	after	the	14th?	
o How	did	you	first	find	out	about	what	was	going	on?	
o At	what	point	did	you	realize	the	importance	of	events?		
o Did	you	participate	in	the	protests?		
	
- Can	you	tell	me	a	little	more	about	what	type	of	media	you	used	or	followed	
during	that	period?	
	
	 Political	engagement	
	
- You	mentioned	that	…	[depending	on	previous	answer]	during	the	revolution	
period.	How	would	you	describe	your	general	interest	in	politics	before,	during	
and	after	the	revolution?	
o Do/did	you	attend	political	party	meetings	or	protests?		
o Do/did	you	attend	any	other	forms	of	large	group	gatherings	(e.g.	local	
meetings,	mosques,	seminars)?		
o Do/did	you	tend	to	discuss	political	issues	with	family,	friends	or	work	
colleagues?	If	so,	usually	where/when?	
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o Do/did	you	follow	political	and	social	issues	in	the	media?		
	
	 Media	use	/	detailed	
	
- Can	you	tell	me	a	little	more	about	the	type	of	media	content	you	tend	to	follow	
most	regularly?		
o What	interests	you	the	most	in	them?	
o Do	you	think	this	is	quite	similar	to	-	or	different	from	–	what	other	
people	around	you	follow?	
o How	much	of	what	you	follow	in	the	media	do	you	think	is	related	to	the	
current	social	and	political	situation	in	the	country?		
o What	is	your	opinion	about	the	changes	in	Tunisian	media	since	the	
revolution?	
o What	about	the	Internet?		
o How	much	time	do	you	spend	online	on	an	average	weekday	and	on	a	
weekend?		
o What	do	you	typically	do	online?		
o Has	this	changed	over	time?		
o Do	you	follow	any	TV	channels,	newspapers	or	radios	through	their	online	
websites,	streaming	sites	or	their	Facebook	pages?	
o Would	you	say	this	is	quite	similar	to	or	different	from	how	other	people	
around	you	use	the	Internet?	
	
	
PART	2	
	
	 Facebook	use	/	general	
	
- Can	you	tell	more	about	how	you	use	Facebook?	
o How	long	have	you	been	using	it?	
o How	much	time	do	you	spend	on	it	on	average?	
o Do	you	use	your	own	name	and	show	your	photo	on	your	profile?		
o Do	you	use	one	profile	or	more	than	one?		
	
- Generally,	what	do	you	think	about	Facebook	and	how	it	is	used	in	Tunisia?	Has	
your	opinion	about	it	changed	over	time?	If	so,	in	what	way	and	why?	
	
	 Facebook	networks	
	
- What	about	other	people	around	you	like	friends,	family	or	colleagues	for	
example?	
o Do	they	use	it	as	well?		
o How	many	of	them	would	you	say	are	also	your	friends	on	Facebook?		
o Are	there	any	that	you’re	not	connected	to	on	FB?		
o Have	you	ever	removed	people	you	know	from	your	FB	friends?		
o Similarly,	are	there	any	you	only	know	online	but	never	met?	
o Do	you	use	the	privacy	setting	adjustments	available	on	FB?	
	
- Other	than	FB	‘friends’,	who	or	what	else	are	you	connected	to?	
o Are	there	pages	or	people	you	are	subscribed	to	or	follow?		
o Are	you	part	of	any	groups	on	Facebook,	such	as	political	parties,	
religious	groups	or	any	social	causes	for	example?		
278	
	
o If	so,	do	you	remember	how	you	found	out	about	them	on	FB?	
o Do	you	follow	any	groups	or	people	that	are	very	different	from	your	
normal	circle	of	friends	or	show	different	opinions	from	the	ones	you’re	
usually	exposed	to	in	your	everyday	life?	Why/why	not?	
	
	 Political	use	
	
- Can	you	talk	me	through	what	you	typically	do	when	you’re	on	Facebook?	
o Do	you	tend	to	go	on	individual	pages	or	check	your	news	feed?	
o Do	you	find	FB	useful	to	find	out	about	news	in	the	country?		
o Do	you	follow	any	social	and	political	issues	on	the	network	–	if	so,	how?	
o Do	you	tend	to	post	content	related	to	such	issues,	create	your	own,	
comment	on	others,	‘like’,	or	‘share’	content	from	others?	
o What	does	it	depend	on?	Can	you	give	me	an	example?	
o Has	this	changed	over	time?		
	
- Have	you	ever	used	FB	to	find	out	about,	create	or	join	a	protest	or	any	other	
form	of	social	or	political	activism	outside	of	the	Internet?	
	
- Have	you	looked	at	or	followed	any	public	political	figures	or	institutions?	
o If	so,	what	did	you	think	of	their	pages	or	posts?	
o Have	you	ever	interacted	with	them?	If	so,	can	you	tell	me	more	about	it?	
	
	 Visibility	
	
- Would	you	say	that	you	are	more	active	than	other	people	around	you	on	
Facebook,	or	less	so?		
o What	about	when	it	comes	to	political	and	social	issues?		
	
- If	you	have	shared	or	commented	on	content	to	do	with	politics,	do	you	usually	
get	a	reaction	to	your	activity?		
o If	so,	can	you	give	examples?	
o What	type	of	activity	do	you	think	gets	more	noticed	and	why?	
	
- Does	it	matter	to	you	that	people	you	know	see	what	you	do	or	say	about	social	
and	political	issues	on	FB?	
o If	so	in	what	way	and	why?		
o Have	you	ever	had	comments	about	your	Facebook	activity	from	people	
you	know	in	‘real	life’,	whether	positive	or	negative?	
o If	so,	what	happened	and	has	it	changed	the	way	you	use	FB?				
	
	 Trust	
	
- What	do	you	think	about	the	trustworthiness	of	the	social	and	political	issues	you	
find	out	about	in	the	media?	
o For	example	what	you	hear	on	the	radio	or	see	on	TV?		
o What	about	online	media	and	Facebook?		
o Does	it	matter	to	you,	and	why?		
	
- Do	you	think	it’s	easier	or	harder	to	believe	news	you	find	out	about	on	
Facebook?		
o What	about	when	it’s	news	shared	by	friends	of	yours	on	Facebook?		
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o Have	you	come	across	content	on	the	network	that	you	felt	was	
inaccurate	or	distorting	reality?		
o Have	you	ever	shared	or	reacted	to	content	that	turned	out	to	be	a	false	
rumor	afterwards?	
	
- How	do	you	assess	the	believability	of	what	you	come	across	on	the	network?	Do	
any	of	the	following	factors	make	a	difference?	
o Who	posts	the	content	
o How	many	have	shared	it	
o If	your	friends	on	FB	have	shared	it	
o If	it’s	an	image	or	text	or	video?	
o If	so,	can	you	explain	a	little	more	why	you	think	that	is?	
	
	
	
